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XVIII 

CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION IN THE 
COAL INDUSTRY OF AMERICA 



CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION 

IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

OF AMERICA 



BY 



ARTHUR E. SUFFERN, M.A. 

Sometime Lecturer in Economics, Columbia University 







BOSTON AND NEW YORK 

HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY 

(ftfce ifttoergi&e J&regg Cambritrse 

1915 






COPYRIGHT, 1915, BY HART, SCHAFFNER * MARX 
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 

Published February IQ15 



/P %** 


8 25 1915 


©CLA391873 


^01 




PREFACE 

This series of books owes its existence to the generosity of 
Messrs. Hart, Schaffner & Marx, of Chicago, who have 
shown a special interest in trying to draw the attention of 
American youth to the study of economic and commercial 
subjects. For this purpose they have delegated to the un- 
dersigned committee the task of selecting or approving of 
topics, making announcements, and awarding prizes annu- 
ally for those who wish to compete. 

For the year ending June 1, 1913, there were of- 
fered : — 

In Class A, which included any American without 
restriction, a first prize of 11000, and a second prize of 
$500. 

In Class B, which included any who were at the time 
undergraduates of an American college, a first prize of 
1300, and a second prize of 1200. 

Any essay submitted in Class B, if deemed of sufficient 
merit, could receive a prize in Class A. 

The present volume, submitted in Class A, was awarded 
the first prize in that class. 

J. Laurence Laughlin, Chairman, 

University of Chicago. 
J. B. Clark, 

Columbia University. 
Henry C. Adams, 

University of Michigan. 
Horace White, 

New York City. 
Edwin F. Gat, 

Harvard University. 



AUTHOR'S PREFACE 

The purpose of this study is to describe the methods of 
voluntary settlement of disputes in the coal industry. It 
is to be hoped that the spirit of cooperation developed 
among the operators and miners may spread into other 
industries. That such a spirit has come only after much 
strife and that it needs to develop more fully does not 
detract from the good results obtained or from its power 
to encourage employers and employees in other industries 
to emulate it. In order to put the relations between the 
contracting parties to wage agreements on an equitable 
basis the cultivation of a mutual understanding is neces- 
sary. 

Both the operators and the miners have shown a broad, 
liberal, and tolerant spirit by the way in which they have 
cooperated in furnishing the source material which has 
made this study possible. In this connection I am espe- 
cially indebted to Mr. H. N. Taylor and Mr. G. L. Scroggs, 
of the American Federation of Coal Operators, to Mr. 
"W". D. Ryan, former Commissioner of the Southwestern 
Coal Operators, and to many other representatives of Coal 
Operators' associations. On the side of the miners the 
unfailing courtesy and generosity of Mr. John Mitchell, 
and Miss Elizabeth C. Morris, his secretary, in providing 
source material and in placing the facilities of Mr. 
Mitchell's private library at my command, are gratefully 
recognized. My grateful acknowledgments are due to 
Mr. Thomas Ashton, of the Miners' Federation of Great 
Britain, for a wealth of source material placed at my dis- 
posal. I hope to make larger use of it than space in this 
volume permits. 



viii AUTHOR'S PREFACE 

An expression of gratitude can but vaguely convey my 
appreciation of the cooperation and helpful criticism of 
Professors Henry R. Seager, Edwin R. A. Seligman, and 
Robert E. Chaddock, of Columbia University. The short- 
comings of the work exist in spite of their helpfulness. 
Any attempt to formulate an expression of my appreciation 
of my wife's constant encouragement and cooperation can 
only prove inadequate. 

Arthur E. Suffern. 

Columbia University, 
April 17, 1914. 



CONTENTS 

INTRODUCTION 



CHAPTER I 

THE INTRODUCTION AND EXTENSION OF CONCILIA- 
TION IN THE BITUMINOUS FIELD 1 

1. Causes 1 

2. Conditions in the bituminous field from the Civil War to the 

joint movement in 1885 5 

A. Early organizations 5 

a. American Miners' Association 5 

b. Miners' and Laborers' Benevolent Association .... 7 

c. Miners' National Association, 1873 7 

(1) Effects of panic of 1873 8 

(2) Effects of individualism 9 

(3) Inauguration of arbitration 10 

(4) The organization at its height 12 

(5) Trial of Siney and Parks 13 

(6) Decline of the organization 16 

B. Events leading to the joint conference of 1885 16 

a. Arbitration in Ohio 16 

b. Arbitration in Western Pennsylvania . . —. — ._ . » . .17 

c. Interstate convention of 1880 19 

d. Ohio Miners' Amalgamated Association 20 

e. Arbitration under state laws providing for tribunals . —. — 2i~ 

(1) Arbitration in Western Pennsylvania . . ... 21 

(2) Hocking Valley strike, 1884 23 

f . Changes in the coal industry 24 

(1) Enlargement of the market 24 

(2) Working conditions 25 

3. The struggle for a joint agreement from 1885 to 1898 ... 29 

A. The National Federation of Miners and Mine Laborers . . 29 
a. Suggestion of the interstate joint conference .... 30 

B. Interstate joint conference of 1886 30 

C. Withdrawal of Illinois 31 

D. Withdrawal of Indiana 32 

E. The problem of the joint conference 33 

F. The formation of the United Mine Workers 33 

G. The absorption of the immigrant 37 



CONTENTS 

H. Efforts to revive the joint conference 38 

a. The "suspension" of 1894 39 

I. The strike of 1897 41 

a. Conditions of work and wages 41 

b. Effects of machinery 42 

c. Earnings of capital 42 

d. Condition of the union 43 

e. Negotiations for the Joint Conference of 1898 .... 44 
4. Extension of the joint movement 46 

A. The struggle in Illinois 47 

a. Virden and Pana — importation of negroes 47 

B. Iowa and Michigan seek admission to the joint confer- 

ence 49 

C. Organization of the Southwest Field 50 

a. The strike of 1899 50 

b. Conflict of federal and state injunctions 51 

c. The Reese case 52 

d. The miners' commissary 53 

e. The Southwestern Interstate Joint Conference .... 53 

f. The Southwest Field seeks admission to the joint confer- 

ence of the Central Field 54 

D. Attempt to organize Maryland 54 

E. The struggle in Alabama, Tennessee, and Kentucky . . . 56 

F. Organization of the Northwest 59 

G. The Colorado struggle 60 



CHAPTER II 

THE WEST VIRGINIA PROBLEM 63 

1. The importance of the problem 63 

2. The attempts at organization 66 

3. Why West Virginia has remained unorganized 71 

A. Rural workers and individualism 71 

B. Immigration 72 

C. Absentee ownership 74 

D. The system of armed guards 75 

E. Injunctions and conspiracy laws 76 

F. State statutes vs. the common law 77 

4. The broader aspects of the problem 79 

A. The territorial aspect 79 

B. Investigation by the Interstate Commerce Commission, 

1907 80 

C. Ownership of coal lands and stock 80 

a. Holdings of Norfolk and Western Railway 80 

b. Western Maryland Railroad Company holdings ... 81 

c. The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company .... 81 



CONTENTS xi 

d. The Pennsylvania Railroad Company 84 

e. The New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Com- 

pany 84 

f . Buffalo and Susquehanna Railroad Company .... 85 

g. Buffalo, Rochester, and Pittsburg Railway Company . 85 
h. Pittsburg, Shawmut, and Northern Railroad Company . 85 

i. The Erie Railroad Company 86 

j. Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company 86 

D. Traffic associations 86 

a. The Tidewater Bituminous Steam Coal Traffic Associa- 

tion 86 

b. Ownership of stock and interlocking directorates ... 87 

E. Direction of policy toward labor 91 

F. Westmoreland County strike, 1910-11 91 

a. Cause and spread of the strike 92 

b. Operators' tactics 92 

c. Refusal to arbitrate 

G. The strike of 1912 in West Virginia 94 



CHAPTER III 

THE UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA .... 108 

1. Purposes of the organization 109 

2. Units of organization 110 

A. International 110 

B. Districts 110 

C. Subdistricts Ill 

D. Local unions Ill 

a. Jurisdiction Ill 

b. Democratic features Ill 

c. Local and individual grievances 112 

d. Membership 113 

e. Finances 114 

3. Officers 116 

A. Qualifications 116 

B. Duties of officers 116 

C. Importance of organizers 118 

4. Nomination and election of officers 119 

A. Nominations 119 

B. Elections 120 

a. The recall 121 

5. The International Convention 122 

A. Powers 122 

B. Representation 122 

C. Election of delegates 123 

D. Special conventions 123 



I 
X ii CONTENTS 

6. Strikes ..." ™J 

A. The referendum v ~ 

B. When strikes are supported 124 

7. International finances 125 

CHAPTER IV 
THE COAL OPERATORS' ASSOCIATIONS 128 

■I OQ 

Introduction * * \ *. 1C , Q 

a. The forces which gave rise to the associations iz» 

1. The American Federation of Coal Operators 129 

2. Illinois Coal Operators' Association 134 

A. Objects ]lt 

B. Membership *™ 

a. Obligations of members x ^ 

b. Delinquents and withdrawals ^ 136 

c. Basis of representation and voting 136 

C. Officers and their duties 137 

a. The commission 1^7 

b. The executive board 138 

(1) Duties of the board I 38 

D. The defense fund 140 

CHAPTER V 
THE INTERSTATE JOINT CONFERENCE 142 

1. The foundations of the joint conference . . 142 

A. The "right" of organization and representation . . . .143 

B. The encouragement of good feeling 143 

C. Formulation of principles 144 

2. The conference at work 145 

A. Membership * 4 5 

B. Organization and rules . .146 

C. The order of business I 48 

D. Inviolable contracts 152 

3. The formation of scales I 53 

A. The scale of 1898 I 53 

B. The renewal of the scale of 1898 155 

C. Scale of 1900 and renewals 156 

a. Illinois grievances I 57 

D. Reduction in wages in 1904 16° 

E. Failure to agree in 1906 I 62 

F. Reestablishment in 1908 164 

G. Settlement by states in 1910 165 

H. The new method in 1912 166 

4. Results of collective bargaining 170 



CONTENTS xiii 



CHAPTER VI 

THE STATE CONFERENCE 179 

Introduction 179 

a. The task of the state conference 179 

b. Conditions of the industry in Illinois 180 

1. Organization 181 

2. The fundamentals settled 181 

3. Administrative machinery 184 

A. Business contracts 184 

B. The steps in conciliation 184 

C. The pit committee 186 

D. Method of investigating disputes 186 

a. The Danville Case 187 

b. The case of the Athens local union 189 

E. Coercion by fines 189 

F. The Monthly Bulletin of Decisions 190 

4. The system in the Southwest 191 

5. The system a growth 192 

6. The operators ask for a "closed shop" 193 

A. The operators' offer 194 

B. The need for the closed shop 194 

C. The legality of the closed shop 195 

7. The problem before the public 198 



CHAPTER VII 

CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION IN THE ANTHRA- 
CITE FIELD 201 

Introduction 201 

a. Causes deferring peaceful adjustment 201 

1. From the formation of Bates's Union in 1849 to the close of 

the Civil War 202 

2. Beginning of arbitration, 1869 to 1875 203 

A. Workingmen's Benevolent Association 203 

B. The Anthracite Board of Trade 204 

C. The sliding scale 205 

D. The Reading Railroad attempts to stop the struggle . . . 207 

E. Settlement by arbitration 209 

F. The break-up of the union . . . . 210 

a. The inadequacy of arbitration 210 

b. Concentration of ownership 211 

c. Formation of pools 212 

d. The "long strike" in 1875 212 

e. Period of the "Molly Maguires" 213 



xiv CONTENTS 

f . The contribution of the Workingmen's Benevolent Asso- 
ciation 214 

3. History of consolidation 214 

A. Legal background 215 

a. Constitutional provisions, 1874 215 

b. Acts of 1874 216 

c. Coal land acts of the eighties and their amendments . 217 

d. Effects of judicial interpretation 218 

e. Results of Interstate Commerce Commission Investiga- 

tion of 1907 218 

f. Acts to "quiet the title of real estate" 219 

B. Ownership of lands 220 

C. Attempt to control production by pools 221 

a. Early attempts 221 

b. Combination of operators and carriers 221 

c. The "Morgan Pool," 1886 222 

d. Effects on prices 223 

D. Lease of Jersey Central by the Reading Railroad, 1883 . 223 

E. The Jersey Central and Lehigh Valley leases, 1890- 

1893 224 

F. The Temple Iron Company deal, 1898 226 

G. The purchase of the Pennsylvania Coal Company, 1899 . 227 
H. Railroad consolidation 228 

a. The Erie purchases 228 

b. The Reading obtains the Jersey Central, 1901 .... 228 

4. Immigration 229 

A. Its importance 229 

B. Contract labor 230 

a. Legal background 230 

b. Judicial interpretation 231 

c. Agencies encouraging evasion 231 

C. Immigration from Southern Europe 232 

5. The labor troubles of 1887-88 234 

A. The causes 234 

B. Rise of the Knights of Labor and the Miners' and Laborers' 

Amalgamated Association 234 

a. Inauguration of the strike 235 

b. The Reading Company furnishes the Lehigh operators 

with coal 236 

c. Extension of the strike to the Schuylkill region . . . 236 

d. Findings of the Congressional Committee of 1888 . . 237 

e. The settlement of the strike 239 

f . Effects of immigration on the strike 239 

6. The strike of 1900 240 

A. The work of the United Mine Workers 240 

B. Disrupting factors 241 

C. Economic pressure 241 

D. Negotiations for settlement 242 






CONTENTS xv 

E. Settlement of the strike 243 

7. The strike of 1902 244 

A Preparation for another struggle 244 

B. Negotiations of 1902 245 

a. Operators' attitude toward a joint conference .... 245 

b. Meetings arranged by the Civic Federation 245 

c. The first offer to arbitrate 246 

d. Order for temporary suspension , . 247 

C. The special Bituminous Convention 248 

D. Misunderstanding and discontent 249 

E. Conference called by President Roosevelt 250 

F. The President appoints a commission 25 1 

G. The award of the commission 252 

8. Adjustments since 1902 255 

A. Formation of the Conciliation and Arbitration Board . . 255 
a. Rules of the board 256 

B. The cases before the board 256 

C. Attitude of both parties toward the board 257 

a. The operators' position 257 

b. The miners' position 258 

9. The negotiations of 1912 261 

A. Preliminary negotiations in 1906 and 1909 261 

B. The miners' demands 261 

C. The joint conference 262 

a. The operators' reply 262 

b. The miners' rebuttal 263 

c. The agreement 265 



CHAPTER Vin 

CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION IN THE BRITISH 
COAL INDUSTRY 269 

Introduction 269 

1. The rise of the miners' unions 270 

A. Early conditions 270 

B. Formation of the Miners' Association of Great Britain and 

Ireland, 1841 271 

C. The Miners' National Union, 1863 . . 272 

a. Regulatory measures 274 

D. Formation of the Miners' Federation of Great Britain, 1889 275 

2. Methods of industrial adjustment 277 

A. Arbitration 277 

B. The era of sliding scales 278 

C. The big strikes of the nineties 279 

a. The strike of 1893 280 

D. The Royal Commission on Labour 282 



xvi CONTENTS 

E. The Conciliation Act of 1896 283 

a. Results under the Act 283 

b. The Court of Arbitration 284 

c. The Industrial Council 284 

F. Modern conciliation boards in the coal industry .... 285 
3. The policy of legal enactment 288 

A. Labor representation 288 

a. The "Labour Representation Scheme" 289 

b. Membership in the "Labour Party" 291 

c. The Steele Case, 1907 292 

d. The Osborne Case, 1909 293 

e. Government payment of Parliamentary members, 1^11 . 294 

B. The eight-hour law, 1908 295 

a. Difficulty of obtaining the act 295 

b. Provisions of the act 297 

c. Amendments 299 

C. The Minimum Wage Act, 1912 299 

a. Growth of the minimum wage demand 299 

b. Abnormal "places" 300 

c. Preliminary negotiations 301 

d. The strike ballot 302 

e. Intervention by the government 303 

f . The provisions of the act 304 

g. Settlement under the act 306 

h. Effect of the minimum wage 308 

i. Possibilities of the industry bearing a minimum wage . 309 

CHAPTER IX 

OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE 313 

1. Relationship between a conciliatory system, prices of coal, and 

a regulatory policy 313 

A. Recommendations of investigating committees 315 

a. The committee of 1888 315 

b. The committee of 1893 316 

c. The Interstate Commerce Commission Investigation, 

1907 317 

B. The common law remedies 319 

C. The inadequacy of decisions based on laws in restraint of 

trade 320 

a. The recent anthracite decision 320 

b. The "commodities case" 323 

c. United States vs. Lehigh Valley Railroad Company . . 324 

D. The lack of public policy 325 

E. The work of the Interstate Commerce Commission . . . 327 

a. Coxe Brothers Case 327 

b. The Baird Case 329 



CONTENTS xvii 

c. The power to fix maximum rates 331 

d. The Commission handicapped by the courts .... 331 

F. The need for an accounting system 332 

G. The work of concentrated capital 334 

H. The operators ask for a commission 335 

I. Regulatory measures 337 

a. The eight-hour day 338 

b. A legal ton 338 

c. Regulation of immigration 339 

d. The minimum wage 339 

J. Possible rise and influence of a labor party 340 

2. Relationship between a conciliatory system, the supply of coal, 

and governmental action 343 

A. The Canadian Industrial Disputes Act 344 

(1) Application for a board 344 

(2) Composition of the board 344 

(3) Conciliation, investigation, and publicity 345 

(4) Powers of the board 345 

(5) Penalties for strikes and lockouts during investigation 346 

(6) Results from the act 347 

B. Conclusion 348 

APPENDIX, STATISTICAL TABLES 357 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 367 

INDEX 373 



INTRODUCTION 

In making a study of conciliation and arbitration in the 
coal industry of America we find another instance of the 
evolution from individual bargaining to a method of adjust- 
ing wages and settling differences by conferences between 
the employers and employees. That such an evolution has 
been brought about through response to changing condi- 
tions in transportation, markets, and industrial needs is 
only to be expected. 

But with the adaptation to changing needs a new spirit 
has been born. The employers and employees have both 
learned the advantage of cooperation and organization and 
at the same time have gained a new tolerance each for the 
other. They have transferred the settlement of the wage 
controversy from scenes of force and violence to the con- 
ference hall, where reason and intellect are working out 
something bigger than mere trade agreements. That prog- 
ress which comes as a result of the interplay of group 
forces, and after much testing, is likely to be better and 
freer from vexing conditions than the innovations which 
are brought about by attempting to work out a hard-and- 
fast rule of law. Where the employer and worker are 
willing to grant each other justice and the public fair 
treatment, we shall not need to increase the complexity of 
our administrative machinery. Here we have group organ- 
ization and interests supplanting individualism, and greater 
freedom in working out their common welfare than could 
occur under government regulation. Membership in a local 
group and striving together for group interests have given 
the parties a concept of the meaning of membership in a 
larger national group and greater appreciation of efforts 



xx INTRODUCTION 

looking to the public welfare. This is demonstrated by in- 
creasing deference to public opinion and a recognition of 
the necessity of fair treatment to all concerned. Both sides 
realize that their actions are of national importance as 
well as local, and that, if they are to wear the badge of 
desirable citizens, individual and group selfishness must 
be subordinated. 

If the conciliation movement in settling labor disputes 
had contributed nothing more than men of the kind it has 
brought forward on both sides, it would be worth all the 
effort expended in building it up. The operators in their 
position as captains of industry would have been men of 
prominence anyhow, but the movement has surely made 
them larger-minded and more public- spirited. In the bi- 
tuminous field men of large wealth, endowed with the 
qualities of leadership, find it necessary to adopt demo- 
cratic methods of control in order to meet the solidarity 
of an opposing organization governed by democratic prin- 
ciples. Even in the anthracite field we find entrenched 
monopoly and autocratic leadership obliged to yield to 
this same force when once it asserts itself. A considera- 
tion of what the conciliation movement has done for the 
miners conveys some conception of what democracy rather 
than autocracy in industry really means in our national 
life. It has not only brought forth sane and capable lead- 
ers, but it has unified one of the most heterogeneous popu- 
lations in any industry and, besides making them realize 
the necessity of having wise and efficient leaders, has 
shown them the power of democracy in the use of the 
vote. 

We shall first direct our attention to the introduction 
and extension of conciliation and arbitration in the bi- 
tuminous coal industry of America. The emphasis will be 
put upon the development of conciliation and arbitration 
as a system, with just enough of the historical to give a 
perspective of its evolution. In connection with the exten- 






INTRODUCTION xxi 

sion of the system we shall be concerned with the so-called 
"West Virginia Problem" which threatens to disrupt it. 

In order to understand the forces behind the system we 
must first direct our attention to the organization of both 
parties, employers and employees. We are then in a posi- 
tion to appreciate the significance of the interstate joint 
conference of the central field and the importance of its 
methods and accomplishments. After the general agree- 
ment of the interstate joint conference, which establishes 
regulations between fields, has been considered, our inter- 
est is drawn to the adjustments that are made in the most 
highly developed of state joint conferences. In this con- 
nection we become acquainted with the machinery by which 
adjustments are made under the agreements. This is a 
quite different function from the formulation of agree- 
ments. 

The conditions in the anthracite field then demand our 
attention. This field has had such a different history that 
it is impossible to relate it to the bituminous field. In fact 
there is no connection between them worthy of note before 
1900, and even from that time on the evolution of the 
systems is different. 

In the course of the survey thus made there are many 
indications that we are just approaching some of the prob- 
lems with which Great Britain has already dealt in her 
coal industry. So we turn to a study of developments 
there to see what significance they may have for us. 

In conclusion we find that the system of conciliation 
and arbitration involves us in new problems which have 
a vital relation to public welfare ; that the public as a third 
party must concern itself with functions which the other 
two parties cannot be expected to perform ; in short, that 
the public must be alive to the new industrial, social, and 
political problems which are arising from the evolution of 
the coal industry. 



CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION 

IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

OF AMERICA 

CHAPTER I 

THE INTRODUCTION AND EXTENSION OF CON- 
CILIATION IN THE BITUMINOUS FIELD 

1. CAUSES 

The rise of such an elaborate system of settling disputes 
and fixing wages as exists in the coal industry calls for an 
explanation of its causes. Among these perhaps overpro- 
duction is the chief cause. The producers of coal in Eng- 
land felt the ill effects of overproduction as early as the 
seventeenth century * and it was early felt in this country. 
The term " overproduction " has been used by miners, 
operators, and economists who have made a study of this 
industry to describe a set of concrete conditions which 
have made it possible for the industry to produce an 
annual tonnage of coal much beyond the ordinary con- 
sumption. We shall use the term in this sense, and concern 
ourselves with the concrete factors which have contributed 
to the evolution of a system of industrial adjustment. 

In periods of prosperity many mines were opened. 
During years of depression, instead of restricting produc- 
tion to meet the demand, the operators extended produc- 
tion to a point where the sale of the product brought a 
meager amount for capital and barely enabled labor to 
subsist. The underlying motive for such a procedure was 
the desire of the operators to make even small profits or 

1 Cohn, Economic Journal (the Journal of the British Economic Asso- 
ciation, now the Journal of the Royal Economic Society), vol. 5, pp. 550-62. 



2 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

to escape the necessity of closing their mines altogether 
with consequent deterioration in the properties. Their in- 
ability to withdraw their fixed capital from the coal indus- 
try and employ it in some other way gave a further impetus 
to such a policy. This state of affairs was further aggra- 
vated by the lack of any controlling factor in the indus- 
try which would offset the tendency to glut the market. 
That this capability of producing (with the available 
facilities in the industry) far beyond the demand exists 
may be easily shown wherever it is possible to get a fair 
estimate of daily production in the industry. A fair com- 
putation of daily production in the anthracite field in 
1899 was 300,000 tons. Had the men been employed 250 
days, which has very seldom been approached either in 
the anthracite or bituminous fields, the annual production 
would have been 75,000,000 tons. As a matter of fact, 
the production for that year was only 54,000,000 tons, 
and the miners were given work on only 180 days. 1 Evi- 
dently the demand for coal warranted production only to 
this extent. Similar conditions can be shown as far back 
in the coal industry as it is possible to get figures which 
approach reliability. 

Supplementary to overproduction are the seasonal de- 
mand for coal and the employment of a surplus of men, 
which come in as factors to breed discontent and neces- 
sitate a system of adjustment. 

With continued overproduction on a falling market 
capital insisted on what it regarded as legitimate returns 
on its investment. If any sacrifice was to be made, labor 
was the first to feel it in the form of reduced wages. This 
process generally goes on in industries which are exploit- 
ing natural resources and in manufacturing industries 
developed to the point where it is possible to produce be- 
yond the demands of the market. The miner soon came 

1 See Warne, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science, vol. 17, p. 20. 



CONCILIATION IN THE BITUMINOUS FIELD 3 

to feel that he should not be made to suffer from adverse 
economic pressure over which he had no control and he forth- 
with demanded regulatory measures to relieve his distress. 

The immobility of labor, due to the isolated environ- 
ment of the mining industry and the difficulty of moving 
to a new place, encouraged labor to remain in its old 
haunts during a period of depression. The situation 
brought a fall in wages and encouraged the rise of dis- 
putes. Thus conditions were favorable for a contest over 
a recognition of the rights of labor. The inadequacy of 
individual bargaining was soon seen, and a feeling of 
solidarity arose among the men who felt themselves 
oppressed by a common enemy. What may have been, 
under individual bargaining, a paternal relationship, in 
the contest for supremacy for selfish ends and control of 
industrial policy, became a covert or open hostility. The 
ways open to capital in the contest were to replace the 
laborers, starve them out, or compromise. The avenues 
open to the laborer were to hinder or thwart replacement 
and live as best he might until capital got ready to com- 
promise. 

With the consolidation of capital and the ownership of 
many mines it was possible to play off the men employed 
in one mine against the men in another. Mines were put 
on short time or closed entirely if the workers were dis- 
satisfied with their conditions, while the men in the pro- 
ducing mines were made to feel that they could maintain 
their favorable position only so long as they remained 
docile. Furthermore, it was the policy of the unionists to 
share their work during a period of depression with their 
fellows rather than to permit them to be discharged. 1 The 
ability of capital to encourage and direct the flow of im- 
migration and the increasing use of machinery were ad- 
ditional elements that tended further to aggravate the 
situation. 

1 Report of Ohio Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1883, p. 305. 



4 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

Adverse working conditions of various degrees of im- 
portance were fundamental in encouraging the growth of 
a feeling of common interests among the laborers and the 
recognition of the fact that those conditions could not be 
changed by one group of men or by one group of em- 
ployers. This common feeling had its birth among men 
bound only by a common language and forced itself for- 
ward in spite of the different national characteristics and 
customs of the English, Scotch, Irish, Welsh, and Ger- 
man 1 peoples. It would have come sooner among the 
workers of any one nationality had it not been for the 
counteracting influence of the influx of nationalities that 
did not have even a common language as a means of 
approach. Fortunately for the bituminous fields this in- 
flux did not come so rapidly as to overwhelm the union 
movement. In the anthracite region we find that, though 
the union was swamped by the influx from southern Eu- 
rope, the fundamental economic conditions and adverse 
working regulations pressed so hard that it took but 
a spark of human sympathy from the solidly organized 
union field to set off a conflagration that swept twenty 
nationalities within its compass. 

An element not to be forgotten is the development of 
education and opportunity for enlightenment that enabled 
competent leaders to come to the front and put the rank 
and file in a position to appreciate and support the policies 
necessary to bring results for all. 

With the growth of canals, river navigation, and rail- 
roads, what had been local markets with monopolistic 
conditions widened into a general market in which all 
were competitors. This situation brought larger problems 
which needed cooperation for solution. The conclusion 
was constantly forced upon both parties that there must 
be on a few fundamental matters such uniformity as 
would enable competition to exist on a higher level. 

1 The Germans are included when referring to English-speaking peoples. 



CONCILIATION IN THE BITUMINOUS FIELD 5 

Under these conditions it was necessary to evolve a 
method of industrial adjustment. It is hoped that the 
concrete details which follow will fully bear out this 
hypothesis. 

We shall endeavor to describe the rise and extension of 
a system of industrial adjustment which has met the needs 
of capital and labor employed in an industry where many 
complex problems arise. Varied working conditions, differ- 
ences in productivity of mines, and the uncertainty of 
investment and of profits for capital are all factors un- 
derlying constant demands for change and readjustment. 
Conciliation and arbitration have their opportunity when 
the parties recognize the necessity for peaceful settlement. 
The individual worker cannot obtain justice in bargaining 
with his employer under the complex conditions of mod- 
ern industry. When the employer recognizes this situation 
and the further fact that he cannot make his own position 
clear to his workers without a frank discussion of his prob- 
lems, another important stage has been reached. 

With the recognition of these fundamentals the parties 
seek to devise means that will enable them to come to an 
understanding, adjust inequalities, and extend the system. 
This must be done in order to govern, so far as possible, 
the economic forces which, under an unregulated regime, 
bring overproduction and depression. 



2. CONDITIONS IN THE BITUMINOUS FIELD FROM THE 
CIVIL WAR TO THE JOINT MOVEMENT IN 1885 

A. Early Organizations 

A. AMERICAN MINERS' ASSOCIATION 

In the forties and fifties the influx of British workmen 
imbued with Chartist ideas and the opening up of many 
coal fields to railroad traffic laid the foundations for a 
national movement among the miners of America. Pro- 



6 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

duction was estimated at 6,500,000 tons in 1861 and there 
were about 30,000 miners in the industry. 1 Daniel Weaver, 
an Englishman, and Thomas Lloyd, a Welshman, were 
the prime movers in the first attempt at national organ- 
ization. They were employed as miners in the Belleville 
Track, Illinois, and in January, 1861, issued an address 
to their fellow workers pointing out the necessity for 
improving the physical, mental, and social conditions 
within their ranks, calling for cooperation to reduce the 
animosity between the nationalities, and appealing for 
unity to force legislative action for the improvement of 
their condition. 2 

As a result of this address the convention held at St. 
Louis, Missouri, formed the "American Miners' Associa- 
tion" and elected Weaver president and Lloyd secretary. 
Local lodges formed the units of the organization, and 
they in turn were grouped into districts with a board of 
directors exercising general supervision over all. Besides 
the national officers the membership of the board was 
made up of one delegate from each lodge elected annually. 
These delegates met each year and elected national officers 
every two years. Each delegate was allowed a vote for 
every twenty members he represented. The organization 
spread rapidly in Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, and Maryland, 
and became active in obtaining legislative measures for 
mine inspection and general mining laws. In spite of its 
so-called national organization the time was not ripe for 
national action on policies governing the industry as a 
whole. During the Civil War the men easily profited by 
the rise in wages, but with local dissensions, popular dis- 
approval of labor organizations, the return of men from 
the war, and the loss of local strikes in 1867 a 4 nd 1868, 
the organization disintegrated. 

1 Warne, Bulletin of Bureau of Labor, no. 51, March, 1904. 

2 McBride, The Labor Movement, edited by McNeill, p. 245. y 






CONCILIATION IN THE BITUMINOUS FIELD 7 

B. miners' and laborers' benevolent association 

With the break-up of the American Miners' Association 
the active cohesion of the miners was maintained some- 
what by the formation of local organizations. The Work- 
ingmen's Benevolent Association had been formed in the 
anthracite region of Pennsylvania in 1867. 1 

With the grant of a state charter in 1870 the organiza- 
tion became known as the Miners' and Laborers' Benevo- 
lent Association, and its influence was soon felt in Illinois, 
Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and West Vir- 
ginia. In these States it took the form of independent or- 
ganizations which utilized the material left from the wreck 
of the American Miners' Association. " There was neither 
state nor national head to the organization," but "when 
occasion required the different districts acted in concert." 2 
Although the Illinois Miners' Benevolent and Protective^ 
Association was formed in 1871 as an independent organ- 
ization, its structure and purposes were so similar to the 
Miners' and Laborers' Benevolent Association that mem- 
bers' cards were given and accepted between them. 3 It had 
been possible thus far for local and state organizations to 
cope with their problems fairly well, but conditions were 
fast arising that would necessitate thorough national or- 
ganization. Prices were falling and the extension of the 
railroads resulted in opening new fields and in making 
the operators of the fields competitors in common markets. 

C. MINERS' NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, 1873 

John Siney had been president of the Miners' and La- 
borers' Benevolent Association in the anthracite region 
and had led the men successfully in a series of strikes and 

1 Further description of the organization will be found in chap, vn, 
p. 203. 

2 Roy, History of the Coal Miners, 1903, p. 71. 
8 McBride, op. cit., p. 249. 



8 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

in the establishment of a system of negotiations. A con- 
vention was called by the officers of several States to meet 
at Youngstown, Ohio, in October, 1873. The reputation 
that Siney had gained in Pennsylvania made him the nat- 
ural recipient of the presidency of the Miners' National 
Association organized at that time. The object of the asso- 
ciation was to consolidate the mine workers in order to 
equalize the " contest in which a handful of men have to 
contend with the power of aggregated wealth." * To ac- 
complish this, districts which had to strike to alleviate 
their conditions were to receive pecuniary and moral sup- 
port, and this device was to be supplemented by legal regu- 
lation of working conditions. The districts controlled their 
own affairs except that they could not engage in a strike 
until they had exhausted peaceable means for a settlement 
and obtained the consent of the national president and the 
executive board which was made up of a representative 
from each State. It had become evident to the miners that 
local strikes did not pay and that prices and general con- 
ditions could be established only by general suspensions. 

(1) Effects of panic of 1873 

Unfortunately the panic of 1873 occurred just as the 
organization was getting under way. That it should have 
survived this disastrous industrial paralysis and increased 
its membership is a mark of its vitality. The national 
office of the organization was located in Cleveland and 
the national officers immediately sought friendly relations 
with the coal companies which had headquarters in that 
city. 'The labor leaders received no encouragement from 
any but Mark Hanna. As soon as he was convinced that 
the leaders proposed to stand by arbitration decisions and 
use all their influence to establish peaceful relations, he 
stood ready to help. In spite of various handicaps the 
organization grew steadily until 1875. 

1 Roy, op. cit., p. 156. 



CONCILIATION IN THE BITUMINOUS FIELD 9 

(2) Effects of individualism 

The national officers and organizers of the union had a 
most difficult situation on their hands to keep the local 
unions from striking while the market was constantly fall- 
ing and entailing attendant reductions in wages. Too often 
the union element was in a minority in a mine, and when 
the non-union element struck, the unionists would go out 
with them and violate their contract and the constitution 
of their organization. The unionists who struck under 
such circumstances could not get strike benefits and were 
soon deserted by the non-unionists, who migrated to an- 
other place after they had stirred up the trouble. Siney 
found ex-union men in Maryland who were unwilling to 
organize, though their employers were willing that they 
should, 1 and many men in Maryland refused to enter the 
union because it stood for a " free turn." The " free turn " 
was demanded by the union to prohibit certain favored 
ones from getting a disproportionate number of cars, which 
enabled them to earn more than their fellows. The spirit 
of individualism was rampant in spite of the hard lessons 
that both capital and labor had learned. Though the oper- 
ators admitted 2 that it paid them to bring in unskilled 
non-unionists, pay them more, break the strike, and then 
make the regular workmen labor at the owners' terms, a feel- 
ing of solidarity among the laborers was to come only after 
much suffering. The locals refused to send their monthly 
dues and strike payments to the national treasurer, 3 and 
when the national officers interfered in the settlement of 
a local strike they were met by insult from the local. The 
situation had become so intolerable that the Executive 
Board was called, in the fall of 1875, to consider the non- 
compliance of the locals with the national constitution. 4 

1 Miners' National Record, vol. 1, no. 10, p. 172. 

2 Ibid., vol. 1, no. 9, p. 152. 

3 Ibid., vol. 2, no. 1, p. 13. 
* Ibid., voL 1, no. 7, p. 110. 



10 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

It had to treat with such cases as the following resolu- 
tion : — 

Resolution of Clay County Board of Ohio 

Whereas, Communications have been received by the General 
Secretary, from our operators, on our present difficulties, be it 
therefore 

Resolved, that we respectfully recommend to the National 
Executive that they take no further action upon our case unless 
advised by us, or have positive proof that we are neglecting our 
business or violating the general laws of the Association. Our 
men have implicit confidence in the ability and honesty of the 
National Officers, but they believe that we at home understand 
affairs better than they can in Cleveland — at least so far as 
propositions from the operators or outsiders are concerned. 
When we feel incompetent ourselves to meet any emergency, 
we will not hesitate to call on your assistance. 

Under such conditions the operators refused to treat 
with the national organization unless its officers could hold 
the men to their contracts. To remedy the situation Siney 
proposed to have the grievances of each local submitted 
through the national officers to the vote of the other locals. 
Only on condition of a majority vote would a strike be 
declared legal and the local receive strike benefits. This 
would relieve the national officers of the responsibility and 
keep down the number of strikes to a point where they 
could be supported effectively. 1 However, the change in 
the constitution finally adopted divided the responsibility 
for the strike between the national officers and the officers 
of the district affected. 2 

(3) Inauguration of arbitration 
The beginnings of arbitration were made in the middle 
of the seventies during the prominence of the Miners' 

1 This suggestion came from H. J. Walls, an officer of the Iron Mould- 
ers' Union. 

2 Miners' National Record, vol. 2, no. 1, p. 13. 



CONCILIATION IN THE BITUMINOUS FIELD 11 

National Association. In 1873, the miners of western Penn- 
sylvania had got a bill through the state legislature regu- 
lating payment by run-of-mine and entitling the miners 
to station a checkweighman at the scales with the company 
weigher to see that the men were given full weight for 
their coal. The purpose of the law was thwarted by the 
proviso that nothing in the act should prevent operators 
and miners from contracting for any method of measuring 
and screening that the parties could agree upon. 1 This 
proviso, with the lack of solidarity among the miners 
and the ability of the "railroad " operators and "river" 
operators to play off their respective workmen against 
each other, thwarted the honest attempts made by the 
leaders of the miners to come to an agreement by arbi- 
tration. However, the feeling of the necessity for arbitra- 
tion was penetrating the minds of men who had held 
tenaciously to the individualist concept of ownership and 
operation of their business. The first approach to success- 
ful negotiations and settlement was made in the Tuscara- 
was Valley of Ohio in 1874. 

The operators notified the miners of that region of a 
reduction of twenty cents on a ton. This heavy reduction 
led the miners to think that the operators wished to force 
a fight, but the national officers sent to the operators a 
constitution of the Miners' National Association and called 
attention to its provisions for arbitration. As a result a 
board was formed consisting of three representatives of 
the miners and an equal number of operators, among whom 
was Mark Hanna. Judge Andrews, of Cleveland, was 
selected as umpire and he decreed a nineteen-cent reduc- 
tion instead of twenty cents. 2 Although the miners felt 
that they could have secured better terms by a strike, 
they accepted the award and went to work. 

1 Report of Secretary of Internal Affairs of Pennsylvania, 1880-81, 
p. 302. 

2 Report on the Statistics of Labor, Massachusetts, 1881, p. 58; also Roy, 
op. cit., p. 168. 



12 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

The Crawford Coal Company of the same field did not 
belong to the Operators' Association, and its miners had 
not joined the union. The company locked out its men be- 
cause they demanded a checkweighman. After the award 
of the arbitration board the company offered their miners 
an advance of nine cents a ton above the awarded price 
if the miners would recede from their demand for a check- 
weighman. It would seem that it might have occurred to 
these men that if a checkweighman was worth nine cents 
a ton to the operators for the purpose of getting rid of 
him, he would be a still more valuable functionary for 
them. Evidently the miners could not see so far, for they_ 
accepted the offer of the company. Thus an occasion was 
made for breaking the award by the union miners, who 
demanded the same rates. 

The union miners appealed to the national officers and 
executive board to be absolved from the decision of the 
arbitration board, and the struggle was on again. 1 The 
miners' appeal was granted without giving the operators 
the hearing which they asked for, and the miners struck. 
After a short suspension the operators granted the nine- 
cent increase paid by the Crawford Company. This did 
not help to convince the miners of their ability to obtain 
either justice or the best terms from arbitration. In fact, 
the whole episode was rather a severe blow to the princi- 
ple of arbitration and contributed largely to the decline 
of the union. 

(4) The organization at its height 

The Miners' National Association had reached its largest 
development by November, 1875. At that time it had 347 
lodges with a total membership of 35,355. The extent and 
distribution of the union element at this time is worth 
noting. In Pennsylvania there were 20,840 members; 
in Illinois, 5122 ; in Ohio, 4734 ; in Indiana, 2135 ; in Mis- 
1 Roy, op. cit., p. 170. 



CONCILIATION IN THE BITUMINOUS FIELD 13 

souri, 547 ; in Wyoming, 544 ; in Maryland, 431 ; in Iowa, 
272 ; in Colorado, 242 ; in West Virginia, 178 ; in Tennes- 
see, 129 ; in Kansas, 123 ; in Indian Territory, 57. In 1875 
the union had total receipts of 126,699 and spent about 
$15,523 in aiding strikers. 1 We shall see that these men 
were the advance guard of one of the largest industrial 
unions in the world and were made up of the most hetero- 
geneous population. 

(5) Trial' of Siney and Parks 

The failure of arbitration proceedings in Ohio was 
closely followed by an event which did still more to break 
up the union. Xingo Parks, an organizer of the National 
Association, was sent into the Clearfield District of cen- 
tral Pennsylvania to organize the miners. His success in 
organizing the men was quickly followed by a strike. The 
operators rather than treat with the union imported strike- 
breakers, and the miners were successful in persuading a 
trainload of these men to leave by explaining the situa- 
tion to them and paying for their transportation. The 
operators used this occasion to bring action under the con- 
spiracy laws, and Siney (who had gone to the scene of 
the trouble), Parks, and several others were arrested and 
brought to trial. Roy, who knew Siney personally, says 
that the arrest of Siney " created a profound sensation, 
not only in the labor circles of the United States, but 
among the business and public men as well. He was the 
best known man in the ranks of organized labor in the 
country, and was universally liked and respected by all 
the labor organizations. His character was, however, not 
understood by the business men of the country, and he 
was hated and feared by the coal and railway companies. 
The newspapers in the interest of these constituencies had 
for years held him up before the country as a demagogue 
who did nothing but foment discord between the coal 
1 Miners' National Record, vol. 2, no. 1, p. 5. 



14 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

companies and their employees." It undoubtedly created 
a furore quite on the order of our recent case of the dy- 
namiters. The questions at issue were the right to picket 
peacefully and the maintenance of the miners' organization. 

United States Senator Wallace, of Pennsylvania, was 
engaged by the coal companies and the Pennsylvania Rail- 
road to assist the prosecuting attorney of Clearfield 
County. United States Senator Carpenter, of Wisconsin, 
was engaged by the miners, and Benjamin F. Butler, of 
Massachusetts, volunteered his services. 

In 1869 a law had been enacted authorizing mechanics, 
journeymen, etc., to form labor organizations, but to favor I 
some interest the proviso had been inserted that " the pro- / 
visions of this act shall not apply to the Counties of Clear- 
field and Centre." 1 And the act of 1872, relieving work- 
men and their associations from the laws of conspiracy 
for refusing to work for wages or under conditions that 
were unsatisfactory, had provided " that nothing herein 
contained shall prevent the prosecution or punishment, 
under existing laws, of any person or persons who shall, 
in any way, hinder persons who desire to labor for their 
employers from so doing." 2 The prosecuting attorneys 
were thus able to apply in Clearfield County the law of 
conspiracy under the common law and find a technical 
violation of the act of 1872 against picketing. The de- 
fense rested its case on the obsoleteness of the law of con- 
spiracy in England, the prevailing sentiment in the other 
States of our country which had passed statutes permit- 
ting organization, and the fact that capital combined to 
do the very things for which labor was indicted. The 
judge said that " any agreement, combination, or confed- 
eration to increase the price of any vendible commodity, 
whether labor, mechandise, or anything else, [was] indicta- 
ble." 3 Yet it was common knowledge that the coal com- 

1 Laws of Pennsylvania, 1869, p. 1260. 2 Ibid., 1872, p. 1175. 

8 Miners' National Record, vol. 1, no. 11, p. 1S8. 



CONCILIATION IN THE BITUMINOUS FIELD 15 

panies combined to limit output and fix prices. With this 
the miners had no quarrel, but insisted that they also 
should be allowed to organize to meet the situation. One 
of the operators testified that seven companies had com- 
bined to prosecute the men, and the miners pertinently 
pointed out that they " had struck and conspired to pre- 
vent other men from going to work at prices lower than 
the strikers were willing to accept for their labor. The 
operators refused the price demanded and combined to 
raise means to keep labor down and send the leaders to 
the penitentiary. Which is the more heinous offense?" 1 

Siney was acquitted. Parks was sentenced to one year 
in prison, one thousand five hundred dollars costs, and one 
dollar fine. The president and secretary of the local union 
were sentenced to one year because they were officers, and, 
although forty miles away at the time of the technical vio- 
lation of law, it was held not necessary for them to have 
been present to be guilty of a conspiracy. The other men 
were sentenced to sixty days. The jury refused to obey the 
mandate of the court and convict Siney, and afterwards 
signed a petition for the release of the other men. 2 

The event so stirred the people in general that the fol- 
lowing year, 1876, the law of 1872 was amended so that 
the proviso " should be so construed that the use of lawful 
or peaceful means, having for their object a lawful pur- 
pose, shall not be regarded as 'in any way hindering' 
persons who desire to labor ; and that the use of force, 
threat, or menace of harm to persons or property shall 
alone be regarded as in any way hindering persons who 
desire to labor." 3 However, the miners' leaders contin- 
ued to be punished under the law of conspiracy in the 
eighties. 4 

1 Miners'' National Record, vol. 1, no. 12, p. 198. 

2 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 153. 3 Laws of Pennsylvania, 1876, p. 45. 
4 Report of Secretary of Internal Affairs of Pennsylvania, 1880-81, p. 380, 

and 1882-83, p. 163. 



16 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

(6) Decline of the organization 

The national officers had from the beginning advocated 
a Fabian policy during a period of falling prices and 
glutted markets and advised the men to make the best 
terms possible with their employers. This condition ex- 
tended over so many years after the panic of 1873 that 
the miners lost all patience and in the autumn of 1875 and 
spring of 1876 engaged in a series of disastrous strikes 
which left the organization in a very weak state. In the 
summer of 1876 the national officers were forced to give 
up their headquarters, and settle debts of several hundred 
dollars out of their own pockets because of lack of funds. 
Thus the organization came to an end. 

B. Events leading to the Joint Conference of 

1885 

A. ARBITRATION IN OHIO 

Although the men neglected to support an organization 
of national compass, yet immediately after its break-up 
the industry entered upon a period of development and 
adjustment that was to lead to the joint agreement in 
1885. The Knights of Labor were becoming prominent 
and absorbed many of the local miners' organizations, but 
there was still enough solidarity of feeling to attempt the 
adjustment of local differences. We shall concern our- 
selves at this point with events and conditions which indi- 
cate that new machinery for industrial adjustment was 
necessary. 

In 1877, in another attempt made at arbitration in the 
Tuscarawas Valley of Ohio, the miners made the fruitful 
suggestion that in the award to be made there should be 
a standing committee of three miners and three operators 
to adjust all differences which might arise under the award. 1 

1 Beport on the Statistics of Labor, Massachusetts, 1881, p. 61. 



CONCILIATION IN THE BITUMINOUS FIELD 17 

This is in accordance with the development of true con- 
ciliation in industry, for there must be two distinct proc- 
esses — the making of a wage contract and the adminis- 
trative machinery for working out its details. The award 
was to be the minimum price for mining, and the miners 
suggested that the standing committee have access to the 
companies' books to ascertain the selling price of coal. 1 
But this was a step too advanced for the operators, who 
disagreed technically on the selection of the proper months 
which should determine the selling price of coal. 

B. ABBITBATION IN WESTEBN PENNSYLVANIA 

Interesting arbitration proceedings took place in west- 
ern Pennsylvania in the region of Pittsburg in 1879. The 
"river" miners on the Monongahela and Youghiogheny 
Eivers and the " railroad " miners on the Baltimore and 
Ohio and the Pennsylvania Railroads had been organized 
into the Miners' Association of Western Pennsylvania in 
18T9. With the beginning of prosperity in 1879 the min- 
ers were quick to seek improvement in wages. At their 
convention in July they decided to try arbitration and 
appointed a committee to confer with the River Coal Ex- 
change. As an organization the Exchange refused to enter 
an arbitration arrangement, but a few of its members along 
with a number of " railroad " operators were induced by 
Mr. Joseph D. Weeks, a disinterested authority on arbi- 
tration, to form a board and a set of rules. 2 

Mr. Weeks had made a study of conciliation and arbi- 
tration boards in England, and the rules drawn up followed 
English models. Fundamentally the board was to adjust 
wage questions, settle disputes that arose over working con- 
ditions, and by conciliatory means prevent disputes. It con- 
sisted of nine members from each side, who were to appoint 
a referee in case of a tie vote. A smaller conference 

1 Report on Statistics of Labor, Massachusetts, 1881, p. 61. 

2 Report of Secretary of Internal Affairs of Pennsylvania, 1878-79, p. 144. 



18 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

committee of four was to give a preliminary hearing on 
matters to come before the board. In the general board 
only an equal number from each side could vote if either 
side were not fully represented. A decision of the majority 
was to be final. Pending a settlement, work was to go on 
and neither operators nor miners were to interfere with a 
man because he was union or non-union. The expenses of 
the board were to be borne equally by both parties, and 
besides the stated meetings of the board it was to be as- 
sembled upon a requisition of the president signed by five 
members stating the nature of the business. No subject 
could be brought up for discussion before the conference 
committee or the board unless five days' notice was given. 
This should be contrasted with the freedom of a truly con- 
ciliatory board where the only limiting provisions are the 
courtesies due under ordinary parliamentary rules. 

The parties came to a preliminary agreement, but the 
chief point at issue was temporarily deferred. The miners 
wished to base a scale on the price paid in the iron mills 
for boiling iron, and held that since most of the coal they 
mined was used in the iron industry and the price for boil- 
ing was fixed, they would always know what the basis was. 
The operators pointed out that not one fourth of the coal 
they mined was used in the iron industry and that it 
was illogical to base the scale on anything but the price 
obtained in the yard of the Pennsylvania Railroad at Pitts- 
burg. The operators yielded to the miners temporarily, 
but the iron industry was experiencing a rapid expansion 
and the price for boiling reached $7.25 per ton, which would 
have given the miners $5.20 per hundred bushels. 1 This 
was so out of proportion to what the miners had ever re- 
ceived that it seemed to the " public as extremely excessive 
and to the miners as somewhat ludicrous." 2 A " railroad " 

1 Report of Secretary of Internal Affairs of Pennsylvania, 1878-79, 
p. 147. 

2 Ibid., 1880-81, p. 377 — the words of miners' leader in report to State 
Bureau. 



CONCILIATION IN THE BITUMINOUS FIELD 19 

miners' convention met and shaved the scale down so that 
the miners would get $3.62| per hundred bushels under 
similar conditions. But even this was rejected by the Kail- 
road Coal Exchange, and the miners withdrew their demand 
for a scale and asked for a flat rate of four cents per bushel. 
In the mean time the arbitration board had failed to agree 
on a scale and on the selection of an arbiter because they 
could not get the man they wanted. The Coal Exchange 
stuck to its original offer of 3J cents per bushel and a 
break in the ranks of the miners forced acceptance. The 
failure of the board was undoubtedly due to the atti- 
tude both parties had taken toward arbitration, and to the 
inferiority of arbitration as compared with conciliation. 



C. INTERSTATE CONVENTION OF 1880 

After the demise of the Miners' National Association 
in 1876, the miners seemed content with local organiza- 
tions and with entering upon local struggles. The need of 
a general strike to meet changing conditions in a more 
broadly competitive market was not appreciated. One of 
the first signs we have that the recognition of this was to 
come is seen in the Interstate Convention of 1880. 

In the spring of 1879 the miners on the Monongahela 

' and Youghiogheny Eivers had struck for an advance in 

wages. 1 They obtained their increase through accepting 

^the advice to continue the strike for a couple of weeks 

longer. This advice was given by a young lawyer, formerly 

a miner, who observed that the operators " were daily in 

receipt of orders for coal at constantly increasing prices." 

He was elected president of the local miners' organization 

and through the autocratic power vested in him was able 

to wring other concessions from the operators. He soon 

gained a reputation for his excellent management of the 

local union, and the effect of the union's reputation for 

1 Roy, op. cit., p. )Slk 

II ' 



20 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

unanimity of action was not lost on the miners in other 
localities. 1 

In the mean time the miners in the Tuscarawas and 
Hocking Valleys of Ohio took advantage of rising prices 
to demand increases in wages ' and obtained them. But a 
dispute arose in the Tuscarawas Valley over the weighing 
and screening of coal. The operators of this field agreed 
to abandon the use of screens if their competitors in the 
neighboring fields could be induced to do so. 2 An inter- 
state conference of miners from Ohio and Pennsylvania 
met at Pittsburg on March 17, 1880, and demanded pay- 
ment by weight for all coal mined, receipt of their wages 
fortnightly, abolition of the company stores, and an eight- 
hour day. 3 If these demands were not granted by August 1, 
a general strike was planned to force concessions. The 
Hocking Valley and Jackson County miners of Ohio re- 
fused to enter into a struggle over payment by weight and 
the abolition of the screen system, but the Tuscarawas 
Valley men held out for nine months and were finally 
forced to surrender by the importation of negroes under 
military protection. 4 At the same time the Pennsylvania 
miners were trying to the best of their ability to secure 
some uniformity, by local strikes where individual oper- 
ators were obdurate. 5 These experiences were demonstrat- 
ing the necessity for solidarity and concerted action. 



D. OHIO MINERS' AMALGAMATED ASSOCIATION 

During the struggle over the screen question John Mc- 
Bride and other prominent miners had been active in agitat- 
ing for the organization of a state union for Ohio. As the 
result of the miners' failure to win their strike, McBride was 
blacklisted and he found it impossible to obtain work in the 

1 MeBride, op. cit, p. 252. 2 Roy, op. cit., p. 192. 

8 McBride, op. cit., p. 253. 

4 Roy, op. cit., p. 194 ; also Warne, op. cit., p. 383. 

6 Report of Secretary of Internal Affairs of Pennsylvania, 1880-81, p. 379. 



CONCILIATION IN THE BITUMINOUS FIELD 21 

mines. 1 But he obtained other employment and continued 
to agitate for a state union. By April, 1882, he succeeded 
in getting a representative convention together at Colum- 
bus and the Ohio Miners' Amalgamated Association was 
formed. The most extended source of information we have 
on the organization 2 leaves us to infer that the State was 
divided into district and local divisions with corresponding 
organizations. No more power was given the state officers 
than was actually necessary to bring about concerted ac- 
tion in the various fields.^ It was not long before the oper- 
ators as well as the miners recognized the desirability of 
some organization which should keep track of conditions 
over the State at large and prevent one district from 
securing advantages over another by cutting wages. 4 The 
chief importance of the organization lies in the fact that 
it is an expression of the tendency to extend the principle 
of solidarity over State-wide areas in contrast with locali- 
ties and districts. The organization also furnished some 
moving spirits who were far-seeing enough to recognize 
that the principle of cooperation must be national in 
scope. 

E. ARBITRATION UNDER STATE LAWS PROVIDING 
FOR TRIBUNALS 

(1) Arbitration in western Pennsylvania 

The following year in western Pennsylvania successful 
arbitration took place under the Trade Tribunal Act of 
1883. This act provided that a license or authority for 
establishing a tribunal should be issued by the presiding 
Judge of the Court of Common Pleas. The license should 
be denied unless the petition were signed by fifty work- 
men and five firms within the county where the petitioners 

1 Roy, op. cit., p. 194. 

2 Report of Ohio Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1885, p. 25. 
8 Ibid., p. 26. * Ibid., p. 25. 



22 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

L resided. The tribunal was to exist for one year and consider 
further disputes that arose within that time. Vacancies 
were to be filled by judges from lists submitted by the 
parties, and an umpire was to be selected by mutual choice, 
who should act only when the parties, after three meet- 
ings held for discussion, had failed to reach an agreement. 
The award was to be final on all matter submitted, but it 
was to be binding only on condition that both parties ac- 
quiesced. If agreed to and made a part of a court record 
the court could grant judgment for its fulfillment. The 
tribunal fixed its own rules of procedure and the chairman 
was vested with a power of procuring witnesses, preserving 
order, and obtaining proofs. 1 

In May, 1883, the " railroad "operators sought to force 
a reduction of a half cent a bushel on their miners. This 
would be a matter of thirteen cents a ton of two thousand 
pounds. The local miners' organization, after several un- 
successful conferences with the operators, decided to arbi- 
trate under the Trade Tribunal Act. On the organization 
of the board it was decided that the miners should resume 
work at once, with a checkweighman to see that they re- 
ceived proper weight, and at a price to be determined by 
the tribunal. This price should apply from the time they 
began work. A committee of four was appointed to visit 
the Lake ports to obtain the selling price of Pittsburg coal 
and to find out the freight rates on the same. They were 
to obtain also the prices of competitive coal and its cost 
of transportation. Another committee of four was to visit 
Pittsburg and examine the books of the operators to ob- 
tain their selling prices, prices paid for mining, and costs 
of mining other than wage costs. After this investigation 
the parties were "obliged to confess that the information 
they obtained but served to strengthen [their] feeling of 
partisanship," and they had to appeal to an arbitrator. 

1 Report of Secretary of Internal Affairs of Pennsylvania, 1882-83, 
p. 160. 



CONCILIATION IN THE BITUMINOUS FIELD 23 

The umpire split the difference and the parties accepted 
the award. 1 In December of the same year a promising 
case of arbitration regarding a differential between the 
Fourth and Second Pools of the Monongahela Eiver was 
effected. Later, however, the award was broken by several 
of the operators in the Fourth Pool positively refusing to 
pay the back wages due the men or to abide by the terms 
in general. 2 In another case at this time in Allegheny 
County both parties abode faithfully by a scale of wages 
and the selling price of coal fixed by Mr. Joseph D. Weeks. 

(2) Hocking Valley strike, 1884 

In 1884, the Ohio Miners' Amalgamated Association 
crossed swords with the Hocking Valley coal syndicate 
while consolidation of mines by the Ohio Coal Exchange 
and the Hocking Valley Coal and Iron Company was going 
on. The difference in the thickness of the seams in the 
northern part (ten feet) and in the southern part (six 
feet) of the valley resulted in too many laborers being in 
the thick seam and causing others to clamor for a chance 
to work it. The competition of workmen enabled the coal 
syndicate to force reductions from seventy cents per ton to 
sixty cents and then to fifty cents. It was the policy of the 
operators thus to hold the market. The average monthly 
wage in one of the Ohio Coal Exchange mines ran — 
March, 127.53 ; April, $18.55 ; May, $19.95 ; June, $12.83. 
In one of the Hocking Valley Coal and Iron Company 
mines the average monthly wage from January to June 
was $17. 84. 3 The nearest approach we have to statistics 
bearing on the industry of the State in general is from 
fifty-nine reports of representative miners' earnings from 
various parts of the State. The average yearly wage was 
$239.17. We have no record of the average daily wage or 
the number of days worked. The fluctuation in average 

1 Report of Secretary of Internal Affairs of Pennsylvania, 18S2-83, p. 142. 

2 Ibid., 1884, p. 73. 3 Saliers, The Coal Miner, p. 13. 



24 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

yearly wage arrived at under similar circumstances in the 
reports of the State Bureau of Statistics, is shown thus — 
1879, 1314 ; 1881, $397.54 ; 1883, $443.14 ; 1885, $239.17 ; 
1886, $239.99.* 

The Ohio coal and iron products were experiencing se- 
vere competition from Pennsylvania and Alabama, and the 
Ohio blast furnaces were tenaciously holding on to the 
use of the native ores from the coal measures. 2 Besides, 
Ohio coal met severe competition in the Chicago market 
from the Pennsylvania bituminous and anthracite coals. 

The trouble in 1884 had been settled by a compro- 
mise, and by the latter part of October, 1885, a general 
strike over the State was imminent when the operators re- 
fused to grant an advance from fifty cents to sixty cents 
per ton. The operators finally accepted an offer to arbi- 
trate. Ohio, in February, 1885, passed an arbitration law 
similar to Pennsylvania's, but the miners and operators 
organized a board without the aid of the law, examined 
books, and heard evidence. They failed to agree and re- 
sorted to an arbitrator. The award was against the oper- 
ators and they were forced to pay an advance of ten cents 
per ton. 3 



F. CHANGES IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

(1) Enlargement of the market 

These troubles in Ohio and Pennsylvania were among 
many of similar nature in other States. An evolution had 
been taking place in competitive markets which was bound 
to force both parties to cease looking upon their business 
and working conditions with a local or provincial attitude 
and to compel them to expand their concepts to national 
boundaries and conditions. The coal from eastern West 

1 Reports of Ohio Bureau of Labor Statistics, for the above years. 

2 Saliers, op. cit., p. 13. 

3 Report of Ohio Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1885, p. 252. 



CONCILIATION IN THE BITUMINOUS FIELD 25 

Virginia and Maryland fields and the central Pennsyl- 
vania and anthracite regions went to seaboard cities, while 
coal from western Pennsylvania, western West Virginia, 
Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois went to the Lake ports and 
the Northwestern States. 1 The coal fields located on the 
Ohio Kiver and its tributaries sent their product to Cin- 
cinnati, Louisville, and points on the Mississippi. But the 
railroad development was fast breaking down the influ- 
ence of the physiographical features which had widely 
separated markets and was making sectional markets re- 
sponsive to coal supply from other fields. This fact with 
the rapid increase of new coal fields made overproduction 
inevitable in the race to pay dividends. 

(2) Working conditions 

Along with extreme competition, overproduction, and 
reduction of wages went certain working conditions that 
must be understood to appreciate the welding force which 
was driving the men to united action to secure the regu- 
lation or suppression of these conditions. In most cases 
the conditions were the direct outgrowth of competition 
and overproduction, but the men recognized that they 
could be utilized to bring about uniformity and set a 
limit to cutthroat competition. If these basic conditions 
of labor could be established and the standard of living 
raised, the operator could carry on his competition so long 
as he did not attempt to make his men suffer for it. 

Among the more obvious grievances which caused fric- 
tion with even the most ignorant of men, because of its 
audacious robbery, was the short weighing that went on 
when the miner had no checkweighman at the scales in his 
employ to check up the company man. Not until 1902, 
after the award of the Anthracite Commission, do we have 
definite figures of the amount of saving this meant to the 
miner. 2 Closely connected with this matter was the abuse 
1 Warne, op. cit., p. 384. 2 See post, p. 253. 



26 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

of the " dockage " system. This was an institution, legiti- 
mate in itself, for making the miner careful about loading 
impurities, but easily subjected to abuse when no check- 
weighman was at hand. The question of mine-run pay- 
ment versus compensation for the amount of coal that 
passed over a screen of a certain size, was hotly disputed. 
The miner pointed out that the operator sold the small 
sizes which were left as screenings and could see no reason 
for non-payment. The operator said that the screen sys- 
tem was to encourage careful mining, and justified the 
method by paying a somewhat higher price for screened 
coal, supposed to compensate for the small coal that fell 
through the screen. The miner found that the screen sys- 
tem was subject to many abuses; for example — larger 
openings than agreed upon, non-repair when the screens 
had spread and allowed an extra large percentage of coal 
to pass through, and the placing of spreaders and other 
obstructious on the screens which would break the coal. 1 
This abuse was further aggravated as the demand for 
small sizes increased. The only way out of this situation 
the miner saw was to demand run-of-mine payment for his 
coal (payment for all coal mined), and, since the operator 
refused to grant it, the workmen early sought legislation 
which should do away with these abuses and establish stand- 
ard weights and measures and legalize check weighm en. 2 
But the legislation obtained along this line was generally 
thwarted by the proviso that the operator and miner 
might contract between themselves for any method of 
payment, and usually the miner had to accept the employ- 
er's terms or starve. Besides, to obtain redress for non- 
payment for all clean coal a suit for damages was neces- 
sary. The mine-run question is still a live one. 

1 Legislative Record of Pennsylvania, June 7, 1897, — quoted by 
George, Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 12, p. 196. 

2 Report of Secretary of Internal Affairs of Pennsylvania, 1882-83, 
p. 172a. 



CONCILIATION IN THE BITUMINOUS FIELD 27 

Another practice the injustice of which the miner was 
quick to feel was the non-payment for " dead work." It 
was well named, for the miner, without pay, had to bail 
water from his room, post the roof, lay track, cut clay 
veins and spars, and move all obstructions which hin- 
dered his getting at the coal. In some cases a little was 
added to the price per ton or per bushel, or a miner was 
paid a certain amount for his time while doing such work. 
In most cases he had the alternative of performiDg what 
he was told to do or losing his job. The amount to be paid 
for such work is still a controverted question when mak- 
ing wage scales. 

The company store was an institution of great service 
to the miner in the early days in isolated sections. But 
with the growth of a mining camp into a town its real 
function was nil, unless it could give as cheap and good 
service as the town stores. In too many cases the owner- 
ship of property about the mines enabled the operators to 
refuse to allow competing stores. Where economic growth 
was too powerful for them to control in this way, the 
operators could still resort to favoritism in employment 
and conditions of work towards those men who patronized 
the company store and quietly dismiss those who did not. 
In many cases the operator depended on the store profits 
to enable him to undersell his competitor who did not 
own stores. This element was such a strong factor in a 
uniformity scheme in the Pittsburg district, as late as 
1895, that the operators who did not have company stores 
were given a differential of five cents on a ton. 1 The ex- 
istence of the store encourages the operator to employ 
more men than are really needed for the sake of their 
trade at the store. This limits the earnings of the miner 

1 Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 
7, p. 164. A twenty cents differential was given to operators who had a 
limit to the weight of the car, allowed a checkweighman, used the regu- 
lation screen, and paid in nothing hut cash. 



28 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

because he obtains less work. The operator thus gets a 
" rake-off " from all the miner's consuming ability as well 
as his productive capacity. But still more important, the 
surplus labor kept wages down to a subsistence level. 
The extortionate prices and the enforced use of scrip soon 
brought state legislation 1 which it was hoped would 
remedy the evils. But as the Ohio Commission of Labor 
Statistics points out, the laws were ineffective because no 
provision was made to enforce them, 2 and it took united 
action on the part of the workmen to make them effec- 
tive. With the growth of concentration of capital and 
strong unionism in the mining industry, the large com- 
panies, at least, have done away for the most part with 
the semblance of the store system, although it hangs on in 
places in the form of stores in which the mining corpora- 
tion may hold stock and for which it deducts store bills from 
the miner's wages. Another subtle form is the ownership 
of stores by relatives of officials or mine bosses and dis- 
crimination in favor of men who will trade at their stores. 

In the eighties semimonthly pay was becoming a strong 
demand. The company store kept the men constantly in 
debt and encouraged the improvident to spend their last 
penny. In fact, the combined system of company store 
and deferred payment is nothing but peonage. 

Analogous to the store are the company houses. Besides 
yielding exceptionally good returns on the investment, the 
operator was in a position to evict the miner on short no- 
tice in case of a strike, and this power was used when the 
miners were particularly obdurate. 

The seasonal demand for coal, the surplus number of 
mines in operation, too many men in the industry, and the 
willingness of the miner to share work with his fellow 
unionist in times of depression, have been the elements 
that have given the miner from one hundred and fifty to 

1 Beport of Ohio Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1878, p. 115. 

2 Ibid., p. 116. 



CONCILIATION IN THE BITUMINOUS FIELD 29 

a little over two hundred working days in a year. This 
situation and the adverse conditions of work prompted the 
miner to demand and fight for the eight-hour day as a 
means of lessening overproduction, distributing the work 
more evenly over the year, and giving him more time to 
spend in the daylight and for self-improvement. 



3. THE STRUGGLE FOR A JOINT AGREEMENT 
FROM 1885 TO 1898 

A. The National Federation of Miners and 
Mine Laborers 

The economic pressure of the conditions described, the 
relative homogeneity of population, 1 and the rise in intel- 
ligence of the mass of workers laid a basis for the system 
of joint interstate agreements begun in 1885. The miners' 
organizations in the various States and districts were 
learning the futility of attempting to cope with the eco- 
nomic pressure without solidarity of organization and 
purpose. The leaders from the various States came to- 
gether in convention at Indianapolis, September, 1885, 
and formed a national organization known as the " Na- 
tional Federation of Miners and Mine Laborers." The 
preamble to the constitution recited the evils growing 
out of excessive competition and overproduction and re- 
called the adverse working conditions under which the 
craft was laboring. The belief was expressed that " in a 
federation of all lodges and branches of miners' unions 
lies our hope." The chief purposes of the organization 
were to spread intelligence and promote the social and in- 
dustrial welfare of the workers by the use of arbitration 
and legal enactment. 2 

The executive and legislative powers of the organiza- 
tion were put in the hands of five representatives at large, 

1 That is, they had a common language and a similar standard of living. 

2 McBride, op. cit, p. 255. 



30 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

and one member from each of the coal-producing States 
with one additional member from the anthracite field. 
The five members at large, a secretary, and a treasurer 
were charged with the administrative functions. A. per 
capita tax on each member furnished the funds. 1 It was 
truly a federation as compared with the organization of 
the United Mine Workers, which, we shall see, has de- 
veloped into a strong industrial union and democracy. 2 

A. SUGGESTION OF THE INTERSTATE JOINT 

CONFERENCE 

At this federal convention the suggestion was made by 
Daniel McLaughlin, chairman, that the miners seek to 
bring about a joint interstate convention of miners and 
operators to frame a scale of wages, agree upon uniform 
working conditions, adjust " market and mining prices in 
such a way as to avoid strikes and lockouts, and give to 
each party an increased profit from the sale of coal." Only 
one operator, W. P. Rend, responded to the call for the 
convention at Chicago, October, 1885. Mr. Rend, in the 
Hocking Valley strike and on other occasions, had shown 
himself a friend of the miners when he felt that they were 
in the right, and he encouraged the miners to issue an- 
other call. A few Chicago operators responded to the 
second call and with the miners signed another invitation 
for a meeting at Pittsburg, December, 1885. Emphasis 
was put upon the belief that the movement would inau- 
gurate a new era for the settlement of industrial ques- 
tions and that friendly conferences would accomplish what 
force had failed to bring about in the past. 3 

B. Interstate Joint Conference of 1886 

Although a larger number attended the Pittsburg meet- 
ing, it was not representative of the industry, and it drew 

1 Roy, op. cit., p. 244. 2 See. chap. in. 8 Roy, op. cit., p. 252. 



CONCILIATION IN THE BITUMINOUS FIELD 31 

up a possible scale of wages and issued another call for a 
convention at Columbus in February, 1886. The February- 
meeting was well attended, and the novel experiment met 
with strong advocates and with determined opponents 
among the operators. At the same time a spirit of fair- 
ness pervaded the proceedings and the debate on the wage 
scale. Each State was allowed eight votes as a basis of 
representation — four for the operators and four for the 
miners. As only Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Pennsylvania 
were represented by the operators, the miners from Mary- 
land and West Virginia were not allowed to vote. 

The Pittsburg scale was adopted for one year, lapsing 
April 30, 1887, and established differentials among the 
various coal fields varying from 56J cents per ton in the 
Mount Olive and Staunton districts to 95 cents per ton 
at Wilmington, Illinois. 1 A national board of arbitration, 
consisting of nine operators and an equal number of 
miners, was established to settle disputes that might arise 
between States, and similar boards were to care for state 
matters. The national board met several times during the 
year and tried to come to some agreement on the eight- 
hour day question, but it, along with other matters that 
needed general sanction to make them effective, was wisely 
left for the convention. 

C. Withdrawal of Illinois 

The meeting of the convention of 1887 was an occasion 
for felicitations on the success of the movement and the 
good feeling it had engendered. But hardly had the echoes 
of praise died away before the participants discovered 
forces at work which were to disrupt the movement. The 
operators from southern Illinois refused from the beginning 
to enter the agreement, and the operators from northern 
Illinois withdrew in 1888. The thicker seams of coal, 
the greater opportunity to use mining machinery, and the 
1 McBride, op. cit., p. 256. 



32 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

readjustment of freight rates enabled southern Illinois to 
put its coal in the Chicago markets at a price lower than 
could northern Illinois. 1 Both sections of the State de- 
pended on coal contracts with the railroads for their chief 
business, and it was charged in the convention of 1888 
that there was a conspiracy of the Northwestern railroads 
and the Illinois operators to shut out the Ohio and Penn- 
sylvania coal from the Northwestern markets. 2 It has been 
pointed out, by one who knew the situation at first hand, 3 
that the ownership of Illinois mines by railroads and their 
officials was the real reason why Illinois was not anxious 
to stay in an interstate uniformity agreement. As long as 
the ownership of the bituminous field was not consolidated, 
it was to their interest to be free to deduct from the earn- 
ings of their coal mines to pay the railroad, or to put 
those operators not in the combine at a disadvantage by 
high freight rates. We shall find this situation and the 
working out of this policy in the bituminous fields of 
Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Maryland (and in the 
anthracite field), 4 and there is no reason to think the same 
influences were not at work in Illinois. In fact the same 
questions of rebating and discrimination, supplying of 
cars and the use of " individual cars," have come before 
the Interstate Commerce Commission from Illinois as from 
Pennsylvania and the other States. 5 Furthermore, " Illi- 
nois never went into the movement heartily, notwithstand- 
ing the enthusiasm of certain operators for it ." ' 6 There 
were also disrupting influences among the Ohio operators. 7 

D. WlTHDEAWAL OF INDIANA 

The refusal of Illinois to be governed by the agreement 
put Indiana at a disadvantage, and she withdrew in 1889. 

1 Report of Special Commission on Northern Illinois Coal Strike, 1889, p. 9. 

2 Ibid., p. 11. 8 Lloyd, A Strike of Millionaires, p. 205. 

4 See p. 79 ff. b Reports of Interstate Commerce Commission. 

6 Report of Special Commission, op. cit., p. 10 (italics mine). 

7 Report of Ohio Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1888, p. 208. 



CONCILIATION IN THE BITUMINOUS FIELD 33 

The Ohio and Pennsylvania operators were wroth and 
went so far as to propose to throw one sixth of their coal 
into the Northwestern markets at reduced prices until 
Illinois was forced to come into the agreement. The scales 
of 1886 and 1887 had set mining prices for Illinois which 
were contingent on the ability of the miners to force the 
guerrilla operators into the agreement. The strikes of the 
miners were without avail. The withdrawal of Indiana 
and the failure of Ohio and Pennsylvania to come to an 
agreement brought the joint conference to an end in 1889. 

E. The Problem of the Joint Conference 

The parties to the agreement did not fully comprehend 
the magnitude of the problem before them. They must 
first establish an equality in common markets which would 
take account of nearness to market, the ease with which 
coal could be mined, quality of the coal, cost of transpor- 
tation, the rate of mining and " deadwork," and the many 
other conditions that enter into the production of coal. 
In the second place, they had included in the movement 
only the central States of Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, western 
Pennsylvania, and one district of West Virginia. To estab- 
lish differentials between the coal from Michigan, Iowa, 
and the Southwestern field of Kansas, Missouri, Okla- 
homa, Texas, and Arkansas, was one of their first prob- 
lems. But before the operators became ready to attack 
the problem with earnestness, they were to experiment 
for a decade longer with cutthroat competition and over- 
production. 

F. The Formation of the United Mine Workers 

During the life of the agreement the miners had been 
passing through a period of discord and evolution in trade- 
union philosophy that was to lay a basis for solid indus- 
trial unionism. In the same year (1885) that the National 
Federation of Miners was formed, the Knights of Labor, 



34 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

which had locals scattered over the mining regions, or- 
ganized a National District Assembly of Miners further to 
extend their principles of general solidarity among work- 
men in all industries. The Knights had been a strong 
educational influence among workmen, and the adherents 
of the organization determined not to have it crowded out. 
Each organization sought to gain supremacy, and the di- 
vided counsel and quarrels in every district worked to the 
advantage of the operators. 

A threat on the part of the Knights of Labor that, un- 
less they were put on an equal basis with the Federation 
in the adjustment of disputes with the operators, they 
would not be under obligation to abide by the contracts, 
brought the Federation to a compromise. An attempt 
at consolidation was made in December, 1887, but the 
Knights refused to sink their identity in another organi- 
zation, and the only results that came from the meeting 
were a reorganization of the Federation and the changing 
of its name to the National Progressive Union. 1 By the 
latter part of 1889, the organization had had enough of 
war and recognized that only by unity could it cope with 
its problems. |A plan for amalgamating the two organiza- 
tions was submitted to all the locals and a call issued for 
a national convention at Columbus, Ohio, January, 1890. 
At this convention the two organizations, the National 
Progressive Union and the National District Assembly 
No. 135 of the Knights of Labor, united under the name of 
the United Mine Workers of America with provisions that 
allowed each organization to retain its essential features, 
hold open or secret meetings, and permit the general ad- 
ministration to be in the hands of the national officers. 2 
The organization began its career with a membership of 
about 20,000 out of a body of 255,244 miners and laborers. 3 
After pointing out the significance of the miner's func- 

1 Roy, op. cit., p. 270. Reorganization consisted in having a president 
instead of an executive secretary as administrative head. 

2 Ibid., p. 274. 8 United States Census Report, 1890. 



CONCILIATION IN THE BITUMINOUS FIELD 35 

tion in the production of coal for modern industrial life, 
the organization announced its purpose to secure ade- 
quate earnings, payment of wages in lawful money, an 
eight-hour day, laws providing for checkweighmen, safety 
appliances, equipment for ventilation, and regulations 
which would do away with the mine guard system. The 
miners felt that their children should not be compelled to 
go to work until they were fourteen and recognized that 
education must stand as their chief emancipating factor. 
Although they expected considerable from legal enactment, 
they pointed to the lack of enforcement of existing laws 
as one of their chief handicaps. Furthermore, conciliation 
and arbitration were recognized as among their most 
powerful instruments for obtaining betterment and for 
establishing relationships which no amount of legislation 
could bring about. 

The national union was given jurisdiction over all its 
affiliated bodies and the national executive officers were 
given powers commensurate with such jurisdiction. The 
president, vice-president, and secretary-treasurer and four 
other members made up the national executive board and 
were elected by the annual national convention. The presi- 
dent with the consent of the executive board was em- 
powered to make appointments for vacant offices and 
suspend or remove national officers for insubordination. 
Organizers and other workers needed by the union re- 
ceived their appointments through the same source. The 
executive board, besides acting as a national board of 
arbitration and conciliation, also had full power to direct 
the workings of the union when the national convention 
was not in session. The national convention was the power 
of last resort and was made up of representatives from 
the locals, who were given one vote for each one hundred 
members or majority fraction thereof. 1 

1 Reprint of Constitution in the Report of United Mine Workers' Con- 
vention, 1891, p. 67. 



36 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 



Comparison of English-speaking and Southern European 
Labor in the Coal Industry 1 



Year. 


Workers. 


Pennsyl- 
vania. 


Ohio. 


Indiana. 


Illinois. 


West 
Virginia. 


1870 2 


Total workers in 
industry . . 
South Europe 


41,997 
121 


12,501 
50 


1,109 
2 


6,954 
43 


1,525 
4 


18802 


Total workers in 

industry . . 

Other countries 3 


103,917 
2,037 


16,331 
356 


4,469 
100 


16,301 
604 


4,497 
25 


1890 


Total anthracite 
Slav and Italian 
Total bituminous 
Slav and Italian 


124,203 
31,2026 
53,712 
26,8066 


19,591 
2,509 s 


6,532 

87 6 


24,323 
6.095 6 


9,952 
1516 


1901 


Total anthracite 
Slav and Italian 
Total bituminous 
Slav and Italian 6 


141,780 4 
67,1186 

111,229* 
86,855 s 


25,963 

8,243 s 


10,593 

378 6 


46,005 
14,249 s 


23,914 
1,792 « 



1 U.S. Census Reports. 

2 The reports of 1870 and 1880 give figures of the number of nationalities employed in 
each industry in each State, but the other reports do not. 

3 Other than English-speaking peoples. 

* These figures are from State Reports. The U.S. Census gives only the average 
number employed. 

6 Includes Roumanians. 

6 These figures include the total Slavic and Italian population engaged in all industries 
in the principal coal counties of the above States. The number of principal coal 
counties in each State is as follows : Illinois, 23 ; Indiana, 8 ; Ohio, 14 ; Pennsylvania, 
anthracite, 6 ; bituminous, 16 ; West Virginia, 7. The nationalities selected include 
Russians, Hungarians, Bohemians, Poles, and Italians in the case of every State except 
West Virginia where the Bohemians and Poles are omitted. 

The revenue for the support of the national organiza- 
tion was derived from a per capita tax of twenty cents per 
month. Fifteen cents of this amount was set apart as a 
defense fund to be used to support men on strike. Such 
support was paid on condition that the strike took place 
after investigation by the district and national officers. In 
case the national officers failed within ten days to render 
a decision based on the report of the district officers of 
conditions with which the men were dissatisfied, the dis- 
trict officers could call a strike. During the strike the men 
received $3.50 per week, and after a strike had been au- 



CONCILIATION IN THE BITUMINOUS FIELD 37 

thorized under the above provisions the national officers 
could not declare a strike off " except with the consent of 
a majority of the members involved." 1 The secretary- 
treasurer could not pay out sums for the support of strikes 
without the consent of the national executive board which 
held the local receiving committee responsible for such 
funds. 

We have here the nucleus for the elaborate provisions 
connected with the present organization of the miners' 
union. These provisions will be considered in chapter in 
to show the development of the organization and to give 
the reader a comprehensive understanding of the real 
forces which meet in the Interstate Joint Conference in 
order to bargain for mine labor. 

Gr. The Absorption of the Immigrant 

It was indeed fortunate for the miners that the organi- 
zations ceased their warfare and sought to build up unity. 
During the decade of the nineties the central bituminous 
fields were subjected, to a less extent, to the same influx 
of a heterogeneous population that had taken place in the 
anthracite regions during the eighties and continued into 
the nineties. A glance at the table on page 36 will show 
that in Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio, this influx was of an 
extent that could be controlled and absorbed while allow- 
ing opportunity for the English-speaking peoples to attain 
some degree of solidarity and invent a system of adjusting 
differences. We shall see that this heterogeneity in the 
anthracite regions during the eighties and nineties was 
one of the chief factors that destroyed the beginnings of 
organization for conciliation and prevented their rise until 
pressing economic conditions should force nationalities 
and races to rise above their prejudices and customs and 
unite for their common welfare. 

Although the censuses of 1890 and 1900 do not give 

1 Report of United Mine Workers 1 Convention, 1891, p. 68. 



38 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

the number of each nationality in each industry, yet the 
total population of the Slavic and Italian nationalities in 
the coal counties stands there as an asset for the operators 
to draw upon to thwart combination among the workers. 
As will be seen from the table, the figures for the mining 
population include all the coal counties, while the Slavic 
and Italian population constitute the total of the nation- 
alities in all industries in the principal coal counties. 
These offset one another somewhat in making a compari- 
son of the relative homogeneity or heterogeneity in the coal 
industry as between different years and different States. 
Besides, the nature of the country in the coal counties of 
Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio permits employment in other 
industries to a greater extent than in the anthracite 
counties of Pennsylvania. The estimate of the recent Im- 
migration Commission is that seventy-five per cent of 
the miners in Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio are of English- 
speaking stock. 1 

In addition to a glutted and heterogeneous labor mar- 
ket, we may point out the estimate made that with the 
mines continually employed enough mines were in opera- 
tion in 1890 to have produced 40,000,000 tons more than 
were mined. 2 Moreover, during 1891, 1892, and 1893 the 
number of mines increased and a larger number of men 
were enrolled in the industry. Under such circumstances 
we can better appreciate the efforts made by the United 
Mine Workers to reestablish the interstate agreement and 
improve conditions of labor. 

H. Efforts to revive the Joint Conference 

In 1891 a committee of miners met a committee of oper> 
ators from Ohio and Pennsylvania and endeavored to draw 
up a scale and introduce the eight-hour day. The failure 
to accomplish this was the signal for local strikes all over 

1 Report of Immigration Commission, vol. 1, 534. 

2 Warne, op. cit., p. 388. 



CONCILIATION IN THE BITUMINOUS FIELD 39 

the coal regions. Among these was a strike in the Con- 
nellsville coke region similar to that of 1887 when the op- 
erators were given their first real intimation of the nature 
of Slavic peoples and their ability to fight when pressed 
far enough. 1 Their tenacity, the violence with which they 
met eviction from the company houses, and their destruc- 
tion of property were in great contrast to the tameness 
with which the English-speaking peoples met similar con- 
ditions and manifested a respect for law and order. 

In the same year the " United Mine Workers' Journal " 
was established and began its educational work for unity. 
The news and the principles of the organization were 
printed in several languages. The full import of such a 
propaganda became apparent when the anthracite strikes 
of 1900 and 1902 brought about the welding of many 
nationalities. 

A. THE "SUSPENSION" OF 1894 

Again in 1892 the miners made an attempt to get an 
interstate convention, but were successful only in bringing 
about state meetings which somewhat relieved the chaotic 
competition. In the following year the general industrial 
depression forced a series of reductions in wages and the 
number of working days considerably below two hundred. 
In 1894 the union resolved to resort to a series of general 
suspensions to relieve the market, bring up prices, and 
ultimately, wages. 2 The command of the national officers 
to suspend work (April 21) was obeyed by 125,000 men, 
although the organization had only 13,000 paid-up mem- 
bers. 3 In fact, the conditions of the previous year were so 
hard that many were excused from paying dues. What 
had been planned as a series of two-weeks suspensions 
developed into a general strike of eight weeks. 

Meanwhile forces were operating which brought about 

1 Report of Secretary of Internal Affairs of Pennsylvania, 1887, pp. 2-17. 

2 Roy, op. cit., p. 325. 3 Warne, op. cit, p. 390. 



40 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

in both parties a readiness to come to an agreement. An- 
thracite coal and soft coal from non-union districts of 
West Virginia were fast supplying Western markets, and 
when the superior West Virginia coal once found an en- 
trance it was hard to supplant it. The suffering of the 
miners from want of necessities was putting them in a 
mood to fight such inexorable forces with something other 
than passivity, and threats were heard of burning bridges 
that allowed imported coal to come in. An appeal to 
President Cleveland to protect such connecting points 
brought a call from four States for troops. 1 Another pow- 
erful factor that brought terms of agreement was the 
threatened cooperation of manufacturers and railroads with 
the operators in replacing union with non-union men. 2 At 
a meeting held June 9, there were enough representative 
operators present so that a scale was formed for Pennsyl- 
vania, Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois with the provision that it 
was to be effective if it could be enforced. The miners knew 
that most of the enforcing would have to come through 
strikes on their part, but it gave them some sort of standard 
to go by. An interstate board of conciliation and arbitration 
was named which was to look after disputed differentials 
between fields, and the miners were allowed check weigh- 
men and promised semi-monthly pay. 3 

It was hoped that this beginning meant the reestablish- 
ment of the joint movement, but the squabbles and bick- 
ering over differentials, the breaking of agreements, the 
determined selfishness and greed of certain operators 
owning mines in fields of greatest natural advantage, and 
the forcing down of prices, all militated against it. The 
miners even kept faith with their agreement in one case 
to the extent of voluntarily lowering the wages in a dis- 
trict because they could not force one concern to keep the 
agreement. 4 

1 Roy, op. cit., p. 330. 

2 Report of Ohio Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1894, p. 128. 
8 Roy, op. cit., p. 334. * Ibid., p. 342. 



CONCILIATION IN THE BITUMINOUS FIELD 41 
I. The Strike of 1897 

A. CONDITIONS OF WORK AND WAGES 

It is a long road that has no turn, and to appreciate the 
turning-point in this situation, it is necessary to know the 
full extent of the depths to which the labor and capital 
of the industry had sunk. The mining prices in the Pitts- 
burg district in the beginning of 1893 had ranged from 
65 cents per ton in the thick vein to 79 cents in the thin 
vein, but by 1897 they had sunk to between 28 cents and 
30 cents in the thick vein and between 47 cents and 54 
cents in the thin vein. 1 When it is known that a man can 
mine but three to five tons a day, and added to this could 
obtain but about 190 days' work a year, the low level to 
which the standard of living must have fallen is obvious. 
Testimony before a special legislative committee of Penn- 
sylvania revealed the fact that in some localities eighty 
per cent of the miners had no knowledge of the English 
language and lived "like sheep in shambles." In Indiana 
and Ohio mining prices had fallen from 75 cents and 70 
cents respectively to 51 cents, with a contemplated cut to 45 
cents in Ohio. In Ohio the yearly earnings for 1896 ranged 
from 8213.20 to f 319.62. 2 Illinois wages had been on a par 
with the other States and for five months previous to the 
strike averaged about $ 12 per month. 3 President Ratch- 
f ord, of the United Mine Workers, characterized the strike 
of 1897 as a " spontaneous uprising of an enslaved people," 
but pointed out that the conditions of the industry could 
not be laid at the doors of the great majority of employers. 
The situation, he held, depended for the most part on the 
actions of a few operators who " cut prices far below the 
demands of the market." 

1 George, "The Coal Strike of 1897," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
vol. 12, p. 187. 

2 Beport of Ohio Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1897, p. 113. 

3 George, op. cit. t p. 190. 



42 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

B. EFFECTS OF MACHINERY 

The introduction of mining machinery began in 1875, 
but by 1891 only 6,211,732 tons, or 6.6 per cent of the 
production, was machine mined. In 1896 the production 
was 16,424,932 tons, or 14.17 per cent, and by 1902 it 
had reached 69,611,582 tons, or 26.09 per cent. 1 Wher- 
ever machinery is introduced it does away with pick miners 
and makes them machine tenders or mere " loaders," and 
the incentive to work which the skilled laborer has is gone. 
It makes possible the introduction of a larger and larger 
percentage of unskilled labor. The price for loading in 
1897 in Ohio was one half the rate for pick mining, and 
production had to double for the "loader" to make the 
same wages as a pick miner. 2 

By 1897 machines had almost supplanted pick mining 
in the Hocking Valley of Ohio, which produced ninety 
per cent of the State's output. Although the State's pro- 
duction had increased only 282,976 tons from 1890 to 
1895, machine production had increased 1,878,674 tons, 
and by displacing pick-mined coal thereby decreased the 
miner's (or loader's) earnings. Besides, there was no pro- 
portionate decrease in the number of men to help main- 
tain earnings at the old rate. On the contrary, from 1890 
to 1895 there had been an increase of 787 men employed, 
which, with the failure of the demand for coal to exceed 
or equal the supply, served only as an added element to 
decrease the yearly earnings. 

C. EARNINGS OF CAPITAL 

The average selling price of coal at the mine had fallen in 
the previous six years, in Illinois, 11 per cent ; in Indiana, 
18 per cent ; in Ohio, 16 per cent ; in Pennsylvania, 18 
per cent ; and in West Virginia, 28 per cent. 3 The full 

1 Roy, op. cit., p. 152. 

2 Beport of Ohio Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1897, p. 112. 3 Ibid., p. 192. 



CONCILIATION IN THE BITUMINOUS FIELD 43 

significance of persistent overproduction and the exploita- 
tion of unorganized labor by uncontrolled fields is demon- 
strated by the fact that, in the face of the beggarly con- 
dition of the miners and the low earnings of capital in 
their own States, West Virginia and Illinois operators 
were increasing their tonnage by 2,000,000 tons each, 
while the production of the other States was falling be- 
hind their usual output. 1 All the evils of the company 
store, abuse of screen system, dockage, etc., were rampant. 
The New York and Cleveland Gas Coal Company, which 
utilized all these methods, made its men work under an 
" iron contract," 2 and got its coal mined for ten cents a 
ton less than any other company in the Pittsburg district, 
gave testimony under oath that it was making only $8000 
profit on an investment of $1,000,000. 3 

D. CONDITION OF THE UNION 

During the few years previous to the formation of the 
United Mine Workers in 1890, the coal trade had been 
on a fairly prosperous basis. The impetus given to the 
trade led to a rapid increase in the number of mines op- 
erated and the number of men employed. By 1894 the 
number of employees in the industry had increased 52,399 
over the number employed in 1890, and an increase in 
coal production of over 7,000,000 tons had taken place. 
But the total production of coal mined in 1894 sold for 
11,768,350 less than that of 1890 in spite of the surplus 
production. The secretary-treasurer of the union esti- 
mated that this was virtually the same as having the em- 
ployees mine over ten million tons for nothing. 4 Of this 
increase of seven million tons the Virginias alone were 
responsible for five millions. 5 

1 Beport of Ohio Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1898, p. 75. 

2 A contract not to strike under penalty of losing all money due them. 

3 George, op. cit., p. 196. 

4 Beport of United Mine Workers' Convention, 1896, p. 15. 

5 Ibid., 1896, p. 16. 



44 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

These considerations show that there were fundamental 
economic factors which caused the decline in membership 
of the union. Its membership of 20,000 in 1890 had 
dropped off about 5000 by 1893, but this was offset some- 
what by an addition of about 5000 in 1894, the year of 
the attempted " suspension." The failure of the suspen- 
sion, continued unregulated production with attending 
low wages, and the slow recovery of business from the 
depression of 1893, were all conducive to further loss of 
membership. By 1896 the membership reached its lowest 
level, 9617. 1 With a membership of 9731 in 1897, and 
not enough money in the treasury to pay its officers or 
the expense of having a convention, the outlook for united 
action was not promising. The leaders from the States 
traveled to national headquarters at their own expense, 
and, after careful consideration of market conditions and 
the condition of the workers, decided to call a general 
strike (July 4) as a last resort. At least 150,000 men 
finally responded, practically the entire central field ex- 
cept a few districts in West Virginia and southern Illinois. 
Some districts in West Virginia were finally brought out 
by peaceful picketing and in spite of injunctions. In fact, 
I a new solidarity seems to have been born, an appreciation 
of the meaning of quiet, united action. 

E. NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE JOINT CONFERENCE OF 



Until the union succeeded in bringing out the West 
Virginia miners in the Pan-Handle and unorganized mines 
in the Pittsburg district, the operators had " nothing to 
arbitrate." By the latter part of August, however, they 
were ready to submit a plan for arbitration within each 
State and named a scale which should apply until an 
award was given. The miners refused to settle locally un- 
til conditions over the whole field had been adjusted, and 

1 Report of United Mine Workers' Convention, 1905, p. 45. 



CONCILIATION IN THE BITUMINOUS FIELD 45 

called for a conference of all the central States. At the 
Pittsburg conference in September a compromise scale 
granting an advance was agreed upon, with the under- 
standing that it would be revised at a joint conference 
which should meet in Chicago in January, 1898. On that 
date a really representative body of operators and miners 
from Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, and Pennsylvania 1 laid a 
sound basis for further development in settling dis- 
putes. 

A new generation of men had come to the front on 
both sides. They had suffered from adverse conditions 
and had learned a little from experience. Whether they 
recognized it or not, the operators had got some distance 
away from the position of " This is my business and I 
propose to run it," while the miners had learned that 
there really was only one coal field and that only unity 
would enable them to control the forces that oppressed 
them. Business in general during the nineties had been^ 
learning the value of combination and cooperation, andj 
the operators and miners began to realize that the same 
spirit must prevail in the coal industry. Industrial opera- 
tions were reaching too large proportions for the indi- 
vidual entrepreneur to expect to be a controlling factor. 
The regime of cutthroat competition had brought the 
earnings of capital and labor in the coal industry to the 
low level on which it then rested, and some controlling 
force was needed to establish differentials that would offset 
the irregularities of the coal fields. Differences in distance 
from the market and the accompanying freight rates must 
be taken into consideration. The relative richness and 
quality of coal resources in the various regions needed at- 
tention. The nature and form of the coal deposits, which 
of necessity established different working conditions for 
the men and affected their earnings, must be understood. 

1 West Virginia miners appeared at the convention, but were not seated 
because their operators did not appear. 



46 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

The uniformity of a scale of wages for " outside " and 
" day labor " was another important element in putting 
the various coal fields on a basis of equality. These are 
some of the factors that determine the formation of a scale 
in the Interstate Joint Conference. The methods used in 
the conference in the formation of a scale, a statement of 
the scale of 1898, and the history of succeeding agree- 
ments up to 1912 will be taken up in chapter v. 

4. EXTENSION OF THE JOINT MOVEMENT 

At this point we are chiefly interested in the conditions 
which both parties had to meet in order to make the scale 
of 1898 effective. It was a comparatively easy matter to 
form an agreement among the men who met in the confer- 
ence, but to put that agreement into operation widely 
enough to bring order out of what had been chaos was 
the chief problem of both parties. The conference was 
undoubtedly made up of the more far-seeing from both 
sides and of those who were suffering most from adverse 
conditions. To make operators and miners with strong 
individualistic tendencies see the necessity for concerted 
action was a different problem, especially if they happened 
to be fairly well satisfied with their state of prosperity. 
This difficulty was further increased by the general im- 
provement in industrial conditions then beginning. But if 
the scale was to be effective, it was necessary to extend 
the agreement as widely as possible, and the burden of 
this extension had to rest upon the miners. Where the 
miners were organized and their employers happened to 
be obdurate about paying the scale prices, a strike had 
to be ordered to bring conformity. In sections where the 
miners were not united, their organization was a task that 
must be performed before pressure could be brought upon 
their employers. In order that we may understand the 
significance of the joint agreement in the bituminous 
fields as it exists to-day, we must know the extent of the 



CONCILIATION IN THE BITUMINOUS FIELD 47 

area over which the joint agreement is in operation and 
trace a few of the struggles that accompanied its installa- 
tion. 

A. The Struggle in Illinois 

A. VIRDEN AND PAN A IMPORTATION OF NEGROES 

Over the various States it was expected that the miners 
would have trouble with two classes of operators — those 
who were not represented at the conference and did not 
consider themselves bound by the agreement, and those 
who were represented but were dissatisfied. In Illinois the 
miners had to deal with about twenty such cases, chief 
among which were the Yirden and Pana operators. The 
Virden Coal Company announced that it was impossible 
for it to pay the scale (forty cents a ton) and submitted 
its claims to the State Board of Arbitration for adjudica- 
tion, promising to abide by the award. The board found 
evidence that the company could afford to pay the forty 
cents, but the company repudiated the decision and con- 
tinued the contest. 1 The company then appealed to a 
committee of the national executive board of the United 
Mine Workers, but met with the same decision. 

During the general strike of 1897 certain of the Illi- 
nois operators had threatened to break it by importing 
Chinese coolies, but learned that Governor Tanner would 
not allow such a procedure. So now, with the adverse 
decision of the miners' committee, the company erected 
stockades about the mines and imported negroes from 
Alabama under armed guards. The governor also refused 
to allow this action, on the ground that under the sys- 
tem of convict labor in the South the probabilities were 
that a large percentage of the negroes were criminals and 
had learned their trade under the convict system. Be- 
sides, bringing them in under a force of armed guards was 

1 Beport of Illinois Inspector of Mines, 1898, p. 5. 



48 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

practically an armed invasion of the State. The governor 
ordered the militia out with strict injunctions Dot to 
permit the disembarkation of the negroes. As was then 
said, " This is the first time in the history of the State 
or the nation that the military power of the law, dur- 
ing an industrial contest, has been exercised in defense 
of the rights of American labor." 1 The event created a 
furore in the metropolitan press (or as the " Coal Trade 
Journal " of New York put it, " the moneyed aristocracy 
press "), which tried to make political capital out of it 
and explain it on the basis of race hatred and discrim- 
ination. As the above " Journal " describes it, " The con- 
demnation heaped upon the governor, boiled down and 
crystallized, is hatred for his position as a fair man, and 
opposition to his method of doing justice to all men. It is 
such a new thing." 

"Such a departure from the ordinary way of doing 
business by the chief executive of any State is such an 
unheard-of thing that the employers, who heretofore have, 
almost without exception, been able to use the militia in 
defeating the projects and objects of the laboring people, 
are surprised. Workingmen have repeatedly charged that 
the militia were used to coerce them into obedience to the 
wishes of the employers, and that they were used for that 
purpose is at present very evident from the abuse heaped 
upon Governor Tanner." 2 

The lockout at Virden continued from April to Novem- 
ber. By its complete capitulation in paying the scale and 
dismissing superintendents and mine managers who had 
taken obnoxious parts in the contest, the company demon- 
strated that it had been chiefly animated by stubbornness 
and a determination not to treat with union men. 

The Pana operators refused to submit disputed ques- 
tions to the State Board of Arbitration or any committee, 
basing their action on the assumption that the State had 

1 Report of Illinois Inspector of Mines, 1898, p. 6. 2 Ibid., 1898, p. 15. 



CONCILIATION IN THE BITUMINOUS FIELD 49 

no right to interfere in private affairs (though they were 
a corporation) or to inspect their books. 1 They succeeded 
in getting negro miners, and the militia was stationed in 
the region for months to prevent rioting. In April, 1899, 
the state board again offered its services for conciliation, 
but failed to bring the parties to agreement because they 
were unable to cOme to a settlement of the question of 
reemployment of union and the discharge of non-union 
men. By October, 1899, the operators were willing to pay 
the scale prices and to reemploy their old men. 2 

This gives one an idea of the fierce fighting and the 
necessarily extended support by the union to the miners 
who were engaged in the struggle to bring the operators 
into the joint movement and establish uniform working 
conditions. 

B. Iowa and Michigan seek Admission to the 
Joint Conference 

In the miners' convention of 1898 their president an- 
nounced that the union had organizers in every coal-pro- 
ducing State, from the anthracite field in the East to 
Wyoming in the West. The efforts of these men soon 
bore fruit in Iowa, for by 1900 the membership was over 
7000, the State was organized into a district, and repre- 
sentative miners and operators were seeking admission to 
the joint conference. The same year Michigan was organ- 
ized into a district with about one thousand members. 
But every coal miner in the State was within the union, 
and the growing importance of the State as a coal pro* 
ducer warranted such action. 3 In 1901 the operators and 
miners entered into a state agreement which gave the 
miners an increase of sixteen cents per ton and payment 
for inside and outside day labor equal to the wage in the 

1 Report of Illinois Inspector of Mines, 1898, p. 5. 

2 Report of Industrial Commission, vol. 17, p. 431. 

3 Report of United Mine Workers' 1 Convention^ 1900, p. 18. 



50 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

central field. 1 In connection with the efforts of the opera- 
tors and miners of Iowa and Michigan to gain admission 
to the joint conference, the operators of Ohio, Indiana, 
and Pennsylvania have always voted against it, while the 
operators of Illinois and the miners of all these States 
have been in favor of it. The operators have opposed it 
on the ground that mining conditions and competition were 
different and it would result in breaking down the system. 
The Illinois operators and the miners of the four State, 
join with the Iowa and Michigan contingents and hold 
that Iowa and Michigan are in the competitive field as 
much as West Virginia, and, since the central States are 
the basing point, they should have a voice in making the 
scale. In 1900, as a matter of courtesy, since they had 
attended the conference with the hope of being admitted, 
the Iowa representatives were given a seat in the conven- 
tion with no voice or vote. 2 Although Iowa and Michigan 
do not participate in the joint conference of the central 
field, their scales are fixed with reference to the prices 
established in that field. 

C. Organization of the Southwest Field 

A. THE STRIKE OF 1899 

In what is termed the " Southwest Field " — Missouri, 
Kansas, Arkansas, Oklahoma, and Texas — the United 
Mine Workers had organized the men by March, 1899. 
A request for recognition of the organization and for a 
joint meeting to form a scale was ignored by the large com- 
panies. The opposition came for the most part from four 
large companies termed the " Big Four," who insisted on 
meeting their own men and refused to recognize that con- 
ditions in the industrial world had become such that the 
men had a right to representation. 

1 Report of United Mine Workers 1 Convention, 1901, p. 52. 

2 Proceedings of Interstate Joint Convention, 1900, p. 46. 



CONCILIATION IN THE BITUMINOUS FIELD 51 

The demands of the men centered mostly around the 
eight-hour day, increase in the mining rate, and a decrease 
in the price of powder. A joint conference in June drew 
up a scale which conceded most of the demands of the 
men and it was signed by twenty-five of the small com- 
panies. It provided for a board of arbitration to settle dif- 
ferences that could not be settled by the " pit committee " 
of a mine and the mine officers. The institution of a com- 
mittee in each mine to settle differences immediately was 
becoming common over the bituminous fields. It made 
possible the adjudication of working conditions that ap- 
plied to all alike without making the individual workman 
who dared to state his grievances the object of persecu- 
tion by an inconsiderate official. Besides, it brought up 
for immediate settlement matters, which, if left to grow, 
would produce widespread trouble. 

B. CONFLICT OF FEDERAL AND STATE INJUNCTIONS 

The " Big Four " refused to recognize the union and 
imported negroes from Alabama. The miners met the ne- 
groes as they got off the trains, explained the situation, 
promised support or transportation back to their homes, 
and induced many to leave. This was sufficient cause for 
the coal companies to obtain a federal injunction prohib- 
iting the miners from " doing any act whatever " which 
would hinder the companies from carrying on their busi- 
ness. 1 The miners tried their hand at injunctions and ob- 
tained from a state court an injunction restraining the 
companies from importing a criminal class of citizens which 
would be a menace and expense to the State. But the fed- 
eral injunction superseded the State injunction, and the 
negroes continued to come. 

1 Appendix to Beport of Kansas Bureau of Labor, 1898, p. 340. 



52 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 
C. THE REESE CASE 

In connection with the strike a typical case arose which 
gives one an appreciation of the handicap under which 
union organizers labored in their efforts to extend the 
organization of the miners and establish a basis for further 
extension of the joint agreement. During the progress of 
the strike, J. P. Reese, of Iowa, a national organizer, was 
sent to the scene of the trouble to direct the men. He had 
come into the State of Kansas before the injunction was 
issued, but was not brought under its provisions by name 
or by the inclusion of the terms " servants, agents, and 
attorneys of the defendants." He addressed a meeting at 
Yale, Kansas, and some of the strikers committed trespass 
in going to the meeting. The judge, when sentencing him 
to three months in jail, a fine of one hundred dollars, and 
costs of the case, admitted that the injunction did not pro- 
hibit assemblage and discussion ; that it was not proven 
that Reese used violent language ; that the strike was con- 
ducted peacefully ; but held that the effect of the meeting 
was to intimidate the negroes and cause them to quit work. 
After Reese had spent a month in jail he was released on 
a writ of habeas corpus granted by the United States Cir- 
cuit Court of Appeals at St. Louis. The writ was granted 
on the grounds that the injunction had not been phrased 
so as to include him and the fact that the lower court had 
exceeded its jurisdiction. 1 The instance shows what an 
unsatisfactory process it is to be subjected to a one-man 
trial, lie in jail, and finally be informed that one is not 
guilty J In fact the injunction has been one of the most 
effective weapons in many cases for snatching victory from 
the miners just as they seemed ready to bring about an 
extension of the joint agreement. That labor in general is 
still handicapped by the injunction in its legitimate efforts 
to better its condition would seem to show the necessity 

1 "Report of Kansas Bureau of Labor, 1899, p. 465. 



CONCILIATION IN THE BITUMINOUS FIELD 53 

of raising the question, as to the proper use of the injunc- 
tion, out of the realm of controversy between labor and 
capital and connecting it with the issues that demand a 
broad social policy and action for their solution. This case 
44 excited great indignation among the industrial masses of 
the United States by reason of the high-handed usurpation 
of judicial authority," 1 but the miners had been merely in- 
troduced to the use of the injunction as a "strike-breaker." 

D. THE MINERS' COMMISSARY 

A notable feature of the strike was the successful opera- 
tion of commissary stores which were supported by the 
miners. The stores were in charge of local secretaries who 
handled the provisions in the same manner as in a general 
store, and the miners obtained goods to meet their actual 
needs by signing a receipt which showed the extent to 
which each individual was being helped and enabled the 
secretary to account for all that he had received. 

Finally, in the spring of 1900, as the miners showed 
no signs of being starved out, the "Big Four " companies, 
one after another, offered their employees wage scales and 
working conditions practically the same as the scale of the 
joint convention. But the companies refused to recognize 
the United Mine Workers as an organization and the 
agreements were drawn up between the companies and 
their own employees. 

E. THE SOUTHWESTERN INTERSTATE JOINT 
CONFERENCE 

v^From 1899 to 1903 the miners and individual operators 

ontinued the plan of joint agreements. But in 1903 the 

Southwestern Interstate Coal Operators' Association was 

organized and the contracts were made and carried out 

between the Association and the United Mine Workers as 

1 Roy, op. cit., p. 378. 



54 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

organizations. In that year the " Big Four " joined in 
making a scale in the interstate conference, and since 
these four companies produced about two thirds of the 
coal of that region, it was " particularly gratifying " to the 
president of the miners to be able to report their partici- 
pation. 1 The interstate meeting establishes general condi- 
tions over the whole field, and then special agreements are 
made to suit the varying working conditions and oppor- 
tunities for production in the different districts. 2 

F. THE SOUTHWEST FIELD SEEKS ADMISSION TO THE 
JOINT CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL FIELD 

In 1906 the delegates of miners and operators from 
Missouri, Arkansas, Texas, and Indian Territory were re- 
fused admission to the conference of the central field on 
the ground of diversity of interest. The operators of the 
conference pointed out that the method of voting made 
it possible for one State to forestall an agreement and 
accused the miners of misdirecting their efforts in organ- 
izing the southwest field when they should have been 
occupied with coercing West Virginia, 3 which they re- 
garded as their most dangerous competitor. The scale in 
the southwest field is governed largely by the action taken 
in the central field. 

D. Attempt to organize Maryland 

In the spring of 1900 the miners of the George's Creek 
district of Maryland had been organized and a request 
made for joint agreement. /The companies refused to meet 
the organization, but offered as a sop an increase of ten 
cents a ton, which was five cents less than the scale for the 
central field of Pennsylvania. 1 The miners wisely saw that 

1 Beport of United Mine Workers' Convention, 1904, pp. 27-28. 

2 Texas has not been in the joint agreement since 1908. 

8 Proceedings of Joint Conference of Central Field, 1906, p. 8. 



CONCILIATION IN THE BITUMINOUS FIELD 55 

this increase would be one only in appearance, not in sub- 
stance, for the companies refused to allow the men to have 
checkweighmen. Because the men attended a meeting ad- 
dressed by the national officers, one hundred of them 
were discharged. The officers appealed to the operators 
for the reinstatement of the men, but to no avail. A strike 
was called in April and the men held out till August, when 
a break in their ranks caused all of them to apply for 
work. Eight hundred were blacklisted, remaining an ex- 
pense to the organization, and the fight already made was 
useless. As is common in such a case, the union helped to 
distribute the men in organized fields. 

During the strike unusual methods were used by the 
operators to break up the solidarity of the men. An at- 
torney was hired to call a meeting and address the men. 
5ome of the miners were disposed to disturb the meeting, 
but they were warned by the national organizer, Warner, 
not to do this. For his good offices he and several others 
were arrested and charged with riot and unlawful assem- 
blage. The charge of riot was not proven, but on the 
charge of unlawful assemblage the judge held that the 
assemblage had prevented the right of free speech and 
Warner was made responsible for disbanding the men. 2 
With the Reese case in mind, the miners naturally raised 
the question as to whether the courts would have been so 
solicitous if it had been their free speech which was at 
stake. Warner was sentenced to six months and the others 
to shorter terms. Requests for a change of venue and 
appeals to the higher courts and the governor were with- 
out avail, although the defendants claimed evidence of 
prejudice and unfair trial. To this day Maryland has no 
joint agreement. In chapter n the underlying forces which 
have kept the industry in that State in a disorganized 
condition receive consideration. 

1 Report of United Mine Workers 1 Convention, 1901, p. 37. 

2 United Mine Workers' Journal, August, 1900, p. 1. 



56 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

E. The Struggle in Alabama, Tennessee, and 
Kentucky 

Between September, 1897, and January, 1899, the 
miners had succeeded in organizing about 2500 men into 
thirteen locals in Alabama, four locals in Tennessee with 
a membership of 400, and in Kentucky into eighteen locals 
with about 2000 members. 1 Although the membership 
was still small in 1898, a strike of considerable propor- 
tions took place in Tennessee in protest against the " sub- 
contracting " system of mining coal. This system resulted 
in keeping about forty-six per cent of the miners dig- 
ging coal for much less per ton than they could get by 
working independently. The settlement obtained abol- 
ished the system and raised the rate of mining about four- 
teen cents. 2 

By 1900, District 19, comprising Kentucky and Tennes- 
see, had been formed with a membership of over 4000 
scattered among thirty-six locals. Joint agreements were 
entered into by many operators, but the union met with 
very determined opposition in Hopkins County, Ken- 
tucky. The Hopkins County operators "paid whatever 
wages they chose and entered any market they desired." 
Peaceful overtures were refused, and the strike called in 
November, 1900, resulted in the importation of negroes 
and the use of the injunction. The injunction in this case 
went so far as to forbid the United Mine Workers to fur- 
nish the strikers with food and supplies. -8 Not until 1908 
did the organization consider the situation favorable 
enough to seek to gain a joint conference, but the efforts 
of the miners' leaders were not successful and the opera- 
tors of the county still refuse to make any agreement with 
the union. 

By 1903 the union in Alabama had increased to about 

1 Eeport of United Mine Workers 1 Convention, 1899, p. 6. 

2 Ibid., p. 20. 3 Ibid., 1902, p. 59. Reprint of injunction. 



' 



CONCILIATION IN THE BITUMINOUS FIELD 57 

8000 members, 1 and in the state convention of that year 
the miners demanded that their wages and working con- 
ditions be made to conform more nearly to the standards 
fixed by the central field. 2 The refusal of the operators 
to meet these demands led to arbitration proceedings 
wherein the operators and miners were each represented 
by two members, and Judge Gray, the former Chairman of 
the Anthracite Coal Strike Commission, acted as referee. 
The award granted the miners an increase of two and one 
half cents per ton on the mining rate with a correspond- 
ing increase on day wages, established a semi-monthly pay 
day, prohibited the employment of boys under fourteen, 
and regulated the issuance and transfer of store orders. 3 

The sliding scale, which automatically adjusted mining 
rates according to the fluctuation in the prices of iron, 
was not abolished. The Tennessee Coal, Iron, and Rail- 
road Company was the dominant factor in regulating con- 
ditions of mining both in Tennessee and Alabama. In 1904 
this company, along with other "furnace" 4 operators, re- 
fused to pay the scale established by arbitration in 1903. 
After several conferences the operators still declined to 
pay the scale and declared their " inability to pay more 
than they had proposed and operate their mines and fur- 
naces without a loss." 6 

The miners' state convention met and voted for a strike. 
This brought an offer of &ve cents more on a ton than the 
operators had previously declared themselves able to pay, 
but the offer held good on condition of an increase of oue 
hour on the working day, monthly payment, increase in 
the differential between pick and machine mining, and 
the severance of the employees from connection with their 
union. 6 

1 Beport of United Mine Workers' Convention, 1903, p. 17. 

2 Ibid., 1904, p. 28. 3 md ^ p . 2 8. 

4 Operators who employed miners to produce coal for iron furnaces. 
Eeport of United Mine Workers' Convention, 1905, p. 16. 



6 Ibid., p. 17. 



58 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

The " commercial " operators continued to pay the scale, 
but 10,000 men employed by the "furnace" operators 
went on strike. Four federal injunctions and one from a 
state court supplemented the efforts of the operators to 
obtain non-union labor from other States with attending 
success. The efforts of the officers of the United Mine 
Workers and of the American Federation of Labor to 
prevent shipment of non-union men from Eastern points 
were not so successful. The climax to the Alabama strike 
came when the governor ordered the state militia to cut 
down the tents used to shelter the evicted mine workers 
and their families. In addition to this order the soldiers 
were directed to take possession of the tents, and orders 
were issued that public meetings could not be held. The 
governor also threatened to call a special session of the 
legislature to repeal the vagrancy law of Alabama, so that 
every striking miner could be arrested and sent to prison. 1 

At Tracy and Whitewell, Tennessee, the miners em- 
ployed by the Tennessee Coal, Iron, and Railroad Com- 
pany went on strike over the same issues that involved 
the Alabama employees of this same company. By Janu- 
ary, 1906, the organization had spent over 8127,000 in 
supporting the strike in Tennessee and nearly $600,000 
in Alabama. 2 These strikes terminated unfavorably for 
the union and resulted in the break-up of the joint agree- 
ments in Alabama, but the president of the miners con- 
soled his followers in their convention of 1907 with the 
words, " While we failed to secure the conditions of em- 
ployment we sought to obtain, we have demonstrated that 
although an organization of peace we have the ability to 

fight.- 

The membership of the union has steadily declined un- 
til in 1913 it stood at 192 . 3 If the Tennessee Coal, Iron, 

1 Beport of United Mine Workers' Convention, 1909, p. 66. 

« Ibid., 1906, p. 59. 

8 Report of Secretary -Treasurer of the United Mine Workers, 1913. 



CONCILIATION IN THE BITUMINOUS FIELD 59 

and Kailroad Company, which is a subsidiary of the United 
States Steel Corporation, continues to follow out the 
policy of the larger corporation in dealing with its labor, 
the miners may expect a long struggle before their organ- 
ization will be able to gain recognition. 

F. Okganization of the Northwest 

In 1904 Montana and Wyoming were organized into 
a district which included nearly all the miners in those 
States, and the next year a district was formed in Wash- 
ington. The same year in which Montana and Wyoming 
were organized, the union formed a district in British Co- 
lumbia, and the organization became international in scope. 
This expansion was recognized by the union's prefacing 
the designation of their union and its officers by the term 
" international." _^ 

In 1907 a dispute in British Columbia furnished one 
of the first occasions for conciliation under the Canadian 
Industrial Disputes Investigation Act. The miners of the 
district had met the operators in joint conference March 
4 and 18, but failed to agree. This same month the Dis- 
putes Act was enacted. The contract of the operators with 
the miners ran out on April 1, and as no agreement had 
been reached the miners made application for a concilia- 
tion board as provided for in the act. A board was estab- 
lished by the Government, but during the delay in the 
appointment of its members and their arrival at the scene 
of the trouble the miners suspended work. This was con- 
trary to the act but was attributed to a lack of understand- 
ing of its provisions and hasty action on the part of the 
miners' executive board. 1 General fear of a coal famine on 
the part of the public in that section caused the Minister 
of Labour to send the Deputy Minister to the scene. Explan- 
ation of the act and conciliatory measures by the Deputy 

1 Report of Canadian Department of Labour, 1907, p. 238. 



I 



60 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

Minister soon brought the parties together and resulted in 
their settling the grievances among themselves. Further- 
more, arrangements were made for future peaceful settle- 
ments by a series of conferences between the parties. Pro- 
vision was made for the appointment of an independent 
chairman by the Minister of Labour if the parties failed to 
agree upon a selection. 1 By 1908 the president of the min- 
ers joyfully announced" that the operators in these districts 
(Washington, Montana, Wyoming, and British Columbia) 
have recognized our organization ; they have entered into 
contracts with us establishing the best mining rate and 
the highest day wage scale existing in the United States 
or Canada." 2 

G. The Colorado Struggle 

Colorado was organized into a district in 1901, but the 
union increased in numbers very slowly. Their union rep- 
resentatives failed repeatedly to get a hearing and the dis- 
trict entered upon a strike the latter part of 1903. After 
the strike had been in progress about four months the na- 
tional officers considered it futile to continue the struggle 
longer and called a convention at which it was expected 
the miners could be induced to go back to work. The gov- 
ernor anticipated the convention by the declaration of mar- 
tial law the day previous to the one set for the meeting. 
The miners " were so incensed at the unwarranted and 
uncalled-for action of the governor that, instead of calmly 
considering the status of the strike and declaring it off, 
as they undoubtedly would have done had the troops not 
been there, they decided that while the civil laws were 
suspended a resumption of work would be regarded as a 
cowardly surrender." 3 

Non-unionists were imported ; organizers and members 

1 Report of Canadian Department of Labour, 1907, p. 251. 

2 Report of United Mine Workers' Convention, 1908, p. 28. 

3 Ibid., 1905, p. 11 ; report of the president. 



CONCILIATION IN THE BITUMINOUS FIELD 61 

of the national executive board " were murderously as- 
saulted in broad daylight while traveling on passenger 
trains ; other organizers were held up and beaten on the 
public streets, while still others were threatened that if 
they did not depart from Colorado their lives would be in 
danger." 2 After the organization had spent about half a 
million dollars in supporting the men, the national execu- 
tive board decided to advise a resumption of work and 
every victimized man and his family were transported to 
some place where he could obtain work. The union has 
been unremitting in its efforts to build up membership in 
Colorado and obtain a joint agreement, but, as we write 
this account, current news describes conditions similar to 
those recorded above. Martial law, imprisoning of or- 
ganizers and holding them incomunicado, and resolutions 
on the part of Congress providing for an investigation of 
the trouble are items inviting the attention of the public. 

Thus we see that the principle of the joint agreement 
is in operation in the central field comprising Illinois, 
Indiana, Ohio, and Pennsylvania ; in the southwestern field 
which includes Missouri, Arkansas, Kansas, and Okla- 
homa; in Iowa and Michigan; in Kentucky and Tennes- 
see ; and in the Northwest. 

One naturally wonders why "West Virginia does not ap- 
pear in the list. In order to answer that query satisfac- 
torily, it has been found necessary to devote a separate 
chapter to this State. A greater significance attaches to 
it than a mere explanation as to why the State is not 
included in the system of joint agreements. Besides the 
importance of the relation of the State to the further 
continuance of the system of joint agreement, the factors 
at work in West Virginia should be of great concern to 
the public in connection with a policy dealing with the 
control of our coal resources. In the richest bituminous 
field in America (comprising "West Virginia, western Vir- 

1 Report of United Mine Workers' Convention, 1905, p. 12. 



62 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

ginia, Maryland, central and southwestern Pennsylvania) 
we shall find the same influences at work which have 
brought concentrated ownership and control of the an- 
thracite region and have given rise to the social problems 
attached thereto. We must understand why the West 
Virginia problem has played such an important role in 
the interstate joint conference of the central field, and 
why it has loomed up as the most important factor which 
threatens to disrupt the system of conciliation and arbi- 
tration. 



CHAPTER II 
THE WEST VIRGINIA PROBLEM 

1. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PROBLEM 

An invitation was extended to the West Virginia opera- 
tors to attend the joint conference in 1898, but they did 
not respond. The question arises as to why they failed to 
respond. The most important reason was because they 
could produce coal more cheaply than other fields, realized 
it, and proposed to use their advantage to build up a 
market for their coal. In fact they had to make a market 
for their coal, because as late as 1913 only ten per cent of 
their production was sold to consumers within the State. 1 
One factor making cheaper production possible is found 
in the wealth of coal lying within the state borders. It is 
said that West Virginia has more soft coal than any other 
State in the Union. 2 Besides, this coal can be got at easily 
by direct entrances made into the sides of the hills, while 
Illinois operators, for example, have to sink shafts. The 
character of the veins is such as to enable the West Vir- 
ginia operators to get from six to ten feet of clean coal in 
contrast to the five-foot vein in eastern Ohio and the Pitts- 
burg district. Besides possessing the finest quality of coal, 
there is considerable variation of coals — gas coals, cok- 
ing coals, steam, and domestic coals. 

Because their labor was unorganized, the West Virginia 
operators were able to demand a ten-hour working day 
over against the eight-hour day of the union fields. The 

1 Hearings before a subcommittee of the Committee on Education and 
Labor of tbe United States Senate, 63d Congress, 1st Session, Senate Res. 
37, part 3, p. 2175. 

2 Report of Ohio Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1901, p. 294. 



64 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

lack of a union also enabled them to require larger mining 
cars containing more pounds to the ton, refuse the men 
checkweighmen in connection with the weighing of their 
coal, and exercise their own discretion in regard to the 
amount of coal which they docked the men on account of 
impurities in the coal. Besides, they were in a position to 
say what they would pay the men for "dead work," and 
whether the men should be paid for their coal according 
to a mine-run method or after it had been screened. 

Although the West Virginia operators had to ship coal 
a greater distance to put it into the Great Lakes' markets, 
the freight rates were adapted to their needs so that by 
1901 the Industrial Commission pointed out that the rates 
from West Virginia to the Lake ports were as cheap as 
from points in Ohio but half the distance. The rates from 
West Virginia to St. Paul (one thousand miles) were as 
cheap as from points in Illinois which were only four hun- 
dred miles from St. Paul. The railroad connection with 
some of the best Atlantic ports and with the Lake and 
Northwestern markets has enabled the State to rise from 
the lowest rank as a producer of coal until it now stands 
next to Pennsylvania, which has the highest tonnage. 1 
West Virginia coal is now sold all over the country and is 
shipped from Newport News to foreign countries. 

As early as 1884 we hear complaints from the Penn- 
sylvania operators on the Monongahela River, who had 
formerly held the market from Pittsburg to New Orleans, 
that coal from the Kanawha River district of West Vir- 
ginia was taking their market. The chief explanation then 
offered was that the building of locks on the river by the 
State gave the Kanawha operators constant boating with- 
out payment of tolls and placed them 240 miles nearer the 
market. But the Monongahela operators were subjected to 
tolls from a navigation company, and the Monongahela 
was frozen over several weeks during the winter. However, 
1 West Virginia produced 2,500,000 tons in 1882; in 1912, 59,000,000. 



THE WEST VIRGINIA PROBLEM 65 

it was pointed out that the miner had to bear the chief 
burden of this competition by accepting wages low enough 
to enable the Monongahela operator to get the market 
and still make a profit. 1 

We have seen that the miners and operators of the cen- 
tral field were made to appreciate the full significance of 
West Virginia competition during the " suspension " of 
1894. 2 In the joint conference of 1898, the fact that West 
Virginia was not in the conference was looked upon as the 
element most likely to cause a break-up of the system of 
joint agreements. They realized that West Virginia com- 
petition was to be a growing danger, and that every effort 
must be made to establish working conditions, wages, and 
freight rates that would place the States as nearly as possi- 
ble on an equal basis. The granting of the eight-hour day 
and other concessions was looked upon by the operators 
as their part of a contract which bound the miners to give 
the operators in return "adequate protection against the 
competition of unorganized fields." The tonnage from 
West Virginia and Kentucky (600,000 tons) entering into 
competition with the central field was not " so large as 
it was aggressive and threatening"; but by 1910 it was 
estimated that the competitive tonnage from non-union 
fields was equal to fifty per cent of the coal consumed in 
northern and western Ohio, eastern Indiana, and Michi- 
gan, while 8,000,000 tons from non-union fields, not in- 
cluding fields adjacent to Pittsburg, entered into competi- 
tion with coal from eastern Ohio and Pennsylvania. 3 

Year after year the competition from West Virginia has 
taken on a more threatening aspect as an obstacle to agree- 
ment on a wage scale. The fact that the United Mine 
Workers have failed to organize the State has furnished 
occasion for taunts from the operators that the miners 

1 'Report of Secretary of Internal Affairs of Pennsylvania, 1884, p. 76. 

2 See above, p. 39. 

3 'Report of Senate Committee Hearings, op. cit. , part 3, p. 2152. 



66 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

were not properly directing their efforts. In return from 
the miners came veiled and open implications that the 
operators did not want the State organized and were not 
doing what they might to help bring it about. By 1910 
the only remedial measure which the operators could sug- 
gest to meet the growing pressure from West Virginia 
was for the miners to take a step backward toward the 
wage scale and working conditions of West Virginia. It 
remains for us to consider the attempts that the miners 
have made to organize the State and the reasons why they 
have failed. 

2. THE ATTEMPTS AT ORGANIZATION 

It has been said that in the middle eighties West Vir- 
ginia had more local unions in proportion to the number 
of miners than now. 1 Though this is very indefinite, it 
would seem to indicate that there was considerable agita- 
tion in West Virginia about the time of the organization 
of the National Federation of Miners and Mine Laborers 
in 1885. Evidently what was attained was not very effec- 
tive, for the West Virginia operators were never a party 
to the interstate joint conferences. 

At the meeting of the First Annual Convention of the 
United Mine Workers in 1891, there was a voting power 
of representatives from West Virginia which would in- 
dicate a membership of about fifteen hundred. 2 The fol- 
lowing year the miners in the Fairmont district of West 
Virginia made a demand for higher wages and struck 
without notifying the national officers. The local leaders 
then called upon the national organization for support, 
but an investigation by the national officials convinced 
them that neither market conditions nor wages in com- 
peting districts warranted the men in striking or in appeal- 
ing for aid. The strikers were ordered back to work. The 

1 Report of Senate Committee Hearings, op. cit., part 2, p. 1670. 

2 Report of United Mine Workers' Convention, 1891, p. 7. 



V 1 



THE WEST VIRGINIA PROBLEM 67 

operators took advantage of this situation, discharged the 
leaders, and declined to recognize the union. 1 

During the general strikes over the central field in 
1894 and 1897, the West Virginia operators raised the 
rates of wages to their miners and kept them at work 
while the other fields were idle. Out of 15,049 workers in 
1897 only 5314 struck. At this time the union had but 
206 members in West Virginia. Besides a raise in wages, 
some of the operators gave their men a bonus which 
allowed them to share in the results of increased business 
activity. This was not only effective for the moment, but 
it enabled the West Virginia coal to get into markets 
where it had never been before, and its superior quality, 
followed later by cut prices, enabled it to hold its ground. 
As we have seen, it was the influence of West Virginia 
coal that brought quick settlement of the strikes, and 
under conditions that ultimately reacted on the West Vir- 
ginia miner. If the West Virginia miner had stood with 
his fellows and enabled them to bring up the general 
scale, he would not have been forced to work on so low a 
level. This has now become evident to the national offi- 
cers of the miners. They pointed out to the operators, in 
the recent joint conference of the central field, that it 
would be useless for them to accept a reduction in the 
hope of competing with West Virginia, for West Vir- 
ginia wages and working conditions would only be forced 
down lower than those of the central field. This would still 
enable the West Virginia operator to profit by his natural 
advantage. 2 

During the years 1897 to 1900 the union made very 
little progress in West Virginia, but in 1901 a specially 
organized campaign brought eighty local unions with a 
membership of 5000 into the fold. The State was divided 
into two subdistricts with active, working officers, but 

i Roy, op. cit., p. 322. 

2 Proceedings of Interstate Joint Conference (central field), 1912. 



68 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

" active participation in the organization by any West 
Virginia miner [was] invariably followed by dismissal 
from employment." 1 Furthermore, the movement was 
greatly handicapped by the intense race prejudice exist- 
ing between the American miner of that region and the 
foreign worker. The extent of this prejudice may be ap- 
preciated when we recall that even Americans from other 
sections of the country are looked upon as " f urriners " by 
the mountaineer. The operators were also able to make 
effectual use of the argument that " the sole object of the 
United Mine Workers in sending organizers into West 
Virginia was for the purpose of inaugurating a general 
strike in the interest of other States." 2 

In the early spring of 1902 the miners of West Vir- 
ginia in a state convention formulated a wage scale and 
sought a joint conference with the operators. Failure to 
obtain a meeting stirred up discontent to the point where 
the national and district officers thought it advisable to 
call a strike in order to prevent the union from disinte- 
grating. 3 

The strike which was begun in June involved about 
eighty per cent of the miners of the State and the " pros- 
pects of a complete tie-up were encouraging." Non-union- 
ists were imported and the injunction was used to prevent 
organizers from " holding meetings at or near the mines 
of the companies," and even though the assemblage took 
place on leased ground the organizers were imprisoned. 
When they were released on bond they " were required 
to abstain from their functions as organizers in that 
State." Under a habeas corpus proceeding, brought by 
the miners to secure the release of some of their organ- 
izers, the issue was raised as to whether the Guaranty 
Trust Company of New York had the right to sue out an 
injunction ; but when the " case was taken to the higher 

1 "Report of United Mine Workers 1 Convention, 1902, p. 41. 

2 Ibid., p. 55. 8 Ibid., 1903, p. 33* 



THE WEST VIRGINIA PROBLEM 69 

courts the decision of the lower court was affirmed and 
our members were remanded back to jail." 1 The vice- 
president of the miners, in answering the question as to 
why injunctions were issued in labor disputes, pointed out 
that the injunction as a " strike-breaker is the most dan- 
gerous weapon ever brought into existence because of its 
sweeping character ; the most effective in its application 
because it is used in the name of the law ; the most de- 
structive to labor's interests because there seems to be no 
appeal from the opinions of the individual judges who 
issue the injunction ; the least expensive to the employers 
of labor because the official representatives of the Govern- 
ment enforce the provisions of the injunction.' , He also 
found in his travels over the State that the operators 
" were fearful that in some manner we were attempting to 
organize that State in order to drive them out of business." 2 

With such feelings actuating them and with the power 
to gain their ends, there was small chance of the operators 
meeting the miners to obtain a peaceful settlement. The 
strike rapidly disintegrated in the Fairmont district and ~ 

along the Norfolk and Western Railroad, but was con- ^ 
tinued in the New River and Kanawha districts until 
September. 

It was during the strike in the Kanawha district that 
an event occurred which reveals the strength of the deter- 
mination to prevent unionism from gaining a foothold in 
West Virginia. The national officers were sending sup- 
plies to the striking miners of the Kanawha district. Sev- 
eral carloads of groceries, ordered from the wholesale gro- 
cery house of Shaw, Irwin & Co. of Cincinnati, failed to 
reach their destination and it was found that they had been 
side-tracked. The application of Shaw, Irwin & Co. for an 
injunction against the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway in 
the United States District Court at Covington, Kentucky, 
asking that the railway be enjoined from hindering the 

1 Beport of United Mine Workers' Convention, 1903, p. 53. 2 Ibid., p. 54. 



70 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

free delivery of their goods, was granted. 1 Of course the 
railway depended on the transportation of coal for its 
chief business in that district and it would have been 
just as well pleased to have had the strike stopped as 
soon as possible. However, we shall see later whether that 
explains the whole situation. 

In spite of all handicaps the miners in the Kanawha 
district, with the help of the national union, held together 
until the operators were ready to meet them. The settle- 
ment reached on September 4, involving about 8000 
miners, gave the men a nine-hour day, checkweighmen, 
reduction in the price of powder, semimonthly pay, the 
right to trade at any store they preferred, the right to be- 
long to the United Mine Workers, and the reinstatement 
of all strikers without discrimination. 2 The contract was 
made for two years. Besides, an increase of ten per cent 
in wages (which the union attributed to its agitation) was 
granted in the Fairmont district and in the region trav- 
ersed by the Norfolk and Western Eailroad. 3 

At the expiration of the contract in the Kanawha field 
in 1904, another agreement was reached in joint confer- 
ence which also included the Cabin Creek district. The 
national vice-president, who attended the conference, ex- 
pressed the hope that the successful working of the joint 
agreement in the Kanawha district would make the other 
operators more willing to enter into similar contracts. 
But the Kanawha contract included a provision for the 
" check off " of dues to the union, and the operators of 
Cabin Creek gave their men to understand by notices and 
by instructions to foremen that the miners did not have 
to pay their dues, and by other means encouraged — if 
not coerced — them to sever their connection with the 



1 United Mine Workers' Journal, September 18, 1902. Reprint from Cin- 
cinnati Post. 

2 Report of United Mine Workers' 1 Convention, 1903, p. 53. 
8 Ibid., p. 38. 



THE WEST VIRGINIA PROBLEM 71 

union. 1 In answer to the protest of the district officers, 
the Cabin Creek operators offered to arbitrate the question, 
but when the matter was referred to the national officers, 
they " approved the action of the district officers in re- 
fusing to arbitrate a question clearly defined in the records 
of our convention and accepted without equivocation by 
seventy-five per cent of the operators in the Kanawha 
field." 2 The union men struck without success and the 
organization removed them to other fields where they se- 
cured work in union mines. 

The miners and operators in the Kanawha field have 
continued to form agreements, but the membership of the 
union in West Virginia has been maintained with diffi- 
culty and there has been no extension of the joint agree- 
ment to other fields until recently. The struggle in the 
Cabin Creek and the Paint Creek districts in 1912 is con- 
sidered in another connection in the latter part of this 
chapter. 

These events which have been described are fairly indica- 
tive of the factors which have prevented the organization 
of the State and the joint agreement, but there are larger 
economic and social considerations which demand atten- 
tion before we are in a position to appreciate the full 
significance of the West Virginia problem. 



3. WHY WEST VIRGINIA HAS REMAINED 
UNORGANIZED 

A. RUKAL WOKKEKS AND INDIVIDUALISM 

In the first place, there has always been a large force 
of country laborers to draw upon to whom the wages paid 
in the mine were very attractive. Unless the worker was 
intelligent enough to consider carefully what his net 
wages were, he would not discover that the job was really 

1 Report of United Mine Workers' Convention, 1905, p. 19. 

2 Ibid., p. 19. 



72 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

less attractive than it looked. Only after deductions were 
made for tools, supplies, powder, unfair weighing and 
measuring, dockage, an allowance made for " deadwork," 
and the small number of working days taken into account, 
would he be able to determine whether he was better off 
than at rural work. The standards of living and prices in 
the rural regions of West Virginia are relatively lower 
than in the rural regions of Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio. 
In 1897 (the year of the lowest level) only in the Pitts- 
burg thick vein, where southern European labor was abun- 
dant and rates low, were the wages of miners lower than in 
West Virginia. In the former, 28 to 30 cents per ton was 
paid, while West Virginia's average yearly wage was $275. 
In 1903, a year of one of the highest levels which the scale 
reached in all the States, West Virginia had an average 
price of 49.5 cents per ton, 1 while the average in Illinois 
was 64.4 cents ; in Indiana, 88 cents ; in Ohio, 76.7 cents ; 
and in Western Pennsylvania, 52.9 cents. 2 Individualism 
was highly developed, as is always the case with native 
mountain peoples. Many miners worked on a contract 
basis and employed negroes to work for them at a very 
low rate. 3 Even now, ten per cent of the mine workers are 
negroes working on such a basis, while six per cent of the 
workers are skilled negro miners working on their own 
initiative. 4 Thus a rural population with strong individual 
tendencies and with opportunities for individual enterprise 
in employing contract labor would not take readily to an 
organization which required group action. 

B. Immigration 

Immigration has also played an important part in 
preventing organization. In 1903 the Society for the 
Protection of Italian Immigrants found it necessary to 

1 Report of Chief Mine Inspector of West Virginia, 1903, p. 74. 

2 Proceedings of Interstate Joint Conference, 1903. 

3 George, op. cit. } p. 193. 4 Official correspondence. 



THE WEST VIRGINIA PROBLEM 73 

investigate conditions in West Virginia. From this in- 
vestigation it was found that large bands of men were 
being imported into West Virginia by coal and construc- 
tion companies to carry on the exploitation of natural 
resources. The companies were in collusion with Italian 
agents in New York who made a business of distributing 
immigrants. In most cases the immigrants were deceived 
into thinking their destination was but a short distance 
from New York. The companies paid their transportation 
and naturally made efforts to retain them as long as pos- 
sible. The avarice of the agents led them to send barbers, 
waiters, and other men entirely unfitted for the work of 
mining, thus increasing the difficulty of holding them. 
However, in the " boarding-house law " the keepers of the 
commissary had a ready weapon at hand for their arrest 
and detention. Forceful detention and the employment of 
armed guards to intimidate the men led to practices which 
were well termed peonage. The society took measures 
both in New York and in West Virginia to remedy condi- 
tions. 1 But the fact that the companies could thus direct 
a labor supply, whether forcibly or peacefully, shows the 
significance of immigration to a working population which 
is seeking solidarity in order to raise its standard of living. 
Recent testimony before the Senate Committee on Educa- 
tion and Labor 2 brought out the fact that the State Gov- 
ernment had cooperated in directing the flow of immigra- 
tion. A state law was passed in 1871 which provided for the 
appointment of an immigration commissioner. He was to 
correspond with parties outside of the State to obtain both 
labor and capital and " to show the advantages of West 
Virginia." 3 Although there was no provision in the law 
to warrant it, the commissioner appointed in 1907 did not 

1 United Mine Workers' Journal, June 18, 1903, quotes the society's re- 
port from the Pittsburg Dispatch. 

2 Report of Senate Committee Hearings, op. cit,, part 2, p. 2080^ 

3 Ibid., p. 2086. 



74 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

receive a salary, but obtained his compensation by fees 
from coal companies for furnishing them labor. Before 
the commissioner was authorized to act he was supposed 
to investigate working conditions and to obtain an indorse- 
ment from the Board of Public Works. The act was passed 
at a time when the State badly needed an industrial 
population, and it was thought good policy for the State 
to get its share of the stream of immigration. The Board 
of Public Works organized for this purpose had the power 
to appoint a commissioner, fix his salary, and obtain 
payment for all expenses from the state treasury. 1 

This state cooperation resulted in the commissioner's 
hiring himself for a stated salary to one company, the 
New River Company, for which he worked from 1907 to 
1909, and to the Consolidation Coal Company from 1909 
to 1913. 2 We shall hear more of this company later. The 
companies' advertisements for labor bore the official in- 
dorsement of the " State Commissioner Immigration, State 
of West Virginia," and gave no indication that he was a 
special agent of the company. Thirty-one per cent of the 
mine workers are now of non-English-speaking peoples, 
and sixteen per cent are negroes. 3 It is easy to appreciate 
the part which a heterogeneous mining population has 
played in preventing organization. 

C. Absentee Ownership 

A condition that early showed its force in preventing 
organization was the ownership of West Virginia mines 
by operators and capitalists of other States. So long as 
they could keep the rural population working for less than 
union wages, they had no desire to pay them more even 
though the coal they owned in West Virginia did drive out 
the coal they owned in other States. At the same time that 
their West Virginia coal was supplanting some of their coal 

1 West Virginia Laws, 1871, chap. 156. 

2 Report of Senate Committee Hearings, op. cit., part 2, p. 2085. 

3 Ibid., p. 2028. 



THE WEST VIRGINIA PROBLEM 75 

in Ohio and Illinois, it was also taking a larger percentage 
away from their competitors in those States. There is 
plenty of evidence that this situation exists, for operators 
who have cried loudest against West Virginia competition 
have been known to use their West Virginia coal to take 
the local market away from a mining town in Illinois and 
force the closing of the mine. 1 And from these same men 
the United Mine Workers have met with the sternest oppo- 
sition in attempting to organize the West Virginia miners. 2 
In fact, absentee owners concern themselves mostly with 
dividends, and may well consider the pertinency of a ques- 
tion asked by Senator Kenyon of an absentee owner — 
" Now, is not that one of the troubles in this country, that 
wealth sits back and says, * Our responsibility is ended in 
merely getting our dividends and seeing that things are 
done in an orderly way ' ? " 3 

D. The System of Armed Guards 

The nature of the region and the necessity for the pro- 
tection of their properties has been the chief argument 
which the operators have advanced for maintaining a sys- 
tem of armed guards. This system has been a powerful 
weapon in controlling the working force. In holding the 
men who had been imported until they at least worked out 
the cost of their transportation, and in keeping out union 
organizers, it has been very effective. In 1897 a law was 
passed which prohibited the employment by corporations 
of non-residents of the State for police duty. This was 
aimed at the mine guard system. In so interpreting it, 
Senator Kenyon in the recent investigations was informed 
by a representative of the operators that he was stating 
the statute " a little too broadly," as the statute forbade 
" the employment of any non-resident of the State to do 
police duty," 4 though this interpretation has not prevented 

1 Report of Senate Committee Hearings, op. cit., part. 2, p. 2027. 

2 Ibid., p. 2028. 3 Ibid., p. 2125. * Ibid., p. 1392. 



76 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

the operators from employing private agencies who 
brought in strong-arm men from outside the State. 1 The 
full significance of such a system was shown during the re- 
cent strike when the feeling between the men and the 
mine guards rose to the point of causing bloodshed. We 
are interested at this point in simply enumerating the 
guard system as one of the factors preventing organization 
by the union. The full import of the system of guards will 
be shown in the discussion of the recent West Virginia 
strike. 

E. Injunctions and Conspiracy Laws 

The treatment which the union has received at the hands 
of the federal and West Virginia courts under injunction 
and conspiracy laws is anything but conducive to the mod- 
erate language in which the organization's one-time leader 
referred to injunctions — " It is difficult to speak in meas- 
ured tones or moderate language of the savagery and venom 
with which unions have been assailed by the injunction, 
and to the working-classes, as to all fair-minded men, it 
seems little less than a crime to condone or tolerate it." 2 
One of the judges of a United States District Court showed 
his lack of appreciation of the union movement by refer- 
ring to the organizers as " a professional set of agitators " 
and " vampires that fatten on the honest labor of the coal 
miners." In 1902, under an injunction case the union 
movement was held to be a conspiracy by which the union 
sought to control the coal industry of West Virginia. Sev- 
eral organizers were punished under the law of conspiracy 
and for the violation of an injunction forbidding them to 
hinder (by picketing) the operation of the Virginia Iron, 
Coal, and Coke Company's plant. The case was approved 
by two circuit judges, and as it was impossible to get a 
writ of habeas corpus, direct appeal was made to President 

1 Report of Senate Committee Hearings, op. cit., part 1, p. 85. 

2 Mitchell, Organized Labor, 1903, p. 324. 






THE WEST VIRGINIA PROBLEM 77 

Roosevelt, who, after an investigation of the case had been 
made, pardoned the men. 1 

F. State Statutes veksus the Common Law 

Another important factor which has prevented the union 
from gaining a foothold has been the overthrow of the 
state statutes by court decisions based on the common 
law. 

In connection with a general law on mining in 1897, a 
prohibition was inserted against threats, force, and intimi- 
dation of workingmen by any person or combination of 
persons; "but this provision," it was declared, " shall not 
be so construed as to prevent any two or more persons 
from associating together under the Knights of Labor, 
or any other name they may desire, for any lawful pur- 
pose, or for using moral suasion or lawful argument to 
induce any one not to work in and about any mine." 2 In 
1903 a case arose under this provision wherein a coal com- 
pany brought action against organizers of the United Mine 
Workers for enticing miners, who were employed by the 
company but not under written contract except in two in- 
stances, to quit work. The organizers were legitimately en- 
gaged in their regular business of preaching unionism and 
forming local unions. As is usual when the union senti- 
ment is strong enough, the local made demands and sought 
recognition of their organization. The fact that two of 
the men who struck happened to be working under a writ- 
ten contract gave a basis of action under the common law. 
The lower court refused to grant a remedy to the com- 
pany, but on appeal the Supreme Court held that the leg- 
islature had meant this law to be a criminal act to prevent 
the malicious enticing of workers from their employers and 
that it did not prevent the employer from bringing civil 

1 United Mine Workers' Journal, April 3, 1902, reprint of the court de- 
cision. 

2 West Virginia Laws, 1897. 



78 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 
action for damages against the person who enticed the 



men 



The method by which this conclusion was reached is 
an interesting phenomenon which the average citizen may 
well begin to consider in its application to future social, 
industrial, and political development. To most minds it 
would seem that the above-quoted words of the law meant 
what they said — that the provision against force, threats, 
etc., " should not be so construed " as to prevent " using 
moral suasion or lawful argument," etc., especially so 
since the general act and the section of the act in which 
the clause is introduced is for regulation of general con- 
ditions of the industry and not a " criminal " act. After 
a series of citations thoroughly to prop up the master and 
servant doctrine of common law, the court applied it to 
an assumed contractual relation existing between the em- 
ployer and the miner. The fact that the men were em- 
ployed was assumed to be a contract. " Now, if the law 
gives action for the enticement of a servant, it is not con- 
ceivable that a third person can maliciously entice away 
a lot of employees, simply because there was no contract 
fixing term of service." It was not conceivable to the 
court either that " a party " should " have a justifiable 
cause to investigate, to move, the breach of contract be- 
tween master and servant." But what law gives action 
for " enticement of a servant " ? The common law, of 
course. The state statute did not give any right of action 
for enticement, but sanctioned it. But the court prohibited 
the organizers from spreading their doctrines. 

As a result of this decision rendered in 1906, the state 
law remains on the books and permits combination, pick- 
eting, and lawful persuasion of men to leave their employ- 
ment when it is to their interest and the interest of their 
trade in general. But the legislature in 1907 sanctioned 
a revised code containing this law with the interpretation 
1 Thacker Coal Company vs. Burke, 59 West Virginia, 253. 



THE WEST VIRGINIA PROBLEM 79 

the court put upon it. The union is now subject to a law 
which says that any person or persons shall have the 
right to combine and persuade others to leave their em- 
ployment and yet they are subject to punishment if they 
" maliciously entice servants to desert the service in which 
they are engaged . . . nor does it restrict the master's 
right to sue another for damages resulting from the ma- 
licious enticement of the servant." 1 In short, the common 
law takes precedence over the state statute and makes 
it ineffective, and it rests with the court to decide what is 
malicious enticement and to apply punishment therefor. 

4. THE BROADER ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM 
A. The Territorial Aspect 

Besides the conditions which we have considered above, 
there is a larger aspect to the West Virginia problem 
which involves not merely the question of union organiza- 
tion of the State, but the possible continuation of the 
system of joint agreements at large and a consideration 
of the development of economic and industrial conditions 
which are of national importance. In order to compre- 
hend the forces which lie behind the problem, it is neces- 
sary to extend our consideration of it beyond the confines 
of the State of "West Virginia. It is a question of control 
and exploitation of a territory made up of the State of 
West Virginia, southwestern and central Pennsylvania, 
Maryland, and the western portion of Virginia. Our 
chief interest lies in discovering what are the forces that 
control and direct the policies and the attitude of capital 
toward labor and threaten the disruption of the joint con- 
ference. In order to understand the situation it is neces- 
sary to know the extent of concentrated ownership of coal 
lands, stock ownership by railroads in coal companies and 
coal lands, and the interlocking directorates which make 
1 West Virginia Code Supplement, 1909, p. 60. 



80 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

it possible for a few individuals to control the natural re- 
sources and transportation facilities upon which the eco- 
nomic welfare of a large population depends. The power 
and extent of these forces were brought out by the find- 
ings of the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1907. 

B. Investigation by the Interstate Commerce 
Commission, 1907 

By a joint resolution of Congress in 1906 the Inter- 
state Commerce Commission was directed to make an in- 
vestigation into railroad discriminations and monopolies 
in coal and oil in the region outlined above. 1 More specifi- 
cally the Commission was directed to find out the extent 
of stock holding and ownership in coal properties and 
mines by common carriers ; how far their officers were in- 
terested in this ownership; whether there was any conspir- 
acy in restraint of trade ; and whether the system of car- 
supply and distribution was equitable. Any other facts it 
might consider pertinent and any remedy it could sug- 
gest were also to be reported to Congress. 

C. Ownership of Coal Lands and Stock 

A. HOLDINGS OF NORFOLK AND WESTERN RAILWAY 

Previous to 1901, 300,000 acres of coal land had been 
held by the Flat Top Coal Land Association in the Poca- 
hontas Flat Top coal field of Virginia and West Virginia. 
In that year the Pocahontas Coal and Coke Company 
was incorporated in New Jersey to take over these coal 
lands. The Norfolk and Western Railroad Company ac- 
quired the stock of the coal company the same year 
and transferred $20,000,000 of joint bonds of the two 
companies to the syndicate which put through the deal. At 

1 Beport of Interstate Commerce Commission on the Investigation of the 
Eastern Bituminous Coal Situation, 59th Congress, 2d Session, House Doc. 
561. 



THE WEST VIRGINIA PROBLEM 81 

the same time the interest on these joint bonds was guar- 
anteed by the Pennsylvania Railroad Company and the 
Pittsburg, Cincinnati, Chicago, and St. Louis Railway 
Company. The Pocahontas Coal and Coke Company up 
to 1907 had not been able to meet its expenses and pay 
interest on its bonded indebtedness. The revenue it got 
from royalties on coal and coke produced on its land by 
lessees was not sufficient to cover its obligations. The com- 
pany itself did not mine coal and the deficiency in interest 
had to be met by the railroads. Since the Norfolk and West- 
ern Railroad gets about seventy per cent of its coal traffic 
from the Pocahontas region, it was worth controlling. 

B. WESTERN MARYLAND RAILROAD COMPANY 
HOLDINGS 

By the acquisition of the West Virginia Central and 
Pittsburg Railway Company and its coal lands in 1902, 
the control of the Davis Coal and Coke Company, and 
the purchase of the Maryland Smokeless Coal Company 
stock in 1905, the Western Maryland Railroad Company 
acquired control of 138,000 acres of coal land in West 
Virginia and Maryland. 

C. THE BALTIMORE AND OHIO RAILROAD 
COMPANY 

The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company carries 
coal from the bituminous fields in the southern part of 
Pennsylvania, the western part of Maryland, and the 
northern part of West Virginia. The Baltimore and Ohio 
Railroad in 1873 purchased fifty-two per cent of the 
stock of the Consolidation Coal Company (organized in 
1860), which had reached a capitalization of 110,250,000 
by 1907 and produced about 2,000,000 tons yearly. Some 
years previous the Consolidation Coal Company had pur- 
chased the stock of the Cumberland and Pennsylvania 



82 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

Railroad which serves the region in which a large part 
of the coal company's lands are located. In 1903 the 
Consolidation Coal Company purchased the majority 
stock of the Fairmont Coal Company which produces 
a yearly tonnage of 3,800,000 tons and owns 56,986 
acres of coal land. The Fairmont Coal Company at the 
time of its deal with the Consolidation Coal Company 
owned the Clarksburg Fuel Company which produced 
800,000 tons yearly; the Northwestern Fuel Company 
which is engaged in the business of forwarding, storing, 
selling, and retail distribution of coal and coke for 
Chicago and the Lake markets ; and the Pittsburg and 
Fairmont Fuel Company which shipped 300,000 tons 
yearly. The Fairmont Coal Company also was engaged in 
the purchasing of coal from independent operators along 
the lines of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. In 1903 
the Consolidation Coal Company also purchased the 
Somerset Coal Company and the following year bought 
the Metropolitan Coal Company of Boston which buys, 
sells, and distributes coal in New England. In 1905 the 
Southern Coal and Transportation Company, which owned 
4800 acres of coal lands in Barbour County, West Vir- 
ginia, was forced to sell out at a loss to the Consolidation 
Coal Company because it could not get sufficient car serv- 
ice from the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. 1 Through its 
ownership of the West Virginia and Pittsburg Railway 
Company, the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad is the owner 
of a large body of coal lands in the Gauley country in 
West Virginia. " It appears in the record that this com- 
pany owns directly a very large amount of coal lands." 
Thus the ownership by the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad 
of fifty-two percent of the Consolidation Coal Company's 
stock gave it control over an immense coal-producing 
area and placed at its command distributing agencies in 
New England and in the Lake markets. 
1 Report of Interstate Commerce Commission to Congress, op. cit. y p. 11. 



THE WEST VIRGINIA PROBLEM 83 

During the progress of the investigation the Baltimore 
and Ohio Railroad informed the Commission that it had 
made a sale of its stock in the Consolidation Coal Com- 
pany. But the announcement was made only after the 
stock ownership of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad in 
the coal company and discriminations against other ship- 
pers had been developed. The nature of this sale is worth 
examining. It was described as an absolute sale of the 
stock to a syndicate of men interested in other coal com- 
panies, and gave the railroad a lien on the coal properties 
for unpaid purchase money ; nor could the periodically 
fixed payments on the stock be completed for thirty years. 
One provision of the sale required that all coal of the 
Consolidation Coal Company and its subsidiaries should 
be shipped over the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad till the 
purchase money was paid. Both parties refused to state 
the price at which the sale had been made. After the first 
payment was made the stock was placed in the hands of 
the Windsor Trust Company of New York to assure the 
other payments and the " observance of certain covenants 
made by the purchasers in reference to the sale." The 
railroad defended its policy of acquiring stock and control 
as a " war measure " to prevent the Wabash interests 
from gaining the ascendancy. The whole transaction 
failed to deceive the Commission, for it ascertained that 
the earnings for years had been greater than the dividends 
and by utilizing the net earnings above the interest on the 
purchase money the principal could be gradually paid off 
" without any expenditure on the part of the purchasers." 
The Commission concluded that the railroad was still 
" very largely interested in the prosperity of the Consoli- 
dation Coal Company and its subsidiary companies." Fur- 
ther, it was discovered that this " sale " could not have 
been made without the consent of men who, besides being 
directors of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, were also 
directors of the Pennsylvania Railroad and the New York 



84 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

Central and Hudson River Railroad Company. But the 
full significance of this will be seen later. 

D. THE PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD COMPANY 

The Pennsylvania Railroad owned the entire capital 
stock and $4,383,231 of bonds of the Manor Real Estate 
and Trust Company, whose business is the buying and sell- 
ing of real estate, and it owned 8899 acres of coal land 
"more or less" in the various counties. Besides, the rail- 
road had "some interest" in the Walhonding Coal Com- 
pany on its lines west of Pittsburg and owned the entire 
capital stock of the Susquehanna Coal Company whose 
holdings were in the anthracite region. 

E. THE NEW YORK CENTRAL AND HUDSON RIVER 
RAILROAD COMPANY 

The New York Central acquired control of the Fall 
Brook Railroad and the Beech Creek Railroad by lease 
in 1899 and by purchase of stock in 1910. 1 This gives the 
Central a line extending from Lyons, New York (on its 
main line), into central Pennsylvania. It hauls coal out 
of Cambria, Clearfield, Indiana, Center, and Tioga Coun- 
ties. The railroad owns the capital stock (11,000,000) of 
the Clearfield Bituminous Coal Corporation whose entire 
product is used by this railroad for fuel. Formerly this 
coal corporation engaged in commercial coal business. 
But in 1901, by agreement with the Beech Creek Coal 
and Coke Company, the commercial coal business was dis- 
pensed with. In the same year the New York Central was 
given 5000 shares of the Beech Creek Coal and Coke Com- 
pany on condition that it furnish ready transportation for 
1,000,000 tons of coal mined by the coal company. Four 
years later the railroad exchanged these 5000 shares for 
5000 shares of common stock, 5000 shares of preferred 

1 Official correspondence. 



THE WEST VIRGINIA PROBLEM 85 

stock, and $500,000 in bonds of the Pennsylvania Coal 
and Coke Company, which, by taking over the Beech 
Creek coal and coke properties, became owner of 26,000 
acres of coal lands, 3000 acres under lease, 21 mines in 
operation, and about four fifths of the capital stock of the 
North River Coal and Wharf Company, which controls 
" a tidewater delivery point of the Central Railroad of 
New Jersey, for coal originating on the line of the New 
York Central and Hudson River Railroad." The railroad 
also owned fifty-two per cent of the stock of the West 
Branch Coal Company, a small concern with a capital 
stock of 150,000 (in 1907). 

F. BUFFALO AND SUSQUEHANNA RAILROAD COMPANY 

The Buffalo and Susquehanna Railroad Company's ac- 
tivities were confined to the northern central portion of 
Pennsylvania, and it owned the Buffalo and Susquehanna 
Coal and Coke Company which had a capital of $1,140,- 
000, and all but $400 of the $100,000 capital of the Pow- 
hatan Coal and Coke Company. 

G. BUFFALO, ROCHESTER, AND PITTSBURG RAILWAY 

COMPANY 

The Buffalo, Rochester, and Pittsburg Railway Com- 
pany owned $3,999,500 of the $4,000,000 capital stock 
of the Rochester and Pittsburg Coal and Iron Company, 
and the latter company owned a controlling interest in 
the Jefferson and Clearfield Coal and Iron Company, 
capitalized at $3,000,000. 

H. PITTSBURG, SHAWMUT, AND NORTHERN RAILROAD 
COMPANY 

The Pittsburg, Shawmut, and Northern Railroad Com- 
pany, through its ownership of the Kersey Mining Company 
and the Shawmut Mining Company, possessed 28,800 



86 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

acres of coal lands besides coal lands in Jefferson County 
that were not in operation. 

I. THE ERIE RAILROAD COMPANY 

The Erie Railroad Company owned the Northwest 
Mining and Exchange Company and the Blossburg Coal 
Company. The production from these concerns was used 
almost entirely by the Erie for fuel. 

J. CHESAPEAKE AND OHIO RAILWAY COMPANY 

It was claimed that the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway 
Company did not own stock in any coal properties along 
its lines, but it acquired the ownership of 28,000 acres of 
coal land from the Western Pocahontas Coal and Lum- 
ber Company. In 1907 the railroad did not penetrate this 
property and no mining was conducted upon it. 

D. Traffic Associations 

Chaotic conditions previous to 1895 caused the railroads 
• to form themselves into traffic associations in order to 
stop the demoralization of freight rates by rebating and 
to come to some agreement in the allotment of tonnage 
and the establishment of rates. These associations em- 
ployed statisticians to determine tonnage, and the various 
railroads were assigned different percentages. Penalties 
were provided for the violation of these percentages, but 
it was found impossible to enforce them strictly. How- 
ever, the conferences of the associations resulted in the 
fixing of rates. 

A. THE TIDEWATER BITUMINOUS STEAM COAL 
TRAFFIC ASSOCIATION 

The association which controlled the territory we are 
interested in included the Pennsylvania Railroad, New 
York Central and Hudson River Railroad, the Baltimore 



THE WEST VIRGINIA PROBLEM 87 

and Ohio Railroad, the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway, 
the Norfolk and Western Railway, and the Philadelphia 
and Reading Railway. 



B. OWNERSHIP OF STOCK AND INTERLOCKING 
DIRECTORATES 

The fact that the association was not effective in fixing 
allotments and rates led the Pennsylvania Railroad to buy 
stocks in the Chesapeake and Ohio, the Baltimore and 
Ohio, and the Norfolk and Western Railway Company in 
order to act with others in bringing about the desired re- 
sults. It acquired 38 per cent of the Norfolk and Western 
stock, 25 per cent of the Chesapeake and Ohio, and 37.6 
per cent of the Baltimore and Ohio. 

The New York Central acquired 20 per cent of the 
Chesapeake and Ohio stock, and 21.7 per cent of the stock 
of the Reading Company, which in turn owned the entire 
capital stock of the Philadelphia and Reading Company. 
The Baltimore and Ohio also acquired 21.7 per cent of the 
Reading Company's stock. Thus the New York Central 
and Baltimore and Ohio together owned 43.4 per cent of 
the Reading Company's stock. 

At the meetings of the stockholders the minority hold- 
ings by combining could control the railroad policies and 
the Commission was forced "to the conclusion that the 
practical control of the several railroads mentioned was 
in the Pennsylvania Railroad Company and the New York 
Central and Hudson River Railroad Company." 1 In the 
make-up of executive committees of the boards of directors 
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90 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

York Central and two were officers of the Pennsylvania 
Railroad ; and of the five members of the executive com- 
mittee of the Norfolk and Western Railroad, the Penn- 
sylvania Railroad controlled three. 

The diagrams on pages 88 and 89 make these facts 
stand out more strikingly than words can portray them. 
We must remember also that this is the minimum amount 
of information in regard to the situation. In many cases 
the Commission made no pretense of giving the extent of 
landholdings of companies which the railroads owned or 
in which they held a partial or controlling interest. These 
facts make us realize that the same process is going on 
and the same policy being pursued which has directed de- 
velopments in the anthracite field. 1 Furthermore, we have 
no knowledge of how close the relationship is between the 
big railroads and the smaller ones whose holdings are 
shown on page 89. Of this we may be sure — the rail- 
roads meant not only to assure themselves of traffic, but 
they proposed to gain the ownership of the resources of 
the region and to direct so far as possible the policies 
which should govern them. 

1 Since the investigation by the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1906 
the railroads have been carrying on a process of consolidation by purchase 
and ownership instead of control through majority stock ownership or com- 
bination of minority holdings. The Pennsylvania Railroad divided its hold- 
ings in the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad between the Pennsylvania Com- 
pany (a holding company) and its other companies, and by July, 1913, its 
interests amounted to $42,547,200 of preferred and common stock in the 
Baltimore and Ohio, or twenty-one percent. (See Moody' 's Manual, 1914, p. 
1369.) In July, 1913, the Pennsylvania Railroad traded its holdings in the 
Baltimore and Ohio for $38,292,400 of Southern Pacific stock held by the 
Union Pacific Company. (See Moody 1 s Manual, 1914, p. 103.) A mere trans- 
fer of landlords is not apt to change the policy in respect to concentration 
and control. Moreover, the Pennsylvania Railroad has surrendered none of 
its control of the coal lands in possession of the Norfolk and Western, for 
its percentage of the stock of that road has risen from thirty-eight to forty- 
three per cent. 



THE WEST VIRGINIA PROBLEM 91 

E. Direction of Policy towakd Labor 

If these interests were able to control the general poli- 
cies affecting the common carriers and natural resources 
in regard to prices and rates, they were also able to direct 
the policy of capital toward labor. Under these circum- 
stances the real powers with which labor has to contend, 
whenever it attempts to disturb prices, become apparent. 
We must remember that it is not merely the coal compa- 
nies owned and controlled by the railroads which are sub- 
jected to the all-pervasive influence of the railroads, but 
the so-called independent companies, in spite of them- 
selves, in their attitude toward labor, must conform to the 
wishes of the powerful railroad officials. No matter how 
willing an independent operator may be to grant conces- 
sions to his men, it becomes an impossibility if the coal 
and railroad corporations decide to crush unionism and 
establish wages and working conditions which go with 
individual bargaining. The independent operator cannot 
compete under such circumstances and he must fall in line 
with the general policy of the bigger concerns in order 
to exist. The large corporations, which are able to estab- 
lish a regime of individual bargaining over a large section 
of the most valuable coal fields, stand as a constant men- 
ace to all the fields which are willing to enter a joint 
agreement to establish uniformity. Besides the differen- 
tial which this region has, because of its better natural 
advantages and resources, the opportunity is always pres- 
ent under individual bargaining to exploit the individual 
laborer to almost any extent within the limit of subsistence 
wages in order to keep just under the prices of the union 
fields. 

F. Westmoreland County Strike, 1910-11 

If we are disposed to question this power and the pol- 
icy of crushing all opposition, we have but to refer to 



92 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

recent events in Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania 
(a county dependent on the Pennsylvania Railroad and 
its branches), and in West Virginia. In Westmoreland 
County we find a working force, seventy per cent of 
whom are foreigners, 1 struggling for over a year to obtain 
collective bargaining, only to be defeated by the resources 
which large corporate wealth had at its command. 

A. CAUSE AND SPREAD OF THE STRIKE 

For twenty years the condition in this county had been 
a bugbear to the collective agreement in the Pittsburg 
district. The miners' leaders were always confronted with 
the statement that competitive conditions in Westmore- 
land made it impossible to grant concessions. All efforts 
of the United Mine Workers to organize the county by 
employing organizers had failed. Finally, in March, 1910, 
the company charges for " permissible explosives " (safety 
explosives) and safety lamps brought the men of one com- 
pany together to discuss their grievances. As soon as the 
company officials learned that the men had sent a dele- 
gate to the United Mine Workers to obtain an organizer 
and that a union was being formed, the unionists were 
discharged. 2 The men demanded the reinstatement of 
those victimized. With a refusal from the company the 
fight was on. Within a month the strike had become gen- 
eral in the Greensburg, Irwin, and Latrobe Basins, in- 
volving 10,631 men out of 15,537. 

b. operators' tactics 

Then the companies began all the tactics usually em- 
ployed to defeat the worker. Unskilled strike-breakers 

1 Report on the Miners' Strike in Westmoreland County, Pa., 1910-11, 
prepared under the direction of C. P. Neill, Commissioner of Labor, 62d 
Congress, 2d Session, House Doc. 847, p. 108. 

2 The law of 1897 prohibiting interference with employees for connection 
with a labor union and providing penalties was declared unconstitutional in 
1900. Ibid., p. 46. 



THE WEST VIRGINIA PROBLEM 93 

were imported at higher wages than the regular men de- 
manded, with resulting increase of accidents and loss of 
life. 1 The strikers were evicted from the company houses 
and the United Mine Workers sheltered them in camps 
on leased ground. The ever-ready injunction prohibited 
the men from marching on the public highways to stir up 
enthusiasm and gain adherents. 2 State coal and iron po- 
lice, deputy sheriffs, deputy constables, and state police 
made up the small army of men which protected the prop- 
erties. The state coal and iron police were commissioned 
by the governor at the request of the companies, and paid 
by the companies. The state police were a body of mounted 
men belonging to the state constabulary. The deputies 
were made up of outsiders furnished by the sheriff to the 
companies according to contract at a rate of from four to 
five dollars per day. When the sheriff sent deputies with 
warrants to arrest some non-unionists employed by the 
companies who were alleged to have fired upon the 
strikers, the deputies were arrested for trespass by coal 
and iron police employed by the companies. They were 
taken before a justice of the peace and sentenced to ten 
days' imprisonment. The sheriff refused to imprison his 
deputies and later was tried for this offense by the 
Court of Quarter Sessions and sentenced to thirteen 
months in the penitentiary. This charge and one for 
embezzlement of fees the sheriff claimed were instigated 
by the companies because of a disagreement over the 
amount of profit he was to make out of furnishing dep- 
uties. 3 

1 An increase of twenty-one fatal accidents above normal years. Re- 
port of Miners 1 Strike in Westmoreland County, Pa., 1911, op. cit., p. 14 

2 The miners obtained a modification of the injunction in order to attend 
the funeral of a comrade in a body. Their march took them over a high- 
way leading through a coal company's property. Before the officials of the 
company and their hired police would honor the modified writ, the men 
were compelled to furl their American flags and carry them with staffs 
pointing downward. Ibid., p. 62. 

8 Ibid., p. 21. 



94 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

Seven companies filed suits against the union officers 
for damages amounting to from 1200,000 to 1500,000 for 
each company. They were charged with conspiracy, intimi- 
dation, violence, and general lawlessness. This raised such 
a furor among organized labor in all industries that the 
suits were not pressed. 

O. REFUSAL TO ARBITRATE 

Offers to arbitrate, by the men, and attempts at medi- 
ation by the Pittsburg Chamber of Commerce were with- 
out results. Appeals to the governor brought the response 
that he had no power to investigate the situation or reme- 
dies to offer. The union spent $1,064,865 in supporting 
the miners, but finally declared the strike off in July, 
1911. As a mere test of strength and resources the union 
was fighting against too great odds. 

G. The Strike of 1912 in West Virginia 

When we turn our attention to the recent troubles in 
West Virginia we find many conditions similar to those 
which were present in Pennsylvania. In West Virginia 
the ill-feeling developed into actual warfare between the 
contending parties. In the early part of this chapter we 
found that the union had gained a foothold in the Kana- 
wha district in 1902, but since that time no headway had 
been made in organizing the State. 

The trouble in the Kanawha field began in April, 1912, 
and after a ten days' strike an agreement was made with 
all the field except Paint Creek. But the trouble at Paint 
Creek soon spread to Cabin Creek and New River, both 
non-union fields. In the background of the immediate or 
surface causes for discontent stood the larger economic 
and geographical factors which influenced the viewpoint 
of the operators and encouraged them to assume an arbi- 
trary attitude toward what they regarded as insurmount- 
able difficulties. The geographical situation of West Vir- 



THE WEST VIRGINIA PROBLEM 95 

ginia, which leaves the West Virginia operator farthest 
from the Lake market, led him to assume that a fair 
adjustment of differentials between the State and other 
States could not be worked out in the joint conference of 
the central field. 1 

Until a little more than a year ago the operators in the 
Pittsburg district had a differential in freight rates over 
the West Virginia operators of 9 cents on a ton. Pressure 
from the Pittsburg operators upon the railroads brought 
a joint meeting of railroad officials, Pittsburg operators, 
and West Virginia operators in an attempt to settle upon 
satisfactory rates. 2 The parties could not agree, but the 
railroads raised the rates on the West Virginia coal 9^ 
cents per ton, which gave the Pittsburg district a differen- 
tial of 18 J cents. As the result of an appeal which the 
West Virginia operators carried to the Interstate Com- 
merce Commission the rates were suspended, but later the 
Commission ordered a decrease of 10 cents per ton on the 
existing rates from the Pittsburg district, which gave it a 
differential of 19 cents. 

Because of this differential the operators on Cabin 
Creek and Paint Creek claimed they could not pay the 
union scale which went into effect in the Kanawha district, 
but " even with the differential spread to 19 cents, they 
are shipping coal as fast as they can mine it." 3 

The Paint Creek miners were organized, but they re- 
ceived information that their operators would not sign the 
union scale for another year and that they would insist on 
conditions similar to those in vogue in the unorganized 
Cabin Creek district. This forecast proved correct, and 
the Paint Creek operators withdrew from the Kanawha 
Operators' Association. 

1 Report of Senate Committee Hearings, op. cit., part 1, p. 962. 

2 Ibid., part 2, p. 1880. 

3 West, " The Civil War in the West Virginia Coal Mines," The Survey, 
April 5, 1913, p. 40. 



96 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

The issues which weighed most heavily with the miners 
are expressed in their formal demands: — 

Abolition of the mine guard system. 

A reform in the system of docking used (which deducted as 
high as 1000 pounds for impurities). 1 

The employment of checkweighmen on the tipples to repre- 
sent the miners and to be paid by the miners. The law provides 
for these checkweighmen, but this law is ignored by the coal 
companies. 

Permission for the men to trade where they please without 
discrimination against them for so doing. 

The payment of wages in cash every two weeks and not in 
script or credit cards. 

Improved sanitary conditions, with the requirement that the 
companies remove garbage and keep the houses in good con- 
dition. 

Payment for mining coal on the basis of the short ton, on 
which the coal is sold, and not on the basis of the long ton, on 
which it is at present mined. 

Rentals of houses based on a fair return on their cost with 
allowance for upkeep and electric lights on the same basis. 

The nine-hour day [the men now work ten hours]. 

Recognition of the union. 

An increase in pay. 

It is significant that the abolition of the mine guard sys- 
tem stands at the head of the list. When the Paint Creek 
operators refused to pay the union scale, the mine guards 
were brought in and the war was on. The strike spread 
through Cabin Creek and the struggle developed into a 
fight for supremacy and to settle old scores between the 
mine guards and the miners. In order to appreciate the 
part which the mine guards have played, we have but to 
recall their function in maintaining the regime of peonage, 
landlordism, and "union smashing." Former Governor 
M. O. Dawson said in his special message to the legislature 
of 1907 in response to complaints of peonage from the 

1 Report of Senate Committee Hearings, op. cit., part 1, p. 951. 



THE WEST VIRGINIA PROBLEM 97 

Italian ambassador, which had been brought to his atten- 
tion by Secretary of State, Elihu Root : — 

The use of mine guards in this state is not restricted to cases 
like these under investigation. They are used at some of the 
collieries to protect the property of owners, to prevent trespass- 
ing, and especially to prevent labor agitators and organizers of 
a miners' union from gaining access to the miners. . . . Many 
outrages have been committed by these guards, many of whom 
appear to be vicious and dare-devil men who seem to aim to add 
to their viciousness by bull-dozing and terrorizing people. It is 
submitted in all candor that it is not to the best interests of the 
owners of these collieries to employ such lawless men or to justify 
the outrageous acts committed by them. 1 

The commission appointed by Governor Glasscock in 
August, 1912, expressed similar sentiments : — 

From the cloud of witnesses and mass of testimony figuring 
in the hearings, there emerges clearly and unmistakably the 
fact that these guards . . . recklessly and flagrantly violated, 
in respect to the miners on Paint Creek and Cabin Creek, the 
rights guaranteed by natural justice and the Constitution to 
every citizen howsoever lowly his estate. . . . Many crimes and 
outrages laid to their charge were found upon careful sifting to 
have no foundation in fact, but the denial of the right of peace- 
ful assembly and of freedom of speech, [the] many and grievous 
assaults on unarmed miners, show that their main purpose was 
to overawe the miners and their adherents and, if necessary, to 
beat and cudgel them into submission. We find that the system 
employed was vicious, strife-prompting, and un-American. 2 

These statements were further verified by the testimony 
given before the Senate investigation committee. At that 
time men testified that they were imported to become 
" strong-arm " men, 3 and it was shown that the Baldwin- 
Felts Detective Agency furnished guards and sent secret 

1 Quoted by West, op. cit., p. 49. 

2 Report of Senate Committee Hearings, op. cit., part 1, p. 380. 

3 Ibid., p. 85. 



98 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

spies among the miners to report on their movements, 1 
provided blacklists, 2 and sought to prevent the organiza- 
tion of the union. 3 A special train was fitted up with a 
machine gun and armed men who fired into the miners' 
camp as the train passed by. 4 Additional testimony by 
men imported from New York brought out the fact that 
they were kept in locked cars and under guard from the 
time the train left New York State until they were landed 
in West Virginia. 5 Such activities show the abuses which 
can arise under the guard system. 

The ill-feeling between the miners and the guards had 
progressed to such a degree that thorough preparations 
for warfare were made by both sides and pitched battles 
were fought. The leaders of the miners urged the gov- 
ernor to declare martial law, but not until a request for 
troops came from the county sheriff on July 26, 1912, was 
the governor in a position to take a hand in the matter. 
The state law made it necessary for the governor to wait 
till the local officers requested aid before he could inter- 
fere, and the commission appointed to investigate the 
situation could not refrain from recording its judgment 
that the local peace officers " exhibited a woeful lack of 
resolution and energy in enforcing law and order." 6 A 
few companies of troops were sent to aid the sheriff, and 
finally the entire state militia was stationed in Cabin 
Creek and Paint Creek prior to the first declaration of 
martial law on September 2. 

Feeling over the issues involved had arisen to such a 
pitch that it was undoubtedly impossible for the civil au- 
thorities to cope with the situation. During August the 
miners kept up an agitation and held mass meetings in 
protest against the guard system and the importation of 
non-unionists. The governor invited the operators and 

1 Beport of Senate Committee Hearings, op. cit., part 1, p. 856. 

2 Ibid., p. 863. 8 Ibid., p. 864. * Ibid., part 2, p. 1642. 
5 Ibid., part 1, p. 694 ff. 6 Ibid., p. 386. 



THE WEST VIRGINIA PROBLEM 99 

miners each to appoint two members on a commission 
which should undertake a state- wide investigation of the 
coal industry, but as that was not done, he finally, in the 
latter part of August, appointed a commission of three 
which made an extended inquiry into conditions. 

Along with the declaration of martial law on the 2d of 
September a military commission was placed in power. 
The militia confiscated 2354 rifles and pistols, 6 machine 
guns, and over 178,000 rounds of ammunition of various 
kinds. 1 State statutes and constitutional provisions were 
laid aside and the commission punished at its discretion 
regardless of statutory penalties. 2 The findings were not 
divulged until the governor had passed upon them. The 
governor explained that it was understood between the 
commission and himself "that it was not the intention 
that these people should be required to serve the time for 
which they were apparently sentenced. We used that 
practically for the purpose of detaining these people until 
we had peace and order in that territory." 3 However, this 
did not prevent the militia from arresting the local justice 
of the peace, (seemingly) unwarrantedly detaining him 4 
and in aiding the guards in bringing in non-unionists. 

When the miners realized that martial law meant pun- 
ishment for " unlawful assemblage " and brought with it 
trial by military commission, they appealed to the courts, 
but without avail. A judge of the county court, who is- 
sued a writ of habeas corpus on the theory that the de- 
fendants had a right to trial by jury, later " reversed his 
opinion and decided that [he had] ' no right to interfere 
with a court martial duly organized under the laws of a 
State ' ; and at the same time the West Virginia Supreme 
Court of Appeals upheld the governor's right to declare 
martial law and to appoint a military commission." 5 

1 "Report of Senate Committee Hearings, op. cit., part 1, p. 80. 

2 Ibid., p. 164. 8 Ibid., p. 398. * Ibid., p. 493 ff. 
5 Literary Digest, April 5, 1913. 



100 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

Five union leaders who were brought before the mili- 
tary commission refused to put up any defense to a charge 
of conspiracy to murder, with the hope that their counsel 
would thus be able to carry the case by appeal to the 
United States Supreme Court and there establish whether 
the civil law can be suspended and trial by jury super- 
seded by court martial. The defendants based their appeal 
upon the following clauses of the West Virginia constitu- 
tion : — 

The military shall be subordinate to the civil power ; and no 
citizen, unless engaged in the military service of the State, shall 
be tried or punished by any military court for any offense that 
is by the civil courts of the State . . . 

The provisions of the Constitution of the United States and 
of this State are operative alike in a period of war as in time of 
peace, and any departure therefrom, or violation thereof, under 
the plea of necessity, or any other plea, is subversive of good 
government, and tends to anarchy and despotism. 

On September 11 the governor received a copy of a 
letter addressed to the operators by the international vice- 
president and the district president, asking for a confer- 
ence to try to effect "an honorable and fair settlement." 
The good offices of the governor were sought to bring 
about such a conference. In complying with the request 
the governor reminded the operators that no law existed in 
"West Virginia which would permit his appointing a board 
of arbitration whose decision should be final, appealed to 
their patriotism to " save life and property," and earnestly 
pleaded with them "to make some suggestions and use 
your best efforts to end this struggle, which we all admit 
is a disgrace to our State." * 

In response to the governor's appeal the operators in- 
formed him that they declined to meet the representatives 
of the miners because they were " convinced that no good 
could result from a conference." They reminded the gov- 

1 Beport of Senate Committee Hearings, op. cit., part 1, p. 520. 



THE WEST VIRGINIA PROBLEM 101 

ernor that the United Mine Workers had been trying 
" for twenty years or more to ' organize ' West Virginia 
in response to the insistent demands of the operators of 
the * organized ' districts. If we were to admit, which we 
are unwilling to do without more convincing evidence than 
has yet been presented to us, that the officers of the United 
Mine Workers of America in good faith would endeavor 
to put wages in the field on a fairly competitive basis with 
those in other fields, we believe they could not resist the 
pressure brought upon them by the interests of the com- 
petitive fields." x Furthermore, the operators had steadily 
resisted the United Mine Workers, " with the sympathy, 
we believe, of a great majority of the miners, who have 
no wish to see union conditions with the consequent hard- 
ship upon all the interests of this State." And again, " We 
repeat that there has never been any demand, formal or 
informal, made upon us for higher wages or any different 
conditions of employment or living than are now in force 
at our mines." They were also convinced that if proper 
protection could be given their men who had ceased work 
they would return, and the United Mine Workers as the 
"persistent and malignant foe to the prosperity of the coal 
industry of the State . . . should be taught that such 
methods [of carrying on war] will not be tolerated." 

On September 14 the representatives of the parties 
came to the capitol at the governor's invitation, but as- 
sembled in separate rooms. The governor submitted a plan 
of arbitration to both parties, which involved the selection 
of a representative by each side and the third member 
" by the governor of one of the adjoining States or by the 
Secretary of the Department of Commerce and Labor." 
The system of mine guards was to be abandoned and only 
bona fide citizens employed as watchmen or guards. If 
the miners would return to work on the terms under which 
they had been working, the decision of the arbitrators was 
1 Report of Senate Committee Hearings, op. cit., part 1, p. 522. 



102 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

to go into effect from September 1, 1912. The arms still 
held by the parties in the strike zone were to be turned over 
to the military commander and the governor offered to pay 
for the expense of arbitration from his contingent fund. 1 

The miners were willing to accept this plan in spite of 
the fact that they would have liked to change some of its 
provisions, "but by doing this we realize the proposition 
would not be yours, and since we believe you have only 
the interests of both parties to this unfortunate controversy 
at heart and in the interest of peace and harmony as well 
as the public good, we agree." 2 

To meet the operators' criticisms on technicalities the 
governor submitted a revised plan limiting the range of 
the arbitration to the guard system, the right of the indi- 
vidual to belong to a union, and the right of the employees 
to meet their employers to discuss wages and conditions 
of labor. The decision should involve only the Paint Creek, 
Cabin Creek, and Coal River operators, and the agreement 
of arbitration should be signed by representatives of both 
union and non-union men. 

The miners accepted this second proposition, but the 
operators refused on the basis of their right to protect 
their property and employees and because of their deter- 
mination not to recognize the union in any way. 3 

On October 15, 1912, martial law was revoked, but by 
November 15 the governor found it necessary to put it in 
force again. It was again " lifted " on December 12, but 
the adjutant-general was directed not to make it public 
with the hope of keeping peace " by simply leaving the 
impression " that martial law was in force. In the early 
part of February another battle took place in which about 
sixteen persons were killed and the governor sought the 
advice of the legislature which indorsed his action in de- 
claring martial law again. 4 

1 Report of Senate Committee Hearings, op. cit., part 1, p. 521. 

2 Ibid., p. 521. 8 Ibid., p. 528. * Ibid., p. 396^ 



THE WEST VIRGINIA PROBLEM 103 

When Governor Hatfield came into office in March, 
1913, martial law was still in force. He made a determined 
effort to restore law and order, and finally, on April 25, 
practically issued an ultimatum that the " strife and dis- 
sension must cease within thirty-six hours" and the fol- 
lowing terms for a settlement which he suggested were 
accepted : — 

First, the operators were to agree to allow checkweigh- 
men to act for the miners " as indicated and in keeping 
with sections 438-439 of the code." 

Second, a nine-hour day, which should be understood as 
nine hours of actual service, " at the same scale of wages 
now paid." 

Third, " that no discrimination be made against any 
miner, and that if he elects he may be permitted to pur- 
chase the supplies for the maintenance of his family wher- 
ever it suits him best, as this was claimed by the operators 
to be the case at the present time. It is hoped by the chief 
executive that it will be the pleasure of the mine opera- 
tors who own and control commissaries to see that the 
prices of their merchandise are in keeping with the same 
prices made by independent or other stores throughout 
the Kanawha Valley." 

Fourth, that the operators grant a semimonthly pay. 

The governor proposed to see that the above conditions 
were carried out, and " where the law is not now explicit 
to have the same so amended as will secure in the future 
the carrying out of the suggestions I have made." J 

By the middle of July the Paint Creek operators and min- 
ers were working under a formal agreement which provided 
for the same working conditions existing in the unionized 
Kanawha field, except that the Paint Creek miners had 
gone to work for two and a half cents per ton less than their 
former scale. The Cabin Creek operators, in their settle- 
ment the latter part of July, refused to permit the " check 
1 Quoted by Literary Digest, May 10, 1913. 



104 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

off " for dues or to allow representation of the men by a 
mine committee. The individual had to deal with the mine 
foreman and superintendent or manager. If grievances 
were not settled, then the miner might appeal to his local 
president, who could ask for an arbitration committee made 
up of a representative selected by the miner, one by the 
operators, and a third selected by these two, if necessary. 
A majority decision was made binding on either party. 1 
The Cabin Creek operators refused to make an agreement 
with the United Mine Workers, and the settlement was 
made with representatives of their employees. 

The agreement made between the New River operators 
and other operators along the Virginian Railroad (repre- 
senting in all an ownership of ninety mines) and their 
employees not only included the provisions demanded by 
the governor, but also provided for a commission of four 
— two representatives from each side — to settle disputes 
by majority decision. In case of failure to obtain a major- 
ity decision, the governor as umpire must give the decid- 
ing vote. 2 Decisions must be rendered within ten days and 
in the mean time the men must remain at work. In regard 
to their attitude toward union organization, the following 
statement is made : " It is not within our province to ques- 
tion the right of any man which the laws of nature or the 
statutes of State or nation concede him, and it is not a 
question for arbitration or consideration; if the stipula- 
tions above submitted are agreed and lived up to, it seems 
to us that no questions of dispute will arise, and one that 
will be given no consideration as far as we are concerned. 
Nothing more could of right be demanded if the principles 
included in the above propositions are carried out." This 
was supplemented by a promise to " eliminate anything in 
the shape of the old guard system." 

1 Memorandum of Agreement between Cabin Creek Operators and their Em- 
ployees, 1913, p. 2. 

2 Memorandum of Agreement of New Biver Coal Operators (and others) 
with their Employees, 1913, p. 5. 



THE WEST VIRGINIA PROBLEM 105 

The territory now unionized includes eight counties in 
the central part of West Virginia, which is about one 
third of the mining district of the State. 1 The union lead- 
ers say that they do not anticipate any trouble in renew- 
ing their agreements, and they probably hope soon to see 
the whole State organized and representatives of both 
sides meeting with the joint conference of the central field. 
The fact that such a large percentage of the State is work- 
ing under certain regulations as to hours, company stores, 
checkweighmen, etc., ought greatly to encourage further 
spread of the joint agreement. The influence of the oper- 
ators working under these regulations ought to weigh 
heavily in the movement to reduce the unfair competitive 
conditions. 

In answer to the operators' arguments that fair com- 
petitive conditions between West Virginia and the other 
States could not be established in the joint conference of 
the central field, the miners reply : — 

We have made it clear to both sides [northern operators and 
West Virginia operators] that it is not our intention to unionize 
these fields for the purpose of strangling competition with the 
operators in the Northern States, nor to establish prohibitive 
wages and conditions, viewed from a competitive standpoint, 
that will keep their product out of its most favorable market. 
It is needless to say that if we adopted such a short-sighted 
policy it would act as a boomerang and would hit our cause and 
the men we organize harder than it would the operators, inas- 
much as it would greatly limit the output of these fields, deprive 
the men of work, and cause them more hardship than they now 
suffer. Such, of course, is not our intention, all reports and wild 
statements to the contrary notwithstanding, and in the making 
of any wage scale these economic facts must and will be taken 
into consideration. Every mining district in the country has a 
natural market and an inherent right to the same, and we are 
well aware of the peculiar geographical location of those par- 
ticular fields, and in dealing with this complex problem we fully 

1 Official correspondence. 



106 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

realize that we are face to face with a condition and not a theory, 
and must meet it with reason and intelligence, and with the sin- 
cere desire to be constructive and not destructive, to build up 
and not tear down, until, at last, in the evolution of things, 
now being hastened by intelligent, world-wide discontent, uni- 
versal cooperation shall supplant the present inefficient system 
of competition, with all its waste, brutality, and utter disregard 
for the higher and nobler phases of our common life. 1 

And the president of the union in testifying before the 
West Virginia Mining Commission in 1912 pointed out 
that the formation of contracts involves consideration of 
freight rates, market conditions, and physical conditions 
in the mines in arriving at an equitable price which will 
permit all the fields to get their proper share of the 
market. 2 

But it is estimated that in Virginia, West Virginia, Mary- 
land, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Alabama approximately 
150,000 miners are unorganized and " utterly helpless in 
meeting the encroachments of organized wealth" under a 
regime of individual bargaining. 3 Moreover, this leaves 
out of account the unorganized men in southeastern and 
central Pennsylvania, and the miners realize that the fate 
of the joint agreement is dependent upon their success in 
thoroughly unionizing the coal industry. 

In chapter I we have shown how the system of concilia- 
tion and arbitration arose, pointed out the economic and 
social factors which underlie such development, and de- 
scribed the methods by which the joint agreement has been 
extended. In the midst of the process of the extension, 
the West Virginia problem loomed upas the most threat- 
ening factor for disruption of the system thus built. We 
have seen the significance of the geographical location of the 
State, the importance of its wealth in coal, and the effect 

1 Eeport of Vice-President of the United Mine Workers, 1912, p. 5. 

2 Beport of Senate Committee Hearings, op. cit., part 3, p. 2175. 

8 Beport of Vice-President of the United Mine Workers, 1912, p. 4. 



THE WEST VIRGINIA PROBLEM 107 

of longer hours and adverse working conditions. Along 
with such factors as immigration and a conservative rural 
population stands the concentration of wealth and a deter- 
mination on the part of the owners thoroughly to control 
and direct the exploitation of the natural resources. The 
importance of these considerations must be held in mind 
as we turn to make a further study of the conciliatory sys- 
tem and the organization of the parties which make the 
system effective. 



CHAPTER III 

THE UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA 

We have reserved the consideration of the organization 
and development of the United Mine Workers and of the 
Operators' Associations for chapters Hi and IV, in order 
to present to the reader the effective forces which stand 
behind collective bargaining in the interstate joint confer- 
ence. One cannot appreciate the real power behind the 
armed neutrality of nations without an understanding of 
their fighting equipment and natural resources. Neither 
can one conceive of the significance of industrial forces 
making for peace without a knowledge of the machinery 
of organization and the methods by which effective soli- 
darity is attained. The effectiveness of an organization 
must be kept at a maximum quite as much in peaceful 
times as in those of strife, in order that their agreements 
may be loyally carried out. To understand how 400,000 
men are held in line in times of peace, induced to conform 
to the laws during strikes, and taught to exercise the might 
of non-resistance and inactivity, one must have a knowl- 
edge of the technical features of organization that have 
secured a unity of action in industrial democracy not 
attained in political democracy. When we consider that, 
besides the difficulty of holding a widely scattered mem- 
bership to a continuous policy, there are added the dis- 
ruptive factors involved in the fact that twenty different 
nationalities and several races are concerned, the difficulty 
of the problem of organization is apparent. We shall de- 
scribe the United Mine Workers' organization as con- 
trolled by the constitution of 1912 which presents a great 
contrast to the loose federations of the sixties and eight- 
ies. We shall find that every phrase of the preamble to the 



THE UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA 109 

mine workers' constitution recalls concrete industrial prob- 
lems with which the organization has to cope. 

1. PURPOSES OF THE ORGANIZATION 

The purposes of the organization are thus set forth in 
the constitution : — 

There is no truth more obvious than that without coal there 
could not have been such marvelous social and industrial prog- 
ress as marks present day civilization. 

Believing that those whose lot it is to toil within the earth's 
recesses, surrounded by peculiar dangers and deprived of sun- 
light and pure air, producing the commodity which makes pos- 
sible the world's progress, are entitled to protection and the full 
social value of their product, we have formed the " United Mine 
Workers of America " for the purpose of establishing, by lawful 
means, the principles embraced in the body of the constitution. 

First. To unite in one organization, regardless of creed, color, 
or nationality, all workmen eligible for membership, employed 
in and around coal mines, coal washers, and coke ovens on the 
American Continent. 

Second. To increase wages and improve the conditions of 
employment for our members by legislation, conciliation, joint 
agreements, or strikes. 

Third. To demand that not more than eight hours from bank 
to bank in each twenty-four hours shall be worked by members 
of our organization. 

Fourth. To strive for a minimum wage scale for all members 
of our craft. 

Fifth. To provide for the education of our children by law- 
fully prohibiting their employment until they have reached at 
least sixteen years of age. 

Sixth. To secure equitable statutory old age pension and 
workmen's compensation laws. 

Seventh. To enforce existing just laws and to secure the re- 
peal of those which are unjust. 

Eighth. To secure by legislative enactment laws protecting the 
limbs, lives, and health of our members ; establishing our right 
to organize ; prohibiting the use of deception to secure strike- 



110 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

breakers ; preventing the employment of armed guards during 
labor disputes ; and such other legislation as will be beneficial 
to the members of our craft. 



2. UNITS OF ORGANIZATION 
A. International 

The jurisdictional units of the organization are divided 
into international districts, subdistricts, and local unions. 
There are twenty-five districts, fifty subdistricts, and 
twenty-four hundred local unions. 1 The international 
union has jurisdiction over all the other units and derives 
its name " international " from the extension (in 1905) of 
the jurisdiction of the United Mine Workers to the mine 
workers of Canada. In all questions of dispute, appeals, 
and grievances under the constitution, the jurisdiction of 
the international organization is limited only by the terms 
of the joint agreement, and the decision of the international 
executive board is final unless reversed by the action of 
the international convention. 2 

B. Districts 

The districts are designated by the international officers 
and may encompass two or three States, a whole State, or 
part of a State, according as varying conditions or the ex- 
tent of the territory may warrant. For example, in Penn- 
sylvania the anthracite region is divided into three districts 
and the organized portions of western and central Penn- 
sylvania are divided into three districts. In the south- 
western field a district may include two or three States. 
Farther west, District 15 includes Utah, Colorado, and 
New Mexico. The districts are allowed to adopt such rules 
and regulations as do not conflict with the jurisdiction 
of the international organization or the terms of the joint 
agreement. 

1 Official correspondence. 

2 United Mine Workers 1 Constitution, 1912, Article m. 



THE UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA 111 

C. SUBDISTRICTS 

If the conditions warrant the arrangement, the districts 
may be divided into subdistricts, but not until the officers 
of districts and local unions which are affected have been 
consulted and the accounts of locals with the district, com- 
prising taxes and assessments, are settled. Subdistricts 
are necessary only in States having a large coal area and 
a large working force, and they are organized to facilitate 
prompt settlement of disputes. The officers of a State like 
Illinois, with large coal fields and 75,000 men, could not 
be expected to cope with all the demands made upon 
them. The rules of the subdistricts must conform to the 
rulings of the jurisdiction above, but the subdistrict unit 
makes possible certain regulations which it is unnecessary 
to impose on the whole district. 

D. Local Unions 

A. JURISDICTION 

The local union is the unit upon which the other juris- 
dictions are built. It is subject to all the rulings of the 
jurisdictions above, but withal it has a great deal of power 
in dealing with its own affairs. In fact it has all the auton- 
omy which it has not been found necessary to delegate 
to the jurisdictions above. In chapter I we described the 
period during which the functions and powers of the local 
were accentuated to the neglect of the welfare of the in- 
dustry as a whole. That the jurisdictions above have 
received their power has been the result of pressing neces- 
sity, and to enable the organization to cope with the many 
problems of the industry. A local union is allowed juris- 
diction over only one mine. 

B. DEMOCRATIC FEATURES 

The locals are demqcratic in their form of government 
and procedure, and it is here that the individual is made 



112 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

to feel the spirit of unionism which binds the men to- 
gether. Besides the acquaintances and friendships formed 
as working comrades, they gain a higher estimate of one 
another as they study and discuss their common industrial 
problems. Here native ability, character, and the efforts 
at self-education reap their full fruits and are judged on 
their merits. The immediate problems of industry lead 
to a consideration of the wider problems of citizenship. 
These local organizations stand as a potent influence for 
the encouragement of political and industrial democracy. 
By the use of the referendum the average individual is 
able to express his judgment on the policies that shall 
govern an industry, and here, as elsewhere, the man who 
is in immediate contact with the problem is in a better 
position to recognize the need for a remedy than the one 
who is farther away and who has not felt the pressure of 
necessity. 

C. LOCAL AND INDIVIDUAL GBIEVANCES 

Strikes and difficulties over working conditions usually 
originate in local unions. The man who is mining coal is 
the first to feel the effect of adverse conditions, and for- 
tunately he has a means of rectifying matters without 
being subjected to the pressure which comes with the ex- 
pression of dissatisfaction under a regime of individual 
bargaining. It is the duty of the local officials to bring 
about an amicable settlement with the employers if possi- 
ble, but if not, the district and international officers are 
called in. These jurisdictions may reverse the action of 
the local officials, but the latter, in turn, if dissatisfied 
with the decision, may appeal the case until it reaches the 
highest authority, the international convention. If the local 
union continues to strike in spite of a ruling of the inter- 
national jurisdiction forbidding the strike, not only may it 
be denied financial aid, but it may be suspended or have 
its charter revoked. 



THE UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA 113 

The local has full power to penalize or debar members, 
but the individual is protected, through the right of appeal 
to the international jurisdiction, against malicious action 
on the part of a coterie of men. If it is found that any 
branch of the uniou has done an injustice to a member or 
applicant for membership, the branch responsible for this 
injustice has to compensate the individual for his time 
and the expense incurred in defending his rights, and the 
member or applicant is restored to all rights and privi- 
leges of the organization. 

D. MEMBERSHIP 

A local union cannot have fewer than ten members, 
and they may be composed of skilled and unskilled men 
working in and around the mine. No distinction is made 
on the basis of race, color, or nationality. Mine officials, 
operators' commissioners, persons selling intoxicating li- 
quors, and members of the National Civic Federation or 
Boy Scout Movement are ineligible to membership. The 
insertion of the provision against members of the Civic 
Federation in 1911 was evidently aimed at Mr. John 
Mitchell, former president, and to test his loyalty to the 
miners' organization. 1 The Boy Scouts were debarred from 
membership because at the time of the convention the 
delegates were under the impression that the movement 
was a " first step towards militarism," and they " felt they 
were justified in their action from past experience with an 
organization of a military character." The miners have 
since been informed of the real nature of the movement. 

By a system of transfer cards members in good stand- 
ing find a welcome when they move from one district to 
another. The issuing of these cards is strictly regulated and 
violation of the regulations subjects the offenders to severe 

1 Mr. Mitchell proved his loyalty by resigning from a position in which 
he was doing exceedingly good work. He deserves better treatment for the 
extremely valuable services he rendered the organization. 



114 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

penalties. When a local union is organized by an organizer 
or any other official, it pays a fee of $8 to the international 
union, which in turn supplies it with full equipment of char- 
ter, seal, books, cards, etc., for conducting its business. An 
organizer must report the organization of any local within 
a week and send the international fee or show valid cause 
for delay. The initiation fee is $10 for skilled miners and 
$2.50 for boys from fourteen to seventeen. Members who 
forfeit their membership by working in non-union mines 
or by arrearages in dues can only be reinstated by paying 
another initiation fee. 

E. FINANCES 

The local dues paid by each member are fifty cents per 
month plus such other assessments as are levied by the 
jurisdiction above. The local union as an organization 
is made responsible for a tax of twenty -five cents per month 
per member and such other assessments as are levied by 
the international convention and referendum vote. The 
extent to which this provision enabled the organization 
to rise to an emergency was exemplified in the anthracite 
strike of 1902 when each member contributed an aver- 
age of $7 to $16 in four months with a total col- 
lection of $2,645,324. 1 Boys under sixteen and decrepit 
or disabled members are classified as half members and 
are taxed one half the regular dues. 

The local financial secretary is responsible for a monthly 
report on all members in good standing and a statement 
of taxes and assessments due the international organiza- 
tion. Locals which fail to fulfill this obligation are notified 
by the international secretary, and if he receives no response 
within ten days the local is suspended from membership 
and its name is published in the delinquent list. Once on 
the delinquent list, it can only be reinstated by payment 
of arrearages and a fine of $2 for each one hundred mem- 

1 Mitchell, Organized Labor, p. 379. 



THE UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA 115 

bers. Local officers entrusted with funds are required to 
give bonds, and for failure to perform their duties they are 
subjected by the international union to a suspension from 
office-holding for two years. Since their failure to perform 
their duties involves the whole local in trouble, a duty is 
placed upon each member to see that his local is in good 
standing if he does not wish to be subjected to the penal- 
ties applied to the local for delinquency. The local finan- 
cial secretary is required to furnish each member with a 
" Due Card," which is a receipt for the taxes and assess- 
ments recorded upon it. No local is allowed to divide its 
funds among its members, and if a local disbands (due to 
abandonment of a mine or any other cause) the funds and 
supplies revert to the international. Locals which have 
been idle for a month or more through no fault of their 
own are exonerated from international taxation upon writ- 
ten request from the local officers. 

Each local is required to subscribe to the "Mine 
Workers' Journal," which furnishes a convenient means 
of disseminating official notices and gives the individual 
an outlook upon the whole industry. " It shall be non- 
sectarian in religion, dignified in tone, and shall serve the 
political interest of our members and the general move- 
ment." 

We thus see that the local is the foundation upon which 
the superstructure of the national organization is built. 
The locals furnish the funds which make the organization 
effective in maintaining loyalty to the union, in extending 
it into new fields, and in supporting strikes which include 
large areas. The close relationship established is illus- 
trated by the use of the term "brother" which the mem- 
bers use in addressing one another. This spirit of 
brotherhood along with detailed regulations proves 
a powerful factor in holding the rank and file in line 
and in building the cohesion necessary for a continuous 
policy. 



116 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

3. OFFICERS 
A. Qualifications 

The officers of the international organization are a presi- 
dent, vice-president, secretary, treasurer, three tellers, 
three auditors, seven delegates to the American Federa- 
tion of Labor, and the members of the executive board 
composed of one member from each district. Any member 
in good standing in the organization is qualified to hold 
office, provided he has been a member three consecutive 
years, has had five years' experience as a mine worker, 
and has never been guilty of misappropriating funds of 
the organization. No two tellers or auditors can be elected 
from the same district. In case two such officials from the 
same district receive a plurality of votes, the one receiv- 
ing the lesser number of votes must resign in favor of a 
candidate in another district who received the next highest 
number of votes. This would seem to be a measure of pro- 
tection against coteries or cabals. 

B. Duties of Officers 

In the office of president we have a fine illustration 
of full delegation of authority supplemented by features 
which enable the rank and file to retain ultimate authority 
and power. Besides presiding over all international con- 
ventions and executive board meetings, all bills and 
official documents must receive his signature. He fills by 
appointment all vacancies in international offices except 
executive board members, who must be elected by their 
districts, and lie may remove any international officer 
or appointee "for insubordination or just and sufficient 
cause. " Organizers, committees necessary to transact the 
work of the international convention, traveling auditors, 
and a statistician are subject to his appointment and he 
may visit or appoint an officer to visit local unions. How- 
ever, his appointments, suspensions, or removals must 



THE UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA 117 

meet with the approval of the executive board. His inter- 
pretation of the constitution is subject to repeal only by 
the executive board. He may grant dispensations in regard 
to initiation fees when he thinks they will encourage the 
growth of the union. In short, he is responsible for gen- 
eral supervision of the organization, and is delegated suffi- 
cient authority to prevent the evils that occur as the re- 
sult of divided leadership or lack of unified policy. This 
is particularly important during strikes, for then the indus- 
trial army must have a commander-in-chief who has power 
to direct his forces to the best advantage, and no labor 
organization has suffered more than the miners by not ap- 
preciating the importance of this. For these valuable serv- 
ices the president receives a salary of $3000 per year. 

The vice-president works under the direction of the 
president, and gives valuable service by investigating and 
settling disputes and going upon missions for which it 
would be impossible for the president to find time. He 
makes a report of his work to the international conven- 
tion and is eligible to the presidency in case the office is 
vacated by resignation or removal. His salary is $2500. 

The office of secretary-treasurer is more important than 
the name ordinarily implies. Besides having charge of 
books, documents, and other effects, he is the guardian of 
the organization's finances. And this is of no small im- 
portance because the financial organization is one of the 
strongest features of the union. The secretary-treasurer 
exercises supervision over locals and their reports, and 
penalizes them for violation of rules. Except at a period 
just before each meeting of the international convention, 
when the locals desire as large a representation as possi- 
ble, they are greatly tempted to minimize in their reports 
the number of paid-up members. This is explained by the 
desire of the locals to fill their own treasuries in order 
that they may build and equip meeting-places and take 
care of their own particular wants. To prevent such ir- 



118 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

regularities is the duty of the secretary-treasurer. He is 
required to give a bond of $25,000, and has only $ 15,000 
subject to his order at any one time. His report to the 
convention keeps the organization thoroughly informed of 
its standing in every way. He receives a salary equal to 
that of the vice-president. 

During the interval between international conventions 
the executive board has " full power to direct the workings 
of the organization." The board is composed of one mem- 
ber elected from each district and of the president, vice- 
president, and secretary-treasurer. It levies and collects as- 
sessments during such intervals when necessary, but not 
for a period of more than two months unless authorized by 
a referendum vote of the members. The board holds the 
money of the organization in trust, but a withdrawal of 
the money requires a written order indorsed by two thirds 
of the members of the board. It may recommend the call- 
ing of a strike by a two-thirds vote, " but under no cir- 
cumstances shall it call such a strike until approved by 
a referendum vote." On ordinary matters the board takes 
a " unity " vote, but at any time a member may ask for a 
roll vote in which each member has " one vote and one 
additional vote for each 2000 members, or majority frac- 
tion thereof, in good standing he represents." This sort 
of vote prevents a minority from inaugurating policies 
that are detrimental to the majority. The president, vice- 
president, and secretary-treasurer are allowed to vote in 
" unit " votes, but not on a roll call. In case of a tie on 
a roll call, the president has the deciding vote. Board 
members, tellers, auditors, and delegates to the American 
Federation of Labor receive $4 and expenses when em- 
ployed. 

C. Importance of Organizers 

From the simple statement in the constitution that or- 
ganizers are appointed by the president and are subject 



THE UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA 119 

to his direction, it would be impossible to gain a concept 
of the importance of their work. In chapter I we saw 
something of the difficulties with which the union had to 
contend in its attempt to extend its jurisdiction and inau- 
gurate joint agreements. The brunt of this battle for the 
extension of unionism is borne by the organizers. They 
are the missionaries or apostles of the faith. They natu- 
rally expect opposition from the operators when they at- 
tempt to sow the seeds that spring up and choke the abuses 
of individual bargaining. But they also meet with indif- 
ference, ignorance, suspicion, fear of the employers, and 
race antipathies among the workers, all of which must be 
overcome by the ideals of unionism and faith in the things 
to be accomplished by solidarity. In spite of injunctions 
and intimidation from armed guards they spread their 
gospel. By the employer who proposes to surrender none 
of his prerogatives as proprietor they are hated as pests 
and they meet with treatment appropriate to the regard 
in which they are held. But they disseminate their teach- 
ings as they meet the individual or give him literature 
until a small group is won over to form a nucleus for a 
local union. With the formation of a local and increase in 
membership there comes a demand for recognition of the 
union and collective bargaining. Usually it takes a strike 
and help from the international union to inaugurate the 
joint agreement and seal the outpost as union territory. 

4. NOMINATION AND ELECTION OF OFFICERS 

A. Nominations 

The full significance of democratic control and the pro- 
visions for attaining it are shown in the nomination and 
election of officers. The international officers are nomi- 
nated directly by the membership upon nomination blanks 
sent out twenty weeks before the election. These nomina- 
tions must be returned within five weeks, and within ten 



120 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

days from the close of nominations the international sec- 
retary notifies the candidates who have been nominated 
by at least five local unions. The nominees who desire to 
become candidates have their official notice attested by 
the local officers and return them to the international sec- 
retary. After a candidate has filed his acceptance he is 
not allowed to withdraw. Not later than four weeks after 
the acceptances are in, the secretary must forward to the 
locals ballots containing the names, showing the place of 
residence, and stating the positions for which the nomi- 
nees are candidates. Local secretaries are required to post 
notices not later than one week before nominations and 
elections. 

B. Elections 

The international officers are elected by referendum 
vote for a period of two years. The candidates receiving 
a plurality of the legal votes cast are declared elected. 
This legal vote is cast by members in good standing and 
the number of these is determined by special reports from 
the subdistrict and district secretaries. 

The local union is at liberty to designate an official 
voting place, and strict injunctions are issued in regard to 
tabulation of votes and interference with tellers. Mem- 
bers who have not attended at least one half of the local 
meetings for a period of six months before the election 
are not allowed to act as tellers. All members must be 
present at the time the votes are cast in order to have their 
votes tabulated, " except officers, organizers, and workers 
in the field away from home, whose votes shall be recorded 
if sent to the secretaries of their respective local unions." 
The locals elect from three to six tellers, who are responsi- 
ble for the tabulation, the correctness of which must be 
further attested by the local seal and signatures of the 
local officials. If more votes are recorded than were actu- 
ally cast, the vote of the local is thrown out, and those 



THE UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA 121 

responsible for the fraud are " tried by the international 
executive board, and fined, suspended, or expelled, as the 
magnitude of the transgression may warrant." 

The return sheets in sealed envelopes and properly at- 
tested are sent to the international secretary, who keeps a 
record of their receipt, and before turning them over to 
the tellers checks them off and obtains a receipt from the 
tellers. The international tellers are not allowed to count 
the votes of locals which have cast more votes than they 
have paid a, per capita tax upon to the international union 
for one month preceding the election, " unless a satisfac- 
tory explanation for so doing accompanies the ' Eeturn 
Sheet' of the local." Contests must be filed with the in- 
ternational tellers not later than ten days after the elec- 
tion, and in case no plurality vote is cast for a candidate 
another election is held. Local officers are required to pre- 
serve all ballots for a period of six months after the elec- 
tion. Loitering about the voting place is not allowed, and 
tellers are held responsible for all irregularities and are 
subject to trial by the international executive board. 

A. THE RECALL 

If ten per cent of the entire membership request it, the 
international secretary is obliged to send out to the local 
unions a petition for the recall of any international officer 
guilty of malfeasance. Accompanying the petition are the 
charges on which the recall is based and the defense of the 
officer, issued in answer to these charges. If within thirty 
days thirty per cent of the members sign the petition, 
the international executive board must " call an election 
for the recall of any international officer so charged." The 
recall was an innovation introduced into the constitution in 
1912, but it has not been used. 



m ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

5. THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION 

A. Powers 

The extent of democratic control is further illustrated 
in the international convention. The administrative officers 
are given their extensive powers in order that they may 
do the will of the rank and file as expressed through the 
medium of the convention and the referendum. The inter- 
national convention is held biennially on the third Tuesday 
in January. This meeting comes just before the meeting 
of the joint conference to form a wage scale. Opportunity 
is thus furnished for the leaders to know how the rank 
and file feel about the working conditions under which 
they have labored during the two years past. The conven- 
tion is the supreme body of the organization and is limited 
only on measures which are submitted to referendum vote. 
Since it is made up from the general membership, expres- 
sion is sure to be given to vital problems connected with 
the coal industry and with the functioning of the union. 
The convention can amend or revise the constitution and 
reverse any action or policy of the officials. It stands as a 
responsive agent of the mass of workers and offers free 
opportunity to introduce measures to meet changing needs. 

B. Representation 

The delegates are elected directly by local unions and 
are allowed " one vote for one hundred members or less, 
and one additional vote for each one hundred members or 
majority fraction thereof, but no delegate shall be allowed 
more than five votes." Representation is based upon the 
paid-up membership for a period of three months previous 
to the convention. Several local unions with less than one 
hundred members are allowed to unite in sending a dele- 
gate, but he shall not have more than five votes. Locals 
that are in arrears for taxes and assessments for two 



THE UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA 123 

months previous to the convention are not allowed repre- 
sentation. Nor can a person act as a delegate unless he 
has attended one half the meetings of his local for a period 
of six months previous to the convention. 

C. Election of Delegates 

Delegates can be selected only at an official meeting of 
the locals, notice of which has been posted by the local 
secretary three days before the meeting. This notice must 
state that an election of delegates is to take place. The 
delegates receiving a majority vote of the meeting are 
declared elected. "No other meeting than the one first 
advertised and called . . . [is] recognized as an official 
meeting for the election of delegates." The failure of local 
officers to read the call and post the notices of the meeting 
subjects them to removal from office and they are not 
allowed to hold office for a period of two years. If a 
delegate's credentials are to be contested, notice of the 
fact must be sent to the international secretary ten days 
prior to the opening of the convention and the matter is 
turned over to the credentials committee. The interna- 
tional organization pays the transportation of delegates, 
to obtain which they must submit railroad certificates or 
receipts for fare. 

All resolutions, grievances, and constitutional amend- 
ments must also be in the hands of the international sec- 
retary ten days before the opening of the convention in 
order that they may be considered by the proper commit- 
tees. But the international convention refuses to consider 
internal grievances of districts unless they have been first 
considered by the lower jurisdiction. 

D. Special Conventions 

Special conventions are called by the president when 
the executive board thus instructs him or upon request 
of five or more districts. But the districts must state 



124 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

their reasons for desiring a convention. These reasons are 
embodied in the call for the convention. Once assembled, 
the special convention is limited to the consideration of the 
particular measures for which it was called. This provision 
for a special convention stands ready for emergencies and, 
as we shall see, was effectively used in the formulation of 
a policy to govern the bituminous miners during the an- 
thracite strike of 1902. 

6. STRIKES 

A. The Referendum 

The strike is regarded as the measure of last resort. 
The organization has learned from experience that it pays 
in time, money, and suffering to utilize conciliation, arbi- 
tration, and joint agreements. This is substantiated by 
the fact that general strikes must be declared by a refer- 
endum vote. It demonstrates also the extent to which the 
idea has penetrated the rank and file. The referendum re- 
lieves the conservative leaders from the responsibility of 
declaring a strike and robs the radical leaders of undue 
power ; but when conditions have arisen that stir the rank 
and file to the fighting point, the referendum is a fair 
indicator of the extent of the discontent in the industry. 

B. When Strikes are supported 

The value placed on peace is shown by the measures 
which hedge in the alternative of the strike. A district is 
not allowed to engage in a strike which would involve a 
major portion of its members without the sanction of the 
international executive board. The districts may order 
local strikes, but if they expect financial aid from the in- 
ternational organization the action must be sanctioned by 
the international executive board. The international exec- 
utive board decides the conditions upon which financial 
support shall be rendered to strikes, and the amount of 



THE UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA 125 

relief per member. It appoints a bonded representative to 
handle the funds and no bills are paid by the international 
union unless contracted and authorized by its representa- 
tive. The international secretary furnishes locals on strike 
with report blanks upon which itemized and detailed state- 
ments of expenditures must be recorded. The reports are 
signed by the local officials, and one copy is sent to the 
international secretary, one to the international represent- 
ative, and one is kept by the local. Only by fulfilling 
these conditions can the local obtain financial support. 

7. INTERNATIONAL FINANCES 
The extent to which aid in support of strikes, either in 
gaining new union territory or adjusting difficulties within 
old districts, is a drain on the international treasury, is 
shown in the report of the international secretary for the 
year ending January 1, 1912. In that year the organiza- 
tion spent $1,749,106.07 in aiding ten districts. This was 
met for the most part by special assessments amounting 
to §1,408,079.93, while the income from the regular taxes 
was $769,157.72. The organization refused some years 
ago to enter upon the policy of storing up a large fund, 
and the end of the year saw the union with a balance on 
hand of only $160,793.77. The next largest item of ex- 
pense was the payment of $215,153.85 for the salaries 
and traveling expenses of 194 officers and employees. 
Most of these salaries are below $500, and only the more 
important officers reach a little over $1000. In fact, the 
total expense account was only $8000 above the amount 
paid for salaries. It is this small army of executive officers 
which supplies the brains and enthusiasm, keeps the or- 
ganization from succumbing to mere inertia, and prevents 
the unwieldiness of numbers from degenerating into chaos. 
An understanding of the effectiveness of this organiza- 
tion and its solidarity in collective bargaining gives one 
some conception of the real forces that lie behind the 



126 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

arguments of the leaders in the joint conference. Its 
effective financial system enables it to prepare for and 
carry on a protracted struggle. The democratic control of 
the union's policies gives the leaders greater and more 
vital power than they could possess under a regime in 
which their effectiveness depended upon their ability as 
demagogues to sway the rank and file. But perhaps greater 
than all — this effectiveness in organization, this democ- 
racy, and the consequent forcing of the individual to feel 
his responsibility, has brought a conservatism that can- 
not come to men who are unused to acting under rules 
and regulations and who do not feel the full force of 
unity. 

The whole mechanism of this organization is arranged 
for the purpose of controlling mine labor. The miners 
have had to organize to meet changing economic condi- 
tions and to offset the evils of individual bargaining. 
Not until their right to organize is admitted and their 
leaders are intelligent enough to cope with the employers 
are the miners on a basis of equality in bargaining. To 
maintain this equality the miners have had to force the 
independent worker into the organization and bring coer- 
cion on trade-union organizations like the blacksmiths, 
engineers, firemen, and carpenters employed about the 
mine, in order to make it an industrial union as opposed 
to a mere trade union. The appointment of a statistician, 
who must " collect and compile statistics on the produc- 
tion, distribution, and consumption of coal and coke, 
freight rates, market conditions, and any other matter 
that may be of benefit to the organization," has proven a 
valuable aid to the miners' leaders in intelligent bargain- 
ing. 

In selling their labor the miners cannot offer it to a 
disorganized market where separate bargains are driven 
with each individual consumer, but they must offer it to 
an organization or organizations, of buyers. Also these 



THE UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA 127 

buyers of labor are coming to realize that they have 
more and more in common. Buyers and sellers are thus 
made approximately equal in bargaining power. In the 
next chapter we shall examine the degree of organization 
that has taken place among the operators. 



CHAPTER IV 

THE COAL OPERATORS' ASSOCIATIONS 
INTRODUCTION 

A. THE FORCES WHICH GAVE RISE TO THE 
ASSOCIATIONS 

In discussing the organization of the operators as a party 
opposed to the miners in joint conference, we should 
understand at the outset that we cannot expect to find 
the solidarity of feeling and universality of organiza- 
tion which we have seen among the miners. Although we 
find references to organization among the operators as 
early as the seventies, such organization was local. The 
growth of a feeling of common interests among them over 
the industry in general has had a very slow development. 
This was to be expected when we consider that the force 
of competition between different fields has been so strong 
as almost to prohibit action on policies for the industry 
in general. One important factor which has helped them 
to develop so far as they have is the necessity of prevent- 
ing cutthroat competition from bringing the general in- 
dustry to a low level of prices. Another factor quite as 
powerful was the growing strength of unionism and the 
necessity for meeting it effectively. 

We have seen that the chief cause of the break-up of 
the joint conference in 1885-89 was the diversity of in- 
terests among the operators and their inability to har- 
monize these interests. After a decade of ruinous compe- 
tition and strife, a general strike on the part of the miners 
in 1897 brought the operators together again in joint con- 
ference. Even then the operators' side was made up 



THE COAL OPERATORS' ASSOCIATIONS 129 

merely of representatives from the various fields who 
recognized the necessity for harmony on at least a few 
fundamental matters.) Gradually, from 1898 on, harmony 
of interests within particular fields developed to a point 
which permitted the formation of operators' associations 
for the different fields. This organizing was further in- 
duced by the necessity of meeting the growing solidarity 
of the miners' organization in the various fields. But di- 
versity of interests between fields has thus far raised too 
many barriers to permit the growth of a general organiza- 
tion among the operators comparable to the United Mine 
Workers. This can come only after sufficient unity has 
developed to lead the operators in the various fields to 
sink their individual inclinations for the sake of the wel- 
fare of the industry as a whole and in thus acting find 
that they are ultimately serving their own best interests. It 
would seem that the only force which could compel such 
cohesion is the necessity for meeting an absolute monop- 
oly control of mine labor, or the necessity for a combi- 
nation of the independent operators to meet the pressure 
brought by larger combinations of capital. We shall turn 
our attention to a consideration of the extent of federa- 
tion among the coal operators' associations in the various 
fields and to the organization of one of the most highly 
developed associations. Thus we shall be able to see the 
effectiveness of the forces which the operators bring to 
the bargaining for mine labor in the market of the joint 
conference of the central field and understand the com- 
munity of interests which will stand opposed to the United 
Mine Workers in the event of a general strike. 

1. THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF COAL 
OPERATORS 

What may be regarded as the first step taken in the 
direction of the formation of a general organization 
among the bituminous coal operators was consummated in 



ISO ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

the latter part of 1909. At that time the commissioners 
and secretaries of coal operators' associations from ten 
States met and inaugurated a preliminary organization. 
There the plan was broached of organizing a national 
association or national federation of associations. To this 
end a committee was appointed to draft a form of organi- 
zation to be submitted at a later meeting. In January, 
1912, an organization known as the American Federation 
of Coal Operators was formed and included in its mem- 
bership the coal operators' associations of Illinois, Michi- 
gan, Iowa, Montana, Washington, and Wyoming, and the 
Southwestern Interstate Coal Operators' Association. 1 

The purpose of the federation is "to promote the com- 
mon interests of the coal operators of America by all law- 
ful means ; but the federation shall not deal with matters 
relating to freight rates or with prices and sale of coal." 2 
All associations whose purposes are similar to those of 
the federation are eligible to membership, but we do not 
find the names of the operators' associations of Indiana, 
Ohio, and Pennsylvania in the list. We have seen in 
chapter I that the operators of these three States have 
thus far taken a conservative attitude on the question of 
including coal fields outside of the central field in the 
joint conference, and undoubtedly the same objection of 
a supposed lack of community of interests accounts for 
their being outside of the federation. However willing 
Indiana may be to enter the federation, she is placed in 
an embarrassing position by the opposition and competi- 
tion from Ohio and Pennsylvania. We are inclined to 
think that, though the Ohio and Pennsylvania operators 
are unwilling to include the other fields in the joint bar- 
gaining, they will see the day when they will be glad of 
their support in facing the united opposition of the union 
during a general strike. Some of their opposition to the 

1 Constitution of American Federation of Coal Operators, 1912, p. 7. 

2 Ibid., p. 1. 



THE COAL OPERATORS' ASSOCIATIONS 131 

adjustment of differentials between fields may die away 
because of the necessity for a larger community of inter- 
est on other matters. 

In the deliberations of the federation each operators' 
association is entitled to one vote " for each two million 
tons or majority fraction thereof," but no association has 
less than two votes. Though each association may send as 
many delegates as it has votes, the delegation represent- 
ing an association may cast its entire vote. Thus there is 
a democratic basis for ultimate control, but there is suf- 
ficient authority placed in the hands of the president and 
executive committee to provide for effective administra- 
tion. On the executive committee there is a representative 
from each association, and although the committee pos- 
sesses all the powers of the federation when the latter is 
not in session, it is limited by the mandates of the larger 
body and by constitutional provisions. Nor is unanimity 
of feeling and action to be sacrificed for the sake of ra- 
pidity in administration, for any two members of the 
executive board who are dissatisfied with the action of 
the board on main or principal questions may demand 
that the committee receive a mandate from the federation 
convention before carrying its policies into effect. The 
most important function of the executive committee is to 
act in conjunction with the national executive board of 
the United Mine Workers in constituting a court of con- 
ciliation and arbitration for the interpretation of agree- 
ments and the adjudication of disputes which are referred 
to it. 

The policy of the federation is to make regulations 
which enable it to enforce all contracts made by its mem- 
bers with their employees. Of course the coercion is to be 
placed upon the employees by providing penalties for vio- 
lations. This is to be accomplished chiefly by suspending 
the "check-off" of dues to the miners' organization. Thus 
the leaders are compelled to make greater efforts to hold 



132 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

their followers in line and prevent local strikes. Members 
who are suffering from strikes in violation of contracts are 
reimbursed by the association, though we are not informed 
just how, probably by the furnishing of coal and the meet- 
ing of losses attendant upon the suspension of mine opera- 
tion. 

The financial obligations of the federation are met by 
the returns from membership fees ($25 for each one mil- 
lion tons produced) and special assessments, which are 
levied in proportion to the number of tons produced. 

Although these provisions characterize the organization 
as a true federation, it shows possibilities of developing 
into a capitalistic industrial union. Only the future can 
reveal whether it will pass through the same evolution as 
did the United Mine Workers in feeling the necessity of 
more centralized control and the subjection of local and 
district autonomy in certain matters to the larger inter- 
ests of the industry as a whole. Of course the force of 
competition between fields has been and will be a source 
of conflict and a constant menace to measures taken to 
bring about unanimity of action. Moreover, this force of 
competition, so long as the bituminous coal is produced 
by relatively small companies, is less apt to yield to con- 
certed action than the competition between union and un- 
organized labor did. Fixed capital being less mobile than 
labor, and the expense of production being so dependent 
upon the variation in the size of the vein of coal, the 
amount of de*bris necessitating removal, etc., every possi- 
ble effort will be made to bring returns upon the invest- 
ment. The further fact that the mines in operation are 
always able to produce millions of tons more than the 
market will absorb will not encourage the development 
of altruism on the part of the larger concerns sufficiently 
for them to be willing to permit the little fellows to have 
their share of the market. On the other hand, the smaller 
concerns will take their share if the difference between 



THE COAL OPERATORS' ASSOCIATIONS 133 

selling prices of coal and their expenses of production 
will permit it. In fact, it would seem that a capitalistic 
industrial union comparable to the United Mine Workers 
could not develop unless concentration of ownership and 
control should increase to such an extent as to permit of 
the exhaustion of the most profitable mines first and a 
gradual extension of production to the less profitable. 
Were this to take place it would be a matter of vital con- 
cern to the public and to the miners' union : to the former 
as affecting the prices paid for coal and to the latter as 
affecting the prices paid for labor. If the miners could 
present forces as united as those of the operators, and if 
the public would not permit extended warfare, the miners' 
wages would undoubtedly reach a higher level by employ- 
ment of the men only in the richest mines. We are con- 
cerned about seeing the degree of unity and the magni- 
tude of the forces which the operators bring at present to 
the bargaining for mine labor, and it is on this side that 
the operators are likely to find their greatest community 
of interest. 

It has been within each coal field or district that the 
operators have learned their greatest community of inter- 
est. There conditions of production and marketing were 
similar enough to permit the growth of a recognition of 
like interests in the competition within the fields. With 
the expansion of the union from local to district and na- 
tional scope an ever-present necessity was at hand com- 
pelling the operators to bring about some degree of uni- 
formity in wages and working conditions. Thus a new 
sense of common interests emerged and encouraged the 
development of district, field, or state operators' associa- 
tions, as the situation demanded. Most of this develop- 
ment has taken place since 1898 as the fields have been 
unionized. It is in these associations that we find the 
greatest degree of solidarity yet developed among the op- 
erators, and it has been the representatives from these 



134 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

organizations that have thus far met the leaders of the 
miners in joint conference and established wage scales 
and differentials between coal fields. In the Illinois Coal 
Operators' Association we find the highest degree of de- 
velopment. There the operators have had to meet a strong 
union organization and there they mined coal under simi- 
lar competitive conditions. These factors have encouraged 
a complex organization among the operators and made 
Illinois one of the prime movers for an extension of capi- 
talistic solidarity from state to national scope. We cannot 
do better, then, than to consider the way the Illinois as- 
sociation is organized. 

2. ILLINOIS COAL OPERATORS' ASSOCIATION 

A. Objects 

The following statement of the objects of the associa- 
tion is taken from the constitution: — 

Its object shall be to promote stable, just, harmonious and 
business-like relations between the coal operators of Illinois and 
their employees ; to secure in coal trade agreements a recog- 
nition of the legitimate needs and rights of the employers ; to 
aid in enforcing agreements between the members of this asso- 
ciation and their employees when made ; to aid in seeing that 
suspension of operations in violation of contract is visited with 
adequate penalties ; to see that any member of this association 
suffering from strikes in violation of contract is sustained and 
supported, and that he is reimbursed by those violating the con- 
tract and otherwise ; to promote business-like methods in negoti- 
ating agreements and in operating under them ; to provide means 
for interpreting of trade agreements ; to compile coal mining 
statistics and, in general, to promote in all lawful ways the inter- 
ests of the coal operators of the State. 1 

The State is divided into nine districts, each of which is 
at liberty to form district associations, if it thinks it to its 

1 Constitution of Illinois Coal Operators' Association, as amended, 1912. 



THE COAL OPERATORS' ASSOCIATIONS 135 

interest to do so, and provided that none of the rules and 
regulations of such associations shall conflict with the 
state association. 

B. Membership 

Any person, firm, or corporation is eligible to member- 
ship upon making application to the recording secretary 
and paying the membership fee of $2 for each mine oper- 
ated and the annual dues of $5 per year. But no " official 
or representative of more than one coal mining interest in 
the State shall be entitled to the privileges of the associa- 
tion, unless each such separate interest shall have mem- 
bership in good standing in the association, or unless mem- 
bers of the executive board representing two thirds of the 
districts shall decide otherwise. Should any dispute arise 
as to the eligibility of any applicant, it shall be decided 
by a majority vote of the executive board.' , 

A. OBLIGATIONS OF MEMBERS 

In joining this association the member obligates himself 
to do all within his power to further the interests of the 
association, "to maintain and observe the agreements 
entered into by the association (paying no more nor no 
less than the rates established, and making no more favor- 
able conditions than those set forth therein), any devia- 
ations therefrom to be considered a violation of such agree- 
ments." When a member is charged with a violation he 
is given an opportunity for defense. If the charges are 
proven and he fails or refuses to conform to the require- 
ments of the constitution, he may be expelled from the 
association by a majority vote. 

A member further obligates himself to furnish any other 
member with coal in case his mine has been closed by his 
laborers violating the agreements. Before this aid is given 
the executive board inquires into the suspension, and if it 
finds the violation was unwarranted designates the other 



136 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

members who shall be required to furnish coal to take care 
of the afflicted member's existing contracts for coal. In 
taking this action, where voluntary contributions of coal 
are insufficient, the board takes into consideration the 
location of mines which are to contribute, the character 
of the coal, the relative cost at points of delivery, the pro- 
portion to be contributed by each, the prices to be charged, 
and the existing contracts of other members. In no case 
can the board require a member " to contribute coal at 
less than the operating cost thereof." 

B. DELINQUENTS AND WITHDRAWALS 

But if a member becomes delinquent in paying his dues 
and assessments he may be deprived of the right to partici- 
pate in the affairs of the organization, or he may be ex- 
pelled by the executive board " (subject to reversal by the 
association), or by a majority vote of the association,'' 
provided due notice has been given of the pending action. 

A member may withdraw at the expiration of a thirty 
days' notice on condition that he is not involved in a labor 
dispute (which exists or is pending) and if no labor negotia- 
tions are in progress. But this withdrawal does not " re- 
lease him from any then existing obligations concerning 
labor matters, nor from being bound by the provisions of 
any labor agreement for which negotiations are then in 
progress," if the agreement with the union is authorized 
"by a majority vote of the members of the association in 
his district." 

A member who withdraws or is expelled can be rein- 
stated only by a majority vote of the executive board or of 
the association and after the payment of all arrearages in 
assessments and dues. 

C. BASIS OF REPRESENTATION AND VOTING 

Each member is entitled to one vote, and a majority 
vote governs, except that at the request of three members 



THE COAL OPERATORS' ASSOCIATIONS 137 

a two-thirds vote is required to secure the adoption of 
a resolution in reference to pending labor negotiations or 
agreements, declarations or terminations of lockouts or 
strikes, grants of power to the executive board to consum- 
mate labor agreements, appropriation of money, levying 
of assessments, and the adoption of rules for the collec- 
tion, disbursement, and maintenance of the defense fund. 

C. Officers and their Duties 

The officers of the association consist of a president, 
vice-president, secretary-treasurer, recording secretary, 
commissioner, secretary of the commission, and an execu- 
tive board. These officers are all elected annually except 
the commissioner, secretary of the commission, and the 
recording secretary, who are appointed by the executive 
board. 

A. THE COMMISSION 

The duties of the president, vice-president, secretary- 
treasurer, and the recording secretary are sufficiently set 
forth by the names they bear. But the commissioner and 
secretary of the commission are at the head of a depart- 
ment whose chief business is to carry out the adminis- 
trative work connected with trade agreements. This func- 
tion has proven to be as necessary as the making of 
agreements. The individual members on the side of either 
capital or labor cannot be left to interpret the agreement 
as may suit their purposes. It is as necessary that capital 
have its representation in adjusting disputes as it is for 
labor to be represented by its leaders. Only in this way 
can an approach be made to consistency and uniformity 
of policy. Furthermore, they stand as salaried officials 
who have no pecuniary interest in the disputes and are 
able to bring a corresponding degree of fairness in their 
attitude to the matters at issue. But they have no author- 
ity to set aside or modify decisions or interpretations of 



138 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

agreements previously made by the association or executive 
board. The association evidently considers that one of its 
most important duties is the "enlightenment of public opin- 
ion, that the public may know that the operators desire to 
respect the agreement entered into with labor organizations, 
and to enlist its moral support in behalf of this organi- 
zation and of responsible officers of labor organizations, to 
the end that violation of agreements on either side may 
be condemned and rebuked." In order that the members 
of the commission may have a full understanding of the 
policy of the association, they are given a seat and a voice 
without a vote in all meetings of the association, executive 
board, and all standing committees except the finance and 
auditing committees. The secretary of the commission is 
expected to collate statistics concerning production of coal 
in other States, the markets to which it is consigned, mine 
casualties, etc. 

B. THE EXECUTIVE BOARD 

The executive board is composed of three members 
from each of the nine districts, and where more than one 
method of mining is in vogue in a district each method 
must be represented on the board. The members are se- 
lected by the several districts " subject to confirmation by 
the association at each annual meeting " and hold office 
till their successors are selected. Ex-presidents of the as- 
sociation are honorary members of the board without a 
vote. 

(1) Duties of the hoard 

The executive board represents the association when it 
is not in session, adopts its own rules (to conform with 
the constitution), directs the administrative officers, and 
may delegate any of its powers to an officer or standing 
committee. It may recommend to the association a repeal 
or change in any provision of the constitution in its an- 
nual or special reports. It is the scale committee during 



THE COAL OPERATORS' ASSOCIATIONS 139 

the negotiations of labor agreements, "but when such 
[agreements] have been reached, and ratified by the asso- 
ciation, and promulgated, its powers as such shall cease." 
It then becomes a " standing committee with power to in- 
vestigate and adjudicate all alleged violations of existing 
agreements with intent to secure their faithful observ- 
ance." 

Either the association or the board may take means to 
enforce contracts with employees, provide penalties for 
their violation, and arrange for the reimbursement of em- 
ployers suffering from strikes which are in violation of 
contracts. One of the most effective measures the board 
has at its command for penalizing the union for violation 
of contracts is the refusal to grant the "check-off" of 
dues. To this end the board is authorized to formulate 
plans which would provide, "if practicable," for the inser- 
tion in contracts of the provision for releasing members 
of the operators' association from paying the check-off 
when the miners violate their contracts. Another provision 
the operators desire to have inserted in the contracts would 
prohibit the union from reimbursing individual employees 
or locals for penalties inflicted as the result of breaking 
contracts. Evidently the operators expected that these 
measures would require the state and national unions to 
exert more power over the locals and individual members. 
During the stormy period of development from 1898 up 
to 1907 (the time of the adoption of the operators' consti- 
tution), these provisions would have been very hard to 
inaugurate either from the operators' or the miners' side, 
for the whole movement was too recent and rested on a 
too unstable basis to stand much coercion. With further 
development of the full significance of conciliation in the 
minds of both parties the conditions which require such 
provisions ought to disappear. 

The diversity of the activities of an association is illus- 
trated by the number of its standing and special commit- 



140 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

tees, such as a general affairs committee ; an interstate 
relations committee, consisting of the past and existing 
presidents ; railroad and transportation committee ; mine 
casualty and mining institute committee ; legislative com- 
mittee ; coal-stoking and anti-smoke committee ; finance 
committee ; and auditing committee. " The association or 
the executive board can, at their discretion, revoke or 
modify the powers and duties of any standing or special 
committee, or transfer the same from one committee to 
another, or assign any power or duties to any one of 
them." 

D. The Defense Fund 

One of the most noteworthy features of the association 
is the defense fund. This is built up by special assess- 
ments on the basis of the tonnage produced by the mem- 
bers and is drawn upon to help those who are subjected 
to loss because the union has failed to live up to its con- 
tract. If the union officers cannot hold the men in line in 
a certain district this fund proves a valuable asset. When 
a suspension of work occurs, the members of the executive 
board of the district make (or delegate the commissioner 
to make) an investigation of the case and report the find- 
ings to the board. If the executive board decides the mem- 
ber is entitled to support, he is reimbursed out of the 
defense fund, " taking into account both the direct and 
consequential loss sustained and the assistance and pro- 
tection rendered by any other measures provided by virtue 
of any existing joint agreements or through or by the As- 
sociation." 

The assessments for the fund are levied as a result of 
a three-fourths vote in annual or special meetings of the 
association, and all rules and regulations regarding collec- 
tion and disbursement are subject to a majority vote of 
the association. The defense fund is kept separate from 
all other funds of the association and is invested in 



THE COAL OPERATORS' ASSOCIATIONS 141 

readily convertible assets. Payments from the fund must 
be approved by a majority vote of the executive board. 
Separate accounts of the amounts paid in by individual 
members and the deductions for defense purposes are 
kept, and when a member withdraws or is expelled he is 
entitled to recover the unexpended portion of his contri- 
butions plus his apportionment of interest which has ac- 
crued on the fund. 

The associations in other fields are similarly organized, 
but they are not so highly centralized, do not have so great 
a diversity of activities, and the defense fund feature is 
absent. But provision is made for a commissioner to rep- 
resent the association when disputes arise and in the 
interpretation of agreements. This feature is found in all 
associations that recognize the union and deal with its 
representatives. Such a provision is a logical step after 
the formation of an operators' association and after mak- 
ing a contract in joint conference. Thus the district, field, 
and state operators' associations present the most united 
front to labor organizations and upon the centers of unity 
there established the beginnings of federation have been 
built. In bargaining for labor in the joint conference and 
during general strikes we may expect a growing solidarity. 
We are now in a position to appreciate the strength of 
the parties that come together to bargain for mine labor 
and the responsibility the representatives of these parties 
have in forming an agreement acceptable to their constit- 
uents. 



CHAPTER V 

THE INTERSTATE JOINT CONFERENCE 

1. THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE JOINT CONFERENCE 

Knowledge of the rise of the miners' organization, its 
evolution into a thoroughly organized and well-adminis- 
tered body, and the development of operators' organiza- 
tions along similar lines, affords a basis for understanding 
the full significance of the interstate joint conference. 
The joint conference of the central field is the central 
market for mine labor. Collective bargaining has here 
reached as high a point of development as in any other 
industry in our country. An insight into its complexity 
makes one realize how far removed the average miner is 
from the old days of individual dealing with his employer. 
Under individual bargaining the employee was forced to 
take the wages the employer offered, and his inability to 
control the sanitary arrangements and dangers under 
which he worked put him at the mercy of his employer. 
In short, it is the contrast between the policy of expecting 
the self-interest of the employer to work out to the best 
interests of society and the growing modern concept that 
human life and public warfare should be held in higher 
esteem than mere acquisition and preservation of property. 
Nor does collective bargaining mean that a dead level of 
uniformity must exist among the laborers. According to 
Mr. John Mitchell, trade unionism stands for competition 
among workmen on " the basis of efficiency and not upon 
that of reduced wages, lengthened hours, or any abate- 
ment of the conditions fixed by the collective bargain." * 
1 Mitchell, Organized Labor, p. 6. 



THE INTERSTATE JOINT CONFERENCE 143 

A. The " Right " of Organization and 
Representation 

A chief foundation stone in the structure of the inter- 
state conference is the " right " of the employee to organ- 
ize which carries with it the right to be represented in 
bargaining with the employer. Labor thus becomes a 
product for sale, and, except for the fact that it is a perish- 
able commodity, the seller of the same is on a par with 
the coal operator. Organized labor is coming to the point 
where it deplores strikes as much as any other group in 
the community. The fact that these elemental rights are 
disputed or not recognized is the cause of most of the 
strikes. This is because employers are unwilling to allow 
labor the benefits of cooperation and representation. 
Strikes are to be used only as a last resort in obtaining 
justice, for " the victories won in conference halls, where 
the elements of strength are the enlightened logic of the 
combatants, are the victories which leave no wounds to 
heal and are the greatest victories of them all." 1 

B. The Encouragement of Good Feeling 

As we have seen, there was a period when the miners 
had to be educated in regard to the benefits of concilia- 
tion and cooperation. In the early days of the interstate 
conference the leaders on both sides felt called upon to 
impress upon the minds of their constituents the impor- 
tance of the conciliation movement. Hard experience had 
taught them that they had hit upon something worth con- 
sidering by the rank and file on either side. The occasion 
of electing a permanent chairman was generally used to 
lay a groundwork. " This is not an arena where foe meets 
foe, but it is a friendly meeting-place of those who are 
interested for the benefit of all. And happy will be the 
day when capital and labor can meet on the same plat- 
1 Report of United Mine Workers 1 Convention, 1902, p. 36. 



144 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

form and shake hands with true friendship." * President 
Ratchford at the miners' convention laid emphasis on the 
importance of maintaining the joint conference by point- 
ing out that " the man or men who throw a single obsta- 
cle in its way [are] undeserving of a place in the councils 
of miners or operators, and will be adjudged guilty of a 
crime against hundreds of thousands of men, women, and 
children whose comfort depends so largely upon its con- 
summation." 2 The evolution in attitude of both sides is 
plainly shown, in the conferences of recent years, by the 
brevity with which each side exchanges felicitations and 
proceeds to the necessary business. 

C. Formulation of Principles 

Although the joint conferences had begun in 1898, it 
was not until 1902 that a clear formulation of their basic 
principles was adopted. The following resolutions were 
presented by Mr. Herman Justi, commissioner for the 
Illinois Coal Operators' Association : 3 

First. That this movement is founded, and that it is to rest, 
upon correct business ideas, competitive equality, and upon well- 
recognized principles of justice. 

Second. That, recognizing the contract relations existing be- 
tween employer and employee, we believe strikes and lockouts, 
disputes and friction, can be generally avoided by meeting in 
joint convention and by entering into trade agreements for spec- 
ified periods of time. 

Third. That we recognize the sacredness and binding nature 
of contracts and agreements thus entered into, and are pledged 
in honor to keep inviolate such contracts and agreements made 
by and between a voluntary organization, having no standing in 
court, on the one hand, and a merely collective body of business 
men doing business individually or in corporate capacity on the 

1 Proceedings of Interstate Joint Conference, 1899, p. 2. 

2 Report of United Mine Workers' 1 Convention, 1898, p. 7. 
8 Proceedings of Interstate Joint Conference, 1902, p. 51. 



THE INTERSTATE JOINT CONFERENCE 145 

other, each of the latter class having visible and tangible assets 
subject to execution. 

Fourth. That we deprecate, discourage, and condemn any 
departure whatever from the letter or spirit of such agreements 
or contracts, unless such departure be deemed by all parties in 
interest for the welfare of the coal mining industry and for the 
public good as well, and that such departure is first definitely, 
specifically, and mutually agreed upon by all parties in interest. 

Fifth. Such contracts or agreements having been entered into, 
we consider ourselves severally and collectively bound in honor 
to carry them out in good faith in letter and in spirit, and are 
so pledged to use our influence and authority to enforce these 
contracts and agreements, the more so since they rest in the 
main upon mutual confidence as their basis. 

A sixth resolution providing for arbitration by a board 
of referees was thrown out. 

2. THE CONFERENCE AT WORK 
A. Membership 

The conference has generally been held during the lat- 
ter part of January and the beginning of February. The 
miners' convention is held previous to this and their 
demands are formulated. This gives the joint conference 
plenty of time to reach an agreement before the previous 
agreement expires, usually April 1. 

Until 1908, the interstate joint conference was made 
up of miners and operators from the States of Illinois, 
Ohio, Indiana, and Pennsylvania. In that year the miners 
and operators of Illinois failed to attend the conference, 
for reasons which will be taken up later. 

The following table shows the growth from 1898 to 
1906 (the highest point), the decline in 1908 and 1910, 
and the relative strength of miners and operators in the 
various States: 1 

1 In 1912 a large committee took the place of a convention. 



146 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 



Variations in Membership in the Joint Conference 



J 



States. 


Mine Workers. 


Operators. 


1898 


1906 


1908 


19101 


1898 


1906 


1908 


1910 '» 


Pennsylvania .... 

Ohio 

Indiana (bituminous) . 
Indiana (block) . . . 

Illinois 

West Virginia . . . 


40 

83 
27 2 

111 
17 


113 
156 
111 
13 
240 



105 

128 

31 

3 

15 




113 

117 

60 

8 






45 
67 
43 2 

95 



30 
85 
50 

8 
184 




35 

83 

15 

2 






15 

50 

14 

2 








278 


633 


282 


298 


250 


357 


135 


81 



1 The decrease in number of representatives in 1908 and 1910 is due to the participa- 
tion of only three States in the joint conferences. 

2 No distinction made between bituminous and block representatives. Block coal 
contains a higher percentage of carbon than bituminous and is taken out in large chunks. 

The operators not only expect the miners to keep their 
own members within the agreement, but rely on them to 
coerce a delinquent operator. This they can do by calling 
a strike, which may be more effective than any fine by an 
operators' association. But the cost of the procedure falls 
upon the miners, and it is a losing fight if the operator can 
get plenty of non-union labor. In fact, the chief burden of 
the cost of making competitive conditions uniform in the 
various districts comes on the miners. " No attempt is made 
to make wages uniform or the earning capacity of the 
men equal between the different districts, or within the 
districts themselves, the principal object being so to regu- 
late the scale of mining as to make cost of production 
practically the same in one district that it is in another, 
regardless of whether or not the earnings of the miners 
are equal." 1 

B. Organization and Rules 

The organization and work of the conference is unique 
and interesting. The president of the miners is generally 

1 Report of Industrial Commission, vol. 12, p. 698. 



THE INTERSTATE JOINT CONFERENCE 147 

elected temporary chairman, which gives him a chance to 
extend felicitations on the continuation of the movement 
and to introduce local and national men of prominence 
who have been asked to address the conference. A com- 
mittee on credentials and a committee on rules and order 
of business and permanent organization are then selected. 
These committees are made up of two operators and two 
miners from each State. A recess of a couple of hours is 
taken in order to give the committees time to make up 
their report. In connection with the report of the com- 
mittee on rules and order of business and permanent or- 
ganization the name of an operator is suggested as perma- 
nent chairman, a miner as secretary, and a representative 
of the operators as assistant secretary. The rules of the 
convention contain provisions for definite hours of meet- 
ing and adjournment, but special meetings or an evening 
session are allowable, which provision is often made use 
of at critical times when an agreement seems about to be 
reached. The miners' representatives occupy the right of 
the hall and the operators the left. Each State has the 
same number of votes, four votes for the operators and four 
votes for the miners. No vote is declared carried except 
upon the affirmative vote of both operators and miners 
from all the States. The unanimous vote shows that each 
side fears to trust the issue to the other side plus perhaps 
one vote from its own. In questions of mere procedure 
the rules in any standard manual of parliamentary pro- 
cedure are in force. But the rule requiring unanimous 
vote on all main and principal questions is never sus- 
pended. "Main and principal questions" are "all ques- 
tions affecting the proposed scale and agreement.' ' Each 
State has four operators and four miners on the scale 
committee, who are appointed with the understanding that 
each representative shall have an alternate who has all the 
privileges of the scale committee, but cannot " vote except 
in the absence of his principal." In the formation of this 



148 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

method of representation on the scale committee in the 
conference of 1898, the minority of the committee on rules 
and regulations stood out strongly for representation on 
the basis of tonnage of the respective States, " one vote, 
miner and operator, respectively, for each five million tons 
or major fraction thereof, mine-run coal, produced in the 
year 1896." The majority insisted that their method was 
fairer to all concerned, and that it was not desirable that 
" conclusions " should " be forced on any State." The ses- 
sions are open to the public except when otherwise ordered, 
and as a result of this both sides suffer misrepresentation 
at the hands of newspaper reporters. But undoubtedly it is 
a considerable asset to the conciliation movement in con- 
vincing the public that their proceedings are open and 
aboveboard and in winning support for the side which has 
the right of it. 

C. The Order of Business 

The order of business consists of the report of the cre- 
dentials committee, report of the rules and regulations 
committee, appointment of the scale committee, report of 
the scale committee, disposal of the report of the scale 
committee, and adjournment. This appears rather a sim- 
ple order of business, but what seems at the most to be a 
few days' work has lengthened into weeks at critical times 
in the industry. After the report of the credentials com- 
mittee has been accepted, each side learns what the other 
is expecting by the presentation of formal demands. 
These demands generally pertain to an increase or de- 
crease in the mining rate, uniform mining system (the 
miners generally asking for mine-run rather than screen 
system), uniform wage scale for outside and inside day 
labor, differential per ton between pick and machine min- 
ing, advance in payment for yardage and deadwork, a 
check-off system by which the dues and assessments are 
deducted from the miners' wages and paid to the United 



THE INTERSTATE JOINT CONFERENCE 149 

Mine Workers, settlement of internal difficulties and ine- 
qualities in the various districts, etc. Discussion of these 
demands brings out the dissatisfaction that both sides have 
felt during the life of the previous agreement, and one 
would imagine that such diametrically opposite views as 
are there expressed could never be reconciled. On a vote 
to accept either the miners' or the operators' demands, the 
miners vote unanimously one way and the operators unan- 
imously the other. If the demands had to be reconciled 
there in open convention, they probably never would be 
settled, but the machinery of the scale committee is now 
set in motion and the discussion is carried on by thirty-two 
men and their alternates instead of by several hundred. 
The convention adjourns subject to call by the scale com- 
mittee (or chairman) when the committee is ready to re- 
port. The scale committee is governed by the rules of the 
convention, and here the minutest details of the industry 
are taken up. It does not take long for each party to dis- 
cover that there are two sides to every question which is 
brought forward. The only hope for an agreement lies in 
a willingness to recede from the arbitrary positions which 
each side has taken. Usually each side has certain de- 
mands which it will not withdraw, but others which it is 
willing to trade on. These demands are generally discov- 
ered by discussion and consideration, in the form of a 
motion, of the formal demands that each has presented. 
Both sides are desirous of carrying full and unanimous con- 
viction of the reasonableness of their demands before they 
are allowed to come to vote, for they always have hanging 
over them the knowledge that one dissenting vote will kill 
their proposition. Here one has a chance to see all the 
foibles of human nature at play, but withal mixed up with 
banter and good fellowship. Out of it comes a respect for 
the man for his real worth. Both sides realize that they 
cannot be governed by the personal concessions they are 
willing to make, for ultimately they are held responsible 



150 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

by their constituents. They must present an agreement 
to the convention that both sides feel will be accepted and 
lived up to by the rank and file. If the scale committee 
reaches an agreement, the convention is called to order 
and the report of the committee presented. If there is any 
dissatisfaction it is sure to be heard, but the leaders of 
both sides on the scale committee defend their course of 
action and advise acceptance of the agreement that has 
been reached. If the scale committee has been unable to 
agree, this is reported to the convention and there is an- 
other period of general discussion in the conference. 

The leaders of the miners prove themselves just as 
capable and well informed as the best of the operators. 
It was in 1902 that the miners established a department 
of statistics to keep themselves in touch with prices and 
conditions of trade. 1 They have used the information ob- 
tained in this manner in a very effective way. In 1906, 
when the operators offered to open their books for in- 
spection, that a scale might be made on the basis of profits 
and selling prices, Mr. Mitchell very properly wished to 
know the connection between the coal companies and the 
railroads, who owned the stock, and how much of the profits 
of the coal companies were absorbed to pay freight rates, 
etc. 2 At the most critical times and when the heat of the 
discussion runs highest the speaker on the floor is given a 
fair hearing. We give here a report of a convention inci- 
dent : — 

Mr. (evidently from the miners' side, interrupted Mr. 

R., an operator). What are you doing, Mr. R. ? 

Mr. R. I am working, and you would be a great deal better 
off if you were doing the same thing. 

Mr. W. (miner). I protest against any unfair treatment from 
this convention to any man who has the floor. 

Mr. D. (miner). I move that the first man who does anything 

1 Report of United Mine Workers' Convention, 1902, pp. 44-45. 

2 Proceedings of Interstate Joint Conference, 1906, p. 246. 



THE INTERSTATE JOINT CONFERENCE 151 

of this kind be put out. If the operators, when Mr. Mitchell or 
Mr. Lewis were on the floor, would act as our delegates are do- 
ing, would you like it ? 

Mr. L. (miner). I believe it is time to appoint a half-dozen 
sergeants-at-arms in this convention. Any man who interrupts 
any speaker on the floor ought to be ejected from the hall, I 
don't care who he is. 

Mr. R. (operator). They needn't do that to protect me; I 
can take care of myself. 

Mr. K. (chairman). I believe it is the feeling of the members 
on both sides, with a few exceptions, that every speaker should 
be given a fair hearing. 1 

After further discussion in general convention the scale 
committee is recommitted to the task of reaching an agree- 
ment. Such modifications as each side are willing to make 
are brought forward. But here as elsewhere the unani- 
mous vote required results in a process of elimination until 
something is brought forward upon which all can agree. 
If it becomes evident that such a large number as are in 
the scale committee cannot agree, a sub-scale committee, 
of two operators and two miners from each State, is se- 
lected by the scale committee. Stenographic reports of the 
convention and scale committee deliberations are made, 
but no record of the sub-scale proceedings is kept. The 
last thing that either party wants is a failure to agree, be- 
cause it means loss of money. They realize that they must 
get together and undergo the difficult process of changing 
their minds — in part, at least. Various sources of infor- 
mation seem to indicate that this is a rather heating and 
exciting process. In the past it has been part of a sort of 
gentlemen's agreement that the participants should not 
reveal the difficult contortions some individuals have had 
to go through with in order to accomplish this result, but 
in the conference of 1910 the rather disagreeable practice 
was begun of making reference in general conference to 

1 Proceedings of Interstate Joint Conference, 1904, p. 63. 



152 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

what went on in the committee meeting. This called for 
an explanation on the part of the individual accused, with 
the result that it all went down on the record. It does not 
look well, and is likely to cause distrust. The sub-scale 
committee is appointed with the feeling that it is a last 
resort. When it brings forth an agreement after much 
labor and discussion, its report is accepted by both the 
scale committee and the convention. Neither side has re- 
ceived all it wanted, but each feels that it has obtained all 
it can get and that work may as well begin on this basis. 
In cases where even the sub-scale committee has failed to 
agree, the convention has adjourned and a suspension of 
work taken place until the leaders could succeed in get- 
ting together another conference. 

D. Inviolable Contkacts 

It is not to be supposed that the miners in the begin- 
ning had an enlarged conception of the sacredness of the 
agreements any more than the operators. Mr. Herman 
Justi, commissioner of the Illinois Coal Operators' Asso- 
ciation, in order to impress upon the miners the necessity 
of exercising more discipline over the organization, re- 
minded them of the Spring Valley strike. 1 In that case 
the strike was settled by a board of arbitration composed 
of three miners and three operators. A unanimous vote 
was given to the basis of settlement, but the miners re- 
fused to submit and remained idle three weeks " until 
they had obtained by indirection what arbitration had 
denied them, and until the union had voted strike benefits 
to the miners, although it had been contended by the 
miners' union that the miners were not legally on strike 
and were not entitled to such strike benefits." On the 
other hand, this was met by one of the leaders of the Il- 
linois miners with " We stand ready to prove that there 
has never, since the inception of the joint movement, been 

1 Proceedings of Interstate Joint Conference, 1903, p. 80. 



THE INTERSTATE JOINT CONFERENCE 153 

a strike of any kind indorsed in Illinois by the organiza- 
tion that could not have been avoided had the operators 
lived up to the spirit and letter of our agreement." 1 There 
was evidently room for improvement on both sides if 
President Mitchell felt called upon to say to the 1900 
conference, after the scale had been adopted, "I will 
serve notice to the operators now that when they go home, 
unless they keep the agreement inviolate, we will call the 
men out ; and I will serve notice on the miners that unless 
they keep the laws of the organization, we will suspend 
them from the organization." 2 In the miners' convention 
he urged the miners to remember that the agreements were 
inviolable, and that they should be regarded all the more 
so because they were purely matters of honor, and, if 
broken, the employer could not have a greater weapon 
against them. 3 

3. THE FORMATION OF SCALES 

A. The Scale of 1898 

The following is the agreement reached in 1898 and is 
a good example of the items which are settled for the whole 
central competitive field. 

Chicago Agreement, 1898 

Chicago, January 28. — Contract between the operators of 
the central competitive coal field and the United Mine Workers 
of America. 

The following agreement made and entered into in Joint In- 
terstate Convention in this city (Chicago, Hlinois), January 26, 
1898, by and between the miners and operators of Hlinois, In- 
diana, Ohio and Western Pennsylvania, known as the Pittsburg 
thin vein district, witnesseth : — 

1 Proceedings of Interstate Joint Conference, 1903, p. 83. 

2 Ibid., 1900, p. 142. 

8 Report of United Mine Workers' 1 Convention, 1902, p. 51. 



154 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

1. That an equal price for mining screened lump coal shall 
hereafter form a base scale in all the districts above named, ex- 
cepting the state of Illinois, the block coal district of Indiana to 
pay ten cents per ton over that of Hocking Valley, Western 
Pennsylvania, and Indiana bituminous district; and that the price 
of pick run-of-mine coal in Hocking Valley and Western Penn- 
sylvania shall be determined by the actual percentage of screen- 
ings passing through such screens as are hereinafter provided, 
it being understood and agreed that screened or run-of-mine coal 
may be mined and paid for on the above basis at the option of 
the operators, according to market requirements, and the opera- 
tors of Indiana bituminous shall also have a like option of min- 
ing and paying for run-of-mine coal or screen coal. 

2. That the screen hereby adopted for the State of Ohio, 
Western Pennsylvania, and the bituminous district of Indiana 
shall be uniform in size, six feet wide by twelve feet long, built 
of flat or akron-shaped bar of not less than five eighths of an inch 
surface, with one and one fourth inches between bars, free from 
obstructions, and that such screen shall rest upon sufficient num- 
ber of bearings to hold the bars in proper position. 

3. That the block coal district of Indiana may continue the 
use of the diamond screen of present size and pattern with the 
privilege of run-of-mine coal, the mining price of which shall be 
determined by the actual screenings ; and that the State of Illi- 
nois shall be absolutely upon a run-of-mine system and shall be 
paid for on that basis. 

4. That an advance of ten cents per ton of 2000 pounds for 
pick-mined screen coal shall take effect in Western Pennsylvania, 
Hocking Valley, and Indiana bituminous districts on April 1, 
1898, and that Grape Creek, Illinois, and the bituminous dis- 
tricts of Indiana shall pay forty cents per ton run-of-mine coal 
from and after same date, based upon sixty-six cents per ton 
screened coal in Ohio, Western Pennsylvania, and the Indiana 
bituminous district, same to continue in force until the expira- 
tion of this contract. 

5. That on and after April 1, 1898, the eight-hour work day 
with eight hours' pay, consisting of six days per week, shall be 
in effect in all of the districts represented, and that uniform 
wages for day labor shall be paid to different classes of labor in 
the fields named, and that internal differences in any of the 



THE INTERSTATE JOINT CONFERENCE 155 

States or districts, both as to prices or conditions, shall be referred 
to the States or districts affected for adjustment. 

6. That the same relative prices and conditions between ma- 
chine and pick mining that have existed in the different States 
shall be continued during the life of this contract. 

7. That present prices for pick and machine mining and all 
classes of day labor shall be maintained in the competitive States 
and districts until April 1, 1898. 

8. That the United Mine Workers' organization, a party to 
this contract, do hereby further agree to afford all possible pro- 
tection to the trade and to the other parties hereto against any 
unfair competition resulting from a failure to maintain scale 
rates. 

9. That this contract shall remain in full force and effect from 
April 1, 1898, to April 1, 1899, and that our next annual Inter- 
state Convention shall convene in the city of Pittsburg on the third 
Tuesday in January, 1899. 

In the above agreement they were unable to formulate 
an inside day wage scale, and a resolution was passed pro- 
viding that two miners and two operators from each State 
should meet at Columbus, Ohio, and agree on such a scale. 
The mere enumeration of the kinds of labor to be consid- 
ered (tracklayers, tracklayers' helpers, trappers, bottom 
cagers, drivers, trip riders, water haulers, timbermen, pipe- 
men, company men, " and all other inside day labor ") gives 
one some conception of the complexity of labor conditions 
in the industry. Besides these there are various kinds of 
outside day labor which have had to be adjusted in succeed- 
ing agreements. 

B. The Renewal of the Scale of 1898 

In 1899 the agreement of 1898 was continued for an- 
other year, but with the provision that the machine differ- 
ential in Illinois, outside of the basing point 1 (the Dan- 
ville district), should be referred to the Illinois state 

1 The prices in the districts known as basing points are a gauge in reg- 
ulating prices elsewhere. 



156 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

convention for settlement. In case the convention should 
not reach an agreement the question was to be referred to 
a board of arbitration of seven members composed of three 
miners and three Illinois operators who should select a 
seventh. It was not settled because of a failure to agree on 
a final arbiter. The Hocking Valley operators (Ohio) and 
the Indiana block-coal operators had to be forced to sign 
this agreement. The Hocking Valley operators felt that 
they were placed at a disadvantage with the other com- 
petitive fields and suggested arbitration for adjusting the 
matter. President Ratchford refused to comply with this 
suggestion on the ground that whatever the decision arrived 
at the operators would insist on the same advantages and 
it would result in breaking the agreement. He suggested 
that the operators sign the agreement and redress their 
grievance at the next annual conference, because their de- 
mands pertained to internal differences which should be 
settled after the scale was signed and he had " neither 
inclination nor authority to commit the organization to 
any other rate than that provided for in the joint conven- 
tions." x The operators signed. 

C. Scale of 1900 and Renewals 

In the joint conference of 1900 the miners received an 
advance of fourteen cents per ton of 2000 pounds for pick- 
mined, screened coal in the Western Pennsylvania thin 
vein, the Hocking Valley, and the block-coal district of In- 
diana. In the Danville district of Illinois and the bitumi- 
nous district of Indiana an advance of nine cents was paid 
for run-of-mine coal. The differential between the thick and 
thin vein pick mines of the Pittsburg district was referred 
to that district for settlement, and a distinction between 
punching and chain machine prices was made in Indiana, 
whether on a screen or run-of-mine basis. An advance 
of twenty per cent was obtained for inside day labor and 
1 Report of United Mine Workers' Convention, 1900, p. 16. 



THE INTERSTATE JOINT CONFERENCE 157 

all narrow deadwork, and room turning was paid a pro- 
portionate advance with the pick-mining rate. We must 
remember that getting an agreement and seeing that it was 
lived up to was only apart of the work of the miners' organ- 
ization. They had to reduce competition which affected the 
central field, both for their own sakes and for the welfare 
of the operators who were willing to meet them on a fair 
basis of settlement. We have already noted the struggles 
in Maryland and elsewhere which followed the formation 
of this scale. 

The scale of 1900 was renewed for the years 1901 and 
1902, but in 1903 the miners received another increase. 
An advance of ten cents per ton on screened, pick-mined 
coal was given in Western Pennsylvania, the Hocking Val- 
ley basing district in Ohio, and in the block and bitumi- 
nous districts of Indiana, while a six-cent advance on pick 
mine-run coal was accepted in Illinois and the bituminous 
district of Indiana. Advances of eight and ten cents were 
given on machine-mined screened coal and six cents on 
machine mine-run coal in the above named districts. Yard- 
age and deadwork were advanced 12 J per cent and a 
suitable increase given to day inside labor. 

A. ILLINOIS GRIEVANCES 

It was in this conference of 1903 that the Illinois oper- 
ators made a formal presentation of the inequalities which 
they felt they were laboring under and called upon the 
conference to adjust them. They reminded the conference 
of the resolutions which had been adopted in 1902 as the 
basic principles of the joint conference, and intimated that 
their continuance in the movement depended on a peaceful 
settlement in conference. Operation on a mine-run basis 
while the other States had a screen basis and unfair machine 
differentials were the chief points complained of. Penn- 
sylvania had a machine differential of 19^ cents and the 
Indiana bituminous a differential of 12| cents and 10 cents 



158 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

on chain and punching machines respectively. " While in 
the Danville District of Illinois, the machine differential 
was only ten cents less than the hand mining rate of both 
types of machines and in the remainder of the State it 
[was] but seven cents less." They called attention to the 
attempt to arbitrate these matters in 1899, and attributed 
the failure to the unwillingness of the miners to accept as 
final arbiter " any man in the United States beyond both 
financial and political influence." They were further ag- 
grieved because the miners were not making conditions 
of entrance to the union equal in the whole competitive 
field. The conditions they had set up in Illinois were such 
that the operators were entirely limited to union labor. 
The laws of Illinois required a two years' apprenticeship, 
but the miners were setting up a six years' period. If 
these grievances could not be settled in conference they 
were willing to submit to any fair arrangement for arbi- 
tration. To give the conference a chance to adjust matters 
they voted for resolutions referring their demands to the 
scale committee. 

The miners were with the Illinois operators in a demand 
for a run-of-mine basis for the entire competitive field 
and a universal differential between pick and machine 
mining. They maintained that the mine-run basis was the 
only fair method of paying for coal, since by the screen 
method the operators got a large percentage of coal for 
which they did not pay, and wherever the miners were un- 
organized and the operator fixed conditions of employ- 
ment he was glad to pay on a mine-run basis. The operators 
answered this by pointing out screens as the only means 
by which they could force the miner to be careful in 
his mining, and since they paid a higher price for screened 
coal, the miner was really paid for the small coal. On 
the other hand, the miner complained that the operators 
were not careful in keeping their screens in good order 
and used " spreaders " so that a larger and larger per- 



THE INTERSTATE JOINT CONFERENCE 159 

centage of small coal went through. Besides this they 
made the complaint that some operators selected the 
cars which appeared most profitable to pay for on the 
screen basis and the other cars were paid for at mine-run 
rates. This abuse is due to the operators' privilege of pay- 
ing according to the double standard. The operator is 
protected by the privilege of fining a miner who loads 
impurities (rock or slate), but he insists that mine-run 
payment encourages the introduction of unskilled labor 
and unskillful methods on the part of miners who know 
better. The diversity in machine differential is due for 
the most part to the conditions in the various mines which 
make the use of machines more or less profitable, and is 
an attempt to make the earnings of the pick and machine 
miners equal. The miners had obtained mine-run payment 
and the favorable machine differential in Illinois through 
strikes in former years. It was to the interest of the 
miners in other States that they should have as favorable 
conditions as Illinois, and to the interest of the Illinois 
operators that the other operators should grant as favor- 
able terms or else see that the Illinois operators had the 
same mining rates. It will be noted, however, that it was 
of advantage to the operators of the other States not to 
grant Illinois a more favorable competitive basis, and to 
the interest of the Illinois miners not to surrender what 
they had gained. Since altruism is not the basis of the 
joint agreement, the only way to have compelled justice 
for all would have been a strike on the part of the miners 
of the other States with aid from the Illinois miners and 
operators in coercing the other operators into granting 
equally favorable terms. However, the miners had many 
other things to consider, and the Illinois operator had not 
developed to the point of helping miners in a strike. The 
Illinois resolutions were turned down and the State met 
with the joint conference in 1904 and 1906 hoping for a 
peaceable solution. 



160 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

D. Reduction in Wages in 1904 

The operators came to the conference of 1904 with the 
determination to force the miners to accept a reduction of 
fifteen per cent in wages. Industrial depression, present 
or anticipated, was offered as the underlying cause. The 
miners conservatively asked for the maintenance of the 
scale of 1903. They met the arguments for reduction by 
pointing out that industrial depression meant cessation 
of labor, which was equivalent to reduction. Since the cost 
of living would not fall with a reduction of wages, the 
consequence would be to lessen the miner's effectiveness 
as a consumer and this would be another factor in further 
depression. Furthermore, this principle would work all 
through industry, and the real solution of the problem 
was suspension to limit overproduction and restore normal 
equilibrium. They quoted industrial reports to show that 
industry was awakening, and used a circular of the Pitts- 
burg Coal Company which claimed a $5,000,000 surplus 
fund with which to pay dividends for the next five years. 1 
The Report of the Labor Commissioner of Ohio was used 
to show that the average wage of the miner was but 
$436 a year, while the operators were getting a margin of 
seventy-one to seventy-seven cents per ton above labor 
cost with which to operate their mines. 2 

Scale and sub-scale committees were of no avail in 
bringing an agreement, but the conference before adjourn- 
ment appointed a special committee with power to call 
another convention before the contract expired in April, 
1904. Another joint conference was called for February 
29 and lasted until March 5. The regular routine of the 
conference was gone through, but without bringing any 
better results. At this second conference the operators 
presented an ultimatum which entailed a reduction of from 

1 Proceedings of Interstate Joint Conference, 1904, p. 81. 

2 Ibid., p. 81. 



THE INTERSTATE JOINT CONFERENCE 161 

three to five cents per ton on pick-mined coal and from four 
to five cents on machine-mined coal. The miners' delegates 
were committed by the instructions of their locals and did 
not accept the ultimatum. But by a special convention 
composed of the miners' delegates to the joint conference 
it was voted to appoint a committee to determine their 
policy, and this committee recommended that the opera- 
tors' proposition be submitted to the rank and file of 
miners by referendum vote. In accordance with this a 
statement was sent out embodying the ultimatum with 
instructions for voting, and on March 15 the mines 
were closed in the afternoon from one to six o'clock 
to give the miners a chance to vote. The result was a 
large majority in favor of reduction in preference to a 
strike, and on March 21 the joint sub-scale committee 
met and signed the agreement to remain in effect till 
1906. 

In connection with the call for the vote the national 
officers sent out a statement calling attention to industrial 
conditions, the slight amount of reduction, the advantages 
obtained in the past by peaceful means, and the possibility 
of competition from West Virginia and other unorganized 
fields. "Men who will strike and suffer all the hardships 
of a long struggle when they know that others are strik- 
ing also will hesitate, weaken, and finally return to work 
when day after day coal is being produced and shipped 
past their doors into the markets which they formerly sup- 
plied." " It will strengthen us with the public, because it 
will demonstrate that a trade union can, when the occa- 
sion arises, gracefully accept a reduction as well as stren- 
uously insist upon an advance, and it will leave us with 
an organization, strengthened by its conservatism, ready 
to take advantage of any improvement in the future of 
the coal trade, to still further better the conditions of the 
mine workers." Half of the battle would depend on pub- 
lic opinion and, "That body of men has never yet been 



162 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

organized which can long resist a thoroughly aroused, 
well-organized and well-directed public opinion." 1 

E. Failure to agree in 1906 

The miners opened the joint conference in 1906 by de- 
manding an advance of 12-J per cent over the 1904 scale. 
This would place them beyond the prices of the 1903 
scale upon which they had accepted a reduction. The 
operators were willing to offer the 1904 scale with an 
amendment to the effect ct that at Danville, the basing 
point of Illinois, the price of mine-run coal be fifty-two 
cents per ton for coal loaded on the cars at the face, in- 
cluding the inspection and shooting of the shots, the tim- 
bering and care of the working places, and, in machine 
mines, the proper snubbing of the coal." The significance 
of this amendment comes out in connection with the " shot 
firers " law in Illinois. In the last agreement the Illinois 
miners had made, they had tried to get a clause providing 
for shot firers which would check the growing loss of life 
that came from lack of inspection and proper firing. Not 
succeeding there, they had lobbied a bill through the 
legislature, and this had entailed extra expense on the op- 
erators. This was an added grievance on the Illinois list. 
The miners replied that consideration of this factor would 
be the same as asking the occupant of a house to pay for 
a fire escape or the employees of a railroad to pay for air 
brakes. Each party stuck tenaciously to its position, and 
the conference adjourned February 2 with each side accus- 
ing the other of breaking up the agreement. 

President Roosevelt wrote to each of the parties ex- 
pressing regret because they had failed to agree and sug- 
gested that, since Mr. Robbins, practically the leader of 
the operators, and Mr. Mitchell were joint chairmen of the 
trade agreement committee of the National Civic Federa- 
tion, they were still further obligated to make another at-. 

1 Rq)ort of Interstate Convention, 1904, pp. 118-21. 



THE INTERSTATE JOINT CONFERENCE 163 

tempt to reach an agreement. 1 In response to this another 
conference was held from March 20 to March 29. After 
going over about the same grounds the deadlock was broken 
by an offer on the part of the Pittsburg Coal Company to 
grant the 1903 scale. This seems to have been in direct 
contravention of an agreement among the operators which 
was to govern their policy, and became the occasion of 
much recrimination. The operators from Illinois, Indiana, 
and Ohio maintained that this was establishing anything 
but fair competitive conditions, and the Indiana operators 
went so far as to offer not only the 1903 scale, but free 
powder if they could employ the same percentage of non- 
union labor, have the same scale for dead work, the same 
scale for day work, and the same machine differential as 
Pennsylvania enjoyed. The miners met this Indiana prop- 
osition with the argument that the Pennsylvania opera- 
tors proposed to grant the scale in the Ohio and Illinois 
mines which they owned, and why should not the operators 
in those States do the same ? The real reason why the 
Pennsylvania operators could grant this increase was be- 
cause they had large contracts with the United States 
Steel Corporation and the railroads. As it was, the leader 
of the Pennsylvania operators voted some of their tonnage 
against their will, and this was the beginning of his down- 
fall. The operators did everything they could to oust him 
and finally ruined him financially. 

The miners had met in a special convention previous to 
the second joint conference and decided to accept the 1903 
scale. The chief motive behind this action had been a 
doubt that they would have public sympathy with them in 
their demand for a 12 J per cent advance, and the fear 
that, if some sort of an agreement were not reached, a 
commission similar to the Anthracite Commission would 
be appointed and meddle with their affairs. In fact they 
were of the opinion that some of the operators would be 

1 Proceedings of Interstate Joint Conference, 1906, p. 141. 



164 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

glad to have such a commission step in and regulate the 
differential between machine and pick mining. 1 The con- 
ference adjourned without an agreement, but the miners 
announced the policy of signing the 1903 scale with those 
operators who were willing to sign. The operators in the 
Pittsburg district and Kentucky, and various companies in 
Ohio signed at once, and by July 1 all the operators were 
paying the 1903 scale. 

F. Reestablishment in 1908 

During the next two years a great effort was made to 
reestablish the joint conference, and after much dickering 
Ohio, Indiana, and Pennsylvania operators met the miners, 
April 14-17, 1908. Illinois operators refused to come in 
unless conditions of competitive equality were established. 
The Illinois miners wanted to attend the conference and 
there secure such conditions, but the operators had no 
faith that this could be brought about and insisted that 
the miners meet them in state conference and settle on 
conditions which would give interstate equality. The 
miners refused to do this, on the ground that settling 
state agreements before the national agreements would 
handicap the national organization in reaching an agree- 
ment. 2 An agreement by the three States was reached 
providing that the mining rates, day wage scale, and 
" general prices," which had been established in 1907 by 
various state and district agreements, should remain in 
effect till 1910. Internal differences were to be left to the 
districts, but a resolution was added to the scale vigor- 
ously condemning the practice which had grown up in 
the last two years of suspending the operation of mines 
during the settlement of disputes. The agreement was 
submitted to referendum vote by the miners and ratified. 

1 Beport of Special United Mine Workers' Convention, 1906, p. 69. 

2 Beport of Illinois Joint Convention, 1908, p. 15. 



THE INTERSTATE JOINT CONFERENCE 165 

G. Settlement by States in 1910 

The miners did not present formal demands in the 
1908 conference, but were satisfied to add to what the 
operators were willing to offer. In 1910 they came for- 
ward with a request for mine-run payment, an advance 
of ten cents on pick mining and an equivalent increase 
for machine mining, inside and outside day work, dead- 
work, yardage, etc. Furthermore the wages for day work 
were to be uniform, with time and a half for overtime, 
Sundays, and legal holidays. Their eight-hour day was to 
be from " bank to bank " (i.e., including time going to 
and from the mine entrance to place of work within the 
mine), with a half -holiday on Saturdays. They demanded 
that the new explosives, which were required by the min- 
ing bureau and were more expensive, should be furnished 
to the men at the same relative cost as black powder. 
There was to be no limit to the amount of deductions 
from wages to be paid as dues and assessments to the 
miners' organization and the miners were to stop the re- 
imbursement of operators for expenses which the law said 
should be borne by the operators. The Pennsylvania 
operators showed a willingness to grant an increase, 
though not what the miners expected. Opposition at 
once arose from the Ohio operators on the grounds that 
competitive conditions in Ohio and inequalities between 
Ohio and Pennsylvania would not warrant an increase. 
In the midst of the deadlock two interesting propositions 
to arbitrate were advanced, one from the Ohio operators, 
the other from the miners. The operators were willing to 
submit to an impartial commission the questions of in- 
crease, decrease, or maintenance of the present mining 
rates. In case this commission could not agree, the opera- 
tors were to select two representatives, the miners two, 
and these four to choose a fifth. The miners responded 
with an offer to arbitrate the question of mining and 



166 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

paying for coal on the mine-run basis (decision to be 
rendered according to whether or not the majority of the 
tonnage of the country operated under that system), the 
justifiability of the wide machine differential of twenty- 
nine cents in Ohio and Pennsylvania (decision to be 
rendered according to whether or not twenty-nine cents 
was " required to pay for the increased cost in the invest- 
ment of machinery and a fair profit on that investment 
as against pick mining "), etc. Neither party would con- 
sider the other's proposition, and after both scale and 
sub-scale committees had failed repeatedly, a special com- 
mittee of one operator and one miner from each State 
was appointed. They failed to agree, and the Indiana 
operators offered the explanation that the Ohio operators 
in one local district desired to go back home and arrange 
a contract there, where they were sure they could get a 
reduction of four cents a ton which they could not get in 
joint conference, and in one large district they expected 
to get a half-cent reduction which they could not get 
in the convention. 1 The convention adjourned and each 
district and State settled by itself. 

H. The New Method in 1912 

It will be remembered that Illinois presented her griev- 
ances in regard to mine-run payment and machine differ- 
entials in 1903, and finally refused to come into the joint 
conference in 1908 because she could get no satisfaction 
along these lines. Although adjustment of these disputed 
points had been secured, yet in the interval between 1910 
and 1912 efforts were made to demonstrate the necessity 
for a general conference including all the central field. 
The invitation sent out by the miners' president included 
the operators and miners of Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Penn- 
sylvania, and West Virginia. A feeling had grown up | 
that a large convention of delegates was an unnecessary 
1 Proceedings of Interstate Joint Conference^ 1910, p. 345. 



THE INTERSTATE JOINT CONFERENCE 167 

expense and mainly a waste of time to both parties. 
Since the convention merely ratified the work of the 
scale and sub-scale committees, and had to adjourn while 
they were carrying on their negotiations, it was felt that 
the ratification could be brought about just as well by 
the referendum. But in cases where concessions by both 
parties have been made only after exceptionally hard 
fighting, and the agreement arrived at does not come up 
to expectations of the rank and file, there are fewer men 
to disseminate themselves over the field and convince 
their constituents that the contract was the best which 
could be obtained. In critical times this may be an 
important matter and worth all the expense attached to a 
convention. In response to the invitation a committee in- 
cluding eight operators and eight miners from each of the 
abovenamed States, except West Virginia, met at Indi- 
anapolis January 26, 1912. The same order of business, 
selection of committees, and the same rules that had been 
in operation in the large convention were used. After con- 
siderable debate it was voted to seat the president, vice- 
president, and secretary-treasury of the union as ex-officio 
members, pursuant to former customs. The miners felt 
that this would make the agreement much more accept- 
able to the rank and file. 

The miners' demands as formulated in their convention 
were presented to the committee for consideration. In 
view of the increasing cost of living, the increasing in- 
ventions of labor-saving machinery, and the dangers of 
their calling, the miners felt that they were entitled to 
a flat ten cents per ton increase at basing points. They 
further demanded that coal be paid for on a run-of-mine 
basis and asked for a twenty per cent increase on dead- 
work, day labor, etc. A uniform work day and wage scale 
for all classes of outside and inside day labor, as well as 
a uniform day of seven hours at the working place for all 
classes of inside labor, were among the demands. They 



168 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

considered it essential that a readjustment of the machine 
differential at the basing points in various States should 
take place. Weekly payment of wages and no limit to the 
amount of deduction made through the companies' offices 
for the miners' organization were also important demands. 
As we have pointed out, the organization has a consider- 
able problem to make their 400,000 members pay their dues, 
and any hindrance offered by the operator in the amount 
he will allow to be deducted only adds to the difficulty. 

The miners' demands were voted down clause by clause, 
and then the operators presented their propositions. They 
were far from being inclined to grant any increase. The 
miners were reminded of the keen competition from the 
non-union fields, and warned that, unless the miners were 
willing to accept a reduction, the competition could not 
be met, their tonnage would be reduced, and the miners 
would obtain less employment. They therefore proposed 
a return to the scale of 1904-06, the year in which the 
miners, by referendum vote, had accepted a reduction 
rather than strike. This they claimed would be the only 
way in which the operators could meet West Virginia 
competition. The miners reminded the operators that no 
matter what the reduction was in the central field, the 
West Virginia operators were in a position to force wages 
under the scale of the other States, and thus retain the 
ability to undersell them. 

Failure to come to a compromise necessitated the ap- 
pointment of a sub-scale committee of two miners and two 
operators from each State. One advantage of the sub-scale 
committee (where no stenographic report is taken) is 
to make both parties less careful of what they say and 
less ready to advocate partisan ideas. 1 The conference ad- 
journed February 1, subject to the call of the sub-scale 
committee, and on March 20 was called together again. 
The sub-scale committee had reached no agreement and 
1 Proceedings of Interstate Joint Conference, 1912, p. 90. 



THE INTERSTATE JOINT CONFERENCE 169 

the miners had not changed their demands. After further 
discussion the sub-scale committee was again assigned the 
task of reaching an agreement. This time the operators 
receded from their position of exacting a reduction in 
wages and offered to renew the scale then in operation. 
The miners refused to accept this, and the discussion was 
again taken up in general conference. With the appoint- 
ment of another sub-scale committee the following agree- 
ment was reached to remain in effect until March 31, 
1914: — 

The price of mining was increased five cents a ton on 
screened coal, pick mined, in the thin vein of western 
Pennsylvania, the Hocking district of Ohio, and in In- 
diana. Mine-run coal, pick mined, was increased three 
cents per ton in Indiana and Illinois, while the prices for 
machine-mined coal were increased from three to four 
cents according to whether or not coal was paid for as 
screened or mine-run coal. The wages of inside and out- 
side day labor were increased 5.26 per cent. The eight- 
hour day was maintained and internal differences were 
referred to the various districts for adjustment. The agree- 
ment was referred to the miners and approved by a refer- 
endum vote. 

Although the agreement was reached only after long 
discussion and stubborn opposition on both sides, it ended 
with good feeling and the inauguration of a new feature. 
During the life of the agreement a joint committee similar 
to the one which had framed the scale was charged with 
the duty of meeting whenever desirable, to consider and 
take action on matters pertaining to the welfare of the 
industry in general. As a first step in this direction the 
following resolution was passed : — 

Whereas, It is recognized that there is a useless waste of 
our fuel resources in the development of the mining industry, 
and an unnecessary loss of life, and 

Whereas, The useless waste of fuel and the reckless loss of 



170 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

life is due to the competition in the industry that prevents any 
form of agreement in establishing the selling price of coal, 

Resolved, That it is the sense of this joint conference that 
a committee of operators' and miners' representatives, of an equal 
number from the States here represented, together with the in- 
ternational officers of the United Mine Workers, should be cre- 
ated for the purpose of using their influence to amend or have re- 
pealed such sections of the Sherman Anti-Trust Law and the anti- 
trust or conspiracy laws of the different States as prohibit mine 
owners from arranging a fair selling price of fuel, or that would 
prohibit miners and operators from arranging wage contracts. 

The statement of the operators in reference to the pur- 
pose of this resolution may cast some light upon it : — 

I believe a committee from this body would have influence with 
that Senate Committee if they appeared before it and said we 
would like to have the Sherman Anti-Trust Law so amended as to 
permit coal operators to enter into agreements on selling prices 
of coal to alleviate the situation (competitive) ; and to remove 
any fear of the coal operators we are willing that a commission 
be appointed, as is now done for the railroad interests, to say 
to the coal operators of this country that when they do so agree 
on schedules of selling prices, those schedules shall not be exor- 
bitant, that they shall not be unreasonable or unfair. 1 

Probably the largest consideration in bringing the opera- 
tors to take this position is the " West Virginia Problem " 
to which we have referred in chapter II. Indeed, some 
operators in West Virginia have reached the point where 
they are willing to have the price of coal regulated by a 
commission with powers and functions similar to those of 
the Interstate Commerce Commission. 2 



4. RESULTS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 

During the time the joint agreement has been in force 
it has not been without its fruits for both sides. The oper- 

1 Proceedings of Interstate Joint Conference, 1912, p. 330. 

2 Beport of Senate Committee Hearings, op. cit. } part 2, p. 1664 Jfl 



THE INTERSTATE JOINT CONFERENCE 171 

ators have been able to maintain more stable industrial 
conditions and less fluctuation in prices. The miners have 
been able to build up an organization which has bettered 
their conditions and helped the operators to equalize com- 
petition. In the Southwest and Northwest the miners have 
reached out and forced state and interstate agreements 
whose scales are governed largely by the scale of the cen- 
tral field. The miners, by extending their organization so 
widely, have made it possible for the operators to grant 
conditions of labor which they would never have conceded 
had they not gone into effect generally. This is shown by 
the hardship which the various States inflict on industries 
when they pass laws compelling their industries to com- 
pete with conditions in other States where such laws do 
not exist. The joint movement has brought, by unity of 
action, the abolition of company stores and company tene- 
ments, the inauguration of the eight-hour day, regulation 
of screens, equalization of wages of different classes, and 
the improvement of working conditions and safety appli- 
ences. Dockage has been lessened and checkweighmen are 
employed, so that the miner is paid for the coal he pro- 
duces. The principle of conciliation is ramifying every 
part of the industry, strikes have been lessened, and the 
movement is working out a better understanding of the 
difficulties with which both sides have to contend. 

From the tables in Appendix A (pp. 359-363), we find 
that, although capitalization, production, number of mines, 
and the total of employees in the industry continued to 
increase, wages did not rise to a new level until collective 
bargaining became effective. When wages are once on 
this level we see no steady absorption of the value of the 
product, but wages fluctuate with the varying prosperity 
of the industry. In fact labor is engaged in a constant 
struggle to maintain this new level and make wages more 
responsive to changes in prices and cost of living. 

There are several factors which make this struggle 



172 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

difficult. We have seen that the effect of machinery has 
been to decrease wages by helping to glut the market and 
lessen the number of days the miners could work. Added 
to this element is the constant increase in the number of em- 
ployees, which causes a further reduction in the number of 
working days for those already in the industry. These con- 
ditions are made possible because the demand does not 
keep pace with the ability to supply the market. Aside 
from the advantages which might have accrued to the oper- 
ator from the miner's patronage of company stores, there 
is another urgent reason for desiring to retain a surplus 
of men on the premises — the seasonal demand for coal. 
Further, it does not pay to mine coal and store it, thus 
giving fewer men steady employment, for the handling is 
a great expense and the coal deteriorates in appearance 
and quality. For this latter factor in the situation the 
public is largely responsible because consumers are very 
slow about buying coal ahead of the season, even though 
they are offered rates that are equal to good interest on 
the money invested. 

The full import of the new level of wages for the worker 
is seen when we consider that in spite of the reduction of 
possible working days by the above factors, we find that 
in 1911 he gets a larger yearly wage for working 167 
days (Illinois table) than he did for 229 days in 1893. 
This result is obtained by gradually forcing up the aver- 
age daily wage. The same general principle is shown in 
the other States, though not quite so strikingly. The force 
of collective bargaining is further shown (as may be seen 
from the tables in the Appendix, and on page 267) by the 
fact that the prices paid for mining were more responsive 
in the bituminous field than in the anthracite region and 
also by the fact that the general level of average daily 
wages in Illinois and Ohio is kept on a higher plane than 
those of West Virginia. Another interesting consideration 
is that in spite of the eight-hour day the production con- 



THE INTERSTATE JOINT CONFERENCE 173 

tinues to increase, although the men are working a less 
number of days. Besides the increased efficiency that 
may result from shorter hours, the increased use of ma- 
chinery and a greater number of men in the industry ac- 
counts for this. Table VI in Appendix A shows that the 
increased production per mine and per employee is worth 
noting. 

In connection with the increase of capitalization, pro- 
duction, and number of mines it may be observed that we 
have an exception here to one of Professor Moore's laws 
of wages, " that the more rapid the increase of capital in 
an industry, the more rapidly do wages increase." 1 The 
situation may be partly explained by another of his laws, 
" that the fluctuations of wages about their general trend 
are inversely correlated with the machine power with 
which the laborers work." But the trouble is that there is 
not a general trend, and the only power which the laborer 
has to make wages respond to prosperity is his united 
stand for higher wages. Nor in this case does the "rate 
of wages, amount of employment, and length of the work- 
ing day" necessarily improve " with the increasing con- 
centration of industry," 2 but rather with the increase of 
the bargaining power of the laborer. 

As has been pointed out, 3 the simple average wage in 
the coal industry is fairly significant because the different 
employees are earning about the same wages. There is not 
so much difference in the pay of the skilled and unskilled 
labor as to affect the simple average greatly. Several in- 
stances are noted in the tables where the average yearly 
earnings of the miners do not vary much from the earn- 
ings of all employees. In fact, in many cases in the bitumin- 
ous field the yearly average earnings of all employees 
(even when the salaries of officials are not included) is 
greater than that of skilled miners. The inclusion of the 

1 Moore, Laws of Wages, p. 1T7. 2 Ibid., p. 193. 

8 Nearing, Wages in the United States, p. 119. 



174 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

skilled miners among the total employees only helps to 
lessen the depression of the simple average by low-paid 
unskilled labor. It was not possible to get a weighted 
average from the census reports previous to 1902, nor 
from the reports of the state bureaus of labor at any time. 
For 1902, when the figures were procurable, the weighted 
average of yearly earnings of all occupations in the bitu- 
minous field is 1470.73, while the simple average is $493.67. 
In the anthracite field, the weighted average for all occu- 
pations is $329 and the simple average is $377.89. This 
was the year of the " big strike " in the anthracite field, 
which accounts for such a large difference between it and 
the bituminous field. 

It is interesting to note the difference in the general 
level of wages in the bituminous and anthracite fields in 
1902. The average daily wage (weighted) for contract 
miners in the anthracite field was $2.72, for all occupa- 
tions, $1.88. In the bituminous field the corresponding 
daily wages were $2.31 and $2.21 ; the miners not being 
much above the general level, while in the anthracite field 
there is a variation of 84 cents. 

A comparison of the median daily wage gives a truer 
picture of the variation between contract miners and the 
median daily wage for other occupations, for it is not af- 
fected by the extremely low wage of the boy workers, on 
the one hand, or, on the other hand, by the tendency of 
the high wages of the officials (which are included in the 
enumeration of the wages of all occupations) to raise the 
general level. The median 1 (or mid-point) daily wage of 
contract miners in the anthracite field was $2.53, and for 
all other occupations $1.79, a variation of 74 cents instead 

1 Professor R. E. Chaddock describes the median thus : " Having ar- 
ranged the wage-earners in regular ascending order, according to the 
amount of their wages, the median average wage is that of the mid-wage 
earner of the series. This method of computing an average minimizes the 
influence of extremely high or low wages, and where such wide extremes 
exist gives a more typical result." 



THE INTERSTATE JOINT CONFERENCE 175 

of 84 cents as expressed by the weighted averages. In the 
bituminous field the corresponding figures were $2.22 and 
$2.16, which again corroborates the conclusion that the 
general level of wage there was higher than in the anthra- 
cite field. We can assign no reason for this unless it is 
an expression of the results of collective bargaining power 
which had been in effect in the bituminous field since 1898. 
The discrepancy between the fields would have been 
greater had not the anthracite field already profited by 
collective bargaining in 1900 to the extent of a ten per 
cent raise. 

In a notation on the tables in Appendix A, we have 
called attention to the erroneous conception of yearly 
earnings given by the use of the average number of em- 
ployees during the year. The United States Census Re- 
port of 1902 employs these figures, and, when an attempt 
is made to arrive at average yearly earnings by dividing 
total wages by the total number of employees, the average 
is too high. The census does not give the average daily 
wage and the average number of working days, so there 
is no other way of obtaining an approximation. But the 
use of the average number employed leaves out of account 
the fact that there are a great many more men in the in- 
dustry who depend for their subsistence upon the earnings 
they receive during the course of a whole year. Where it 
is possible to obtain the average daily wage and the num- 
ber of working days, it is demonstrable that the proper 
procedure is to divide the total wages by the total em- 
ployees on the pay rolls, which gives an average yearly 
wage that is comparable to the average daily wage multi- 
plied by the number of days worked. 

The table for West Virginia (from the state report) 
shows that the average daily wage in 1902 for all other 
employees than pick miners was $ 1.45. This, multiplied 
by the average number of days worked, gives $361.05. 
No average daily wage for pick miners is quoted, but their 



176 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

average yearly wage averaged with the yearly wage of 
other employees gives $ 447.30. In 1911 the average daily 
wage of pick and machine miners was given and included 
to obtain the average of all employees, which was 12.15. 
The average of pick and machine miners was $2.34, and 
it is seen that their yearly earnings do not vary much 
from the yearly earnings of the total employees. The 
yearly wages of pick miners, obtained by multiplying the 
average number of tons mined by the average price per 
ton, was $ 570.48. The total wages paid is not given by 
the reports in either case, so there is no way of checking 
up the yearly wage by dividing the total wages by the 
total employees. Even though the total yearly wage of 
West Virginia should exceed the total yearly wage of the 
other central States, a fair comparison of the real welfare 
of the workers cannot be made until the number of work- 
ing days and the hours per day are taken into considera- 
tion. From 1904 to 1909 the miners of West Virginia 
averaged " 216 days of 10 hours per day or a total of 
2160 hours each year. [This] reduced to 8 hours per day 
would be an average of 270 days each." Ohio averaged 
173 eight-hour days from 1904 to 1909, " or 97 days less 
than the average work in West Virginia on the eight-hour 
basis." 1 

The only fair basis of comparison, seeing that there is 
this wide discrepancy in actual number of days and hours 
worked, is to reduce the wage to a rate per hour. This 
was done by taking the number of days worked by pick 
miners in Illinois, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia 
and multiplying by eight or ten hours according to the 
length of the working day in the various States. The total 
yearly wages received were then divided by the total num- 
ber of hours, and we find that the rate per hour for West 
Virginia was below all the other States in all the years 
listed in Table V, except that it was equal to the rate in 
1 Beport of Senate Committee Hearings, op. cit., part 3, p. 2155. 



THE INTERSTATE JOINT CONFERENCE 177 

Pennsylvania in 1909 and in 1911 and one cent higher 
than the Pennsylvania rate in 1908. In this connection 
we must remember the total yearly wage of pick miners 
in Pennsylvania is the result of averaging the wages from 
unorganized districts with the wages from unionized fields. 
We have made a comparison between the rates per hour 
for pick miners because their wages are near the average 
for all employees and because sufficient data for making 
a comparison of the average wages for all employees could 
not be obtained in all the States. 

In the years in which West Virginia has a greater total 
yearly wage than the other States, if this difference or 
surplus wage is divided by the total surplus hours that 
West Virginia miners are working above the States which 
have an eight-hour day, it results in a payment per hour 
for this time of never more than fourteen cents. It not 
only goes as low as three cents per hour, but in the in- 
stances where the other States have a surplus over West 
Virginia it can only be expressed as a negative rate. This 
gives us some appreciation of the necessity of considering 
not only the total yearly wage and the number of days 
worked, but the rate per hour and the extent to which a 
worker is really recompensed for the surplus hours he works 
as compared with the worker who is getting a less total 
yearly wage, and who, at the same time, is working a less 
number of hours. 

The importance of the minimum wage and maximum 
working hours has been demonstrated in the bituminous 
coal industry. The abuse of the minimum wage is safe- 
guarded by the employer's right to discharge, and the 
workingman must come up to a certain standard of effi- 
ciency or his services are dispensed with. The cost of 
labor is definitely fixed to all employers, and the union 
guarantees the employers against undercutting by their 
competitors. Where such a regulation does not exist there 
is almost no limit to the depth to which wages may sink, 



178 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

and the just employer is compelled by competitive forces 
to depress wages to the level of the most unfair employer. 
As has been well said, the minimum wage " places com- 
petition where it should be — upon a plane of legitimate 
business activity." It should be remembered that the 
interstate joint conference simply cleared away questions 
which pertained to the whole industry. The settlement of 
state and district matters brings us to our next chapter. 



CHAPTER VI 

THE STATE CONFERENCE 

INTRODUCTION 

A. THE TASK OP THE STATE CONFERENCE 

As we have seen, 1 the local and state agreement preceded 
the interstate agreement, and the partial success there 
suggested the interstate conference and the establishment 
of uniformity over a larger area. State, district, or local 
agreements are made in Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Pennsyl- 
vania, West Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, Texas, Kan- 
sas, Arkansas, Missouri, Michigan, Montana, Iowa, Wyo- 
ming, Washington, and British Columbia, Canada. This 
also gives some idea of the scattered area of the bituminous 
coal fields. The state conference follows the interstate 
conference and proceeds at once to the consideration of 
details which are local and could not be settled effectively 
in the interstate convention. The prices at the basing 
point in the various States having been settled by the in- 
terstate joint conference, the State is left to settle upon 
the variations in the different districts. If there are special 
questions which concern only the district, they are left for 
the operators of the particular district, but district agree- 
ments must be in conformity with interstate and state 
agreements. Questions which the state and district con- 
ferences cannot settle are usually referred to a board of 
arbitration consisting of two miners and two operators 
who, if they cannot agree, choose a fifth party. 

1 See chap, i, p. 19. 



180 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

B. CONDITIONS OF THE INDUSTRY IN ILLINOIS 

Illinois has many peculiar complications which are con- 
ducive to labor disputes, and a study of methods there 
will show the state agreement at its highest point of de- 
velopment. There are 886 mines with over 72,000 miners, 
forty per cent of whom are ignorant of our language. The 
miners' organization has not yet devised means by which 
it can rigidly enforce agreements upon its members. All 
of the operators have not yet been brought into the oper- 
ators' association, and not all of those who are in have 
abandoned the idea of fighting out their difficulties singly 
rather than working through the association. The pro- 
vision in the agreement for fining both the miner and the 
operator is an attempt to make both parties realize that 
it is a serious offense to take matters into their own hands 
rather than to work through the channels provided for 
settling disputes peacefully and without suspension of 
work. The miners have great trouble in replacing incom- 
petent and unruly members who do not live up to the 
agreement. The radical element is too often in the saddle, 
and the officials are frequently compelled to assent to 
much that they disapprove of. The underlying industrial 
situation probably makes each party particularly touchy 
in regard to the least infringement on their earnings. In 
spite of the size and rapid development of the coal in- 
dustry in Illinois, the industry is not prosperous. A great 
many mines have been opened and large sums of capital 
invested which were not warranted from the standpoint 
of normal commercial demand. This overdevelopment was 
largely encouraged by the unusual demand for coal from 
the central States at the time of the anthracite strike in 
1902. The overproduction which results increases the cost 
of production by irregular operation of plants and reduces 
the average number of working days per year for the 
miner to about 168. The normal demand for coal could 



THE STATE CONFERENCE 181 

be met by the labor of about 50,000 men instead of 72,000, 
and the annual wage of the miner would be more nearly 
commensurate with the standard of living which is his due. 
It is evident that these conditions are very favorable to 
the periodic occurrence of industrial strife. 1 

1. ORGANIZATION 

The state conference is much the same in organization 
and methods as the interstate conference. A description 
of conditions in Illinois will show the most advanced stages 
of development in almost every line, for there the regula- 
tions from year to year have been the most elaborate. The 
same method of requiring a unanimous vote on all main 
and principal questions and the same use of the scale com- 
mittee are in operation as in the interstate conference. 
The scale committee has two operators and two miners 
from each of the nine districts, and most of the work of the 
convention is done by this committee. The practice seems 
to be in vogue of appointing special committees from the 
scale committee to draw up different articles of the agree- 
ment. 2 

2. THE FUNDAMENTALS SETTLED 

One of the first things settled on in the state confer- 
ence is the scale of prices to be paid in the various dis- 
tricts as it varies from the basing point according to the 
different coal veins and working conditions. Changes or 
working conditions which increase the cost of production 
are not to be put in operation during the life of the agree- 
ment. Certain employees about the mines are exempt from 
the jurisdiction of the miners' organization. They are in 
positions of authority, are definitely enumerated, and their 
right to hire and discharge is not to be abridged. It is 
definitely stated that this right in conjunction with the 

1 Report of Illinois Employers' Liability Commission, 1910, p. 118. 

2 Report of Illinois State Convention, 1908, pp. 217, 249. 



182 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

management of the mine and the direction of the working 
force are vested exclusively in the operator and he dele- 
gates his authority to his lieutenants. It is understood 
that the coal is to be practically free from impurities such 
as bone, clay, slate, or sulphur. When the miner offends 
in this respect the impurities are estimated by an inspector 
and their weight deducted from the car. Besides, the 
miner is fined fifty cents for the first offense, in any given 
month, and for the second offense he is fined two dollars 
or suspended for two days at the discretion of the opera- 
tor. For the third offense, or in any particularly aggra- 
vated or malicious cases, the miner is subject to discharge. 
In case of discharge the impurities are preserved as evi- 
dence, if the man's case comes up for trial, and the com- 
pany posts in a conspicuous place the names of miners 
thus dealt with. The inspector cannot be a member of 
the miners' organization nor can he be embarrassed in his 
duties. Any one who hinders him in his duties is subject 
to punishment by the miners' organization and may be 
suspended by the operator. If charges are brought that 
the inspector is not performing his duties properly, he 
is subject to trial through the regular channels and, if 
found guilty, is discharged or transferred to other duties. 
The fines collected under these provisions are paid to the 
miners' sub-district treasurer. This helps the miner to see 
that all the owner asks is honest labor. 

Closely connected with this is the provision that a miner 
who absents himself from work for two days without the 
consent of his employer, and without proven sickness, is 
subject to discharge. Employees guilty of throwing a mine 
into idleness or materially reducing the output of the mine 
by using any methods to force demands contrary to the 
agreement, or to secure a decision by any other methods 
than those provided in the agreement, are subject to a fine 
of five dollars each. On the other hand, any operator who 
locks out all or part of his employees in order to force 



THE STATE CONFERENCE 183 

conditions in violation of the agreement is subject to a 
fine of one hundred dollars. Of the fines thus collected 
one half is paid to the miners' and one half to the oper- 
ators' organization. 

To insure skilled workmanship it is agreed that all min- 
ing and shooting of coal shall be according to the state 
mining law. It is stated that payment on mine-run basis 
was inaugurated to do away with contentions incident to 
the use of screens, and the miners' organization promises 
full cooperation and insistence on skilled workmanship. 
The amount and kind of powder used is determined by a 
commission of skilled men selected from the operators and 
miners, which rests its decision on the favorable results to 
be obtained for miner and operator alike. This is quite a 
departure from the days when the operator charged the 
miner extortionate prices and forced him to pay on pen- 
alty of losing his job. 

The mere enumeration of some of the main headings of 
the agreement shows the complexity of the industry and 
why it is that labor has found it necessary to have some 
voice in deciding upon its working conditions, such as 
equal turn, yardage and dead work, operators to keep places 
dry, track laid by operator, rules for drivers, shaft- 
sinking, use of cage by employees, machine differential, 
emergency work and ordinary repairs, responsibility for 
timbering and deadwork, fatal accidents and funerals, 
operators to keep ambulances, bandages, etc., inside and 
outside day wage scale, overtime, oil, blacksmithing, pay 
days and statements of account, definition of eight-hour 
day, etc. 

The district and local agreements cover such things 
as headings, crossroads, rolls, miners' supply of household 
coal, entries, timbering, removing water from miners' 
place of work, and the diverting of smoke from the black- 
smith's fire into return airways. 






184 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

3. ADMINISTRATIVE MACHINERY 

A. Business Contracts 

The machinery for working out the agreement after it 
is made deserves the most extended treatment. The state 
conference has provided this machinery and it is one of 
the principal provisions applied over the whole State. It 
is fairly easy for the leaders on both sides to formulate 
some sort of an agreement, but the problem is to provide 
effective methods for carrying out the agreement. One of 
the foremost obstacles encountered is the fact that the 
mine boss and average workman do not themselves under- 
stand the agreement. They did not make it, and most of 
the trouble which comes up is due to the interpretation 
of the agreement. Not only the workmen and mine boss, 
but the operators' and miners' officials all along the line 
need enlightenment. Tn fact, the agreements are business 
contracts which have grown up gradually, and the changes 
made from year to year are not revolutionary. The will- 
ingness of both parties to meet each other and settle 
questions fairly, and the machinery by which this is ac- 
complished, are the chief contributions of the conciliation 
movement. 

B. The Steps in Conciliation 

On the part of the miners in the local mine there is a 
' pit committee of three members chosen from the rank and 
file. Their chief duty is to adjust any difficulty which may 
arise between the pit boss and any member of the United 
Mine Workers working in or about the mine. In case 
they cannot settle it, the miners' local president, the pit 
committee, and the pit boss get together. In case these 
fail to agree, the questions at issue are referred to the 
superintendent of the mine and the miners' president of 
the subdistrict. In case of their disagreement, it is re- 



THE STATE CONFERENCE 185 

f erred in writing to the officers of the operators' associa- 
tion and commission and to the state officials of the United 
Mine Workers. ) These officials, having a written state- 
ment from both sides and the names of witnesses who are 
able to substantiate the facts, give a hearing to the local 
representatives in dispute and to any of the witnesses 
mentioned in their statements who can be produced. After 
hearing the case the officials retire and if they reach an 
agreement, render a decision in writing. If they fail to 
agree, they must make a written statement of the essential 
facts which govern the case. If they cannot agree on the 
essential facts, they must submit such facts as they do 
agree on, the facts in dispute, and their reasons for fail- 
ing to agree. The joint executive boards of the two organ-; 
izations then take up the case, and if they fail to agree, 
it is arbitrated at the discretion of the joint executive 
boards. Decisions reached under this system govern like 
cases during the life of the agreement and the life of 
"future contracts with like provisions, unless otherwise 
stipulated in writing in the decision, or, except as pro- 
tested, as herein provided." Neither party can appeal 
from any joint decision reached in accordance with this 
system. But any "decision may be set aside by joint 
action of the two executive boards, and either executive 
board may require a reviewal of a decision by the joint 
executive boards, and if not set aside when so reviewed, 
either executive board may protest it as a precedent." 
The intent of these provisions is to " obviate the necessity 
of independent action by either party and to avoid the 
delay in disposing of disputes existing in the past." 1 
While a case is in dispute work continues without inter- 
ruption. If any "day men" 2 refuse to work while the 
decision is being reached and such action threatens to 
close the mine, the United Mine Workers are obliged to 
furnish men to take their places. 

1 Illinois Agreement, 1910, p. 22. 2 Paid by the day. 



186 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

C. The Pit Committee 

The pit committee is not allowed to go about the mine 
unless called upon by a miner or the pit boss to settle a 
dispute, and pit committeemen who are employed as day 
men must have the permission of the operator, unless a 
case has arisen which has stopped the mine. A pit com- 
mitteeman who tries to put in force any provision which 
violates the contract, or does not advise against a shut- 
down (which violates the contract), may be deposed from 
his position. These provisions are not to hinder them 
from looking after membership dues, initiations, etc. The 
functioning of the pit committee has shown that there 
are certain matters in connection with working conditions 
about which the worker should and must have some say 
without conflicting with the employer's duty of " running 
his own business." Furthermore, it places the worker in a 
position of greater equality in bargaining. 

D. Method of Investigating Disputes 

Every effort is made in formulating the agreement to 
avoid all chance of differences and disputes and to make 
both parties realize that it is an inviolable contract. 
Operators are forming the practice of calling together 
their men who have authority and discussing and ex- 
plaining the agreement. 1 In spite of this, unlooked-for 
exigencies are constantly arising which make necessary 
interpretation of the agreement, and the mere bringing 
together of the disputants gives opportunities for impress- 
ing a better understanding of the agreement upon both 
parties. Every effort is made to settle disputes promptly, 
and the mine manager is prevailed upon so far as possi- 
ble to settle with the local officials. An important work 
of the commissioner and the miners' officials is to get 
the mine manager to realize that "A soft answer turneth 

1 Report of Illinois State Conference, 1908, p. 115. 



THE STATE CONFERENCE 187 

away wrath," and the miner that "A polite request will 
obtain tenfold more than a rude demand." When the 
commissioner and union officials set a date for a hearing, 
the parties are summoned, accompanied by witnesses, and 
the witnesses are encouraged to speak freely. Every 
effort is made to get at the truth, and the attempts to 
confuse witnesses, so common in legal proceedings, are 
not allowed. If necessary all the parties go down into the 
mine and investigate actual conditions. 4 

A. THE DANVILLE CASE 

An interesting settlement of a Danville subdistrict 
case took place in 1901. It was referred to Mr. Herman 
Justi, commissioner of the Illinois Association, and to 
Mr. John Mitchell, national president of the miners. 2 
The Danville operators claimed that the run-of-mine sys- 
tem had saddled such a large amount of deadwork upon 
them, due to the careless shooting of coal and timbering 
of the mines, that they could not see their way clear to 
accede to the agreement unless some relief was afforded 
them. The operators showed statements where the cost of 
deadwork had increased from 3| cents per ton to 12 cents, 
which pointed to a danger of permanent idleness and loss 
to all parties concerned. The section in dispute had been 
inserted in the agreement with the expectation that more 
careful mining would result. The decision of the arbiters 
was arrived at after first-hand investigation of the mines, 
and they had to admit that they had found evidences of 
improper shooting and timbering. The following is the 
substance of the rules which they recommended and de- 
cided should be in force : — 

1. Each party should remember the spirit of the sec- 
tion and exercise " mutual fairness and conciliation." 

1 Justi, Illinois Coal Operators' Association Publications ; Plans of Con- 
ciliation and Arbitration, p. 15. 

2 Beport of Industrial Commission, vol. 12, p. 695. 



188 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

2. The miners should exercise good judgment in shoot- 
ing coal in order to reduce the number of props blown 
out. 

3. The miner should use sufficient timbers to prevent 
falling of roofs. 

4. Whenever it was shown that props had been blown 
out as the result of improper shooting, the rock should be 
cleaned up at the expense of the miner. 

5. When unusual conditions like rocks and faults ex- 
isted and abnormal falls of rock resulted, the miner 
should receive extra compensation or the company's men 
should clean it up. When an unusual fall resulted, the 
miner should consult the mine foreman immediately, and, 
if decided unavoidable, the compensation for removing it 
should be fixed in advance. 

6* If the miner and foreman failed to agree, the pit 
committee should try to settle it. If they were unsuccess- 
ful, it should be referred to the subdistrict president and 
the commissioner of the operators. 

7. Miners should shoot their coal so as to produce as 
large a percentage of marketable coal as possible. 

8. The mine foreman should supply proper timbers so 
as not to entail extra work on the part of the miner. 

9 and 10. Where falls take place as the result of con- 
ditions over which the miner has no control, the company 
should stand the expense. 

Also they recommended that mine foremen and pit com- 
mittee treat each other courteously and try to reach an 
equitable and just decision. And further, both parties 
were asked to apply the decision in a " friendly and busi- 
nesslike manner, and thus avoid friction which in the 
past has been so disastrous to the interests of both mine 
owners and workers." 






THE STATE CONFERENCE 189 

B. THE CASE OF THE ATHENS LOCAL UNION 

The case of the miners' local union at Athens, Illinois, 
in 1901 is an example of the difficulties under which the 
miners' organization labors in holding its members up to 
the agreement, and of the disciplinary measures used. The 
miners' local had not only broken the agreement, but 
they had defied their own state organization. Their case 
had been investigated by a joint committee of miners and 
operators, which gave a unanimous vote against the con- 
duct of the miners in violating the agreement and their 
treatment of the mine manager. The report of this joint 
board was approved by the state joint conference, and the 
state executive board of the United Mine Workers sus- 
pended the local for an indefinite period. This action 
made it impossible for them to get work, for they were re- 
fused membership or transfer cards to other locals and 
mines. At the end of eight weeks the miners were con- 
vinced that they had made a mistake and applied for read- 
mission to the union. This the union refused to grant 
until the consent of the operators was given. The opera- 
tors agreed to reinstate them, and work was resumed, but 
the operators had been the losers and something had to 
be done to make the men stick to their contract. 

E. Coercion by Fines 

This with other instances brought the operators to the 
point where they demanded that the miners' organization 
stand losses due to breach of the contract by the miners, 
as is done by the International Longshoremen's Associa- 
tion. 1 The nearest approach to this is the fine on the in- 
dividual member, and various decisions show that the 
operators are rather lenient in not insisting on its strict 
enforcement. Decisions in the monthly bulletin show the 

1 Justi, Illinois Coal Operators' Association Publications ; Conciliation 
and Arbitration, p. 25. 



190 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

common practice of granting an alternative proposition 
or holding the fine in abeyance pending good behavior 
and until the miners are guilty of another offense. The 
agreement of 1908 provided for a ten-dollar fine on each 
miner who suspended work and violated the contract, but 
in 1910 the fine was fixed at five dollars. Whether this 
will be high enough will depend largely on increased will- 
ingness to settle by peaceful means and the development 
of tact by both parties. Too often the men regard a sus- 
pension of work as the only effective means of forcing a 
quick adjustment, and the miners' state officials follow 
the same course in threatening "independent action" 
unless a prompt settlement is made. Often an attempt 
to get at the real core of the trouble is made by discharg- 
ing, fining, or deposing the local president and the pit 
committee. 1 How far the local and state miners' organi- 
zations are guilty of misuse of power in assuming an ar- 
bitrary position in refusing to inflict the penal clauses of 
the agreement is hard to determine from reading the de- 
cisions of the cases. Both parties are probably guilty of 
this offense to a greater or less extent, and improvement 
in this respect will undoubtedly take place as they grow 
confident that real justice will be meted out by the sys- 
tem which they have built up. 

F. The Monthly Bulletin of Decisions 
In connection with the agreement of 1908, when the 
system of making the joint executive board a court of last 
resort was established, the policy was adopted of publish- 
ing a monthly bulletin containing decisions handed down. 
When a dispute arises it is listed with a case and file number. 
If the case is settled during the month by the local officers, 
the decision is recorded. If it has to pass through the 
hands of the operators' special agent and a miners' board 

1 Illinois Coal Operators' Association Bulletins, December, 1909, p. 10; 
March, 1909, p. 73. 



THE STATE CONFERENCE 191 

member to a joint group board and then to the joint execu- 
tive board, the history of the case is traced each month by 
its case and file number to a final settlement. The decisions 
reached are regarded in most instances as precedents in 
deciding similar cases, but, according to the agreement, 
either side may protest the decision as a precedent and con- 
sider it applicable only to the particular case cited. The 
importance of this latter point cannot be too highly estima- 
ted. Mr. Henry Crompton, when writing of the English 
coal industry in 1876, referred to the emphasis put upon 
awards as precedents thus : " The error of this legal concep- 
tion consists in the failure to see that these arbitrations are 
only temporary expedients, to enable industry to emerge 
from a chronic state of war, and that giving systematic 
and permanent form to the continual succession of arbi- 
tration struggles is a danger as formidable as the system 
of strikes. If each arbitration is to be governed by the accu- 
mulated results of former awards, we shall have a series of 
decisions gradually forming a voluminous and unintelligi- 
ble library of case law, and a system of refined advocacy." * 

4. THE SYSTEM IN THE SOUTHWEST 

In the southwestern field the system of settling disputes 
is nearly as elaborate as in Illinois. The pit committee 
functions in the same manner in the Southwest, but if 
trouble arises in a mine and the pit committee and foreman 
cannot settle it, the case goes before the superintendent 
and the district president of the United Mine Workers. 
If they cannot settle it, the case goes before the commis- 
sioner of the operators' association and the district presi- 
dent or such persons as they may designate. Usually the 
district president and the commissioner can settle the 
matter, but if not, a permanent arbitrator, mutually se- 
lected, settles the controversy. 2 In the mean time the mine 

1 Crompton, Industrial Conciliation, pp. 26-27. 

2 Southwestern Joint Interstate Agreement, 1912, p. 1. 



192 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

continues in operation. If there is a question of whether 
the case should be arbitrated, it must be decided by an 
appeal board composed of one operator, one miner, and a 
third party selected jointly in each district. If either party 
to an award feels that the decision has set aside the written 
terms of the contract, they may appeal to the appeal board, 
and the board after hearing the facts may remand the 
case to the arbitrator for a rehearing. 1 The decisions that 
are handed down as a result of this process are preserved 
and serve as precedents in deciding upon similar cases 
under similar circumstances. 

Up to 1908 cases were appealed from the commissioner 
and district president to a reference board composed of 
three operators and the three district presidents. From 
1908 to 1910, appeal was taken to the president of the 
operators' association and the national president of the 
United Mine Workers, but in the latter year the practice 
was inaugurated of having an arbiter selected beforehand 
whose expenses are divided between both parties. 2 His 
decisions are printed and distributed to both factions. 

5. THE SYSTEM A GROWTH 

All this sounds very complicated, and we can hear the 
average employer in most industries exclaim with impa- 
tience at the time and trouble involved. But we must re- 
member that this system is not something conceived by the 
brain of one man at a single stroke and put in operation 
to see by how devious a route a settlement of differences 
can be reached. It has had basic, complex conditions in 
the industry which has caused its growth, and we may 
depend upon it that it is there because it takes less time 
and trouble and costs less than would might and force. 
It occurs to but few employers that strikes finally have 
to be settled by talking the trouble over and reaching an 

1 Southwestern Joint Interstate Agreement, 1912, p. 3. 

2 Official correspondence. 



THE STATE CONFERENCE 193 

agreement, and there is no reason why the talking should 
not be done before the strike. Some employers think that 
they can ultimately get more after a fight. In that case 
might and not justice is the criterion, and they must also 
be of the opinion that they can stem the tide of a social 
movement which has forced its way to its present position 
under the most adverse circumstances and in spite of the 
most determined opposition on the part of the employers. 
The employers in the coal industry have had to learn by 
hard experience that the only way to meet the problems 
before them is to present a solid front to the insistent 
growth of this movement. 

6. THE OPERATORS ASK FOR A "CLOSED SHOP" 

In fact, selfish interests and competition between them 
have proven very disrupting forces even after they have 
recognized this need. If anybody had said to the Illinois 
operators fifteen or twenty years ago that they would see 
the day when they would be asking the union to establish 
the " closed shop," he would have been considered insane. 
And yet that is what they have come to. This request has 
its basis in the recognition that capital must be united in 
coping with the problems of the industry. Not consolida- 
tion, but unity in interests and aims on fundamental poli- 
cies of the industry is needed. In fact they are trying to 
resist consolidation of ownership. They also are trying to 
establish a weapon by which they can curb the tendency 
to selfishness and undue individualism, which conflicts 
with the general welfare of both operators and miners as 
well as of the industry in general. Indeed, the operators 
have learned that there can be such an individual as a 
" scab " on the side of capital as well as on the side of 
labor, and are coming to see his disrupting force just as 
labor has seen it. 



194 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

A. The Operators' Offer 

In the Illinois State Conference of 1908 the operators 
brought forth this proposition for the consideration of the 
miners : — 

The members of the Illinois Coal Operators' Association agree 
that they will not employ any man for a position for which a 
scale is made, who shall refuse to promptly become a member 
of the United Mine Workers of America ; . . . and the United 
Mine Workers of America agree that the members of the organ- 
ization will not accept employment at any mine, . . . unless the 
operator is a member of the Illinois Coal Operators' Associa- 
tion. 

The foregoing provisions shall be effective not only during 
the life of this agreement, but also in case a new agreement is 
not made before the expiration of this one ; then these provi- 
sions shall remain effective for an additional period of thirty 
days, and for a period of fifteen days after the termination of 
negotiations ; provided that if after the expiration of this contract 
western Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois are idle, or if 
each thereof, except Illinois, is at work, then after a hearing to 
the Illinois Coal Operators' Association before said national or- 
ganization, the United Mine Workers of Illinois may obey a 
mandate of the said national organization in conflict with this 
clause. 

B. The Need for the Closed Shop 

The operators frankly admitted that their association 
was in a critical condition and that this request was largely 
for the purpose of helping them to maintain the integrity 
of their organization. The miners fully recognized the 
benefit of the closed shop and considered that the agree- 
ment would make a " perfect form of joint bargaining." 
But the question of cost immediately arose. When the 
miners were idle their organization was under obligation 
to pay the men five dollars per week, and they figured 
that they would be under an expense of at least $200,000 



THE STATE CONFERENCE 195 

a year in coercing delinquent operators. The operators re- 
minded the miners that their association was subjected to 
similar conditions when the miners threw an operator's 
mine into idleness and their expenses under such circum- 
stances were not light. The miners were of the opinion 
that the task of disciplining a tenacious operator would 
be a much more expensive process than that of bringing 
a few miners with small resources into line. The proposi- 
tion would have sounded much more favorable to them if 
the operators had been willing to bear part of the ex- 
pense. 

The operators felt sure that no operator in the associa- 
tion would dare to leave the association and fight both 
organizations. Furthermore, they were convinced that 
operators outside of the association would come in when 
this agreement went into effect. The miners virtually had 
a closed shop, and they argued that what was fair for one 
side was fair for the other. Besides, it was necessary if 
the provisions of the contract were to be enforced. Further- 
more, individuality of ownership of coalmines was at stake. 
The ownership of mines was coming more and more into 
the hands of a few powerful organizations, and with this 
change it would become more difficult for the miners to 
maintain the relation which they had thus far been able 
to establish with their employers. When it came to a 
regime of concentrated ownership, the miners would find 
that the costs for coercion would greatly exceed the costs 
under this arrangement. It was also very questionable 
whether the miners could bring to terms a few big cor- 
porations which proposed to operate their mines with non- 
union labor. 

C. The Legality of the Closed Shop 

The miners raised the question of the legality of such 
an agreement and were of the opinion that the courts 
would render an unfavorable decision. Judging from the 



190 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

unfavorable decisions rendered against labor in past years, 
they were convinced that an operator who wished to with- 
draw from the association would have little trouble in get- 
ting help from " corporation judges," who would jump at 
the chance to take all the money the miners had in their 
treasury. They were sorry to admit that " it [had] come 
to such a pass that few members of organized labor [had] 
any respect for the courts." They cited a case in which 
the brickmakers and bricklayers had formed a similar 
agreement and the court had ruled adversely. Because of 
a decision rendered against some operators in the north- 
ern part of the State who had entered into an agreement 
which regulated prices and was in restraint of trade, they 
were fortified still more in their hesitancy. The operators 
were ready with the citation of a decision of the Supreme 
Court of Minnesota. 1 They had been informed by counsel 
that this was the only case which bore on their proposed 
agreement. 

The operators and miners did not propose to interfere 
with the business of any miner or operator outside of the 
agreement, and the operators were of the opinion that un- 
less they entered into a combination to fix prices or pre- 
vent an operator from getting any labor whatever, they 
were within their rights. At any rate, the agreement could 
only be declared " unlawful and void " and not " crim- 
inal," since no conspiracy was attempted. The operators 
pointed out that the press in the West had commented 
favorably on their suggestion of a closed shop, but it met 
with condemnation from the press in the East and from 
Wall Street, which condemns "our dealing with union 
labor at all." They thought that as a last resort the State 
would pass a law making it legal, since " What is best for 
the coal industry of Illinois is best for the State." The 
clause in the contract as finally agreed on read, " This 

1 Bohn Manufacturing Co. ys. Northwestern Lumberman's Assoc, 54 Minn. 
223. 



THE STATE CONFERENCE 197 

contract applies and is effective only between the Illinois 
Coal Operators' Association and the United Mine Workers 
of America." 1 

This phase of the subject brings out clearly some of 
the complications which confront the capitalist, laborer, 
and public. Mr. Herman Justi, as commissioner of the 
operators' association, did much to instill in both parties 
the concept that these agreements were business contracts 
between labor and capital, and that they should be carried 
out in a businesslike way. A situation like this was only 
the logical outcome of such a policy. If strong individual- 
ism or powerful corporate growth threatens the system of 
settling by peaceful means, adjustments must be made to 
counteract this tendency. On the side of cost to the miners' 
organization, the miners should have been willing to try 
the experiment as a protective measure in maintaining the 
integrity of their own organization and as a check on cha- 
otic conditions affecting the other party to the contract. 
If it proved too costly, they could retrench, but the chances 
were just as good that the operators judged the situation 
rightly ; the agreement would hold members of the oper- 
ators' association in line and bring in those outside. The 
element among the operators which needed coercion in- 
cluded those who resort to " subterfuges to gain their 
object, [refuse] to bear their share of the burdens, [do] not 
hesitate to take advantage of labor, to betray a colleague, 
or rob a client." It was the spirit manifested by this ele- 
ment which, given free play, was responsible for the period 
of unscrupulous dealings with miners and among operators 
before the beginning of the joint conference. Miners and 
operators suffered alike under such a regime, and it be- 
hooves the better element among both parties to devise 
methods which will not allow resort to force and violence. 

1 Report of State Joint Convention of Illinois, 1908, p. 309^ 



198 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

7. THE PROBLEM BEFORE THE PUBLIC 

On the side of the public, the near future will demand 
adjustments in our judicial and administrative machinery 
which will allow capital and labor to cope with the new 
conditions arising and yet see that the interests of the 
public are kept in sight. American conditions of life and 
industry seem to favor a policy of license and liberty that 
will enable the parties immediately concerned with the 
development of complex problems to make regulations 
which can be better arrived at through first-hand negotia- 
tion than through absolute paternal control. Yet the fear 
of paternalism should not be exaggerated. Development of 
our administrative functions is always far behind the needs 
of complex conditions. New departments are needed and 
they should be given sufficient power to protect public 
welfare. 

In summary we may say that it is this complex situation 
which has greatly aided the growth of organization among 
the miners and operators and brought them together in 
interstate joint conferences to adjust difficulties which are 
of universal application. They have done something for 
themselves which government could not do as satisfac- 
torily for both parties and yet leave room for innova- 
tions. How far complex machinery for conciliation is 
needed in the various industries depends on the extent of 
the industry, the universality of the market, the diversity 
of conditions within the industry, and the amount of strife 
due to oppression and cutthroat competition. 

Parts of this complex method of conciliation can be used 
in the smallest local industry if the employer is willing to 
meet his men on a fair basis. The employers in the bitu- 
minous coal industry have learned that the labor problem 
is of sufficient importance to demand a department for the 
adjustment of labor conditions, and that it is just as valu- 
able as the sales, financial, or construction departments. 



THE STATE CONFERENCE 199 

It has lessened strikes, brought greater uniformity of cost, 
and added stability to the industry. Capital here is or- 
ganizing in anticipation of the growing strength of trade 
unionism. If a little over ten per cent of the workers can 
create the furor they already have by organizing, what may 
be expected from a further growth of this movement ? Cap- 
ital here is constructive by reason of its purpose to deal fairly, 
conciliate, preserve peace, secure stability, resist tenden- 
cies to inconsiderate economic adjustment, and punish 
those who discredit honest business. Besides, this method, 
when substituted for force, will cost less. Figuring 1300 
as the minimum average loss per day for closing a mine, 
conciliation saves the operators and miners at least $250,- 
000 a year. 1 Carroll D. Wright, in speaking on this point, 
said that the "ethical effects of friendly settlement far 
transcend any financial results which can be considered,' ; 
and that " the harmonious relations of laborers and capi- 
talists are worth more than the success or estimated losses 
of any or all strikes." 2 Arbitration is a secondary matter 
in this system of settling disputes, but there are some points 
which both sides refuse to yield, and therefore an unprej- 
udiced outsider must allow something to each. The sys- 
tem is far from perfect, as is admitted by both parties, but 
it is growing, and the parties themselves are coming closer 
to each other with an understanding of opposing view- 
points. Organized labor makes its mistakes, but the em- 
ployer and laborer can hardly do better, when expect- 
ing perfectibility, than to remember Mr. Herman Justi's 
words : — 

If labor in recent years has too often practiced forms of tyr- 
anny and has committed acts of lawlessness, if it has forced 
conditions upon the employer that are oppressive, and has made 
contracts, as often charged, simply to violate them, and if all 

1 Illinois Coal Operators' Association Publications ; Conciliation and Ar- 
bitration in the Coal Mining Industry, p. 18. 

2 Ibid., p. 33. 



200 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

these combined evils have become so great that they now seem 
to call for the intervention of courts and the protection of the 
strong arm of the Government, let us not forget that in times 
past it was the arrogance and selfishness so often practiced by 
the rich and well-to-do that in due course brought on the pres- 
ent conflict between labor and capital. Now exalted public spirit 
and wise unselfishness to be practiced by the same class must 
restore peaceful relations and just conditions, at the same time 
that labor takes heed lest it add crime to folly by seeking re- 
venge for wrongs, both real and fancied, instead of following 
such a policy of repression, conciliation, and wise business 
sagacity as the higher dictates of their better natures would sug- 
gest, and as all law-abiding and justice-loving fellow citizens 
would approve. 

We have confined our attention to the bituminous field 
in studying the system of peaceful adjustment, because 
there the development has gone steadily on, whereas its 
growth was retarded in the anthracite field until 1902. 
The factors which prevented the growth of conciliation and 
arbitration in the anthracite region and hindered the ex- 
tension of the methods used in the bituminous fields must 
now engage our interest. 



CHAPTER VII 

CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION IN THE 
ANTHRACITE FIELD 

INTRODUCTION 

A. CAUSES DEFERRING PEACEFUL ADJUSTMENT 

As we leave the bituminous and turn to consider the an- 
thracite field, we find that the early attempts to introduce 
conciliation and arbitration, which seemed so promising, 
met with unsurmountable obstacles. The compactness of 
the anthracite coal field furnished an environment for 
capital which made concentration and monopoly control 
much easier than was possible in the bituminous field. The 
free rein which was given to corporations was an added 
element in hastening concentration. Capital thus acquired 
a unified policy. After wealth is once concentrated it can 
afford to stand large losses in order to win a battle, since 
it can rapidly recuperate. Besides, those in possession of 
a storehouse of wealth have but little conception of the 
precarious position of the man for whom a few weeks' 
idleness or sickness means hunger and starvation. This 
element, which enabled the capitalist to look upon the 
future with little concern and furnished common ground 
in a battle with labor, was for the laborer a disrupting 
force which long prevented social cohesion. In conjunc- 
tion with all these odds the capitalist was in a position to 
manipulate all the industrial and political machinery for 
replacing English-speaking laborers with Slavs and Ital- 
ians. Cooperation from steamship companies easily brought 
alien laborers here, and, once here, transportation facil- 
ities were at hand to rush them to points where they were 



202 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

needed. If capital could not prevent the passage of laws 
making contract labor illegal, its lobbyists or henchmen 
readily saw to it that the laws were so inadequate as to be 
ineffective. Moreover, court interpretations and decisions 
often nullified the plain intent of the law. With all this 
there is no special blame to be attached to capital. It is 
just plain, selfish human nature given free play. It played 
a big game without rules or else easily brushed aside the 
inadequate rules that were made. Individualism ran riot 
while waiting for the evolution of social policy and the 
solidarity of labor. 



1. FROM THE FORMATION OF BATES'S UNION IN 1849 
TO THE CLOSE OF THE CIVIL WAR 

The effects of the panic of 1837 lasted into the early 
forties, but the decade of the forties saw a rise in the trend 
of wages. This tendency was further accentuated in the 
anthracite field by the use of anthracite coal as a smelting 
fuel. 1 In 1849, Bates, an English miner, took advantage of 
these conditions to organize a union to secure better wages, 
and to correct abuses such as the company store. Evi- 
dently he was not able to endure the continued prosperity 
due to the introduction of railroads into the coal fields 
and further expansion of trade, for after the failure of his 
union in a strike he absconded with the union funds. 

We hear of no other organization until 1860. In the 
late fifties wages had declined and the introduction of old 
and new abuses caused " a degree of suffering and bitter- 
ness never before known in the region." 2 In the next dec- 
ade changes took place which revolutionized the industry. 
An increased demand for coal during the war attracted 
larger amounts of capital. This enabled firms to seek coal 
at greater depths and to use machinery for mining and 

1 Virtue, Bulletin of Bureau of Labor, no. 13, November, 1897, p. 730. 

2 Ibid., p. 730. 



IN THE ANTHRACITE FIELD 203 

preparing the coal for market. Along with this there de- 
veloped a consolidated ownership of coal lands and rail- 
roads. The checking of immigration and the demand for 
men in the war lessened the labor supply. The inflated 
currency, along with the natural demand, enabled the 
operator to get big prices and pay contract miners' rates, 
which brought them from $150 to $250 per month. 1 

Under such conditions the miners would not require a 
very strong organization in order to make the demand for 
more wages heard. But the miners had made a beginning 
at organization in 1860. In that year the employees of the 
Forestville Improvement Company formed a union which 
held together till 1864. 2 During the years of the Civil 
War several local unions were formed, and they were ac- 
tive in gaining increases in wages to offset the high prices 
of that period. 

2. BEGINNING OF ARBITRATION, 1869 TO 1875 

A. Workingmen's Benevolent Association 

With the falling off of demand at the close of the war, 
the return of men from the armies, and the fall in prices, 
these local unions were brought together in an effort to 
resist the arbitrary reductions of the operators. Pressure 
by the workingmen of Pennsylvania on the legislature of 
1867 brought a law making eight hours a legal day's 
work. But the employers had been able to enforce the in- 
sertion of a provision making the law applicable only in 
cases where there was no agreement to the contrary. The 
law went into effect July 1, 1868, and the miners were de- 
termined that it should really be effective. They called a 
convention in the early part of 1868 to create sentiment 
and to form an organization which should lend its in- 
fluence to the enforcement of the law. The organization 

1 Virtue, Bulletin of Bureau of Labor, no. 13, November, 1897, p. 731. 

2 Ibid., p. 732. 



204 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

effected at this convention was known as the Working- 
men's Benevolent Association, and its constitution pro- 
vided for a sick benefit of five dollars per week and thirty 
dollars for the burial of a member. 1 

A strike was inaugurated to resist reductions and to 
make this law effective. The proviso that the law should 
be inoperative if the contracting parties agreed to other 
regulations necessitated concerted action on the part of 
the workers. The eight-hour law was no great boon to the 
contract miners, for they spent eight hours or less in min- 
ing enough coal to keep the loaders and other workers 
busy ten hours. But its chief importance would be to 
limit the overproduction somewhat and to distribute the 
work over the year to a greater extent. The strike was 
unsuccessful, but the suspension from July to September 
depleted the market to such an extent that the miners 
were able to resume work at their old rates. 2 By the 
autumn of 1869 the union was said to have enlisted 30,- 
000 members out of the 35,000 anthracite workers. 3 

B. The Anthracite Board of Trade 

It was definitely recognized by 1867 that the operators 
were organizing into associations, and by 1869 they be- 
came known as the Anthracite Board of Trade. 4 The 
same year the operators' association proposed a reduction of 
wages to the union, but the miners had learned something 
from the strike of 1868. Instead of acceding to the reduc- 1 
tion the miners proposed by the use of suspensions to keep 
the market steady and healthy and enable the operator 
to get a " fair interest on investments and at the same 
time receive for our share a fair day's wages for a fair 
day's work." 5 iThe suspensions became general from April 

1 Roy, op. cit., p. 77. 

2 Report of Secretary of Internal Affairs of Pennsylvania, 1881, p. 286. 
A reprint of the Report of 1872. 

8 Roberts, The Anthracite Coal Industry, p. 176. 4 Virtue, op. cit., p. 732. 
5 Virtue, op. cit., p. 735, quotes an order to resume work. 




IN THE ANTHRACITE FIELD 205 

to September, but the good effects to the market were less- 
ened somewhat by the continued production of the Penn- 
sylvania Coal Company and the Delaware, Lackawanna, 
and Western Coal Company. These companies by offering 
liberal wages succeeded in getting their men to break faith 
with the union. 1 This policy of suspensions met with con- 
siderable public criticism. The order to resume work, be- 
sides embodying an explanation of the intentions of the 
union, called attention to the risk and danger of the occu- 
pation and the resulting strikes and distress which arose 
from overproduction. The operators' association raised 
but little objection to this policy, because they recognized 
that too much coal was being mined. But later, when the 
occasion suited them, they pointed to the policy of the 
union as an act of tyranny and the occasion of great loss 
to them. 2 

C. The Sliding Scale 

In May, 1869, the General Council of the Working- 
men's Benevolent Association proposed to the Anthracite 
Board of Trade that wages be governed by the selling 
price of coal. 3 This would involve the formation of a slid- 
ing scale providing that wages fluctuate automatically 
with prices. It was hoped that this arrangement would 
remove one of the chief sources of friction between em- 
ployer and employee. The adoption of a scale in the Le- 
high region provided that an average selling price of five 
dollars per ton at Elizabethport (tidewater) should form 
a basis. For every dollar advance in the price of coal the 
wage-earner received fifteen per cent increase in wages. 
With the advance of a fractional part of a dollar the 
workers received a corresponding fractional part of the 
fifteen per cent. The basis for the Schuylkill region was 

1 Report of Secretary of Internal Affairs of Pennsylvania, 1881, p. 287. 

2 Virtue, op. cit., p. 735. 

8 Weeks, Massachusetts Report on Statistics of Labor, 1881, p. 24. 



206 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

three dollars, i.e., the average selling price of coal at Port 
Carbon on the Schuylkill River. The difference of two 
dollars in the basing points was to allow for freight rates. 1 
Wages increased five per cent in the Schuylkill with 
every advance of twenty-five cents in the selling price of 
coal. In both cases there was to be no reduction of wages 
when the selling price went below the basis. The basic 
prices for day labor were : " outside labor," $11 per week ; 
" inside labor," 112 ; and $14 per week for miners when 
not engaged in contract work. The miners of the northern 
field did not have sufficient strength to secure the slid- 
ing scale. 

Hardly had the scale been put into operation before 
the fundamental question of the justice of the basis arose. 
And with dissatisfaction over that matter the whole ques- 
tion of wage adjustment was again open. Those who had 
expected great things of the sliding scale were sadly dis- 
appointed. The operators were the first to express dissat- 
isfaction, and in December, 1869, offered as a basis two 
dollars per ton at Port Carbon 2 with a corresponding de- 
crease in day wages. This action, along with the attitude 
of the operators in a recent prosecution of members of 
the union under the conspiracy laws, was regarded by the 
miners as an open declaration of war. The union refused 
to consider such a heavy reduction, and after several 
months' suspension, President Gowan, of the Reading 
Railroad, induced the operators to accept a compromise. 
The three dollar per ton basis was retained, but the union 
made the mistake of accepting a provision allowing the 
scale to slide below the basis as well as above. With the 
minimum wage gone, the miners had to bear the brunt of 
overproduction and competition. 

1 Weeks, Massachusetts Report on Statistics of Labor, 1881, p. 24. 

2 Report of Secretary of Internal Affairs of Pennsylvania, 1881, p. 291. 



IN THE ANTHRACITE FIELD 207 

D. The Eeading Kailroad attempts to stop the 
Struggle 

During the suspension in the Lehigh and Schuylkill 
regions the operators of the northern field had been able 
to keep their men at work by their old tactics of increased 
wages. When the other fields began producing to their 
full capacity, the northern operators demanded a thirty 
per cent reduction in wages to enable them to meet the 
competition. The president of the Delaware and Hudson 
Canal Company defined the issue thus to a committee 
of the Workingmen's Benevolent Association : " The only 
question involved in the issue is whether the property 
shall be controlled and the policy of the company deter- 
mined by the owners, or whether it shall be committed to 
the care and direction of an irresponsible organization, 
and in determining this question the managers are strong 
in the belief that the stockholders can have but one opin- 
ion." 1 The northern miners struck and appealed for aid 
to the other fields, which they had betrayed. Neverthe- 
less, the Lehigh and Schuylkill miners, recognizing the 
need for united action over all the fields, decided to sus- 
pend work in order to bring about a general agreement. 
(The northern fields, instead of insisting on a general 
Agreement, went to work at the company's terms 2 after 
suspending from January (1871) to May. 

This practically put an end to the union in the northern 
fields. Meanwhile the southern fields after a month's sus- 
pension had brought some of the operators to the point 
of conceding the three-dollar basis. But when the coal 
of these operators was offered for shipment, it was found 
that freight rates had risen to such an extent that it was 
impossible to carry on business at the market prices. In 
fact the advance was so great that coal could not have 

1 Roberts, The Anthracite Coal Industry, p. 179. 

2 Report of Secretary of Internal Affairs of Pennsylvania, 1881, p. 296. 



208 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

been sold for less than twelve dollars per ton. 1 (TJie Read- 
ing Railroad was supposed by some to be animated purely 
by the desire to regulate the trade and secure steadiness 
in the market. 2 By others it was pointed out that the 
railroad had been buying heavily in coal lands and pro- 
posed to use the occasion to force out of business certain 
operators and secure profits by increased prices) The ex- 
ample of the Reading was followed by other roads and 
their action caused such a storm of protest among both 
operators and miners that the legislature proceeded to in- 
vestigate conditions. The investigating committee found 
that they were prohibited from any action because the 
State Supreme Court had decided 3 that "tolls," the term 
used in the charter of the railroad, referred to carrying' 
passengers and not to freight. Therefore no restrictions 
could be placed upon freight. Perhaps some of the mo- 
tives prompting President Gowen may be explained in his 
words to the legislative committee. After describing the 
conditions of overproduction and surplus labor since the 
Civil War, he makes the Workingmen's Benevolent Asso- 
ciation entirely responsible for the lack of proper adjust- 
ment of the whole situation : — 

We, who thought we understood something of the laws of 
trade, and knew that natural causes would soon bring relief, 
remonstrated with the leaders of the organization in vain. The 
law of supply and demand and every sound maxim which the 
experience of trade has demonstrated to be correct, were thrown 
to the winds ; and from the bowels of the earth there came 
swarming up a new school of political economists, who professed 
to be able during the leisure hours of their short working day, 
to regulate a great industry and restore it to vigor and health. 
In the wildest flights of imagination of the most pretentious 

1 Lloyd, Lords of Industry, p. 234, quotes investigation of State Senate 
of Pennsylvania, 1871. 

2 Report of Secretary of Internal Affairs of Pennsylvania, 1881, p. 296. 

8 Boyle vs. The Philadelphia and Beading Railroad Company, 4t P. F. 
Smith, 310. 



IN THE ANTHRACITE FIELD 209 

charlatan there never was conceived such a cure for the ills 
with which we were afflicted as was suggested by these new 
doctors. In their hands, however, we were powerless, and with 
the eagerness of a student and the assurance of a quack, they 
seized upon the body of a healthy trade, and have so doctored 
it and physicked it that it is now reduced to the ghost of the 
shadow of an attenuation. 1 

It was suggested at the time that the railroad did not 
propose to pay the wages in its collieries which the other 
operators were willing to pay. 2 Perhaps it also occurred 
to Mr. Gowen that one of the best ways of avoiding such 
a contingency would be to start a campaign for ultimately 
crushing the union. Of this we shall see more later. 

E. Settlement by Arbitration 

While the legislative investigation was in progress some 
of the operators had ignored the union officials and sought 
to make a direct settlement with their men. This brought 
no response and the continued deadlock aroused the pub- 
lic to demand some form of peaceful settlement. The in- 
itiative was taken by Mr. E. B. Coxe, an operator who 
had published a series of articles on arbitration in the 
"Anthracite Monitor," the miners' paper. 3 Mr. Coxe's 
efforts and the general pressure of public opinion brought 
together a joint board of operators and miners represent- 
ing all of the anthracite counties, April 17, 1871. Judge 
William Elwell was selected to act as arbiter in the case 
of a disagreement. His services were soon called for to 
settle upon the extent to which the union had a right to 
interfere with the working of the mine, its policy toward 
non-union men, and the treatment accorded to the union 
by the operators. The rule of exclusive control and man- 
agement by the operator was laid down, and the refusal 
of the union to work with non-union men or members of 

1 Quoted in the Nation, May 25, 1871, p. 352. 2 Ibid., p. 255. 
8 Roy, op. cit., p. 92. 



210 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

the union who would not pay their dues was decided as 
" contrary to the policy of the law, and subversive of the 
best interests of the miners and their employers." It was 
stated that " operators ought not in any manner to com- 
bine against persons" who belonged to the union and that 
no member " ought to be deprived of his work " because 
of his official duties in the union. The operator who was 
guilty of these practices would " thereby give good grounds 
for censure, and for other members to refuse to work for 
him." 1 This policy would no doubt work admirably, if 
the operator felt inclined to pursue it. 

The question of wages had been deferred because some 
of the miners' representatives had not been granted the 
power to settle upon it. The attempt of the operators 
again to ignore the officials implied that they thought the 
blame for further suspension lay with them. But the of- 
ficials were more conservative than their followers and 
they had difficulty in directing them along reasonable 
lines. However, another joint conference concerning wages 
and the sliding scale referred matters to the arbiter. He 
split the difference in the demands and included a pro- 
vision for district boards of arbitration which should settle 
all disputes arising under the scale. It was also provided 
that there should be no suspension of work while settle- 
ment was going on. The establishment of the basis price 
was arrived at each month by selecting the average sell- 
ing prices of five operators. Two operators and two min- 
ers made the selection from the entire list of operators by 
casting lots. 2 

F. The Break-up of the Union 

A. THE INADEQUACY OF ARBITBATION 

The award had provided that a basis of $2.15 per ton 
at Port Carbon should mark the point at which wages 

1 Decision quoted by Weeks, op. cit., p. 36. Italics mine. 

2 Weeks, op. cit., p. 39. 



IN THE ANTHRACITE FIELD 211 

were to begin to increase and they should decrease until 
coal sold at 12.25. After this point was reached there 
should be no further reduction in wages. The general 
feeling of satisfaction over the settlement was soon turned 
to chagrin by a dispute which arose at the Thomas Coal 
Company's colliery. Coal had fallen in price and the 
miners' leaders, in violation of the award, refused to ac- 
cept a reduction below the $2.75 basis. The demands of 
the men were promptly granted and this concession led 
the miners at other collieries to seek similar terms. The 
other operators granted concessions, and the men over the 
whole field felt that arbitration had not established a just 
basis. The efforts of the union officers and the officials of 
the Anthracite Board of Trade to hold their respective par- 
ties to the award were fruitless. 

B. CONCENTRATION OF OWNERSHIP J? . 

There were several other factors besides the inadequacy 
of arbitration which led to the break-up of the union. The 
united force of concentrated wealth, though this was just 
beginning, proved to be a stronger power than the union 
was able to cope with. An agreement was arrived at in 
1872 with difficulty, for each party had lost faith in the 
intention of the other to abide by the contract. Yet in 
this year and in 1873 a settlement was finally reached 
through the acceptance of reductions by the miners. But 
for some time influences had been at work which were to 
put the railroads in absolute control of the anthracite sup- 
ply. The charter of the Reading Railroad prohibited it 
from legally carrying on mining. President Gowen deter- 
mined to get around this handicap and procured for the 
Laurel Run Improvement Company, May, 1871, a charter 
permitting its stock to be held by a railroad. 1 Later by a 
court decree the name of the company was changed to the 

1 Beport on Labor Troubles in the Anthracite Regions, 50th Congress, 2d 
Session, House Report no. 4147, p. lxiii. 



,"- 



212 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

Reading Coal and Iron Company. The entire stock was 
owned by the railroad and by 1872 through its instru- 
mentality the railroad had acquired 80,000 acres of coal 
lands. By 1873 the lands in the Lackawanna Basin were 
owned mainly by the Pennsylvania Coal Company and the 
Delaware, Lackawanna, and Western Railroad Company. 
In the Wyoming basin the Wilkesbarre Coal and Iron 
Company was fast absorbing the coal lands. The buying 
of coal lands by the railroads had gone on to such an ex- 
tent that the new state constitution of 1874 prohibited 
common carriers from engaging in mining or manufactur- 
ing or acquiring lands in freehold or by lease other than 
was necessary for carrying on their business as carriers. 

C. FORMATION OF POOLS 

Furthermore, by the formation of pools in 1873 and 
1874, the railroads were able to restrict production, main- 
tain selling prices, and deal arbitrarily with labor and 
thus bring on a disastrous struggle. Evidently Mr. Gowen 
had been converted to the doctrine of the new economists 
which he so greatly deprecated before the legislature in 
1871. These pools succeeded so well that prices were well 
supported in spite of the panic and general depression in 
business. 1 

D. THE "LONG STRIKE" IN 1875 

-> 

By 1875 concerted action on the part of the combina- 
tion forced a reduction of wages from ten to twenty per 
cent and deprived the day laborer of any benefit from the 
sliding scale. Again the operators of the northern field 
were able to keep their men at work and take advantage 
of the so-called " long strike," which lasted from January 
to July. The men of the Lehigh and Schuylkill regions 
were aware that a determined attempt was to be made 
to break up their union, and the struggle was correspond- 

1 Report on Labor Troubles in the Anthracite Regions, op. cit., p. xlvii. 



IN THE ANTHRACITE FIELD 213 

ingly resolute. " In the closing weeks of the contest there 
were exhibited scenes of woe and want and uncomplaining 
suffering seldom surpassed. Hundreds of families arose in 
the morning to breakfast on a crust of bread and a glass 
of water, who did not know where a bite of dinner was 
to come from. Day after day, men, women and children 
went to the adjoining woods to dig roots and pick herbs 
to keep body and soul together, and still the strike went 
on with no visible sign of surrender. But workingmen 
must work that they may eat, and must eat that they may 
work, while capital can wait. ■ The end came at last in the 
unconditional surrender of the miners. The force of na- 
ture could go no further." x This statement from a reliable 
man who knew the real situation makes one question 
President Gowen's explanation that it was all the work of 
a few demagogic labor leaders. 2 These demagogues must 
have had unusual powers to make a people endure such 
suffering for a cause unless there was some real and press- 
ing economic stress behind it all. 

E. PERIOD OF THE " MOLLY MAGUIRES " 

Another force which helped to break up the union was 
the lawlessness of the rougher element. This was during 
the period of the " Molly Maguires," a secret organization 
which was ready to inspire terror or do murder in return 
for an injury. The wildness of the region gave full oppor- 
tunity for secret murders. The fact that some of the 
" Mollies " were members of the union was quite sufficient 
to bring all the opprobrium of their deeds upon the union- 
ists. But it has since been generally recognized that the 
deeds of the Mollies are not to be associated with the 
policies or programme of the union. 

1 Roy, op. cit., p. 99. 

2 Engineering and Mining Journal, August 14, 1875. 



214 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

F. THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE WORKINGMEN's 
BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION 

Primarily the union stood for collective bargaining. To 
make collective bargaining effective they persuaded all 
miners to join the organization and refused to work with 
non-unionists, who were stubborn about joining. The 
unionist can see no good reason why a man who automat- 
ically receives a higher wage through the collective effort 
of his fellows should not support the union. But to make 
the union still more attractive sick and death benefits and 
payments to widows and orphans were established. The 
organization was a strong force in uniting the various 
nationalities then employed. Though they were mostly 
English-speaking peoples, the differences in nationality 
and custom were added obstacles to overcome when seek- 
ing collective action. This had been accomplished to the 
extent of making a body of men suffer for six months to 
bring about better conditions. Cooperative stores were 
started, but were not very successful. A miners' newspa- 
per helped to encourage unity. The first mine-inspection 
law was enacted through the efforts of the union, 1 also a 
law requiring the weighing of coal. 2 With the surrender 
of the men they were compelled, as a condition of obtain- 
ing work, to sign away the right of having their coal 
weighed. The sliding scale continued in operation, but the 
determination of the basis and the prices paid to labor 
were entirely in the hands of the operators till the strike 
of 1900. 

3. HISTORY OF CONSOLIDATION 

We have referred to the beginnings of concentration of 
wealth and ownership in the anthracite region as one of 

1 Roy, op. cit., p. 87. 

2 This was ineffective because of the proviso permitting the parties to 
contract on another basis. 



IN THE ANTHRACITE FIELD 215 

the causes of the break-up of the union. The force of this 
factor increased to such an extent as not only to prevent 
the growth of the union, but practically to control the 
industrial, social, and political welfare of the region. 
Leaving out of consideration the selfishness and greed 
that may have animated the operators, the complex con- 
ditions with which capitalists and legislators had to deal 
made it difficult for them to understand the real situation. 
They were too close to it. Mighty and rapid changes were 
taking place in industry. Large combinations of capital 
not only assumed all the arrogance of individual owner- 
ship, but, because they were conducting large enterprises 
which could not be carried on without immense capital, 
they believed themselves entitled to greater consideration 
than the small owners. The suspicion with which the mo- 
nopolistic tendencies of large corporations were regarded 
led their representatives before the legislature to empha- 
size the favors which large organizations conferred upon 
the Commonwealth and to overawe the simple legislative 
mind with their mighty projects. In this way the capital- 
ists and legislators were led far away from the consid- 
eration of changing social conditions. These factors are 
fully emphasized in the legislative investigation of 1875, 
wherein the Reading Railroad was accused of pooling, 
discrimination, and monopoly control. 1 We need only to 
turn to a consideration of the legal situation and to the 
inadequate way in which the legislature met its responsi- 
bilities to understand the ease with which the process of 
concentration could be carried on. 

A. Legal Background 

A. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 1874 

We have referred 2 to the provision in the new state 

constitution of 1874 which prohibited railroads from en- 

1 Engineering and Mining Journal, August 14, 1875. 2 See ante, p. 212. 



216 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

gaging in mining and manufacturing. The same article 1 
prohibited railroads from consolidation with other rail- 
roads by purchase of stock, franchises, or property. Nor 
could they attain the same ends by lease or through owner- 
ship by officials. By section 7 they were prohibited from 
discriminating and rebating, and they were not to have 
" the benefit of any future legislation by general or special 
laws, except on condition of complete acceptance of this 
article." 

B. ACTS OF 1874 

The party in power was pledged to supplement these 
provisions by legal enactments. The extent to which this 
was effected may be judged by the following laws. The 
act of April 29, 1874, regulating corporations, permitted 
iron and steel companies to mine and sell coal, but pro- 
hibited the ownership or lease of more than 10,000 acres 
of land. Section 39, clause 1, of the same act limited the 
capital stock of mining companies to $5,000,000. By an 
act of April 20, 1874, the officers of dissolved corpora- 
tions were permitted to convey real estate held by such 
corporations, and further allowed to consummate almost 
any kind of a deal if it were approved by the Court of 
Common Pleas of the county in which the property was 
located. An act of May 11, 1874, validated charters of 
" certain corporations " previously granted that " are de- 
fective in validity" because of "technical defects and 
other causes," provided the corporations should hold their 
charters subject to the state constitution. There was noth- 
ing about these laws seriously to disturb the relationship 
of the Reading Railroad with the Reading Coal and Iron 
Company (or other railroads with similar companies) or 
to prevent easy adjustment of future business arrange- 
ments. Furthermore, the railroads claimed, according to 
1 Article 17, sec. 4. 



IN THE ANTHRACITE FIELD 217 

the Dartmouth College decision in 1819, 1 that the pur- 
chases of coal lands acquired previous to 1874 under their 
charters could not be invalidated by the legislature. 

C. COAL LAND ACTS OF THE EIGHTIES AND THEIR 
AMENDMENTS 

By 1883 the legislature decided to pass an act prohib- 
iting discrimination and rebating by railroads, made it 
a misdemeanor, and attached a fine not exceeding $2000 
and a maximum of two years' imprisonment. 2 With the 
agitation for national regulation of railroads it was evi- 
dently considered discreet to further protect the railroads 
in their holdings of stocks and property. Moreover, in the 
case of the Reading Railroad vs. Patent, 3 in 1886, the 
State Supreme Court had decided that the railroad was 
subject to all the provisions of the constitution. An appeal 
was taken to the United States Supreme Court, which re- 
mained on the docket till January, 1889, when it was dis- 
missed on the motion of the Reading's counsel. 4 In the 
mean time an act of June 2, 1887, 5 provided that no real 
or personal property held by a corporation should be es- 
cheated to the Commonwealth, whether or not the " bene- 
ficial ownership " of such property was in the hands of 
residents of the State or outsiders. Transportation com- 
panies could not have the benefit of this act for more 
than five years unless they filed with the Secretary of State 
a certificate stating that the stockholders and directors 
accepted all the provisions of article 17 of the constitution 
which pertained to railroads. This law was further supple- 
mented by an act in the same year providing that " convey- 
ances of real estate " by foreign and domestic corporations 

1 Dartmouth College vs. Woodward, 4 Wheaton, 518. 

2 Laws of Pennsylvania, 1883, p. 72. 

3 Beading Railroad vs. Patent, 2 Central Reporter, 554. 

4 Report on Labor Troubles in the Anthracite Regions, 1887-88, op. cit. t 
p. xiii. 

5 Laws of Pennsylvania, 1887, p. 302. 



i 
218 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

"to any citizen of the United States or domestic cor- 
porations authorized to hold real estate could be con- 
veyed indefeasibly as to any right of escheat in this Com- 
monwealth, by reason of such real estate having been 
held by an alien or corporation not authorized to hold the 
same by the laws of this Commonwealth." * This act was 
amended in 1891 so as to permit conveyances " by the 
officers of any such corporation after dissolution or ex- 
piration of charter." 2 It was amended in 1897 so as 
to legalize transfers of property made since 1891, and 
amended in 1903 to validate transfers made since 1897. 

D. EFFECTS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION 

By 1901, section 4 of article 17, prohibiting consolida- 
tion of stock, franchises, and property, had been so mal- 
treated by judicial interpretation 3 that the legislature 
passed an act frankly permitting corporations to purchase 
or sell " the shares of capital stock of, or any bonds, secu- 
rities, or evidences of indebtedness created by, any other 
corporation." 4 This supplemented a judicial decision in 
1897 which applied to section 5 (prohibiting railroads 
from engaging in mining and manufacturing), wherein 
the court had decided that the section did not apply to 
ownership by a railroad of stock in a mining company. 5 

E. RESULTS OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 
INVESTIGATION OF 1907 

Since the information obtained by the Interstate Com- 
merce Commission in 1907 showed that the ownership of 
coal properties and stock in coal companies by officers 
of the Pennsylvania Railroad resulted in grave abuses 
in discrimination and distribution of cars, the legislature 

1 Laws of Pennsylvania, 1887, p. 350. 2 Ibid., 1891, p. 249. 

8 See Purdon's Digest, 13th edition, vol. 1, p. 215, for cases. 
4 Laws of Pennsylvania, 1901, p. 603. 
6 Purdon, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 215. 



IN THE ANTHRACITE FIELD 219 

sought to remedy this matter. An act was passed for- 
bidding " officers, employers, or agents . . . who have 
charge, directly or indirectly, of the distribution of cars 
to own, or have an interest, directly or indirectly, in any 
operated coal property, or in the stock of any mining or 
manufacturing company, along the line of such railroad." * 
A small fine and a short term of imprisonment were at- 
tached as a penalty. In the same year a law created a 
railroad commission with powers of investigation and 
regulation and provided it with accountants, inspectors, 
clerks, and full working equipment. 2 May 31, 1907, a law 
was approved which provided, " That an incorporated 
company doing the business of a common carrier shall 
not, directly or indirectly, engage in any other business 
than that of common carriers, or hold or acquire lands, 
freehold or leasehold directly or indirectly, except such as 
shall be necessary for carrying on its business." z Action 
for violation must be brought by the attorney-general, and 
the offenders are subjected to a fine of $1000. Another 
act of the same year prohibited discrimination and re- 
bating and has the same method of enforcement and fine 
as the former law. 4 Still another act of the same year 
prohibits further consolidation after 1908 through owner- 
ship of stock franchises and property. It must be en- 
forced by the attorney-general, and the offenders are sub- 
ject to a fine of $ 1000. 5 

F. ACTS TO " QUIET THE TITLE OF REAL ESTATE " 

Evidently these simple provisions had "disquieted" 
somebody, for in 1909 an act was passed " to quiet the 
title of real estate, and to enable citizens of the United 
States, and corporations chartered under the laws of this 

1 Laws of Pennsylvania, 1907, p. 359. 2 Ibid., 1907, p. 337. 

3 Ibid., 1907, p. 352. How this may be interpreted is another matter. 
Italics mine. 

4 Ibid., 1907, p. 352. 6 Ibid., 1907, p. 353. 



220 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

Commonwealth, and authorized to hold real estate therein, 
to hold and convey title to real estate, which has been 
formerly held by corporations not authorized by law to 
hold real estate in Pennsylvania." * These lands shall be 
held and conveyed " indefeasibly to any right of escheat in 
this Commonwealth." Somebody must have required con- 
siderable " quieting" for this identical act, which had been 
approved by Governor Stuart April 23, 1909, was again 
enacted and approved by Governor Tener March 7, 1911, 2 
and reenacted and approved by the same governor June 
15, 1911. 3 Evidently it was thought a necessary precau- 
tion to pass the act every time transfers of property were 
made. 

We have given this brief resume of the legal back- 
ground simply to demonstrate the practically unlimited 
sway held by capital in the anthracite region and how lit- 
tle consideration of the law was necessary before con- 
summating the deals which took place between 1874 and 
1911. 

B. Ownership of Lands 

We have referred 4 to the extent of the ownership of 
lands in 1872 and 1873. The Reading Railroad made 
good use of the time, so that when the constitution went 
into effect in 1874 it was in possession of 100,000 acres. 
As we have seen, from a legal standpoint there was not 
much to hinder further purchases, and by 1887 the Read- 
ing owned 165,189 acres of coal and agricultural lands 
which had a bonded indebtedness of f 160,000,000. 5 After 
the passage of the laws of 1887, to which we referred on 
page 217, the railroads extended their mining operations 
and increased their purchases of lands. 6 By 1896 it was 

1 Laws of Pennsylvania, 1909, p. 172. 2 Ibid., 1911, p. 13. 

8 Ibid., 1911, p. 955. * See ante, p. 211. 

5 Report on Labor Troubles in the Anthracite Regions, 1887, op. city 
p. xv. 

6 Ibid., 1887, p. xiii. 



IN THE ANTHRACITE FIELD 221 

estimated that 96.29 per cent of the coal lands was con- 
trolled directly or indirectly by the railroads, 1 and 90 per 
cent was controlled by five out of the eleven roads reach- 
ing the anthracite fields. In the order of their importance 
they are — Philadelphia and Beading, 42.25 per cent ; 
Central Kailroad of New Jersey, 17.30 per cent ; Lehigh 
Valley, 16.87 per cent; Delaware, Lackawanna, and 
Western, 6.55 per cent ; and the Pennsylvania, 6.24 per 
cent. As we have seen, laws were passed in 1897 and 
1903 to legalize transfers that had been made since 1896. 

C. Attempt to Control Production by Pools 

A. EARLY ATTEMPTS 

The first attempt of the operators to limit production 
and fix prices was in 1849 when Bates's union was in its 
heydey. 2 During the fifties and sixties further attempts 
were made, but with small success. The prime movers in 
these efforts were " independent " operators, but compe- 
tition and transportation rates were forces too disrupt- 
ing for them to attain cohesion and uniformity. With 
the rise of the Workingmen's Benevolent Association 
sufficient impetus was given to bring together operators 
and transportation companies with greater attending suc- 
cess and control. We have called attention to the pools 
in 1873-75 and the opposition to the union which re- 
sulted in its overthrow. 3 

B. COMBINATION OF OPERATORS AND CARRIERS 

In 1874 and 1875 allotted tonnage and graduated 
prices were agreed upon. The proportioning of tonnage 
limited production and steadied the market, while the in- 
creasing prices encouraged buyers to purchase their coal 
early and distributed production more evenly over the 

1 Roberts, op. cit., p. 65, quotes Griffiths, mining engineer. 

2 Ibid., pp. 70-71. 8 See ante, p. 212. 



222 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

year. A committee of six was appointed in 1876 to estab- 
lish monthly prices, to provide for increase or curtailment 
of tonnage, to collect funds, and to employ an account- 
ant who was to keep tonnage accounts. The tonnage ac- 
counts were to be open to inspection at all times, and 
roads which exceeded their tonnage were to pay $1.50 
for each ton in excess of their allotments...: Only competi- 
tive tonnage was subject to the control of the committee, 
and each road had full control of its local trade. But each 
company was held responsible for enforcing the regula- 
tions on " independent " operators along its lines. 1 This 
pool went to pieces in August of 1876, and the remainder 
of the year and the following year was a period of im- 
mense tonnages and low prices, which extended the use 
of anthracite more widely in Western markets. A pool in 
1878 reduced the tonnage to three and a half million tons 
less than that of 1873, but the absence of a pool in 1879 
allowed the production to increase over eight and a half 
million tons. From 1880 to, 1887, with the exception of 
1883, production was well controlled and the roads suc- 
ceeded in " disciplining " the independent operators into 
a " faithful adherence to the pool regulations." 

C. THE "MORGAN POOL/' 1886 

But in 1885 the Pennsylvania Railroad was dissatisfied 
with its allotment of tonnage and was ready to expend 
$ 20,000,000 as a war measure against the Reading road 
to pusjj^ts lines into Reading territory and get busi- 
ness. 2 This situation resulted in the " Morgan Pool " of 
1886. ^The presidents of the various railroads and large 
coal companies met at Mr. J. P. Morgan's house, estimated 
the necessary output for the coming year, fixed a penalty 
of fifty cents per ton for exceeding tonnage, raised the 

1 Report on Labor Troubles in the Anthracite Regions, 1887, op. cit., pp. 
xlvii-xlviii. Reprint of agreement. 

2 Engineering and Mining Journal, January 23, 1886. 



IN^THE ANTHRACITE FIELD 223 

price of coal twenty-five cents a ton, and appointed a com- 
mittee to fix allotments. The Pennsylvania Railroad was 
mollified by concessions of percentages on the part of the 
Reading and Lehigh roads. 

Since 1887 a " community of interest " in connection 
with a policy of centralization by stock ownership and in- 
terlocking directorates has enabled the roads to conduct 
their affairs by a " gentleman's agreement." 

D. EFFECTS ON PRICES 

With the formation of the pool in 1873 there was an 
increase in average prices of fifty-three cents per ton, with 
a still further increase of twenty-eight cents the following 
year. In 1876, with the breaking of the pool in August, 
the average price nearly approached the mark of 1872, 
and with the entire abandonment of the pool in 1877 the 
average price dropped $1.28 per ton. The effective pool 
of 1880 raised the price $1.83 per ton over the price of 
1879 when no pool existed. From 1880 to 1895 the pool 
prices vary very little, but reflect the troubles of 1886 by 
a drop of fifty cents per ton. 1 Using the average pool price 
of $4 for 1886, which is still above the years of competi- 
tion, it is estimated that an extra charge of $79,767,477 
was put upon the public from 1880 to 1884. 2 Although 
the regulations of the pools were not strictly adhered to, 
yet the growing recognition of " community interest " and 
centralization of control had made an " understanding " 
more and more effective. 

D. Lease of Jersey Central by the Reading 
Railroad, 1883 

The Reading road inaugurated the policy of leasing in 
1883. The inability thoroughly to control allotments and 

1 Report on Labor Troubles in the Anthracite Regions, 1887, op. cit., p. xlix ; 
reprint from Saward's The Coal Trade, the accepted authority of the opera- 
tors and carriers. 2 Ibid., p. 1. 



224 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

prices by pooling made more definite control necessary. 
The lease of the Jersey Central for 999 years was in effect 
from 1883 to 1887. In the latter year the Reading found 
itself unable to fulfill the terms of the lease, and its affairs 
were put in the hands of receivers. 1 However, close com- 
munity of interests was maintained and was extended to 
the Lehigh Valley road through the stockholders of the 
Lehigh who also owned stock in the Jersey Central. Down 
to 1890 business was carried on through tacit or informal 
agreements. 

E. The Jersey Central and Lehigh Valley 

Leases, 1890-1893 

Since the leasing of the Jersey Central in 1883, a New 
Jersey law had been passed 2 requiring foreign corpora- 
tions to obtain special legislative consent when leasing 
domestic corporations. As the Reading was a Pennsyl- 
vania corporation, it had to run the risk of being thwarted 
by legislative action or find a way to evade the law. It 
chose the latter. Six officers of the Philadelphia and Read- 
ing Railroad organized the Port Reading Railroad Com- 
pany, in November, 1890, with a capital of 12,000,000. 
They projected a twenty-mile railroad to connect with the 
Delaware and Bound Brook Railroad and have terminals 
at a point on the Arthur Kill opposite Staten Island. 3 At 
the same time the Port Reading Construction Company 
contracted to build the railroad for $1,500,000 in mort- 
gage bonds and all but four hundred shares of the capital 
stock. By January 12, 1892, only a few miles of the road 
had been built, but on this date the Central Railroad of 
New Jersey leased its main lines and forty tributary rail- 
roads for 999 years to the Port Reading Railroad. In re- 

1 Report on Labor Troubles in the Anthracite Regions, 1887, op. cit., p. lx. 

2 Laws of New Jersey, 1885, p. 324. 

8 Report on the Alleged Coal Combination, 1893, 52d Congress, 2d Session, 
House Report no. 2278, p. 211. 



IN THE ANTHRACITE FIELD 225 

turn the Port Reading Railroad agreed to pay all operating 
expenses, seven per cent dividends, and fifty per cent of 
the earnings above these dividends. At the same time a 
tripartite agreement was made between the Jersey Central, 
Port Reading, and Philadelphia and Reading, whereby 
the latter railroad guaranteed the fulfillment of the Port 
Reading's covenants and promised to direct increased traf- 
fic in such a way that the expected earnings would be 
realized. 1 The Lehigh Valley Railroad was leased Febru- 
ary 11, 1892, in order to acquire control of its coal proper- 
ties and to gain access for the combination's product to 
the Lake ports. The combination was further strength- 
ened through the acquisition of stock by the President of 
the Jersey Central in the Lackawanna road, while the pres- 
ident of the latter road became a director of the Jersey 
Central. By the increase of percentage contracts from 
fifty-five to sixty per cent, the good will of the independent 
operators was gained. 2 

Public hostility was at once aroused by the project. In- 
vestigations were ordered by Congress and the New York 
Legislature. The leases were attacked in the Chancery 
Court of New Jersey and declared illegal. The purchase 
of a controlling interest in the Boston and Maine Railroad 
by President McLeod, of the Reading, in an attempt to 
compete in the New England trade, ran counter to the 
Morgan interests. This fact, in connection with the dis- 
trust aroused among investors, and the events leading to 
the panic of 1893, made it hard to get funds. 3 This com- 
bination of circumstances prevented the consummation of 
the deal. 

1 Report on the Alleged Coal Combination, 1893, 52d Congress, 2d Session, 
House Report no. 2278, p. 213. 

2 Report of Industrial Commission, 1902, vol. 19, p. 456. 

3 Ibid., vol. 19, p. 456. 



226 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

F. The Temple Iron Company Deal, 1898 

In 1898 the independent operators in the Wyoming or 
northern field became dissatisfied with freight rates and 
the conditions under which they were obliged to sell their 
coal. The percentage contracts which had formerly been 
made were expiring. This furnished a good opportunity 
to project the New York, Wyoming, and Western Rail- 
road. Chief among the independent operators of this re- 
gion was the firm of Simpson and Watkins, who owned 
eight collieries and produced over one million tons a year. 

The first step taken to break up the potential competi- 
tion of this project was the purchase of the capital stock 
($240,000) of the Temple Iron Company. This company 
was operating a small furnace near Reading, but its chief 
asset was the possession of a charter which permitted it 
to engage in almost any sort of business. 1 President Baer 
of the Reading, and the firm of J. P. Morgan & Co. di- 
rected the financial manipulation. The capital stock of the 
Temple Iron Company was increased to $ 2,500,000 and 
bonds aggregating $3,500,000 were issued. Simpson and 
Watkins agreed to sell out for 12,260,000 in stock and 
$3,500,000 in bonds of the Temple Iron Company. They 
then deposited their stock and $2,100,000 of the bonds 
with the Guaranty Trust Company of New York as trustee 
and received " $3,238,396.66 in money and $1,000,000 in 
certificates of beneficial interest in the stock of the Temple 
Iron Company." The stock thus deposited was taken by 
the various railroad companies " in proportions based on 
the percentage of the total anthracite tonnage carried an- 
nually," and the bonds were guaranteed by J. P. Morgan, 
William Rockefeller, the Guaranty Trust Company, and 
others. 2 

1 United States vs. Beading Co. et al, Supreme Court Reporter, vol. 33, 
no. 4, p. 95. 

2 Ibid., p. 96. 



IN THE ANTHRACITE FIELD 227 

If the projected railroad had gone through, the Erie, 
the Lehigh, and the Lackawanna would have been chiefly 
affected, yet the " community of interest " in maintaining 
the monopoly was sufficient to involve all the roads. 

G. The Purchase of the Pennsylvania Coal 
Company, 1899 

For several years the independent operators had main- 
tained an association called " The Anthracite Coal Oper- 
ators' Association," and through its instrumentality sought 
to improve their condition. They did not propose to meet 
defeat so easily, and in November, 1899, a project was 
started for a new railroad. The largest independent com- 
pany was the Pennsylvania Coal Company, which pro- 
duced about 2,000,000 tons and controlled a coal-gathering 
road of its own, the Erie and Wyoming Valley Railroad. 
The strongest support was expected from this company in 
making the newly projected Delaware Valley and King- 
ston Railroad a success. The firm of J. P. Morgan & Co. 
was sent out to "bag " the Pennsylvania Coal Company. 
This was no small task, for the company was capitalized 
at $5,000,000, had been paying sixteen per cent dividends, 
and had an accumulated surplus of twice its capitalized 
value. The agents of the banking house traversed the 
northeastern regions of Pennsylvania and paid the prices 
necessary to obtain the stock. It is said the average price 
per share was $552. 1 The purchase was made for the Erie 
Railroad, which received the coal property in return for 
$32,000,000 four per cent fifty-year collateral trust bonds, 
which were secured by the coal property and the assets 
of the New York, Susquehanna, and Western Railroad. 2 
With this purchase the hope of the independent opera- 
tors was lost. 

1 Beport of Industrial Commission, vol. 19, p. 459. 

2 Ibid., vol. 19, p. 459. 



228 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 
H. Railkoad Consolidation 

A. THE ERIE PURCHASES 

Since the policy of leasing railroads had proven a fail- 
ure, control was sought through purchase of a majority 
of the stock. In 1898 the Erie road gained control of the 
New York, Susquehanna, and Western Railroad in this 
manner, and by its purchase of the Pennsylvania Coal 
Company obtained the Erie and Wyoming Valley Rail- 
road and all rights in connection with the projected Dela- 
ware Valley and Kingston Railroad. 

B. THE READING OBTAINS THE JERSEY CENTRAL, 1901 

The Reading had too much at stake to be thwarted by 
its failure to lease the Jersey Central. Obtaining the con- 
trol of the Jersey Central's nineteen per cent of the total 
unmined area would give the Reading sixty-three per cent, 
and a close "community of interest" with the Lehigh 
Valley would bring it up to about eighty per cent. 1 Accord- 
ingly in 1901 the Reading, through J. P. Morgan & Co., 
obtained 145,000 shares out of a total 272,138 Jersey 
Central shares at $160, the highest price ever paid for 
the stock. 

From the time of the Temple Iron Company deal up 
to the recent decision of the Supreme Court, the control 
of the anthracite production and policy was in the hands 
of a few men who represented, the various companies. 
The decision simply abolished the Temple Iron Company 
as a holding company and canceled the sixty-five per 
cent contracts. As the situation now stands we may say in 
summary that the Reading owns the entire capital stock 
of the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad, the Reading 
Coal and Iron Company, and the majority stock control 
of the Jersey Central and its subsidiary coal and railroad 

1 33 Supreme Court Reporter, no. 4, p. 92. 



IN THE ANTHRACITE FIELD 229 

companies. The Lehigh Valley owns the Lehigh Valley 
Coal Company and is closely associated with the Reading. 
The Erie owns the Pennsylvania Coal Company and its rail- 
road, the Hillside Coal Company, the New York, Susque- 
hanna, and Western Railroad Company and its coal com- 
pany. The Pennsylvania Railroad operates through the 
agency of the Scran ton Coal Company and controls 6.24 
per cent of the un mined coal. The charter of the Delaware, 
Lackawanna, and Western Railroad has always permitted 
it to mine coal, and it controls 6.55 per cent of the unmined 
coal. This leaves but 3.71 per cent to be controlled by in- 
dependents. A " gentleman's agreement " will probably 
continue to control the industry. 

This survey enables us better to appreciate the magni- 
tude of the forces with which labor has had to contend 
in the anthracite field from 1875 to the present time. An 
understanding of these forces, combined with their ability 
to utilize immigration and to manipulate political and so- 
cial policies, will help us to grasp the problems still before 
us in the anthracite field. 

4. IMMIGRATION 

A. Its Impoetance 

Before we can understand why the sporadic attempts at 
unionism during the seventies and the eighties were not 
more successful, we must take into account the effect of 
immigration and the way it coordinated with the policy of 
concentrated capital. In connection with the description 
of the increase of immigration and its change in character 
the figures are carried up to 1910 in order to show the 
growing heterogeneity in the mining population and its 
influence in preventing solidarity among the workers. We 
can most profitably approach the subject of immigration 
as it affected the anthracite mining industry by a consider- 
ation of the influences which centered around " contract 



230 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

labor," the conditions which brought its prohibition, and 
the ineffectiveness of regulations to protect the American 
laborer. 

B. Contract Labor 

A. LEGAL BACKGROUND 

In 1864 Congress passed a law for the purpose of 
encouraging immigration. This bill emanated from the 
House committee on agriculture and was prompted by the 
need for agricultural workers. It served a worthy pur- 
pose as a war measure when labor was scarce and men 
were needed for the army. The laborer made a contract 
to repay his transportation expenses from his wages, and 
a commissioner of immigration made a contract with the 
railroads for his transportation. 1 It was thought neces- 
sary, however, to provide that no commissioner should 
hold office who was interested in land or in corporate 
enterprises. 

With the close of the war labor was supplied by the 
return of the soldiers, and the contract labor law was 
repealed in 1868. The remarkable industrial development 
during the seventies and eighties furnished sufficient in- 
centive to keep the stream of immigration flowing. By 
1885 the influx of immigrants was pressing with sufficient 
force on American labor to bring about the enactment of 
a law prohibiting contract labor. Moreover, the natural 
flow was considered sufficient without any artificial stimu- 
lation. The act was reinforced in 1887 and 1888, but, in 
1889, a report by a congressional committee for investi- 
gating the contract labor conditions informs us that the 
law was being evaded because of inadequate administra- 
tive equipment. The act of 1891 provided for a superin- 
tendent of immigration and inspection. But in 1893 the 
superintendent appealed to Congress to revise and make 
the law more explicit and comprehensive and to provide 

1 38th Congress, 1st Session, House Report no. 56 ; April, 1864. 



IN THE ANTHRACITE FIELD 231 

for additional means of enforcement. Similar appeals have 
been made from then on to the present. 

B. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION 

However, the commissioner was not long in discover- 
ing that other difficulties besides those of administration 
stood in the way of proper enforcement. In 1900, he says, 
" the rulings of the courts have greatly narrowed the use- 
fulness of these laws [alien contract labor] by limiting 
their application to certain classes of labor, and this well- 
nigh repealed their penal feature as applied to employers 
violating their provisions." 1 The court rulings had also 
made it necessary for the laborers to have escaped the 
vigilance of the officers and to have been landed before 
the employers were subjected to penalty. Furthermore, 
the terms " labor or service of any kind " were limited to 
" manual " labor. 2 Full court dockets, overworked district 
attorneys, and evasions of the law through technicalities 
are additional elements that have made the contract labor 
law a farce. 

C. AGENCIES ENCOURAGING EVASION 

The easy evasion of the law gave the agencies for en- 
couraging immigration full sway. The inspections made 
by the Bureau of Immigration have determined beyond a 
doubt the existence of unscrupulous agencies, encouraged 
by steamship companies, which make a business of ex- 
ploiting the ignorant immigrant and encouraging him to 
come here. Evidence shows that deported immigrants 
were deflected to other places instead of their native vil- 
lages in order not to hurt the business of the agencies. 
There is also plenty of evidence of wholesale shipment of 
contract labor which was thoroughly instructed in the 
proper answers to make to official questions. If they failed 

1 Beport of Commissioner-General of Immigration, 1900, p. 39. 

2 Ibid., 1901, p. 31. 



232 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

in their instructions the steamship companies did not, 
however, reject them. 1 Italy regards the United States as 
a safety valve for surplus population, and restrictions on 
immigration would cut off the prosperity of whole vil- 
lages which are supported by money sent from America. 
Though it is perfectly legitimate for the steamship com- 
panies to get business, the United States must be protected 
from " an energy that knows no rest and a singleness of 
purpose which considers no results except those of a finan- 
cial nature." 

C. Immigration from Southern Europe 

With such a legal situation, with the cooperation of 
such agencies as are described above, and with full com- 
mand of transportation facilities, the railroads had no dif- 
ficulty in getting all the cheap labor they wanted. The 
concrete figures of population in the anthracite counties 
tell the story. 



Immigrant 


Races in the Anthracite 


Region 2 






1870 


1880 


1890 


1900 


1910 


Total foreign-born 
Slav and Italian . . 
English-speaking . . 


108,000 

306 

105,000 


109,000 

1,925 

103,000 


171,000 

43,000 

124,000 


194,000 

89,000 
100,000 


267,000 

178,000 

82,000 



The Germans are included in the enumeration of the 
English-speaking foreign-born because their standard of 
living is on the same level and they are readily assimi- 
lated. From this table it is evident that up to 1880 the 
competition between the races for a chance to work had 
not begun. It was the chance to profit by this competition 
that gave the corporations a powerful weapon in addition 
to the strength of concentrated wealth. 

1 Report of Commissioner-General of Immigration, 1903, pp. 

2 Warne, The Immigrant Invasion, p. 161. 



IN THE ANTHRACITE FIELD 233 

Then, "again, the influx of Slavs and Italians became 
a constantly increasing factor during the nineties in pre- 
venting the growth of organization. Alongside this phe- 
nomenal growth up to 1910 there stands an element quite 
as striking — the decrease in English-speaking peoples. 
This points to two other considerations. Not only have 
the English-speaking stopped coming, but a considerable 
percentage have migrated. The full import of this is easily 
appreciated when we consider the effect of taking those 
with union ideals out of the industry altogether. Not only 
would it hinder the development of a common feeling, 
but the introduction of heterogeneous elements makes it 
just so much harder to hold the men to faithful support of 
an organization. That the influx of foreigners is still a 
powerful factor in preventing unity, and that it is so felt 
by the organization, is exemplified by the recent state- 
ment of the miners' president, — "There are thousands 
of men who seek our shores every year and are unloaded 
into these coal fields. I am now trying to enlist the serv- 
ices of the government to prevent the agents of coal com- 
panies meeting men at the ports of entry and rushing them 
into the coal fields. For what ? To defeat the aims and 
efforts of men who desire to better their conditions." * 
With the perspective of the importance of the consolida- 
tion of capital and of the influx of a heterogeneous popu- 
lation before our minds, we are in a position to appreciate 
the handicaps under which the union movement in the 
anthracite region labored during the eighties and nineties. 
That we do not find the same development here as took 
place in the bituminous field is to be expected, since we 
know these disruptive forces were growing constantly 
more powerful. We shall now turn to a consideration of 
the sporadic attempts at organization in the late seven- 
ties and eighties and see the effectiveness of concen- 
trated capital and immigration in overthrowing the most 

1 Speech before the Wilkesbarre Convention, May 16, 1912. 



234 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

promising attempt to build up a union during the strike 
of 1887-88. 



v 



5. THE LABOR TROUBLES OF 1887-88 
A. The Causes 



In 1877 the miners of the northern fields had engaged 
in a three months' strike, using the occasion of the great 
railroad strike of the same year as an opportune moment 
to express their grievances. They failed to gain any con- 
cessions, and no further serious disturbances took place 
until 1887. Although the sliding scale was still in opera- 
tion, the miners had no representation on the board which 
determined the average selling price and no way of know- 
ing whether the returns were true or false. Furthermore, 
the men pointed out that the increase in prices was ab- 
sorbed by the increased freight rates of the railroads. 
"When the rise in prices occurred, the freight rates were 
raised and the prices at the basis points held to the same 
level. 1 The miners claimed that though there had been no 
material change in the rate for mining, yet the increase 
in the size of the car, unfair "dockage" for stone or other 
waste in the coal, exorbitant charges for powder, fuses, 
etc., and abuses in connection with the company store had 
greatly decreased real wages. 

B. Rise of the Knights of Labor and the Miners 1 
and Laborers' Amalgamated Association 

As early as 1878 the Knights of Labor had gained 
15,000 adherents in the neighborhood of Scranton, 2 and 
the Miners' and Laborers' Amalgamated Association was 
organized the following year. The latter organization ac- 
quired considerable strength in the middle and southern 
fields. In 1885 the unions sought without avail to obtain a 

1 Report on Labor Troubles in the Anthracite Regions, 1887, op. eit., 
p. lxxxiii. 

2 Virtue, op. cit., p. 746. 



IN THE ANTHRACITE FIELD 235 

conference with the operators in order to revise the scale. 
The following year they were refused general recognition, 
but the frank statement of a committee to the Reading 
Company that they thought they were not getting the 
wages due them, considering the market price of coal, t 
brought an advance in wages. 1 Another attempt in 1887 
to gain a general conference in order to change the basis 
of the scale and give the miners representation on the 
board which determined average prices was met by a flat re- 
fusal from the Lehigh operators to consider these demands 
or to submit the matter to arbitration. 2 The Reading 
Company, however, met the miners' committee and prom- 
ised to grant an increase from September 1, 1887, to Jan- 
uary 1, 1888. At the latter date the Reading Company was 
to go out of the hands of the receivers, and the officials 
would not extend the agreement beyond the first of the 
year. During these years the unions (as in the bituminous 
field) were merely local organizations without even an ap- 
proximation at federation equal to the National Federation 
of Miners of 1885 in the bituminous regions. 

A. INAUGURATION OF THE STRIKE 

With the refusal on the part of the Lehigh operators 
to consider their demands or to arbitrate, a strike was de- 
clared (September 10) by the miners of that district, and 
10,000 men became idle. The Reading Company in its 
agreement with its employees had further stipulated that 
it could not pay higher wages after January 1, 1888, than 
the Lehigh operators were paying. The Reading miners 
assented to this proposition, but determined to do all they 
could to help the Lehigh miners win in order to bring up 
the general level of wages. To this end the miners con- 
tributed and the Reading railway employees were led to 

1 Virtue, op. cit:, p. 747. 

2 Report on Labor Troubles in the Anthracite Regions, 1887, op. cit., p. 
lxxxiii. 



236 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

vote a day's wages on the basis of loyalty to the Reading 
Company. The men were told by the company's officials 
that the strike in the Lehigh district would be of great 
benefit to the Reading Company because of the increased 
business it would bring in coal and traffic. 1 In fact, this 
result was attained. The company was able to profit by the 
rise in prices, and it was able to get out of the hands of 
the receivers. 

B. THE READING COMPANY FURNISHES THE LEHIGH 

OPERATORS WITH COAL 

On the other hand, it was not to the interest of the 
Reading Company to have the Lehigh strikers win the 
strike, raise wages, and strengthen the union. Nor could 
the company afford to enter into an extended war with 
the Lehigh. The men discovered that the Reading Com- 
pany was supplying coal to the Lehigh selling agencies 
and the records of shipments showed that a larger and 
larger percentage of coal was diverted to other points than 
Port Richmond, the Reading receiving point. 2 

C. EXTENSION OF THE STRIKE TO THE SCHUYLKILL 

REGION 

Ascertainment of these facts brought together a conven- 
tion of representative miners and railway men at Potts- 
ville, November 22, 1887, to discuss the situation. It decided 
that if the Reading Company was allowed to supply the 
Lehigh operators with coal, the Lehigh miners would be 
starved into submission in spite of the support rendered 
by the Reading employees. In the latter part of Decem- 
ber an attempt was made to force some Reading employees 
to load a coal boat of a Lehigh operator. The men refused, 
and were discharged. Shortly afterward several switching 

1 Report on Labor Troubles in the Anthracite Regions, 1887, op. cit., p. cii. 

2 Ibid., p. ciii. 



IN THE ANTHRACITE FIELD 237 

crews were discharged for refusing to move cars. This 
brought the railroad men out. The trouble was settled 
within two days by the union leaders and the order given 
to go to work. But the concessions made by the union of- 
ficers were interpreted as weakness by the railroad officials. 
The company had given an order that men who did not 
report for duty on December 27 would be discharged. 
Through the delay of telegrams ordering a return to work, 
over 6000 railroad men were discharged, and on January 
1, 1888, due to a failure to reach an agreement, 22,000 
Reading miners went out. 

D. FINDINGS OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE 

OF 1888 

The congressional committee appointed to investigate 
the trouble thought the evidence showed that the delayed 
telegrams were a part of a scheme to precipitate a strike. 
ttts reasons for so thinking were based on the following 
facts : The Eeading had mined its full quota of coal. The 
increased business had sometimes kept the men on duty 
eighty hours at a stretch. With the first of the year the 
demand for coal would fall off, traffic would decline, and 
a surplus of labor would exist. A strike would give the 
company an excuse for raising the price of coal and for 
getting rid of surplus men on the railroad and in the 
mines. Furthermore, the company was convinced that 
the union was growing altogether too strong and that the 
time had come to crush it. 1 The company was sure of a 
single force that would accomplish this task. When the 
superintendent of the road was asked why he was so sure 
the striking men would finally go to work at the com- 
pany's terms he replied, "Their necessities." Asked if 
he meant "starved out," he replied that the company did 
not propose to keep the men out till they starved, but 

1 Beport on Labor Troubles in the Anthracite Regions, 1887, op. cit., pp. 
■vii, cv. 



238 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 



reminded the committee that "it [was] a necessity for 
everybody who works that they get work." 

The committee found evidence that when the payment 
was made by the "wagon," there was great variation in 
size. Where payment was made by the " yard," it meant 
anywhere from thirty-five to forty-eight cubic feet. Among 
other abuses there were " dockage," company houses, com- 
pany stores, company butchers, and company doctors. The 
committee were exasperated at the unlimited authority 
given to corporations in the hiring and use of company 
police, and thought it questionable " whether the Shenan- 
doah ' riot ' was not intentionally provoked by the com- 
pany for the purpose of placing the strikers in the posi- 
tion of offenders, and of thus influencing public opinion 
in favor of the company. " 1 

The committee was convinced that the syndicate con- 
trolled, directly or indirectly, all the tidewater lines from 
the Schuylkill and Lehigh regions except the Pennsylva- 
nia Railroad. The evidence showed that competition in 
rates was eliminated ; that production was restricted and 
prices fixed ; that wages were arbitrarily fixed ; that the 
independent operators surrendered thirty-eight per cent 
of the price of coal for freight ; that Philadelphia coal 
was fifty cents a ton higher than the price at competitive 
points farther from the mines, and it was estimated that 
this amounted to an annual excess to Philadelphia on coal 
consumed of $1,495,000 ; " and that the Southern buyer 
[paid]_a greater freight rate than the New England 
buyer. A The committee concluded that " it [was] difficult 
to imagine how the common carrier could commit greater 
depredations upon national commerce, more flagrant vio- 
lations of the law, or greater abuses of individual and 
public rights." 2 

1 Beport on Labor Troubles in the Anthracite Regions, 1887, pp. cit., p. xciv. 

2 Ibid., p. lxii. 



IN THE ANTHRACITE FIELD 239 

E. THE SETTLEMENT OF THE STRIKE 

The operators refused all offers of arbitration that in- 
volved the recognition of the union, but the Reading met 
committees of their own employees. The miners remained 
out until March and then went to work at the terms 
offered by the companies. The union organizations were 
crushed, and those who looked into conditions recognized 
the part immigration was playing in the industrial situa- 
tion. 

F. EFFECTS OF IMMIGRATION ON THE STRIKE 

That such an absolute defeat should have been admin- 
istered and should have prevented an organization from 
rising for over a decade points to strongly opposing forces. 
Besides the conditions described above, the congressional 
committee of 1888 saw evidence of the force which was 
to accomplish this result and referred to it thus, " There 
is, as before mentioned, a superabundance of labor 
throughout the anthracite regions. Tramps are to be seen 
on every hand ; vagabond squads of Italians, Poles, and 
Huns . . . throng the mines to compete with Americans 
for work ; hence the wages of the miners tend downward 
all the time while the price of anthracite moves upward, 
or at least remains at the monopoly figure which the seven 
joint carrying and mining companies have been exacting 
for it of late years." 1 How large a factor this was in mak- 
ing the strike of 1887 unsuccessful is hard to tell, but 
there were 43,000 Slavs and Italians in the labor market 
of the region. They had a lower standard of living, were 
willing to work for less wages, and stood ready to sup- 
plant the unskilled and rapidly to acquire the places of 
the skilled men. Perhaps the enumeration of the Reading 
mine employees is as good a criterion as any. There we 

1 Beport on Labor Troubles in the Anthracite Regions, 1887, op. cit., 
p. viii. 



240 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

find 5839 Slavs and Italians out of a total 24,734 mine 
employees. 1 

6. THE STRIKE OF 1900 

From the time of the struggle in 1887-88 until 1900, 
we hear of no further attempts to unite for better work- 
ing conditions. In the mean time the momentum of the 
forces of concentrated wealth and immigration which had 
broken up unionism in the seventies and eighties was in- 
creasing. The natural evolution from local to national 
organization found no chance for expression because there 
was not enough local solidarity to build on. In fact the 
re*gime of individual bargaining which was in full sway 
was aggravated to such an extent by the introduction of 
an ever-increasing foreign element with different lan- 
guages, customs, and ideals, that even the common sym- 
pathy necessary to local organization was wantingi Not 
until adverse working conditions had forced the recogni- 
tion of a common lot and made the many nationalities 
receptive to the teachings of the United Mine Workers 
did there appear sufficient unity to warrant a struggle. 

A. The Wokk of the United Mine Workers 

When we consider the factors that have entered into 
the situation since 1875, the wonder is that anything ef- 
fective was accomplished in the strike of 1900. That suf- 
ficient homogeneity was attained to enable the men to 
stand together for any length of time points to a stronger 
influence than a common feeling attained as the result of 
social contact or through political or educational institu- 
tions. 

The United Mine Workers of the bituminous field had 
felt the effects of the anthracite coming into their mar- 
kets during their early struggles, and this, without doubt, 
was one impelling force which drove them to organize the 



V 1 

1 Warne, The Slav Invasion, p. 63. 



IN THE ANTHRACITE FIELD 241 

anthracite miners. During the early and middle nineties, 
however, their desultory efforts had brought only ninety- 
four locals into the fold. In 1899 the problem was at- 
tacked with greater vim. National organizers and mem- 
bers of the executive board were permanently stationed 
in the anthracite field, and the region was organized into 
three districts with the regular local officials to direct the 
work. In spite of this well-laid campaign only 8000 out 
of the 142,000 workers were brought into the organization 
before the strike. 1 

B. Disrupting Factors 

There were many factors which made greater results 
impossible. In the first place there were fourteen nation- 
alities with different languages and different standards 
of living, different customs, and different religions. The 
distrust and jealousies that accompany such factors were 
almost insurmountable. The living participants in past 
strikes sounded the warning of past failures. The fear of 
arousing the wrath of the employer and the relentless 
blacklist made the bravest hesitate, especially those who 
had family obligations and permanent domiciles. The 
ghost of surplus labor stalked near and brought distrust 
among fellow workmen even of the same nationality, for 
there is no force so disrupting as the dread of hunger and 
starvation. 

C. Economic Pressure 

That 142,000 men did respond when the strike order 
was given shows the pressure of adverse working con- 
ditions. This pressure was strong enough to overbalance 
the disruptive factors which would naturally make united 
action impossible in a heterogeneous population. In the 
middle and southern fields, where the sliding scale was in 
operation, out of 153 drawings 2 since January 1, 1888, 

1 Mitchell, The Independent, vol. 52, p. 2614. 2 See ante, p. 236. 



242 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

to establish wages, " 8 resulted in payment of basis wages, 
44 in advance upon that rate, and 101 in a reduction 
therefrom." 1 The miners, having no voice in making the 
scale, had lost all confidence in its working justice, and 
they demanded its abolition. The items in the miners' de- 
mands point to other pressing factors. An increase of twenty 
per cent was asked for those laborers receiving less than 
$1.50 per day; fifteen per cent for those receiving $1.50 
to $1.75 per day; and ten per cent for those receiving 
more than $1.75. Besides the necessity for this increase 
in money wages and adjustment to meet increased cost of 
living, there were other factors affecting real wages which 
needed attention. It was of considerable importance to 
them that 2240 pounds instead of 3360 pounds should be 
considered a ton. To see that this was brought about, it 
was necessary for them to employ a checkweighman who 
was also to see that the amount of " dockage " for impuri- 
ties was fair. 2 A reduction in the price of powder from 
$2.75 to $1.50 a keg was demanded. This would enable 
the operator to supply the men and obtain a proper return 
on his investment, since it only cost from 90 cents to $1 
per keg. The existence of the company store, deductions 
for the company doctor, 3 and compliance with the state 
law which required semimonthly payment in cash, all 
affected real wages. Here was the driving force which 
acted upon all nationalities. It only needed harnessing. 

D. Negotiations for Settlement 

In 1900 the miners of the northern field petitioned 
President Mitchell to call a strike. After conferring with 
leaders of the other districts he decided that the time was 

1 Virtue, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 9, p. 7. 

2 The miners were still suffering from the want of such regulations in 
the face of the fact that the state laws permitted them. 

8 One firm is quoted as making $16,000 profit a year through de- 
ductions for the company doctor. Mitchell, The Independent, vol. 52, 
p. 2614. 






IN THE ANTHRACITE FIELD 243 

not opportune. A convention of delegates from all three 
districts was called on August 13 which formulated the 
miners' grievances and invited the operators to meet them 
in joint conference on August 27. The operators paid no 
attention to this request, and the convention sought per- 
mission of the national executive board to strike if the 
leaders were not able to negotiate a settlement within ten 
days. From the time of the convention till September 12, 
every honorable means, including an offer to arbitrate, 
was used to effect a settlement. Pressure from political 
sources and the expressions of the press were without avail. 
The operators thought that not more than ten per cent of 
the men would respond to a strike order. On September 
17, the day the strike went into effect, 112,000 employees 
struck, and at the time of the settlement, October 29, 
140,000 men were idle. The operators refused to recog- 
nize the United Mine Workers as an organization, claim- 
ing that it was a bituminous organization whose officers 
were not acquainted with the anthracite industry and whose 
superior number should not be allowed to control the an- 
thracite policy. But President Mitchell pointed out to them 
that the anthracite members had become numerically 
stronger than the bituminous membership, and further 
offered to let the negotiations take place between the 
operators and committees of their own men, provided that 
they met in the same city, at the same time, so that 
general conditions could be established. 1 

E. Settlement of the Strike 

The operators did not take advantage of any such ar- 
rangement. They did not propose to recognize the union. 
(Notices were posted at all the most important collieries 
stating that an increase of ten per cent would be granted 



and powder would be reduced from $2.75 to $1.50 per 



1 United Mine Workers 1 Journal, September 27, 1900. Reprint of state- 
ment to the public. 



244 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

keg in the northern and middle fields. 1 Since 1,372,691 
kegs were used in 1899, this was rather an important con- 
cession. The sliding scale was abolished in the middle and 
southern districts, 2 but the other abuses that affected real 
wages remained. Since the state laws were ineffective, the 
concerted action of the union was necessary to bring about 
the abolition of the abuses. ) 

(/ 7. THE STRIKE OF 1902 

A. Preparation for Another Struggle 

The settlement of the strike of 1900 had left both par- 
ties with the feeling that a truce had been declared on the 
real issues. The operators, in anticipation of another strug- 
gle, began the erection of stockades, storage houses for 
coal, and washeries. They felt that the " union was nothing 
but a fighting machine to be fought, and the demands of 
the union nothing but an increase in wages and a reduction 
in dividends. . . . They understood the art of obtaining 
low wages, but they utterly failed to comprehend the new 
spirit which would resist oppression at no matter what 
cost in suffering and privations." 3 In some cases the 
companies who had a large number of non-union men who 
remained at work, blacklisted union men after the strike, 
and those who had few non-unionists discharged them. 
Agents in the employ of the companies circulated among 
the unionists and kept their employers informed. A cam- 
paign was on foot to bring the United Mine Workers to 
the same fate which the previous unions had met. 

In 1901, through the mediation of Senator Hanna, sev- 
eral of the railroad presidents, Mr. Mitchell, and the dis- 
trict presidents were brought together. In this conference 

1 Powder had been reduced to $1.50 by the Reading Company shortly 
after the congressional investigation of 1887-88. 

2 The sliding scale had never been used in the northern field. 
8 Mitchell, Organized Labor, p. 369. 



IN THE ANTHRACITE FIELD 245 

it was agreed that the settlement of 1900 should continue 
for another year, and the union leaders left the meeting 
hoping that another year would find the operators in a 
frame of mind to grant recognition to the union and nego- 
tiate with its leaders. 

B. Negotiations of 1902 

a. operators' attitude toward a joint 
conference 

In response to an invitation to take part in a joint con- 
ference at Scranton, March 12, the operators declined by 
formal letters. The burden of the replies centered around 
their unwillingness to do more than adjust grievances with 
committees of their own employees. They thought it im- 
practicable to form a wage scale for the whole anthracite 
region because of variability in working conditions and 
costs of mining. Furthermore they objected to having their 
relations with their employees disturbed every year for, so 
far as they were aware, their employees were " well satis- 
fied with their present rates of wages, their hours of work, 
and the general conditions under which they perform their 
work for us." x Neither could there be " two masters in the 
management of business," and the adjustment of wages 
and working conditions did " not call for the intervention 
of the organization which you, Mr. Mitchell, represent." 
These statements show how far the operators were from 
an understanding of the principles of conciliation and the 
place it has in industry. 

B. MEETINGS ARRANGED BY THE CIVIC FEDERATION 

From March 18 to 24 the miners held a convention at 
Shamokin, Pennsylvania, and formulated their demands. 
They asked for recognition of the union, an increase in 

1 Report of Anthracite Strike Commission, Bulletin of Bureau of Labor, 
no. 46, p. 219. 



246 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

wages, the weighing of coal, and a uniform scale, and 
they appealed to the National Civic Federation for its 
mediation. At a conference arranged by the Civic Federa- 
tion the operators stated their position in three proposi- 
tions. They promised not to discriminate against unionists, 
and insisted that union men should not refuse to work 
with non-unionists. There should be no deterioration in 
quality of work or restriction in quantity of product. 
Since varying conditions rendered uniformity impossible, 
each mine should " arrange either individually or through 
its committees with the superintendents or managers any 
questions affecting wages or grievances." 2 After discuss- 
ing at great length the general relations of labor and cap- 
ital, the conference adjourned for thirty days, and another 
meeting at the end of that time brought no further re- 
sults. A subcommittee consisting of the presidents of the 
Lehigh, Lackawanna, and Reading companies, the three 
anthracite district presidents, and Mr. Mitchell, debated 
the question further for two full days, but reached no 
settlement. 

C. THE FIRST OFFER TO ARBITRATE 

The union officials during these conferences, as a last 
resort, and to avert the suffering attendant upon a strike, 
had offered to reduce their demands to a ten per cent in- 
crease in wages and a nine-hour instead of an eight-hour 
day. But this was mistaken for weakness and cowardice, 
and " one of the railway presidents predicted that, come 
what might, the men would not strike, but would submit 
to any rebuff." 2 This idea was probably encouraged by 
the offer to arbitrate which was extended by the union 
officials. They offered to accept a board of five selected by 
the National Civic Federation to settle upon the questions 
in dispute, or to trust the fairness of their demands to a 

1 Beport of Anthracite Strike Commission, op. cit., p. 33. 

2 Mitchell, op. cit., p. 373. 



EST THE ANTHRACITE FIELD 247 

committee consisting of Archbishop Ireland, Bishop Potter, 
and the two to select a third. If the committee should de- 
cide " that the average annual wages received by anthra- 
cite mine workers are sufficient to enable them to live, 
maintain and educate their families in a manner conform- 
able to established American standards and consistent 
with American citizenship, we agree to withdraw our 
claims for higher wages and more equitable conditions of 
employment, providing that the anthracite mine operators 
agree to comply with any recommendations the above 
committee may make affecting the earnings and con- 
ditions of labor of their employees." 2 In reply most of 
the operators stated that they had posted notices promis- 
ing to continue to pay the wages granted in 1900, and one 
operator reminded the union leaders that "anthracite 
mining is a business, and not a religious, sentimental, or 
academic proposition." Furthermore, since the business 
management of the company was supposed to be in the 
hands of the president and directors, "I could not if 
I would delegate this business management to even so 
highly respectable a body as the Civic Federation, nor can 
I call to my aid as experts in the mixed problem of busi- 
ness and philanthropy the eminent prelates you have 
named." 2 

D. ORDER FOR TEMPORARY SUSPENSION 

When the union officers saw that peaceful overtures 
had failed, an order for a temporary suspension was issued 
to take effect on May 12. A convention was called for 
May 15, and at that meeting the delegates voted to con- 
tinue the suspension in spite of the advice of their presi- 
dent to wait till autumn, which would save the miners 
and the public from the hardships of a protracted conflict. 3 

1 Report of Anthracite Strike Commission, op. cit., p. 34. 2 Ibid., p. 35. 
3 Mitchell, op. cit., p. 373. He " was even in hopes that hy that time the 
operators would see the folly of their course and make concessions." 



248 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

In obedience to the strike order 147,000 employees ceased 
work. The engineers, firemen, and pumpmen who keep the 
mines in working order were not called out. But by June 
2, they had not been able to get any modification of their 
wages or long working day 1 and they were called out at 
their own request. 

Efforts at mediation were continued by the Civic Fed- 
eration, and in June, with the rise in prices and the com- 
plaints of the public, Carroll D. Wright, Commissioner 
of Labor, was delegated by President Roosevelt to inquire 
into the situation. His report justified the demands of the 
men in part, but no action was taken, nor was it made 
public until much later. 

C. The Special Bituminous Convention 

The anthracite miners had expected help from the bitu- 
minous field, and as the strike held on into July a consider- 
able demand for a sympathetic strike was heard. With a 
request from five districts, President Mitchell was obliged 
to call a national convention, and in response to the call 
a special convention assembled at Indianapolis July 17 to 
consider the anthracite situation. With the increasing dis- 
tress in the anthracite field and the knowledge that a gen- 
eral coal strike would deprive the railroads of fuel and 
soon bring them to terms, the union officials had no small 
task on their hands to thwart the movement for a sympa- 
thetic strike. The wiser and stronger officials saw in the 
contractual system that they had been building up in the 
bituminous field something which should not be thrown 
aside lightly. They had just made a contract which ex- 
tended till April, 1903, and both operators and miners 
had preached the inviolability of contracts to their follow- 
ers. Over against this the argument of self-preservation 
was placed, and its adherents predicted the destruction of 
the organization in the bituminous field if failure was met 
1 Twelve hours and on alternate Sundays twenty-four hours. 



IN THE ANTHRACITE FIELD 249 

with in the anthracite regions. President Mitchell in his 
address to the convention answered this argument by re- 
minding his followers that " a disregard of the sacredness 
of contracts strikes at the very vitals of organized labor. 
The effect of such action would be to destroy confidence, to 
array in open hostility to our cause all forces of society, 
and to crystallize public sentiment in opposition to our 
movement." 1 

Instead of entering upon a questionable policy, the 
miners decided to do the practical thing. From an au- 
thorized appropriation out of the national treasury and 
gifts from state organizations, $110,000 was put into the 
hands of the anthracite district presidents for immediate 
relief work. The districts, subdistricts, and locals were 
asked for donations from their treasuries. An assessment 
of ten per cent of the gross earnings of all members who 
were working and twenty-five per cent of the officers' sal- 
aries was levied. Local committees were appointed to aid 
the anthracite men to get work and solicit local contribu- 
tions. An address was issued to the public setting forth 
the inviolability of contracts, appealing for aid, and re- 
minding the people of the power of public opinion. " No 
class of men realizes more than we do the great power of 
public opinion. Its influence is potent for good or evil in 
accordance with the manner in which it is used. No right 
can be secured and maintained without its support, and 
no wrong can long exist that meets with its concentrated 
opposition." 

D. Misunderstanding and Discontent 

Through an overestimate by the newspapers of the 
amount of money that would be contributed by the vote 
of the convention and the time of its payment, a basis was 
laid for discontent and brought about a very critical situ- 
ation in the month of August. The miners received their 

1 Minutes of Special Convention to consider the Anthracite Strike, p. 39. 



250 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

pay semimonthly and the money earned in the last half of 
July would not be paid until August 15. These circum- 
stances led the anthracite miners to believe they would get 
more than they did per week, made the public slow in 
contributing, and gave the agents of the operators a chance 
to sow discontent by intimating that the money was with- 
held. 1 Mr. Mitchell has expressed the opinion that the 
strike would have collapsed at that time if the operators 
had opened the mines. But explanation of the circum- 
stances from the officials, accompanied by advice to main- 
tain the peace, held the men in line till the contributions 
began to come in. 

E. Conference called by President Roosevelt 

As the strike held on through September, and the suf- 
fering of the poor through the rise of prices became more 
apparent, every influence was brought to bear to effect a 
settlement. The operators maintained that they had noth- 
ing to arbitrate and that they were prevented from con- 
ducting their business by the terrorism and violence of 
the miners. No effort seemed to be effective until Presi- 
dent Roosevelt invited both parties to a conference at the 
White House on October 3. The President placed before 
the miners and operators a statement that a third party, 
the public, was deeply concerned with the situation. He 
disclaimed legal right to call them together, but appealed 
to their patriotism and their sense of responsibility to the 
public. This was met on the part of the miners by an 
offer to submit their claims to a tribunal named by the 
President and abide by the award even if it went against 
them. 

The operators reiterated their claim that the violence 

and terrorism practiced by the miners made it impossible 

to mine coal. They reminded the President that "the 

constitution of Pennsylvania guarantees protection to life 

1 Mitchell, op. cit. y p. 380. 



IN THE ANTHRACITE FIELD 251 

and property. In express terms it declares the right of 
acquiring, possessing, and defending property to be in- 
alienable." Furthermore, it was the duty of the President 
" to reestablish the reign of law " and " to suppress do- 
mestic violence. You see there is a lawful way to secure 
coal for the public. The duty of the hour is not to waste 
time negotiating with the fomenters of this anarchy and 
insolent defiance of law, but to do as was done in the war 
of the rebellion, restore the majesty of law, the only guard- 
ian of a free people, and to reestablish order and peace at 
any cost." 1 Furthermore, the civil branch of the United 
States Government should " institute proceedings against 
the illegal organization known as the United Mine Work- 
ers' Association," and prosecute it under the Sherman 
Anti-Trust Law. 2 

F. The Pkesident appoints a Commission 

The attitude of the operators called forth a storm of 
indignation which they had not foreseen. It was further 
encouraged by the fact that a few days after the confer- 
ence the miners assembled in mass meeting to vote on the 
question of returning to work, and although the Governor 
of Pennsylvania had thrown 10,000 soldiers into the an- 
thracite region to make it possible for those who wished 
to return to work to do so, 150,000 voted to continue the 
strike until their demands were considered. 3 

On October 6, President Roosevelt, through the Hon^ 
orable C. D. Wright, asked Mr. Mitchell to induce the men 
to return to work, promising that a commission should be 
appointed to investigate conditions and that every influ- 
ence should be brought to induce the operators to accept 
its findings. 4 Mr. Mitchell concluded that this course 

1 Report of Conference between the President, the Anthracite Operators, and 
the Representatives of the United Mine Workers, p. 6. Reprint of written 
statements. 

2 Ibid., pp. 11, 15. 

3 Mitchell, op. cit. t p. 389. * jj^. 



252 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

would be inadvisable, since the operators had not promised 
to accept the findings and the President had no legal 
authority to enforce them. 

Meanwhile efforts were made to bring the operators to 
terms. Mr. Root, Secretary of War, was sent to inter- 
view Mr. J. P. Morgan, and as a result of this interview 
Mr. Morgan called on the President on October 13 and 
\ submitted the following proposition. The President should 
appoint a commission of five to be composed of an officer 
of the United States Engineering Corps, an expert min- 
ing engineer, one of the judges of the United States 
Courts for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, a sociol- 
ogist, and a man who had engaged in mining and selling 
coal. As soon as the commission was appointed the men 
were to return to work pending the award. This proved 
acceptable to the miners except that they insisted that 
labor be recognized and asked to have the number on the 
commission increased to seven. This would afford an op- 
portunity to give labor recognition and appoint a Catholic 
prelate as a member. The addition of the latter would in- 
crease the confidence of the men (most of whom were 
Catholics) in the award. With these preliminaries agreed 
on, the proposition was submitted to the miners' conven- 
tion, and ratified, and the men reported for work Octo- 
ber 23. 

G. The Award of the Commission 
After an extended investigation of actual working con- 
ditions and examination of 558 witnesses the commission 
rendered the following award. 

The contract miners were granted a ten per cent in- 
crease in the rates for " cutting coal, yardage, and other 
work for which standard rates or allowances existed." 
The men had asked for a twenty per cent increase. Cor- 
responding to this the union had asked for a decrease 
from ten to eight working hours, which would be equiva- 



IN THE ANTHRACITE FIELD 253 

lent to a twenty per cent increase to men employed by the 
day. In response to this request the day men were given 
a nine-hour day with the same pay, which was equivalent 
to ten per cent increase. 

The commission found that the state laws providing for 
payment by weight had been ineffective, and it declined 
to impose this method of payment or to fix a uniform 
number of pounds to the ton. In some mines payment 
was made by the yard and in others by the wagon or car. 
Payment by weight was to be effective only by mutual 
agreement. But in examining the statistics from certain 
mines the commission discovered that the presence of 
checkweighmen and check docking bosses had saved the 
miners fifty per cent in dockage. 1 Accordingly it awarded 
contract miners the right to elect and pay checkweighmen 
and check docking bosses to look after their interests. 

The commission recommended that the distribution of 
cars be equitable, and that discrimination, lawlessness, 
boycotting, and blacklisting be done away with. It de- 
cided that payment to contract miners' helpers should be 
directed to the helper and not through the miner. Fixing 
the wages paid under the award as a minimum, the com- 
mission reestablished the sliding scale. The basis price of 
coal was fixed at $4.50 at tidewater. When the average 
price increased five cents above this basis, the employees 
were to get an increase of one per cent in wages, and so 
on with every increase of five cents. The average prices 
were to be computed by an accountant who was to be 
named and have his compensation fixed by one of the cir- 
cuit judges of the Third Judicial Circuit. His salary was 
to be apportioned among the operators in proportion to 
their tonnage. 

The operators refused from the beginning of the inves- 
tigation to recognize the United Mine Workers as an 
organization, and insisted that Mr. Mitchell appeared as a 

1 Report of Anthracite Strike Commission, op. cit, p. 69. 



254 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

representative of their employees and not in his official 
capacity. The operators claimed that they objected to the 
miners' organization chiefly because the majority of the 
members of the union were employed in the bituminous 
field which they considered a rival industry. They be- 
lieved that it was to the interest of the bituminous oper- 
ators and miners alike to encourage strife in the anthra- 
cite field. To this Mr. Mitchell responded : — 

That this objection is neither valid nor consistent is clearly 
demonstrated by the fact that many of the railroads officered 
by the same men who control the anthracite coal mines enter into 
agreements with railroad organizations, a majority of whose 
members are employed upon other and competing roads. It 
would be as logical to refuse recognition of the brotherhoods of 
locomotive engineers, firemen, conductors, or brakemen because 
a majority of the membership of these organizations is not em- 
ployed directly by the anthracite-carrying railroads as it is to 
refuse to make an agreement with the United Mine Workers of 
America because a part of the membership is employed in the 
bituminous fields. 1 

The operators objected to boys over sixteen years of 
age being allowed one half of a vote, and the commission 
agreed that this was " unwise and impolitic." Further, 
the commission thought that strikes should be declared 
only by a two-thirds vote. 

In spite of these objections the commission felt called 
upon to include in its award some method of peaceful 
adjustment of disputes. Accordingly it created an arbi- 
tration board of six members, to settle disputes that could 
not be adjusted by mine officials " and the miner or min- 
ers directly interested." Three of the board were to be 
appointed by the operators and three by the employees. 
An award made by a majority vote was to be final. In 
case the board could not agree, the disputed questions were 

1 United Mine Workers' Journal, November 20, 1902. Reprint of open- 
ing address to the commission. 



IN THE ANTHRACITE FIELD 255 

to be referred to an arbiter who should be selected by one 
of the circuit judges of the Third Judicial Circuit of the 
United States. The membership of the board was at all 
times to be kept complete and there was to be no suspen- 
sion of work pending a decision. The award of the com- 
mission continued in force until March 31, 1906. 

8. ADJUSTMENTS SINCE 1902 

A. Formation of the Conciliation and 
Arbitration Board 

Hardly had the men returned to their work when there 
arose plenty of cases which needed the attention of the 
board. Discrimination, blacklisting, refusal to make de- 
ductions from wages to pay checkweighmen and docking 
bosses, the reckoning of increase of wages on the basis of 
gross or net earnings, were all fruitful sources of dispute. 
Shortly after the award was rendered, a dispute arose 
among the Eeading employees over the interpretation of 
the statement regarding hours. A strike involving 30,000 
men demanded immediate attention. President Mitchell 
ordered the men back to work to await the decision of the 
board. This trouble occurred the latter part of April, but 
the board was not ready for work until June 25 because 
of the refusal of the operators' representatives to meet the 
representatives of the miners till they had been duly 
appointed by a convention. The three district presidents 
of the United Mine Workers had been appointed as a 
matter of course, but recognizing them without the sanc- 
tion of a convention looked too much like recognizing the 
union. The miners pertinently reminded the operators' 
representatives that they had not been appointed by the 
stockholders. In the mean time feeling ran high and the 
leaders had difficulty in keeping the men from another 
strike. 1 

1 Mitchell, op. cit., p. 396. 



256 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 



A. RULES OF THE BOARD 

These circumstances did not give the board a very pro- 
pitious inauguration, but the board proceeded at once to 
the formation of a set of rules to govern the consideration 
of cases. If a dispute arose, the person or persons " di- 
rectly interested or a committee of the same" were to at- 
tempt to settle matters with the mine officials. In case of 
failure to agree or to get an interview, the causes of the 
dispute were to be put in writing and referred to the 
members of the conciliation board from that district. The 
board members were then to try to settle the trouble or 
obtain an interview for the workers. If there was a fail- 
ure to reach an adjustment, the board was then to require 
a statement from the employer or summon him to appear 
in person. Complaints by the employers regarding em- 
ployees were to follow the same course. Furthermore, the 
board was to consider no case unless work was continued 
while awaiting a decision. 1 This latter rule was supple- 
mented by making the decision retroactive, i.e., the award 
went into effect from the time the complaint was made 
and not from the time of the board's decision. 

B. The Cases before the Board 

From 1903 to 1912 two hundred cases were brought 
before the board for action. One hundred and fifty arose 
in the first three years of the board's existence, twenty- 
three in the years 1906-09, and twenty-nine from 1909 
to 1912. Two cases were still before the board in the 
early part of 1912 when Mr. Shelby M. Harrison made 
an extended investigation of the cases that had come be- 
fore the board. 2 Out of a classification of 193 cases it was 
found that 181 had been brought by the workers against 

1 United Mine Workers' Journal, July 2, 1903. Reprint of the rules. 

2 Harrison, The Survey, April 20 ? 1912. These figures are taken from 
his report. 



IN THE ANTHRACITE FIELD 257 

the employers. Of these " 15 were sustained, 34 were not 
sustained, 32 were settled by mutual agreement, 32 were 
partly sustained, 53 were withdrawn, 9 were held to be 
beyond the board's jurisdiction, 4 resulted in a tie vote 
with no further action, and 2 [were] still pending. Of 
the 11 grievances brought by the employers 2 were sus- 
tained, 2 were settled, 6 withdrawn, and 1 was decided to 
be beyond the board's jurisdiction." In these figures the 
comparatively large number of cases that were withdrawn 
or settled by mutual agreement is worthy of note. More- 
over, "it is reliably estimated that from two to three 
times as many cases have been settled by the district 
members of the board as have formally come before the 
whole body." The board could not agree on 25 cases and 
they were submitted to an umpire. 

C. Attitude of Both Pakties toward the Board 

A. THE OPERATORS' POSITION 

From the attitude taken by the operators in 1902 toward 
conciliation and arbitration we are justified in inferring that 
they did not look upon the project with any great favor. 
Strangely enough they are now strongly for the board, 
and they have resisted every effort made by the miners 
to supplement the activities of the board by arrangements 
which the miners feel will facilitate the work of the board 
and come nearer to rendering justice. The operators have 
found that the system they now have tends to prevent in- 
terruptions of work, brings the men back to work when 
a local strike occurs, and protects them from extravagant 
and impossible demands. The services of the union lead- 
ers have been very welcome in settling disputes in in- 
stances where the men were unorganized and in cases 
where a spontaneous strike has occurred in protest against 
abuses. A service of this kind was rendered in August, 
1911, when 13,000 employees of the Pennsylvania Coal 



258 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

Company (mostly Italians) went on a strike. It is said that 
the Industrial Workers of the World stirred the men to 
action, but the union leaders went among them, held meet- 
ings, and explained to them the necessity of formulating 
their demands before they could get them before the arbi- 
tration board. Out of the sixty grievances formulated all 
but two were settled by the district representatives of the 
board. 1 Among these 13,000 there were not 100 union 
men, yet it is said there is some restlessness among the 
operators because " the unions do not in all cases hold the 
men in line, pending the settlement of grievances, but this 
is doubtless regarded as a lesser evil than a super-power- 
ful union." 2 The mine officials recognize that a settlement 
of disputes must be on a broader basis than in the days 
of purely individual bargaining. Some of them take pride 
in not having any grievances before the board, and others 
are learning that it hurts their standing with corporation 
officials if they have to be called before the board often 
to answer complaints of their men. In answer to the min- 
ers' demands in 1912 that " a more convenient and uni- 
form system of adjusting local grievances within a reason- 
able time limit " be granted, the operators replied that 
" of all the arrangements effected by the Strike Commis- 
sion, none has worked out better results than the concilia- 
tion board." 3 They maintained further that it furnished 
a means of "prompt and free adjustment"; that its deci- 
sions were rendered more promptly than those of civil 
courts and were retroactive ; and that the cases coming 
before it had steadily diminished from 107 cases in 1907 
to 5 in 1911. 



B. THE MINERS' POSITION 



In reply to this praise of the board the miners declared 
flatly that as a method of adjusting grievances it was very 
unsatisfactory. 

1 Harrison, op. cit.,-p. 145. 2 Ibid., p. 145. 

8 Negotiations of Anthracite Operators and Anthracite Miners, 1912, p. 5. 



IN THE ANTHRACITE FIELD 259 

You lay stress upon the fact that the number of complaints 
submitted to the board has steadily diminished. . . . Instead 
of this proving its value, it strikingly illustrates its failure as 
a practical working method for the adjustment of disputes. In 
1903 the miners hoped it would prove to be of real value, so 
they submitted thereto their grievances. They soon discovered 
that they were wrong. The red tape and technicalities incident 
to the handling and consideration of disputes make it impracti- 
cal. This accounts for the decrease. The number of grievances 
among the men have increased rather than decreased, but they 
suffer under these wrongs rather than submit them to the board. 
It is not a working arrangement ; it exists in name only. 

There are several circumstances which should be con- 
sidered in connection with this strong position which the 
miners have taken. Upon the miners' organization rests 
the responsibility for keeping strikes in check and yet 
their organization receives no recognition by the opera- 
tors. The employers treat with men who are known sim- 
ply as representatives of the employees of the anthracite 
region. Moreover, the whole plan of conciliation and arbi- 
tration is predicated upon effective organization which will 
enable the enforcement of agreements. The union bears 
one half of the expense of the board, although only 29,225 
out of 170,000 employees were paid-up members of the or- 
ganization in 1912. The great mass of the workers appre- 
ciate the benefits of organization when a new agreement is 
to be negotiated and they lay off to a man. But the spirit 
of tax-dodging exists here as elsewhere, and it is only by 
the introduction of proper administrative machinery that 
taxes can be collected and agreements and contracts en- 
forced after they are made. The non-union man gets the 
benefit of general betterment of conditions without con- 
tributing anything to maintain them. 

Again, the individual worker is at a disadvantage in 
dealing with the mine officials. The board up to 1912 
received complaints only from " interested " persons, and 



260 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

without a pit committee backed by the entire organization 
the worker is on the basis of individual bargaining when 
it comes to performing the various classes of work which 
the changing conditions in the mines are constantly requir- 
ing. In such cases he must accept whatever the official 
imposes upon him or quit, and his financial condition is 
generally too precarious to warrant his surrendering his 
job lightly. These conditions were further supplemented 
by the absolute right of discharge which was rendered in 
a decision of Arbiter Wright, and this right was easily 
used to root out the men who dared to express their griev- 
ances. The organizers or board members could not go to 
a mine to protect a union man from retaliation, and the 
whole situation militated against organized labor and made 
membership a very questionable proposition to the average 
worker. 

Also the miners were not satisfied with the powers dele- 
gated to the board for dealing with vital questions, nor the 
scope over which it might extend those powers. In the 
first place, the award of the commission has been set up 
as a sort of constitution which will bear interpretation but 
not radical revision. For example, in the matter of wages 
they are still founded on custom and the reported wage 
schedules of the operators to the commission. The com- 
mission did not attempt to formulate a wage schedule clas- 
sified on the basis of varying conditions and the nature 
of the work done, but contented itself merely by add- 
ing on ten per cent to the existing schedules. Cases have 
arisen where the employers claimed that they were not 
parties in the disputes submitted to the commission and 
did not promise to abide by the award. The board decided 
that disputes with such parties had no standing before the 
board. 

Again, Mr. Wright as umpire said that "the anthracite 
commission did not undertake to deal with the character 
of the work performed, this being left to adjustment in 



IN THE ANTHRACITE FIELD 261 

each colliery in accordance with the prevailing conditions." 
Where satisfactory adjustments have not been made in 
the collieries, the complainants have carried their griev- 
ances to the board only to find that the board claimed to 
have no jurisdiction. These are some of the conditions 
which prompted the miners to call the board an ineffective 
instrument in dealing with the real problems of concilia- 
tion and in keeping pace with changing conditions. 

9. THE NEGOTIATIONS OF 1912 
A. Preliminary Negotiations in 1906 and 1909 



In 1906 the miners signed an agreement to continue \ 
under the award of 1903, with the feeling that, if they j 
had accomplished nothing more, they had at least got the 
operators to do a little negotiating. The miners hoped that 
by 1909 the operators would be ready to meet them frankly 
in joint conference and discuss the real conditions of the 
industry. But again, in 1909, they got no further than 
signing an agreement to work under the award of 1903 
till 1912, and adding a few clauses providing that pay- 
ment for new work should not be less than the rates paid 
under the award; that the arrangements and decisions of 
the conciliation board permitting of dues on company 
property should continue ; and that an employee dis- 
charged for being a unionist should have the right of 
appeal to the board for final adjustment. 1 

B. The Miners' Demands 

On November 3, 1911, the Tri-District Convention of 
the anthracite miners met and formulated the following 
demands. The most important was the demand for recog- 
nition of the United Mine Workers as a party in nego- 
tiating a wage contract for one year, with the right to 
provide a suitable method for collecting revenue for the 

1 Report of Secretary of Internal Affairs of Pennsylvania, 1909, p. 277. 



262 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

organization. An advance of twenty per cent in wages, an 
eight-hour working day, and a better system of adjusting 
local grievances were next in importance. It was further 
demanded " that the rights of checkweighmen and check- 
docking bosses shall be recognized ; that they shall not be 
interfered with in the proper performance of their work ; 
that all coal shall be mined and paid for by the ton of 
2240 pounds wherever practicable " ; and that the system 
of allowing contract miners to have more than one work- 
ing place and employing more than two laborers should 
be abolished. 



C. The Joint Conference 

A. THE OPERATORS' REPLY 

These demands were presented to the operators Febru- 
ary 27, at a joint conference which was adjourned till 
March 13, 1912, to give the operators a chance to consider 
them. On the latter date the conference met and the oper- 
ators presented a written statement in reply to the de- 
mands. Harking back to the award of the commission, 
they reminded the miners that " the award they rendered 
stands recognized as the most just and sound solution of 
labor difficulties ever secured in the country. ... It should 
be conclusive as to all facts and issues which it covered 
and these have not since been changed." All the old argu- 
ments against recognition of the union were advanced, and 
the operators concluded that the demand for " check-off " 
for collecting dues would lead to the " closed shop." They 
also called to mind that it would be impossible to grant 
this because there was a state statute requiring that the 
full amount of wages be paid in cash. 1 In response to the 
request to establish equal opportunity among contract 
miners they refused " to limit the ability and ambition of 
industrious men by arbitrarily agreeing to restrict their 
1 This law had been aimed at the company store. 



IN THE ANTHRACITE FIELD 263 

opportunities to earn increased remuneration." Further- 
more, they disclaimed any interference with checkweigh- 
men and check-docking bosses. For them to grant the 
eight-hour day would be seriously to curtail production, 
and to concede an advance of twenty per cent was not to 
be thought of because, by the ten per cent advances of 
1900 and 1902 and the 4.6 per cent increase as the result 
of the sliding scale, the miners had received a total ad- 
vance of 24.6 per cent. Since the sliding scale went into 
effect the miners had received a total bonus of $30,000,000. 
If the twenty per cent increase were granted, it would 
mean an increase in wages of $ 28,000,000, annually, which 
would have to be borne by the domestic sizes of coal and 
would increase the price of coal sixty-seven cents per ton. 
The estimate was " based upon the cost sheets of a num- 
ber of collieries in all three regions." Furthermore, coal 
was being produced at an increasing cost, and since the 
cost of fuel was " such an important element" to individ- 
ual and industrial consumers it would not be fair to ad- 
vance the cost of mining and thus advance the price of 
coal. The operators hoped that the prosperity which had 
so long obtained in the industry would not " be arbitrarily 
and unnecessarily disturbed." If it were, the responsibility 
would be with the miners. 1 

B. THE MINERS' REBUTTAL 

After the statement of the operators was read the 
miners were informed that it was final, and the confer- 
ence adjourned for two days, when the miners made the 
following reply. They regretted the " positive position " 
the operators had taken and had hoped that they would 
recognize the change in conditions that had taken place 
since the commission made its award. Further, the com- 
mission had not intended that the award should " con- 
tinue in effect for all time." Also, the increased cost of 

1 Negotiations of Anthracite Operators and Anthracite Miners, 1912, p. 9. 



264 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

living had reduced the purchasing power of wages, and 
in the matter of working hours there was no reason why 
the anthracite miner should have to work longer hours 
than the bituminous miner. Unless the union were recog- 
nized, they were thoroughly convinced that they could not 
" protect their interests " under the terms of any con- 
tract. They thought their demands were worthy of the 
most serious consideration, and felt that the answer to 
them should have " at least permitted the fullest and 
freest discussion." They had renewed the award twice in 
nine years and had complied with its provisions, and felt 
that " as public-spirited citizens " they had done their 
full duty. Since the operators had enjoyed "unprec- 
edented prosperity" during this time, a "discriminating 
public" would be able to place the responsibility for the 
failure to reach an agreement in the light of the present 
conditions. 1 

This reply seems rather tame, but the miners felt that 
it was useless " to submit their testimony to a jury that 
had already rendered a verdict." With the adjournment 
of the conference both parties issued statements to the 
public in order to win support if trouble arose. An auto- 
matic suspension of work took place April 1 with the 
expiration of the contract, and approximately 170,000 
employees ceased work. The miners requested another 
meeting, and the conference met in Philadelphia, April 
10. At this meeting the miners were most aggressive in 
their statements. In regard to the finality of the com- 
mission's award, the miners frankly stated that there 
could be no genuine and lasting peace until the operators 
recognized the miners' organization and entered into a 
direct joint agreement. Following this came their flat 
statement regarding the conciliation board quoted on 
page 259. They then analyzed the $30,000,000 bonus paid 

1 Negotiations of Anthracite Operators and Anthracite Miners^ 1912, 
p. 11. 



IN THE ANTHRACITE FIELD 265 

in the nine years, and showed that it averaged but $17.60 
per year for each employee. At the same time the miners 
were getting this munificent sum, the operators were get- 
ting prices that ranged as high as forty cents per ton 
above the basis price of $4.50. They felt justified in con- 
cluding that the operators were making a good profit at 
$4.50, at which point the miners got nothing. Added to 
this was the increased profit that had come whenever any 
of the 600,000,000 tons (mined during the nine years) 
had sold above the basis price. The operators offered to 
submit the issues to the strike commission, but the miners 
wanted " no more of the Anthracite Strike Commission 
or its award." The demands were then submitted to a 
joint subcommittee of four members on each side. 

C. THE AGREEMENT 

This subcommittee continued its sessions until April 24 
and brought forth the following agreement : The agree- 
ment was to extend four years, ending March 31, 1916. 
This will bring the contracts to an end simultaneously in 
the bituminous and anthracite fields. Contract rates and 
wage scales for all employees were increased ten per cent, 
and the sliding scale was abolished. It was agreed that 
there should be an equitable division of mine cars, and 
contract miners should elect check weighmen and check- 
docking bosses in formal meeting. The mine foreman 
should be informed of the results of that election. At 
each mine should be a grievance committee of not more 
than three persons. This committee, it was agreed, should 
settle grievances with the mine officials and it should be 
allowed the services of the district member of the board 
of conciliation " elected by the Mine Workers' Associa- 
tion." In case of failure to agree, the dispute should go 
before the miners' and operators' district representatives 
of the conciliation board. If they failed to agree, the case , 
should go before the board. As an aid in carrying into 



266 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

effect the ten per cent increase and " facilitating the ad- 
justment of grievances, company officials at each mine 
shall meet with the grievance committee of employees and 
prepare a statement setting forth the rates of compensa- 
tion paid for each item of work April 1, 1902, together 
with the rates paid under the provisions of the agreement, 
and certify the same to the Board of Conciliation within 
sixty days after the date of this agreement." 1 

The miners are well pleased with the new features for 
settling disputes, but they regard the system as incomplete 
until the organization is recognized and they are per- 
mitted to use the " check-off." On the other hand, the 
operators look upon the check-off as preliminary to the 
" closed shop," a huge fund in the union treasury, and 
future encroachments. They are afraid of the ignorant, 
heterogeneous masses and the great danger to the trade 
if " ' this heterogeneous mass were to secure a strength 
that would come with a larger membership and treasury/ 
On this point the answer of the mine workers' leaders is 
clearly put : that conservatism comes with strength ; that 
experience in organization is the surest safeguard against 
sporadic action on the part of massed men ; and that the 
insurrection of the 12,000 employees of the Pennsylvania 
Company . . . was provoked by the speakers of an out- 
side organization which stands for neither collective bar- 
gaining nor time agreements — the Industrial Workers of 
the World." 2 However, the new features will encourage 
the growth of the union because the men will be made to 
feel that the organization is able to do effective work in 
other ways than merely the making of an agreement. The 
miners also felt that they had made a good bargain in abol- 
ishing the sliding scale and obtaining a flat increase of 10 
per cent. Under the sliding scale the highest increase had 

1 Negotiations of the Anthracite Operators and Anthracite Miners, 1912, 
p. 29. 

2 Harrison, op. cit., p. 150. 



IN THE ANTHRACITE FIELD 



267 



been 8 per cent and the average was 4.17 per cent. Further- 
more, they had not been satisfied that they were getting 
all that the sliding scale was supposed to guarantee. The 
statistician who figured the average prices had told one 
of the leaders that to obtain the average price, he took 
the total receipts for coal at tidewater reported by the 
operators and divided it by the total number of tons. 
The union leaders pertinently asked, " What assurance 
have we that the operators reported all the dollars they 
received ? " 1 

Comparison in percentages of total ivages to total value of coal 
at the mine produced in the following years in Pennsylvania 
and Ohio. 2 





Pennsylvania. 




Year. 






Ohio. 




Anthracite. 


Bituminous. 




1902 


57.2 


59.9 


66.1 


1903 


51.4 


61.1 


67.9 


1904 


65.7 


71.9 


75.7 


1905 ...... 


61.6 


73.8 


75.5 


1906 


61.8 


53.2 


72.4 


1909 


59.3 


68.2 


76.4 


1911 


59.9 


71.6 


75.9 



The miners' contention that they were not profiting by 
the general prosperity of the industry seems to be sup- 
ported by the table above. When we compare the per- 
centages of total wages to the total value of coal at the 
mines, the miners in the anthracite fields certainly had 
not benefited to the same extent as had the miners in the 
bituminous fields, where collective bargaining was effective. 
This comparison is as fair for one field as for another and 
eliminates the element of monopoly control. The anthra- 

1 Negotiations of Anthracite Operators and Anthracite Miners, 1912, p. 60. 

2 Ohio was the only State having collective bargaining- in which the 
figures of total wages were available for comparison with Pennsylvania. 



/ 
268 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

cite field compares unfavorably even with the bituminous 
fields of Pennsylvania, a large portion of which are still 
subjected to individual bargaining. Another factor worthy 
of note is the immediate drop in the percentages in the 
bituminous fields with the break-up of the joint confer- 
ence in 1906. In Ohio and Illinois, where the union is 
stronger than in the bituminous fields of Pennsylvania, 
the percentages were held up pretty well. In Illinois, in 
1899, the percentage of the total wages to the total value 
of the coal at mine was 79.4. In the other years the total 
wages for Illinois were not obtainable, but the available 
figures show that the wages of the miners, exclusive of the 
wages for day labor, ranged from 46.7 to 51.1 per cent. 
The total wages would bring the percentage up as high as 
or higher than the Ohio percentages. 

C There seems good ground for the hope that this first 
„p in real conciliation in the anthracite field will lead to 
a better understanding between capital and labor and to a 
real democratization of this important branch of the coal 
industry. Time should bring about a greater elaboration 
of the system, and under it both parties must develop a 
clearer perception of what is demanded by fairness to each 
other and by consideration for the public. 

Before we turn our attention to a consideration of the 
relation of this system of conciliation and arbitration to 
the whole coal industry, the part it has in a constructive 
public policy, and the developments that are likely to take 
place in regard to legal enactment and political action by 
the unions, we may profitably consider the developments 
that have taken place in the British coal industry. 



CHAPTER VIII 

CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION IN THE 
BRITISH COAL INDUSTRY 

INTRODUCTION 

If we desire to profit by the experience of others, we can- 
not do better than to turn to Great Britain from whence 
sprang most of the ideas and methods that have been 
utilized in effective industrial adjustments in the mining 
industry of this country. We have adapted them to suit 
our needs and in some respects improved upon them, per- 
haps, but we certainly owe the initial impulse toward 
practical adjustment to the British workers who had been 
trained in an industrial environment where the folly of 
strikes and the futility of strong-arm methods had been 
learned by hard experience. Industrial development, ho- 
mogeneity of population, and the growth of unity among 
the workers have brought developments in the British 
coal trade that we have not as yet approached. A consid- 
eration of these developments is full of suggestions for 
the students of American problems. They are of interest 
not merely as showing the evolution in methods of volun- 
tary conciliation and arbitration, but we see there the im- 
portant part that government has had to take in smoothing 
out the process of obtaining industrial democracy. With 
the growing ability of the unions to bring economic and 
political pressure, the necessity has been shown for le- 
gal enactment and governmental interference and par- 
ticipation in the industrial struggle. The evolution of 
labor representation in Parliament to supplement the ef- 
forts made for peaceful adjustment in conciliation boards 



270 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

points to a development which we shall see has made a 
good beginning in the United States. The struggle for the 
minimum wage involving both economic and political 
pressure is suggestive of the situation we may have to 
meet in this country if both anthracite and bituminous 
miners make a united stand. The nationalization of mines, 
which will be the next big move in the British mining in- 
dustry, has already found influential advocates here. 



1. THE RISE OF THE MINERS' UNIONS 
A. Early Conditions 

When we remember that it was not until 1799 * that 
the Scottish miners were freed from a condition of semi- 
serfdom, we gain some perspective for considering the full 
import of the remarkable developments of industrial de- 
mocracy that have since taken place in the British coal 
industry. Moreover, a "yearly bond" system kept the 
miners of England practically in a state of peonage much 
beyond that date. In spite of forceful measures taken to 
maintain these conditions the industry was subject to vio- 
lent strikes, and in the great strike of 1810 in the north 
of England we first hear of " an oath-bound confederacy 
recruited by the practice of ' brothering,' so named be- 
cause the members of the union bound themselves by a 
most solemn oath to obey the orders of the brotherhood, 
under penalty of being stabbed through the heart or of 
having their bowels ripped up." 2 

The turbulence and attempts at unity seem to have made 
small progress in competition with the existing arbitrari- 
ness of individual ownership, the respect for aristocracy, 
and a government controlled by, and solely for the benefit 
of, the ruling classes. In 1844, Lord Londonderry, " in 

1 The act which provided for gradual emancipation was passed in 1775. 
See Jeans, Conciliation and Arbitration, p. 56. 

2 Webb, History of Trade Unionism, p. 79. 



IN GREAT BRITAIN 271 

his dual capacity as mine owner and Lord Lieutenant of 
Durham County," was not only able to answer a demand 
for better wages by evictions and the replacement of the 
strikers by Irishmen, but " he peremptorily orders the 
resident traders in ' his town of Seaham,' on pain of for- 
feiting his custom and protection, to refuse to supply pro- 
visions to the workmen engaged in what he deems ' an 
unjust and senseless warfare against their proprietors and 
masters.' " 1 

B. Formation of the Miners' Association op 
Great Britain and Ireland, 1841 

The county unions which had grown up in Northumber- 
land, Durham, Lancashire, and Yorkshire had entered into 
a federation in 1841 and employed a solicitor to represent 
their organization in the numerous prosecutions to which 
they were subjected under the law of master and servant. 
W. P. Roberts, the "miners' attorney-general" was so 
active on behalf of the miners that he was " soon retained 
in all Trade Union cases." 2 

1 Webb, History of Trade Unionism, p. 150. 

2 Ibid., p. 165. 

The recital of his experience as a pioneer advocate of the workingmen 
before the courts has a modern note in it. " After explaining 1 the law, 
as he understood it (when writing to the Flint Glass Makers' Friendly So- 
ciety), he proceeds as follows : ' But it is exceedingly difficult to induce 
those of the class opposed to you to take this view of things. I do not say 
this sarcastically, but as a fact learned by long and observant experience. 
There are, indeed, men on the bench who are honest enough, and desirous 
of doing their duty, but all their tendencies and circumstances are against 
you. They listen to your opponents, not only often, but cheerfully — so 
they know more fully the case against you than in your favour. To you 
they listen too — but in a sort of temper of Prisoner at the Bar, you are 
entitled to make any statement you think fit, and the Court is bound to 
hear you ; but mind, whatever you say, etc., etc. In the one case you ob- 
serve the hearty smile of good will ; in the other the derisive sneer, though 
sometimes a ghastly sort of kindliness in it. Then there is the knowledge 
of your overwhelming power when acting unitedly, and this begets natu- 
rally a corresponding desire to resist you at all hazards. And there are hun- 
dreds of other considerations all acting the same way — meetings, political 



272 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

In their national conference held at Glasgow in 1844 the 
miners voted to go on a strike. The men demanded a six 
months' engagement instead of a yearly " bond" ; five days' 
work a week with at least three shillings per day ; a rec- 
ord of their earnings and the deductions made therefrom ; 
an eight-hour day ; a benefit of ten shillings per week in 
case of accident; provision for arbitration; and "a week's 
prior notice with the specification of the charges to be 
brought against them in case of being summoned before 
the magistrate." * 

The Federation is said to have had a membership of 
100,000, and this conference expressed the sentiments of 
70,000. It is little wonder that the strike came to a disas- 
trous end after several months of fighting when we remem- 
ber that they had to contend with conditions of which 
Lord Londonderry's treatment was representative. The 
loss of this strike was a large factor in breaking up the 
federation, and by 1848 it had ceased to exist. 

C. The Mineks' National Union, 1863 

In the next seven years even local unions had almost 
died out, but in 1856 a man came to the front as an ad- 
vocate of the miners, "Alexander Macdonald, to whose 
lifelong devotion the miners owe their present position in 
the Trade Union world." 2 While working as a miner he 
prepared himself for Glasgow University and partially 
supported himself during his residence at the univer- 
sity by summer work in the mines. He started a cam- 
councils, intermarriages, hopes from wills, etc. I do not say that all occu- 
pants of the bench are thus influenced, nor to the same extent ; but it cer- 
tainly is at the best an uphill game to contend in favour of a workingman 
in a question -which admits of any doubt against him. It never happened 
to me to meet a magistrate who considered that an agreement among mas- 
ters not to employ any particular " troublesome fellow " was an unlawful 
act ; reverse the case, however, and it immediately becomes a formidable 
conspiracy which must be put down by the strong arm of the law.' " 

1 Jeans, Conciliation and Arbitration, p. 59. 

2 Webb, op. cit. f p. 285. 



IN GREAT BRITAIN 273 

paign for legal enactments to provide for mine inspec- 
tion, proper weighing, restriction of the age of child 
workers in the mines to twelve years, an eight-hour day, 
weekly payment of wages, abolition of payment in truck, 
and the correction of various other abuses. 

By an effective system of correspondence with local pit 
clubs the growth of district organizations was encouraged, 
and by 1863 they were welded into a Miners' National 
Union. 

At a conference held the same year Macdonald was able 
to organize the meeting into sections on law, grievances, 
and social organization, and to secure the adoption of his 
programme of measures which were essential to the better- 
ment of the miners' working and living conditions. "In 
contradistinction to the view which would make wages 
depend upon prices, the principle of controlling industry 
in such a way as to prevent encroachments on the work- 
man's standard of maintenance is clearly foreshadowed. 
1 Overtoil,' says the report [of the conference] , l produces 
oversupply ; low prices and low wages follow ; bad habits 
and bad health follow, of course ; and then diminished 
production and profits are inevitable. Reduction of toil 
and consequent improved bodily health increases produc- 
tion in the sense of profit; and limits it so as to avoid 
overstocking ; better wages induce better habits and econ- 
omy of working follows. . . . The evil of overtoil and 
oversupply upon wages, and upon the labourer, is there- 
fore a fair subject of complaint ; we submit, as far as these 
are human by conventional arrangements, [they] are a 
fair and proper subject of regulation. Regulation must of 
course be twofold. Part can be legislated for by compul- 
sory laws ; but the principle [sic] must be the subject of 
voluntary agreements.' " 1 

1 Webb, op. c#., p. 288. Quotation from report. 



274 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

A. REGULATORY MEASURES 

The advocacy of an eight-hour day was limited (for 
the time) to boys, but this demand immediately brought 
a line of cleavage between Durham and Northumberland 
and the other districts. Durham and Northumberland 
wished to keep the boys working ten hours and the men 
in two shifts of six hours each. The first shift of men went 
to work two hours before the boys, and thus mined enough 
coal to keep the boys busy loading. The second shift by 
working six hours brought the working day of the boys 
up to ten hours. This diversity of opinion and opposition 
within the ranks of the miners was the chief cause that 
deferred the passage of an eight-hour act till 1908. 

By a series of struggles beginning in 1859 the miners 
succeeded in getting permission to have check weighmen 
at the scales in a few collieries. But the attempt to insert 
such a provision in the Mines Regulation Act of 1860 was 
severely contested in Parliament, and, although finally in- 
corporated, it was evaded by refusing the checkweighman 
access to the mouth of the pit and hampering him in his 
work by fencing up the weights or disputing his calcula- 
tions. The Act of 1860 had to be strengthened by the 
Acts of 1872 and 1889 before it was clearly established 
that a checkweighman had a legal right to keep a record 
of each man's work, and that though elected by a majority 
of the miners all the men had to contribute to his salary. 1 

The leaders of the miners were active with other trade 
union leaders from 1864 to 1867 in obtaining the Master 
and Servant Act of the latter year. The old master and 
servant acts had permitted an official armed with a war- 
rant from a justice of the peace to drag a workman out of 
his bed in the middle of the night and subject him to 
three months' imprisonment if it could be shown that he 

1 Webb, op. cit., p. 291. In the American anthracite field this expense 
has to be met by the contract miners. 



IN GREAT BRITAIN 275 

had broken his contract of service or absented himself 
from his work without leave from his employer. Nor could 
the worker testify in his own favor, or pay a fine in lieu 
of imprisonment. The justice of the peace was often an 
employer of labor and in full sympathy with harsh pro- 
cedure. No matter how arbitrary his decision, the workman 
was allowed no appeal. The extent of the abuses under 
this law was finally realized when it was discovered that 
" 10,339 cases of breach of contract of service came be- 
fore the courts in a single year." * The Act of 1867 rem- 
edied the worst features of the old laws, and the Webbs 
regard it as " the first positive success of the Trade Unions 
in the legislative field," and believe that it " did much to 
increase their confidence in parliamentary agitation." But 
it was not until the passage of the Employers' and Work- 
men's Act of 1875 that imprisonment for breach of con- 
tract was finally abolished and the unions given legal recog- 
nition. 

d. foemation of the mlners' federation of 
Great Britain, 1889 

Another fact, besides the disagreement about legal regu- 
lation of hours of labor, that caused further dissension in 
the ranks of the miners during the later sixties and the 
seventies, was a divergence of opinion over the use of 
the sliding scale. Durham and Northumberland favored the 
sliding scale and the attending dependence of wages on 
prices. But in the Midland counties there grew up a feel- 
ing that the miner, who had no control over prices and 
competition, ought not to bear the brunt of depression 
brought on by the mismanagement of the owners. The 
Midland unions either abolished the sliding scale or in- 
sisted that it be accompanied by a minimum below which 
wages should not fall. Furthermore, they were ready to 
supplement this action by the regulation of production. 
1 Webb, op. cit., p. 235. 



276 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

During the early and middle eighties the contests in miners' 
conferences and in Parliament grew more bitter, until in 
1889 the climax was reached with the withdrawal of the Mid- 
land associations and their organization into the Miners' 
Federation of Great Britain. While the National Union 
gradually fell off in membership until it included merely 
Durham and Northumberland, the Federation grew until 
it took in all the federations and associations in the other 
counties of England, North and South Wales, and Scot- 
land. In spite of the fact that Durham and Northum- 
berland kept persistently by themselves, they responded 
to invitations to special conferences which affected the 
industry as a whole. Finally, in 1908-09, we find them 
both in the Federation and presenting a united front with 
the other fields in obtaining and enforcing the Eight-Hour 
Act of 1908. In the annual conference of the Federation 
in 1911, a membership of 608,200 was represented and 
stood united in their determination to secure a minimum 
wage. 1 

The Federation leaves local and district matters under 
the control of local and district organizations. The dis- 
tricts, which are also a federation of smaller units, are 
held responsible for the financial support of the Federa- 
tion, and these unite in lending moral support and ma- 
terial aid in all matters which are of national importance 
to the industry. But the federation of federated districts 
would not present a strong industrial unity equal to the 
solidarity of the United Mine Workers of America, were 
it not for the homogeneity within the British industry and 
the hard lessons that the various district federations learned 
of the futility of independent sectional fighting. Although 
these two factors of homogeneity and experience are strong 
in their welding force, yet the federation of federations 
would easily permit of independent action and withdrawal 

1 Report of Annual Conference of the Miners' Federation of Great Britain, 
1911, p. 182. 



IN GREAT BRITAIN 277 

with the rise of factional strife. From the standpoint of 
enabling the organization to keep a heterogeneous mem- 
bership loyal and to deal with complex conditions such as 
we have in this country, the United Mine Workers would 
seem to be superior. 

2. METHODS OF INDUSTRIAL ADJUSTMENT 
A. Arbitration 

The period from the early forties to the early seventies 
was one of evolution in the acceptance of trade unions, the 
formation of employers' associations to meet their grow- 
ing power, and the development of irregular negotiations 
carried on largely by means of strikes. These negotiations 
finally led to formal arbitration proceedings. The current 
ideas that lay in the background of arbitration proceed- 
ings, and probably constituted a large element among the 
causes which led later to a more satisfactory method of 
adjustment, are illustrated by a Northumberland arbitra- 
tion case of 1875. 

The case was argued by means of written statements 
which were discussed by the representatives of both par- 
ties in the presence of the arbitrator. On the submission 
of the case to the arbitrator each party was allowed to file 
written statements to strengthen its side, but was not per- 
mitted to introduce new evidence. Accountants submitted 
information reduced to percentages, drawn from the books 
of the operators. The labor costs and selling prices of 1871 
were accepted as a basis of comparison to decide whether 
the operators' demand for a reduction of twenty per cent 
was justifiable. 

The miners pointed out that the operators wanted them 
to bear the full effects of adverse conditions in assuming 
that profits were fair in 1871 and that the price of coal 
had to rise " in exactly the same ratio with wages in order 
that the profits of coal owners may remain the same " ; 



278 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

and, further, " it is also assumed that the great increased 
percentage, mentioned in the owners' case, has been paid 
in the shape of increased wages." 

The umpire in his decision set forth factors which had 
increased the cost of production, such as the increase 
of fifty per cent in wages between 1871 and 1875, the 
shortening of hours without proportionate increase in the 
per hour output, and certain requirements of the Mines 
Regulation Act of 1872 which interfered with economical 
production. But the umpire thought that the chief reason 
why wages should be reduced lay in the fact that the 
number of men in the industry had increased, and he gives 
us an interesting sidelight on the influence of the wages 
fund doctrine. Where there had been formerly ten men 
there were in 1875 fourteen men, and therefore from " the 
total wages fund " each man could only expect one four- 
teenth instead of one tenth. And he concludes " that the 
restoration of economy in production cannot be brought 
about by abating the rate of wages only, or indeed, 
mainly, but must be accomplished by reducing the num- 
ber of men." The men were awarded a reduction which 
varied from ten to twelve and a half per cent. 1 

B. The Era of Sliding Scales 

It was not long before both parties found themselves 
dissatisfied with arbitration and looked upon it only as a 
measure of last resort. With the acceptance by both par- 
ties of the principle that wages should be determined by 
prices, the sliding scale was utilized to accomplish this end. 
The sliding scale was first introduced in the South Staf- 
fordshire field in 1874, and by 1880 had spread to most 
of the other fields. The question of a proper basis and the 
ratio of increase and decrease in wages according to the 
rise and fall in prices occasioned many revisions and nu- 

1 Miners' National Record, vol. 1, no. 7, pp. 107-09. Reprint of the 
Northumberland proceedings. 



IN GREAT BRITAIN 279 

merous resorts to arbitration. The demand for changes 
came from both parties. Another factor which caused 
much dissatisfaction was the failure in most instances to 
incorporate a minimum in the scales. Again, the slow- 
ness in response of wages to changes in prices was an 
aggravation to both parties, according to whether or not 
it was a period of depression or prosperity. 

With the rise of the Miners' Federation in 1888-89, 
the principle of a living or minimum wage found advo- 
cates, and the demand was advanced that wages should 
be considered a first charge on the industry. 1 Nor did 
the advocates of these policies see any reason why prices 
should not be adjusted to wages instead of wages follow- 
ing prices. The Federation rapidly gained a following for 
its new doctrine, and by 1893 the sliding scale remained 
in operation only in South Wales, South Staffordshire, 
and the Forest of Dean. 2 

C. The Big Strikes of the Nineties 

Following the abandonment of the sliding scale, there 
took place a series of struggles which were to inaugurate 
a new era in the British coal industry. The strike in the 
Midland counties in 1890, which involved 151 collieries 
and 107,484 mine workers, was the largest ever recorded 
in the United Kingdom up to that time. 3 It brought the 
men an advance of five per cent instead of the ten per cent 
they had asked for. In 1892 the Federation of Durham 
County was involved in a strike to resist a reduction of 
ten per cent. It affected 150 mining establishments and 
75,000 mine workers, and was finally settled, through the 
mediation of the Bishop of Durham, by the acceptance of 
the reduction and an agreement to submit future disputes 
to a conciliation committee. 

1 Ashley, The Adjustment of Wages, p. 40. 2 Webb, op. cit, p. 486. 
3 Special Report of Commission of Labor, Coal Mine Labor in Europe, 
1905, p. 476. 



280 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

A. THE STRIKE OF 1893 

The next year was the most momentous which had been 
known in the British coal industry. There were 139 strikes 
and lockouts involving 503,061 mine workers. 1 Of these 
the strike of the Miners' Federation, involving 1500 es- 
tablishments and 300,000 men, occupied the center of the 
stage. This strike was called to resist a demand for a 
twenty-five per cent reduction in wages and lasted from 
July 28 to November 17. 

Between 1888 and 1893 the miners had succeeded in 
advancing their wages forty per cent, and the owners 
claimed that they must now reduce wages to be able to 
compete with the other districts in which the men had ac- 
cepted reductions. At a joint conference the union leaders 
stuck to their principle of a living wage and denied that 
their present wage allowed any margin for reduction. 
Their request for a month's time to put the owners' de- 
mands before the men and return an answer was met by 
a refusal and by the posting of notices which terminated 
contracts within a month. The men had refused to accept 
arbitration, but they concluded from this action that the 
owners were bent upon forcing a reduction in violation of 
the terms of the last agreement, which had provided that 
" before any public action is taken with respect to notices 
the men's case shall be laid before a committee of the col- 
liery owners . . . and that the results be made known to 
the workmen." 

During August negotiations continued, but with no 
results other than a referendum vote (September 1) on 
the question of the acceptance of the twenty-five per cent 
reduction, the owners' offer to arbitrate, and the resump- 
tion of work by those who could do so at the old rate of 
wages. There was practically a unanimous vote against the 

1 Special Report of Commission of Labor, Coal Mine Labor in Europe, 
1905, p. 482. 



IN GREAT BRITAIN 281 

first two propositions and a majority of 30,750 against 
the last. The great demand for coal by October 2 prompted 
the mayors of six cities to arrange a joint conference 
which was attended by both parties. The mayors' propo- 
sition that the men be allowed to return to work at the 
old wages, but submit to a reduction of ten per cent six 
weeks later, was acceptable to neither party. 

By October 25 the owners expressed their willingness 
to meet the miners " to discuss the whole question, with- 
out prejudice to the position of either party." Accordingly 
at a meeting on November 3 and 4, the owners advanced 
the offer to form a board of conciliation to settle the whole 
question of reductions and to start the mines at once. 
While their offer was being submitted to the miners, Mr. 
Gladstone invited both parties to a joint meeting under 
the chairmanship of Lord Rosebery, who was to act as an 
adviser and not as an umpire or arbiter. This invitation 
was promptly accepted, and on November 17 a conference 
of a few hours resulted in the following agreement : (1) 
A board of conciliation to consist of fourteen representa- 
tives of each side should, before the first meeting, elect a 
chairman, who should have a casting vote. If they could 
not agree on a chairman, he should be appointed by 
the Speaker of the House of Commons. The board should 
meet on December 13, 1893, and should have the power 
to determine the rate of wages, beginning with February 
1, 1894. (2) In the mean time the men should resume 
work at once and continue at the old rate of wages until 
February 1, 1894. All collieries should be opened and " no 
impediment be placed in the way of a return of the men 
to work." 

The Speaker had to appoint a chairman. The prelimi- 
nary meetings brought forth nothing other than the refusal 
of the chairman to allow the incorporation of a provision 
for a minimum wage in the constitution of the board, and 
no action was taken on the proposal to reduce wages. In 



282 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

July, 1894, the board came to an agreement which re- 
duced wages ten per cent until January 1, 1896, estab- 
lished a minimum of thirty per cent, and a maximum of 
forty-five per cent, above the rates of 1888, and gave the 
board the privilege of establishing wages within these 
limits from January 1, 1896, to August 1, 1896. 1 

In 1894 the Scotch miners were engaged in a struggle 
which involved 500 establishments and 70,000 employees, 
while a strike in South Wales in 1898 involved 100,000 
men. All of these struggles arose through disputes over 
wages. Three were settled by conciliation boards, and in 
two the miners failed to obtain any concessions. 

D. The Royal Commission on Labour 

These industrial struggles convinced the Government 
that it needed to inaugurate preventive and conciliatory 
measures. It was during the unrest of the early nineties 
that the Royal Commission on Labour was making its in- 
vestigations, and its final report in 1894 embodied recom- 
mendations for the functioning of the local and central 
governments in connection with labor disputes. The ma- 
jority report suggested that municipal and county councils 
be empowered to establish industrial courts to decide ques- 
tions arising out of existing contracts, and that the central 
government should have power to obtain and circulate in- 
formation regarding conciliation boards. The central gov- 
ernment should also have the power to advise and to pro- 
mote their establishment by appointing chairmen to boards 
or arbiters upon application of the parties. The minority 
were willing to go a step further on the publicity side and 
empower the central government to obtain the fullest pos- 
sible information concerning each dispute, the net wages, 
the cost of living, prices, cost of production, salaries, in- 
terest, profits, etc. 

1 Special Report of Commissioner of Labor, op. cit., p. 489. 



IN GREAT BRITAIN 283 

E. The Conciliation Act of 1896 

In 1893 the Board of Trade began an inquiry which 
sought to determine the legislation necessary to meet 
modern social and industrial conditions. As a result of 
this investigation the Conciliation Act of 1896 was en- 
acted. The Master and Workmen Arbitration Act of 
1824, which authorized justices of the peace to appoint 
arbiters with extensive powers, the Councils of Concilia- 
tion Act of 1867, which confirmed the Act of 1824 and 
added provisions for conciliation councils, and the Arbi- 
tration Act of 1872, which enlarged upon the provisions 
of the two former acts, were repealed as so much useless 
timber. Their only recognized virtue was that they were 
harmless when not enforced. 

The act provided further for registration of conciliation 
boards and gave the Board of Trade power (a) to inquire 
into the causes of the trouble, (5) to take steps to bring 
the parties together under a chairman mutually agreed 
upon or nominated by the board, (c) upon application of 
either party to appoint a conciliator or board of concilia- 
tion, (d) and upon application of both parties to appoint 
an arbitrator. Furthermore, if it appeared to the Board 
of Trade that in any district or trade adequate provisions 
for conciliation did not exist, it was empowered to inquire 
into the conditions of the trade or district, confer with the 
employees, employers, and local authorities, and seek to 
establish a conciliation board. 

A. RESULTS UNDER THE ACT 

That this enactment has proved an effective measure is 
shown by the work of the Board of Trade between 1896 
and 1910. In that time the board intervened directly in 
432 cases, 201 of which involved stoppage of work and 
231 of which did not. In the earlier years there were few 
applications, and they came mainly from the workingmen; 



284 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

but in the later years, beginning with 1907, a year of de- 
pression, a marked increase in the number of cases took 
place. Along with the increase in the number of cases has 
gone a distinct expression of confidence in the board indi- 
cated by the great increase in joint applications for the 
services of the board, there being 278 such instances out 
of the total of 432 cases. 1 A further expression of appre- 
ciation of the board's services is the increasing number of 
cases wherein the parties do not wait for an open breach, 
but apply to the board to prevent strikes. It has also been 
a strong factor in encouraging voluntary conciliation boards 
and lending dignity and importance to the whole concilia- 
tory movement. 

B. THE COURT OF ARBITRATION 

Further to supplement its activities the board has added 
two devices. In 1908 it established a permanent court of 
arbitration consisting of three panels : " persons of emi- 
nence and impartiality," employers, and labor leaders. A 
court may consist of three or five members, according to 
the importance of the case, and an award is made upon a 
majority vote. In 1909 and 1910 the court handled six- 
teen cases, eight of which were settled before a rupture 
had occurred and eight not until after a strike. 2 

C. THE INDUSTRIAL COUNCIL 

The labor troubles of 1911 led the board to add another 
device to enable it to meet the increasing demands for its 
services. An " Industrial Council," consisting of thirteen 
representative employers and thirteen labor leaders, was 
created. In advocating this addition the president of the 
Board of Trade pointed out that one disadvantage of the 
existing system had been to bring into prominence the par- 
liamentary head of the Board of Trade in matters which 

1 Bulletin of Bureau of Labor, no. 98, January, 1912, p. 133. 

2 Ibid., p. 124. 



IN GREAT BRITAIN 285 

should be purely industrial, and expressed the opinion 
that if the action of the department was still further re- 
moved from politics the parties would more willingly seek 
the assistance of the board. Furthermore, with the in- 
creasing concentration in industry and the federation of 
labor, a national conciliation council, which might have 
been considered premature a few years ago, "is really 
now essential so that these matters can be considered as a 
whole." 1 

Regular meetings are held in February, June, and No- 
vember and special meetings may be called at any time by 
the chairman. The members are supposed to act in a judi- 
cial capacity, not as advocates, and may consider the fol- 
lowing classes of cases : (1) Cases in connection with which 
the parties are merely asking for an impartial opinion 
concerning the facts about which there is no dispute; 
(2) cases in which the parties desire the facts to be im- 
partially ascertained and submitted with recommendations 
which shall not be binding or made public ; (3) cases in 
which the parties agree beforehand that the recommenda- 
tions shall be made public ; (4) cases in which the parties 
decide to accept a decision of the council as final ; (5) spe- 
cial cases submitted by the Board of Trade ; (6) matters 
apart from disputes upon which the board may want a 
representative opinion. 2 Thus the board will be able to 
allow the council to take over a large part of its activities. 

F. Modern Conciliation Boards in the Coal 
Industry 

Of the 432 cases dealt with by the Board of Trade, only 
54 were among the mining and quarrying industries. This 
is due to the fact that in the coal mining industry there 
are nineteen permanent voluntary conciliation boards which 
have complete automatic machinery for settling disputes. 

1 Bulletin of Bureau of Labor, no. 98, January, 1912, p. 126. 

2 Ibid., p. 127. 



286 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

There are two classes of conciliation boards in the coal 
industry. The first deals with the adjustment of wages 
and working conditions which are applicable to a district 
or a federation of districts. The second is termed a joint 
committee and concerns itself with all local matters which 
do not conflict with the county or district agreement and 
which do not demand the attention of the conciliation 
board. 

The Board of Conciliation for the Coal Trade of the 
Federated Districts, which includes representatives from 
Lancashire, Cheshire, Yorkshire, Staffordshire, Warwick- 
shire, Derbyshire, Nottinghamshire, North Wales, Can- 
nock Chase, etc., may be taken as representative of the 
first type. The board must settle upon wages for these 
districts, but " the rate of wages shall not be below 37J 
per cent above the rate of wages of 1888 nor more than 
60 per cent above the rate of wages of 1888, and no altera- 
tion in the rate of wages exceeding 5 per cent shall be 
made at any one time." 1 

The board agrees " upon a selling price of coal as being 
proportionate to a certain rate of wages," but the selling 
price is not the only determining factor. It is considered 
as " one factor only, and either side shall be entitled to 
bring forward any reason why, notwithstanding an altera- 
tion in the selling price, there should be no alteration in 
the rate of wages." Not merely the present state of trade 
is considered, but the indications which point to the future 
trend in prices are strong factors in determining an agree- 
ment. For instance, in reply to a demand for a reduction 
in 1909 the miners refused to lower their rates, but prom- 
ised not to ask for a raise until a certain time in order that 
on the rising market the owners might recoup themselves 
for adverse conditions during a period of falling prices. 2 

1 Second Report of the Board of Trade, 1910, on Bules of Voluntary Con- 
ciliation and Arbitration Boards and Joint Committees, p. 114. 

2 Proceedings of Federated Coal Owners and Miners' Federation, Septem- 
ber 3, 1909, p. 8. 



IN GREAT BRITAIN 287 

The board consists of an equal number of representa- 
tives elected by the Federated Coal Owners and the 
Miners' Federation, and a neutral chairman who has a 
casting vote. In case the parties cannot agree on a chair- 
man he is appointed by the Speaker of the House of 
Commons. 

The board has four stated meetings during a year and 
as many more as may be necessary. All questions are sub- 
mitted in writing, but they may be supplemented by such 
verbal and documentary evidence as the parties may de- 
sire, subject to the approval of the board. If the parties 
cannot agree, the board is adjourned for a period not ex- 
ceeding twenty-one days, which gives each side time for 
further discussion with its constituents. The chairman is 
then called in, and after hearing both sides of the case 
may give his casting vote or subsequently communicate 
his decision to the secretaries of both federations. He is 
not allowed to render decisions which split the difference. 
He may also refer questions back to the board for re- 
consideration without expressing his opinion upon them. 
This process goes on till the parties have reached a work- 
ing agreement, and in the mean time the men remain at 
work. 

Each party pays the expenses of its own officials and 
representatives, and the common costs, such as the ex- 
penses of the chairman and the general expenses of the 
board, the parties bear in equal shares. 

In the Durham, Northumberland, and Cumberland dis- 
tricts, besides a general conciliation board, joint commit- 
tees are appointed to look after local disputes and adjust 
rates of payment for altered methods of working. In the 
other districts of England, Wales, and Scotland joint 
committees are formed for special occasions. Also there 
are local " agents " of the miners, who, if they cannot 
settle local disputes, carry the cases to the joint commit- 
tees or the general conciliation board. 



288 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

The joint committee in Durham consists of six members 
on each side with an impartial chairman chosen annually. 
The county is divided into three districts, "and the de- 
cisions of the committee in all cases shall be such as to 
bring practices, hours, or wages as nearly as may be into 
accord with the recognized county standards." x Both par- 
ties before the committee are represented by their agents 
and bring such witnesses as they deem necessary. During 
the hearing of the case argumentation and discussion are 
not allowed, " the examination of witnesses being confined 
to putting the committee into possession of the facts bear- 
ing on the case." When the evidence is all in, the com- 
mittee discusses it and endeavors to arrive at a decision. 
Unless they reach a unanimous decision, individual mem- 
bers are allowed to introduce motions which they think 
will settle the case justly. When the votes are equal, the 
chairman may himself decide the question or submit it to 
arbitration, but " the committee shall in all cases, where 
it is possible, determine the questions submitted to its 
consideration without calling upon the chairman for his 
casting vote." While the committee is arriving at a set- 
tlement the men continue at work and the decision is re- 
troactive. 

3. THE POLICY OF LEGAL ENACTMENT 

A. Labor Kepresentatton 

As we have seen, 2 the miners early became aware of the 
necessity for and the superiority of legal enactment to at- 
tain certain fundamental regulations which could not be 
got by conciliation and arbitration. However, the adher- 
ents of conciliation and arbitration expected to bring 
about universality more and more as unionism spread and 

1 Bulletin of Bureau of Labor, no. 98, January, 1912, p. 147. Reprint 
of revised rules of the Durham Joint Committee, June, 1911. 

2 See supra, p. 274. 



IN GREAT BRITAIN 289 

as the conciliation boards grew in representation and in- 
fluence. Undoubtedly this has been accomplished in re- 
spect to many minor working conditions, and such a fun- 
damental and universal regulation as the eight-hour day 
was not thought to be too great an accomplishment. It is 
natural that this should not have been regarded as too 
bard a task, since it had already been accomplished in 
America. But, as was the case in America, it would prob- 
ably necessitate a general strike, and with increasing 
strength and realization of power came a healthy conserv- 
atism that led to peaceful measures to obtain the eight- 
hour day. 

In the middle seventies trade unionism in general be- 
came aware that the old Liberal and Tory parties were 
not deeply concerned about furthering the laborers' inter- 
ests, and consequently they determined to have their own 
men in Parliament. In 1874 the miners, ironworkers, and 
other societies voted money for parliamentary candida- 
tures, and in the general election that followed, Alexander 
Macdonald and Thomas Burt, who were officials of the 
National Union of Miners, became the first "Labour mem- 
bers " in Parliament. 1 

A. THE "LABOUR REPRESENTATION SCHEME" 

Almost at the beginning of labor representation the 
miners' representatives from Durham and Northumber- 
land in Parliament were found on the side opposite to the 
representatives of the miners from the other coal fields in 
the matter of a legal enactment of an eight-hour day. 
This circumstance, coupled with the fact that the Labor 
men held to old party affiliations, tended to lessen their 
force as distinctly labor representatives. 

In 1893 a group of labor delegates formed the "In- 
dependent Labour Party," with the hope of establishing 
a connecting link between the Socialists and the labor 
1 Webb, op. cit., p. 273. 



290 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

unions. Of the twenty-nine candidates put in the race for 
parliamentary membership in that year, only five were 
elected. By 1899 it was found necessary to seek closer 
relationship with the trade unions in order to increase the 
labor representation in Parliament. This was to be ac- 
complished by the formation of a" Labour Representa- 
tive Committee." The Liberal and Conservative labor 
representatives of the Trade-Union Congress were out- 
voted on the question of the formation of this committee, 
and when it was submitted to the vote of the unions the 
affirmative vote was only 546,000 as against a negative 
vote of 434,000.! The action of the Taff Vale Railway 
Company, brought against the Amalgamated Society of 
Railway Servants, resulted in a decision (in 1901) sub- 
jecting the unions to the payment of damages for engag- 
ing in picketing which caused the railway employees to 
break their contractual relations. This aroused all the 
unions to political action to obtain a law that would se- 
cure their funds from such attacks. By 1901 the sense of 
the importance of the functions of labor representatives 
had assumed proportions which warranted the executive 
committee of the Miners' Federation in drawing up a 
scheme for the further encouragement of the policy of 
electing and supporting Labor members in Parliament. 

The plan for the purpose was known as the " Miners' 
Federation of Great Britain Labour Fund Scheme." The 
fund was built up by the payment of threepence per quar- 
ter per member or one shilling per year. A district which 
failed to pay this amount per member was not eligible to 
nominate candidates at " Bye and General Elections" and 
could not receive returning officers' fees or other election 
costs. All districts which had a membership under 10,000 
were allowed one candidate, and those having more than 
10,000 were allowed another candidate for every 10,000 
" financial " members. 

1 Orthj Socialism and Democracy in Europe, p. 223. 



IN GREAT BRITAIN 291 

There were several qualifications necessary before a man 
could be eligible as a " Federation Candidate." He had to 
be adopted by the Federation and Federation executive 
board, which decided whether there was a " reasonable 
hope " of the seat being won. Furthermore, the candidate 
had to be a " financial " member of the Federation, and 
either "working in or about the mines or [be] a Miners' 
Representative [official] within the Federation area." 1 
Nor could officials from other districts be selected, but a 
candidate must be " selected by and in his own District." 
When elected, the representative was paid X350 per year 
and given a first-class railway pass " covering the sitting 
of Parliament in each year." 

The scheme was not established " for the purpose of 
wrecking any political party," nor did it prevent a can- 
didate from running under any name he wished, provided 
he was adopted by the executive board as a candidate. 
Furthermore, the board rendered a final decision on " all 
questions arising out of payments into and out of the 
Labour Election Fund." So the board was in a position 
to compel honest representation of labor as a primary 
requisite. 

B. MEMBERSHIP IN THE " LABOUR PARTY " 

The scheme was adopted by the Annual Conference in 
1902, and two years later the miners' annual conference, 
in the following resolution, instructed its representative 
in Parliament to join the labor group : — 

We hereby express our belief in the principle of political 
independence of all Labour Members in Parliament, and that 
those members who may be returned under the auspices of the 
Federation be instructed to do everything possible to initiate or 
support a movement for the formation of a Labour Group in the 
House of Commons. 

1 Proceedings of the Miners' Federation of Great Britain, 1901. 



292 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

The "Labour Representative Committee," after the 
Taff Vale decision in 1901, adopted the name of " Labour 
Party," and the thirty-two Labor members in the House 
of Commons constituted themselves as a separate organ- 
ization. In 1909 the affiliation fees, and contributions were 
paid by the Miners' Federation, and its representatives 
in Parliament became members of the Labor party. 1 We 
must remember that the forty-two votes of the Labor 
members in Parliament are far more significant than their 
number would naturally indicate. They represent a vast 
economical as well as political pressure. Moreover, there 
are hundreds of thousands of labor votes outside of the 
Labor party upon which other party representatives in 
Parliament are dependent, and which may easily throw 
their influence for policies which are distinctly favorable 
to labor. We shall see the force of this in 1911 during the 
struggle for the minimum wage. 

C. THE STEELE CASE, 1907 

The year 1907 brought about developments which 
threatened seriously to disturb the whole labor representa- 
tion scheme. A Welsh miner brought suit to recover four 
shillings which had been levied upon him for the labor 
representation fund, and he sought an injunction which 
should restrain the Federation from making further con- 
tributions from its funds to support labor members. 2 The 
miner had joined the Federation in 1900, and in 1901 the 
rules had been altered so as to provide funds for returning 
and maintaining representatives in Parliament. The plain- 
tiff held that he was compelled to pay contributions to sup- 
port members of Parliament who held views entirely op- 
posite to his own. The plaintiff was not successful in the 

1 Proceedings of Annual Conference of Miners' Federation of Great Britain, 
1909, p. 10. 

2 Steele v. The South Wales Miners' Federation and Others. Reprint in Pro- 
ceedings of Annual Conference of Miners' Federation of Great Britain, 1907. 



IN GREAT BRITAIN 293 

county court nor upon appeal to the King's Bench Divi- 
vision of the High Court of Justice, for the court held that 
" It was intended by these miners, when they associated, 
that there should be a power, amongst others, if it was 
thought fit, to raise by levy sums of money to support and 
maintain a Representative in Parliament, and that all 
the organs of the body have agreed that this should be 
done." 

D. THE OSBORNE CASE, 1909 

The next year a similar case was started which affected 
the whole trade-union world. It found its way finally to 
the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice and 
there met a different fate from the Steele case. W. V. Os- 
borne, 1 a foreman porter and a member of the Amalga- 
mated Society of Railway Servants, brought suit to recover 
his contributions to the parliamentary fund and to obtain 
an injunction against further use of the society's funds 
to support the Labor party representatives. He entered his 
plea on the same grounds as in the case of Steele, i.e., 
against compulsion to support representatives with oppo- 
site political views. 

The lower court decided for the society, and the Justice 
based his decision on previous decisions of the High Court 
of Justice. When it came before the Chancery Division, the 
court held that the rules of the society providing for labor 
representation were outside the scope of trade-union activi- 
ties as defined in the Trade-Union Acts of 1871 and 1876. 
A further objection was expressed that " rules designed to 
procure the election of members of Parliament who should 
be bound to vote in a prescribed manner, and the expendi- 
ture of funds for their maintenance in consideration of 
a pledge to vote in that manner, were contrary to public 
policy." 

The society appealed to the House of Lords, and the 

1 Osborne v. Amalgamated Society of Bailway Servants (1910, A. C. 87). 



294 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

Law Lords unanimously upheld the High Court of Justice. 
This decision was rendered in December, 1909, and by July, 
1911, only 200,000 of the 600,000 members of the Federa- 
tion were free from injunction. The Annual Conference 
of the Miners' Federation in 1910 passed a resolution 
strongly protesting against the decision, commanding the 
parliamentary members to " support all possible legislation 
with a view to giving relief in this direction " and urging 
cooperation on the part of all the various executive com- 
mittees having the matter in charge. In the mean time 
every effort was made to keep up the parliamentary fund 
by voluntary arrangements. We might conclude from this 
peaceful way of dealing with the matter that the Federa- 
tion did not realize the full force of the decision on the 
trade-union future. In fact, this sort of procedure was far 
from the liking of the radical members, who were dis- 
gusted with the " lying-down " way in which the Federa- 
tion had taken it, and thought the Labor members ought 
to have walked out of Parliament, gone back to their con- 
stituencies, and started a revolution. 

E. GOVERNMENT PAYMENT OF PARLIAMENTARY 
MEMBERS, 1911 

But the wiser heads in the Federation had learned to 
work through the ordinary channels and, finding response 
in the political mechanism, were able to reach a better 
solution of the problem than had existed under the old 
regime. By a bill passed in August, 1911, payment of 
members of the House of Commons by the Government 
was inaugurated, each member (except officers of the 
House, ministers, and officers of the King's household) 
receiving £400 a year. 

Although the Act of 1911 assured the trade-unionists 
of parliamentary representation, the Osborne decision still 
governed the use of union funds for political purposes. 
To offset this handicap the Labor members succeeded in 



IN GREAT BRITAIN 295 

getting an act passed in 1913 * which permits the unions 
to use their funds for paying the expenses of their can- 
didates, for holding political meetings, for distributing 
campaign literature, and for the support of their mem- 
bers holding any public office. Any trade-unionist who 
objects to contributing to a political fund may be ex- 
empted by giving notice of his objection. Such a member 
is protected from persecution and discrimination by his 
privilege of appeal to the Registrar of Friendly Societies, 
who has full power to remedy such a breach of trade- 
union rules. 

B. The Eight-Hour Law, 1908 

A. DIFFICULTY OF OBTAINING THE ACT 

In connection with the way the miners obtained the 
eight-hour law we have a good illustration of the interplay 
of conciliatory methods with the method of legal enact- 
ment. We have seen that Alexander Macdonald had the 
eight-hour law on his programme in the sixties. Moreover, 
we saw that the opposition on the part of Durham and 
Northumberland was the disrupting force among the 
miners which prevented unity of action on this measure 
in Parliament. In 1901, we find Durham still holding 
tenaciously to her position that " there must be some men 

— if the work is to be carried on safely and regularly — 
who must work more than eight hours ; there are men who 
must go down before the hewers [miners] go down, and 
there are men who must remain after the hewers come up 

— we cannot make a rigid rule all round." 2 

The bill before Parliament failed to pass and a special 
conference of the Federation in July, 1902, resolved to 
use trade-union action to force the measure, " seeing the 

1 Trade-Union Act, 1913, 2 & 3 Geo. 5, chap. 30. 

2 Mines Eight-Hour Bill in Committee, June 12, 1911, p. 7. Reprint in 
Proceedings of Annual Conference of Miners' Federation of Great Britain, 
1911. 



296 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

Government will not allow a legal eight-hours day, and 
also that the coal owners urge on every occasion that the 
eight-hours day be got by Trade-Union effort." The con- 
ference accordingly resolved to have a meeting with the 
coal owners. But instead of devising means by which the 
regulations could be made universal, the owners spent 
their time in framing objections. In the first place, they 
considered such a measure as " an unjustifiable interference 
with the freedom of the subject." They were convinced 
from the statistics they had collected that the output 
would be reduced from eleven to fifty per cent, according 
as the mine was favorably or unfavorably situated. An 
increased cost ranging from 9c7. to Is. 6d. per ton would 
accompany this reduced output and necessarily raise the 
selling price of coal. The hewers who mine coal at a cer- 
tain price per ton could not expect increased rates, and 
shorter hours would lessen their wages. The men who 
were working by the day certainly could not expect to 
receive the same wage, since " it would be unfair to the 
employer that he should be required to pay the same 
wages for less work." Moreover, decreased output and 
increased cost of fuel would seriously handicap the more 
important industries which were subject to keen compe- 
tition from other countries. Finally, it would work great 
hardship on the older men, and the increased hurry would 
increase the number of accidents. 

These were the stock arguments which the miners had 
heard from the time the subject of the eight-hour day 
was first broached, but on previous occasions they had 
not been advanced in a national conference nor so im- 
pressively presented. Evidently there were hard facts in 
the everyday life of the rank and file that required 
stronger arguments than these to offset them satisfac- 
torily. When the miners saw that they could not obtain 
the eight-hour day peacefully through conciliation, they 
again turned to legal enactment. 



IN GREAT BRITAIN 297 

Northumberland had experienced a change of heart in 
1907 and Durham in 1908, and during the struggle for 
the eight-hour bill of the latter year they were within the 
Federation and were righting for the measure. The bill 
met with strong opposition at every stage in its passage. 
On the committee that considered the bill were twelve 
Labor members, eight of whom were miners, yet it in- 
volved a fight of twelve days before the committee could 
bring the bill forth. The opposition consumed as much 
time as possible, and as the end of the session was draw- 
ing near, "the Federation did all they could to sup- 
port the Government to carry the bill. Their members in 
the House of Commons sat for hours like dumb dogs, 
almost bursting to speak, as the temptation to reply to 
the opposition was very great at times." 1 

B. PROVISIONS OF THE ACT 

The act 2 provides that no " workman shall be below 
ground in a mine for the purpose of his work, and of 
going to and from his work, for more than eight hours 
during any consecutive twenty-four hours." But it is not 
considered a contravention of the act when a workman is 
below ground for a longer period to render assistance in 
the case of accident, to meet any danger or apprehended 
danger, or to deal " with any emergency work uncom- 
pleted through unforeseen circumstances which requires to 
be dealt with without interruption in order to avoid seri- 
ous interference with ordinary work in the mine, etc." 

The owner or manager may fix the time at which the 
lowering of the men into the mine shall begin and end 
for each shift, also for raising the men. These regula- 
tions must be embodied in a notice which shall be posted 
in a conspicuous place, and they are subject to a revision 

1 Quarterly Eeport of International Miners' Federation, March, 1909, 
p. 5. 

2 Coal Mines Regulation Act, October, 1908. 



298 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

by the government mine inspector, if a reasonable time is 
not allowed. Furthermore, the owner or manager is re- 
quired to keep a register containing particulars regarding 
the raising and lowering of men " and the cases in which 
any man is below ground for more than the time fixed by 
the Act, and the cause thereof, and the register shall be 
open to inspection by the inspector." The workmen may 
appoint their checkweigher or any official to see that 
these regulations are carried out, and false entries in the 
register subject the offender to a fine of five pounds for 
each offense. 

The owner or manager may extend the working hours 
"on not more than sixty days in any calendar year by 
not more than one hour a day, and on any day in which 
an extension of time is made in accordance with the sec- 
tion as respects any mine, the time as so extended must 
be kept in a register as directed by the Secretary of State 
and subject to inspection by the inspector." The King 
may " in the event of war or of imminent national dan- 
ger or great emergency, or in the event of any grave 
economic disturbance due to the demand of coal exceed- 
ing the supply available at the time, by Order in Council 
suspend the operation of this Act to such extent and for 
such period as may be named in the Order, either as re- 
spects all coal mines or any class of coal mines." 

In the event of contravention of or non-compliance 
with the act, the owner is subject to a fine of two pounds 
and a workman to a fine of ten shillings. The owner is 
not subject to the penalty if he can prove " that he has 
taken all reasonable means by making, publishing, and 
to the best of his ability enforcing, regulations for se- 
curing compliance " with the act. The workman is not 
guilty of an offense if he can prove that he was pre- 
vented from returning to the surface within the time 
limit " owing to means not being available for the pur- 
pose." 



IN GREAT BRITAIN 



C. AMENDMENTS 



In 1909 the law was amended so as to provide that an 
eight-hour period of work should be " during any period 
of twenty-four hours, reckoned from midnight to mid- 
night," and in 1910 further provision was made to re- 
strict the hours of surface workmen, who have to work 
seven days a week, to eight hours. 

When the act went into effect considerable friction arose 
over reduction of wages, the sixty-hour clause, the num- 
ber of shafts to be worked, and the number of workmen 
in a working " place." But the miners showed a disposi- 
tion to bring a national stoppage rather than to yield any 
of the important benefits from the act, and the minor 
ones were adjusted by conciliation. The difficulty of ob- 
taining this act and its detailed regulations stand in great 
contrast to the inauguration and enforcement of the 
eight-hour day in America by strikes or conciliatory 
methods. The only advantage of the British law is that 
it compels universal compliance and places all on an 
equality that is much harder to obtain by conciliation. 
Legal enactment with all its rigidity will naturally fol- 
low where it is impossible to obtain regulations by agree- 
ment between the industrial parties. 

C. The Minimum Wage Act, 1912 

A. GROWTH OF THE MINIMUM WAGE DEMAND 

Before the eight-hour regulation had been attained a 
movement had already been started which was to lead 
to the struggle for the minimum wage. In February of 
1907, at a special miners' conference held to discuss the 
proposed export tax on coal, a resolution was introduced 
"having for its object the raising of the basis rate of 
wages in all coal-producing districts of the United King- 
dom." In the same year the miners approached the 



300 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

owners " with a view to substituting for the 1879 or 1888 
rate of wages, a basis rate including not less than thirty 
per cent of the present percentages, upon which all fu- 
ture advances in wages shall be calculated.'' They failed 
to gain any satisfaction from the owners, but they ap- 
pointed a joint committee to "collect information and 
watch developments with a view of assistance being ren- 
dered to any district, in order to secure this object." 

The following year was taken up with the struggle for 
the eight-hour law, but in 1909 the district of Yorkshire 
introduced a resolution which should provide measures to 
obtain a minimum wage of eight shillings per day and the 
resolution was carried by the conference. During the same 
year the Scottish coal owners sought to reduce the wages 
of the Scottish federation twelve and a half per cent, but 
the miners served notice upon them that " they would re- 
sist any attempt to reduce miners' wages below an average 
of six shillings per day, or in other words, fifty per cent 
on the average standard rate of 1888." The miners of the 
other districts expressed their determination, by a major- 
ity of over 400,000, to support the Scots in their struggle, 
but special conferences aided by mediation from the Gov- 
ernment narrowly averted a national strike. A new con- 
ciliation board was formed for Scotland, the rules of which 
incorporated the new basis and conceded the minimum 



PLACES " 

In 1910 the miners made their resolution more specific 
and resolved to meet the owners in each district in order 
to seek " an individual minimum day wage for all men 
and boys who are now paid by the ton, yard, etc." How 
much the day wage should be was left to the district. 
The impelling force behind this resolution was a sense of 
injustice in connection with the treatment of men who 
had to work in abnormal places. The miners had proved 



IN GREAT BRITAIN 301 

to their satisfaction that the excessively low wages some 
men were getting were due to the unfavorable conditions 
under which they were working. When first-class miners 
who earned high wages under normal conditions were 
placed at work in abnormal places, their wages fell to the 
level of the other unfortunates. The practice of the owners 
in the past had been to dole out a few extra shillings to 
men who were working in such abnormal places. But this 
was a discouraging, unsatisfactory, and degrading process, 
and the miners' officials were constantly called upon to go 
to the owner or manager and plead for a few shillings for 
such men. Moreover, failure to get aid from the owner in 
many cases made the unfortunate a serious burden on the 
local miners' federation. The miners concluded that the 
individual worker should not be made to suffer for una- 
voidable conditions in the industry, but rather that losses 
due to abnormal places should be a charge upon the en- 
tire production of coal. The only way to accomplish this 
was through a minimum wage to the man who did a fair 
day's work under difficult conditions. 

Supplementary to the abnormal working conditions 
which caused dissatisfaction were the overcrowding of the 
mines with men, the forcing of extra timbering on the 
men, and various other duties which took their time and 
lessened the wages of the piece-workers. 

C. PRELIMINARY NEGOTIATIONS 

The miners sought to settle these matters with the 
owners by districts, but were met by the argument that 
the varying capacity of the men, the necessity which it 
would involve of discharging the old men, and the indis- 
position of some men to earn what they could would make 
a minimum wage impossible. " It is always the men who 
are abnormal, not the places," said one miner. Some of the 
owners were willing to grant the minimum wage (but they 
were looked upon as " blacklegs " among the owners in 



302 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

general), and others stated that it was a national question 
and should be settled on a national basis. 

Accordingly the miners sought a national meeting of 
coal owners and miners. At a national joint conference 
on September 29, 1911, the owners showed that they were 
not ready for national action, and submitted a statement 
in which they recognized the right of workmen working 
in abnormal places " to receive wages commensurate with 
the work performed "; but they concluded that conditions 
between districts varied too greatly to permit of their set- 
tling the matter on a national basis. Therefore they sug- 
gested district settlements. 

The miners again attempted to settle by districts, and 
the owners in the districts associated with the English 
Conciliation Board (the Midland counties) agreed to the 
principle of the minimum wage, 1 but the other district 
owners had not changed their attitude. The miners again 
sought a national conference, but by this time the repre- 
sentative owners in the Midland counties had changed 
their attitude, as their constituencies in " their own dis- 
tricts had repudiated their suggestions [and] they were 
without authority " to put the minimum wage into effect. 

D. THE STRIKE BALLOT 

At a special conference on December 20, 1911, the min- 
ers decided, as a last resort, to take a ballot, and, in 
case the vote was favorable, to give notice of their inten- 
tion to strike so that agreements should terminate by the 
end of February, 1912. The results of the ballot on Jan- 
uary 10-12, 1912, showed a majority of 330,080 votes 
in favor of a strike, and by February 26 upwards of 
800,000 miners were idle. 2 

In the mean time there had been no relaxation of the 
effort to settle the dispute before the agreements should 

1 Miners 1 Special Conference, November 14, 1911, p. 46. 

2 HazelVs Annual, 1913, p. 568. 



IN GREAT BRITAIN 303 

terminate. In the further negotiations carried on by the 
miners and owners the miners had framed a schedule of 
minimum wages which ranged from 4s. 10c?. for the For- 
est of Dean to 7s. 6d. for Yorkshire. It was understood 
by the public in general that the miners demanded a min- 
imum of five shillings for men and of two shillings for 
boys. 

E. INTERVENTION BY THE GOVERNMENT 

The prolonged negotiations of the miners and owners 
having met with no success, the Prime Minister intervened. 
He brought about a joint conference of the parties at the 
Foreign Office on March 8, which was without results, and 
on the 15th he announced in the House of Commons the 
introduction of a Minimum Wage Bill. When the owners 
became aware that wages were to be made a subject of 
legislation, they protested vigorously. " It was confiscation. 
It was flying in the face of economic laws." And the 
owners persisted so long in their opposition that the Prime 
Minister revealed to them that the King was in favor 
of the proposition. "The coal magnates of South Wales 
were dumbfounded. They had supposed, as the Paris 
1 Matin ' says, that a king is always on the side of vested 
interests. The coal owners who held out were told that if 
their attitude remained unmodified, they might be sum- 
moned to Buckingham Palace, there to be confronted by 
the spokesman for the miners. This seems to have brought 
the most obstinate to terms." 1 

It is estimated that by March 8 a million and a half 
of workers were idle and many industries had suspended 
operations through lack of coal. The extent of the strike 
was greater than that of the big strike of 1893, and the 
rapidity with which other industries were affected caused 
the gravity of the situation to be quickly realized by the 
whole nation. A coal famine came about in spite of the 
1 Current Literature, vol. 52, p. 386. 



304 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

fact that the owners had anticipated the strike and had a 
large amount of coal in storage. 

F. THE PROVISIONS OF THE ACT 

As soon as it was evident that the Minimum Wage Bill 
would be passed, the strike was declared off and the men 
returned to work. On March 29 a Minimum Wage Bill 
with the following provisions was enacted : — 

The rates of five shillings for men and two shillings 
for boys which the Prime Minister considered " obviously 
just " were not inserted in the bill, although the Govern- 
ment had offered to include them during the early stages 
of the negotiations. Attached to this offer was a provision 
that " the 5s. and 2s. rates should be settled by arbitration 
on a national basis. If the arbitrators found that the 5s. 
and 2s. were, to use Mr. Asquith's words, ' obviously just/ 
then these rates would have applied to every mine in the 
United Kingdom. Incredible though it may seem, the min- 
ers' leaders positively refused to entertain this proposal." * 
It would not seem so incredible if this provision carried 
with it the possibility of having the minimum which had 
been obtained by conciliation, and which was higher than 
five shillings in most districts, reduced to a lower level. 
However, the law provided that settlement of the minimum 
wage should be made by districts and by district boards, 
with the further provision " that the employer shall pay 
to that workman [any workman under ground] wages at 
not less than the minimum rate settled under this Act and 
applicable to that workman." 2 This would seem to have 
simply insured a certain minimum which might be settled 
upon for work in abnormal places. But it did not necessa- 
rily include any provision for a basic minimum wage which 
would apply all over the United Kingdom and insure every 
underground worker a certain standard of living. On the 

1 Markham, Quarterly Review, vol. 216, p. 570. 

2 Coal Mines Minimum Wage Act, 1912. 



IN GREAT BRITAIN 305 

contrary, the principle was maintained of permitting the 
districts with superior advantages and resources to con- 
tinue to profit by these circumstances. 

The joint district board may lay down rules providing 
for the exclusion of aged, infirm, and disabled workmen 
from their right to wages at the minimum rate, and it may 
" lay down conditions with respect to the regularity and 
efficiency of the work to be performed by the workmen, 
and with respect to the time for which a workman is to be 
paid in the event of any interruption of work due to an 
emergency." If the workman does not comply with these 
rules he forfeits the right to wages at the minimum rate, 
" except in cases where the failure to comply with the con- 
ditions is due to some cause over which he has no control." 
The rules shall state also the persons by whom and the 
method by which applicability is to be determined, and 
under what conditions a workman shall be judged as not 
having complied with them. 

The act went into effect immediately, and a workman 
could recover his wages at whatever rate was settled upon, 
but the operation of the regulations under the act must 
not interfere with any other customs or agreements by 
which the workmen were paid a rate higher than the mini- 
mum. In settling the minimum rate the board must "have 
regard to the average daily rate of wages in the district 
paid to the workmen of the class for which the minimum 
rate is settled." 

The Board of Trade is empowered to recognize the joint 
district boards that are already in existence, or any body 
of persons with an independent chairman which the Board 
of Trade believes fairly and adequately represents both 
parties. If any board does not provide for equality of vot- 
ing power, the Board of Trade can require it to readjust 
such a rule as a condition of gaining recognition. The 
Board of Trade can appoint a person or persons to settle 
upon a minimum wage if within two weeks the regular 



306 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

district boards have not been recognized through failure 
on the part of either party to appoint its representatives. 
If within three weeks after the joint board has been rec- 
ognized, it fails to settle upon a minimum wage, the chair- 
man of the board may adjust the rates and make the 
rules, provided that the members agree or the chairman of 
the joint board directs that a period longer than three 
weeks is necessary. 

The joint district board settles upon general minimum 
rates and general rules for the whole district. In case a 
certain class or group of mines requires different regula- 
tions, the board may divide the district into subdistricts 
and treat these separately. Or for the purpose of settling 
district rules, two or more joint district boards may com- 
bine. The rates and rules may be readjusted at any time 
if both parties agree, or after one year has elapsed if there 
seems to be any considerable demand for readjustment 
from either side. 

G. SETTLEMENT UNDER THE ACT 

The act expires in three years unless Parliament shall 
determine otherwise. The minimum wages settled under 
the act vary from 4s. lOd. to 7s. 6d. for men, and the 
wages for boys are graduated from 2s. at the age of four- 
teen to as high as 5s. 6d. at the age of twenty-one. 1 

The rules which have been established by the joint 
Yorkshire district boards are typical and include the fol- 
lowing provisions : Aged and infirm men are not entitled 
to the minimum wage, and aged workmen are those over 
sixty-five " and workmen over sixty who in the opinion of 
the board are unable to do a fair day's work. Infirm work- 
men are those who from bodily infirmity or illness, or ac- 
cident, or disease, are unable to do a fair day's work." 
Unless a man works eighty per cent of the time the mines 

1 Minimum Hates and District Rules of the Joint District Boards under 
the Minimum Wage Act. 



IN GREAT BRITAIN 307 

are operated, he forfeits the right to the minimum wage 
except in cases of sickness or accident, of which proper 
notice must be given to the management. If a workman 
becomes a party to any arrangement for limiting output, 
he forfeits the minimum wage. Nor is he entitled to the 
wage if when he presents himself for work he is informed 
that something has happened which prevents the working 
of the mine. In case of accident or any cause which neces- 
sitates the closing of the mine during the regular working 
hours, the workman is entitled to only the percentage of 
the minimum wage corresponding to the time worked. 

In case a dispute arises as to whether the minimum wage 
is to apply to a workman or as to whether he has failed to 
comply with the regulations, the question may be decided 
by agreement between the workman and the officials of 
the mine. Failure to reach an agreement brings the case 
before the manager of the mine and a person working in 
or about the mine who may be nominated by the work- 
man. If these two fail to agree, the case is brought before 
a committee appointed by the secretaries of the joint dis- 
trict. When the committee cannot agree, the case is de- 
cided by a chairman selected by the parties, or, if they 
cannot agree on a chairman, by a chairman selected by the 
chairman of the joint district board. The decision shall 
not be delayed more than twenty-one days and during that 
time the workman's right to receive the minimum wage is 
reserved. 

When decisions have been rendered under this system, 
a certificate must be given to the parties which shall be 
binding, except in cases where the workman in dealing 
directly with mine officials shall give notice within sixty 
days after the signing "that such certificate has been 
obtained from him by threats, undue pressure, or other 
unfair means." Under such circumstances the case is 
opened anew and goes before the committee, who may 
cancel the certificate. 



r 



308 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

H. EFFECT OF THE MINIMUM WAGE 

It will be seen from the provisions of the act and the 
working of the same that there is no minimum wage in 
the industry as a whole, but simply a minimum for each 
mine, group of mines, or district, as the case may be. It 
has been prophesied that a real minimum wage on a na- 
tional scale would necessarily close the poorest mines and 
encourage more efficient management. But the act protects 
the owners of the poorest mines and yields to their claim 
that " they must have cheap labour irrespective of the cost 
of living." This lowers the standard of living and gives 
a subsidy to the owners of poorly managed mines. In the 
words of one who, though a coal owner, is first of all a 
public-minded citizen and interested in the wisest public 
policy : " The special minimum rate provided for in the 
act is, moreover, fair neither to owners nor to men, for an 
owner who starves his property and spends all his profits 
is permitted to pay a lower minimum rate of wage than 
another who may spend half his income on improving and 
maintaining his mine in a high state of efficiency. Espe- 
cially is this an injustice on the workman, for in a well- 
managed mine the men get good clearance [for their coal] . 
In the badly equipped mine the reverse is the case ; and 
low wages are paid because the men are unable, through 
bad roads, shortness of tubs, out-of-date haulage, etc., to 
get clearance ; for it must always be remembered that 
hewers of coal are invariably paid on the tonnage of coal 
gotten." 1 He was further convinced that if a universal 
minimum wage was not sufficient incentive to increased 
efficiency in management which would enable the owner 
to keep his mine open, the men would readily find occu- 
pation in the better mines, and there working under better 
conditions would produce a larger output than before. 

1 Markham, op. cit. t p. 566. 



IN GREAT BRITAIN 309 

I. POSSIBILITIES OF THE INDUSTRY BEARING A 
MINIMUM WAGE 

To those who questioned the ability of the industry to 
bear a minimum wage the miners had a ready answer. 
For five years one of their own number and a firm of 
chartered accountants had been busy in making a study 
of profits and wages in the British coal trade. 1 Their study 
included ninety-two public companies which represent one 
third of the British coal trade in production and profits, 
and they make no pretense that their figures include more 
than " the minimum (not maximum) results of the trade 
in the country." The conclusions are based on average 
dividends paid on ordinary capital over a period of thir- 
teen years, and the data are not drawn from "a selected set 
of companies." Among these were six companies who paid 
no dividends at all and many others whose failure to pay 
dividends every year brings their average very low. Even 
on this basis the average return on capital in the form of 
dividends is 9.6 per cent, and the shareholders have re- 
ceived their capital back one and one fourth times in the 
thirteen years " in addition to which the original capital 
not only remains intact, but has been added to by various 
appropriations from profits in some of the many forms of 
reserves — visible or otherwise." 2 In comparing amounts 
received in wages and in dividends (which the authors do 
not consider a fair comparison because the full amount 
received by labor is visible while only a portion of the 
benefits accruing to capital is evident), a basis of 19s. 
9^d. per week for miners is used as contrasted with a 
three per cent return on capital. The 19s. 9^d. is based 
on the earnings of the highest paid labor in the Durham 
coal trade, which may be considered as approaching the 
average of the better paid labor over the industry as a 

1 Richardson and Walbrook, Profits and Wages in the British Coal Trade. 

2 Ibid., p. 19. 



/ 



310 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

whole and leaves out of account the great mass of work- 
men who are receiving much less. Three per cent is con- 
sidered a fair basis for capital, since it is the " recognized 
economic return of interest on capital." From this com- 
parison it is found that, while wages average 45 per cent 
over the basis taken, ordinary dividends average 220 per 
cent over the basis, or, in other words, capital benefits in 
the ratio of 5 to 1. In analyzing the comparison of wages 
and dividends of a firm which balanced £631,000 paid in 
wages over against £39,086 paid in dividends, it was found 
that after including " debenture interest," 1 " visible re- 
serves," "capital expenditure" written off out of the year's 
profits, and the income tax which had already been de- 
ducted, " the total known profits of this concern ... ex- 
ceeded £80,000." Comparing the returns on this basis, 
"the average amount received by each employee is £66 
15s. 10c?., while the profits for the year for each share- 
holder average £68 19s. 3c?." 

But when a comparison is made (for the whole indus- 
try) between wages and total profits, which include pref- 
erence dividends and debenture interest besides ordinary 
dividends, it is found that capital profits in the ratio of 
6 to 1, or 293 per cent as against 45 per cent. The in- 
vestigators are confident that the total profits are the 
minimum profits, for they were not able to obtain the total 
profits of all the concerns and are not sure that they got 
the total profits of those firms which are supposed to have 
rendered a full report. But even on this basis the average 
percentage of total profits on total capital is 11.88 per 
cent. From this investigation the authors concluded that 
"an average of about five shillings per week [could] be 
added to the miners' wages all around, and still leave an 
average return on the total capital sunk in the coal trade 
for the whole period of thirteen years of at least three per 
cent per annum." 2 Or 2s. 6d. could be added and still 

1 The same as our interest on bonds. 

2 This ia exclusive of the income tax at the source. 



IN GREAT BRITAIN 311 

give capital an average 9.6 per cent dividend, " merely by 
utilizing undivided profit and without affecting the divi- 
dends which have been paid by the various companies in 
the past thirteen years." 

The developments in the British coal industry, which 
we have briefly described, should enable us to anticipate, 
to some extent at least, the trend of evolution which lies 
before the coal industry of America. Up to the present 
time trade unionism in the British coal industry has not 
had to face a united body of capitalists with a national 
organization, yet it has had a very severe struggle to ob- 
tain concessions by peaceful means. The growing realiza- 
tion of the power of the miners' national organization may 
cause British owners to unite to meet the men with a simi- 
larly unified front. In fact, the miners were anxious to 
have the owners make a settlement on a national scale of 
the minimum wage. But concentration of ownership and 
control has not progressed in Great Britain to the degree 
that it has in our anthracite field and in some portions of 
our richest bituminous field, and the force of competition 
is still a disrupting factor among the owners. 

The next big issue in the mining industry of Great 
Britain will undoubtedly be the nationalization of mines. 
This movement has been on foot for some years, and the 
miners have already taken definite parliamentary action 
looking to its accomplishment. The " way leaves," 1 mine 
royalties, and large profits of the owners stand as a con- 
stant challenge to the men who mine the coal. National 
ownership, if it comes, will probably come peacefully be- 
cause the British already have at hand the social and po- 
litical machinery with which to make it effective. 

In the process of working out peaceful adjustments, the 
average individual develops to the point where he is fitted 

1 The charge made upon every ton of coal by a property owner where 
entrance to a mine has been gained through his property. It is looked upon 
as legal " blackmail " by owners and miners. 



312 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

to carry out his part under new conditions. In the anthra- 
cite negotiations of 1912, utterance was given to ideas that 
will probably evolve in time into a frank demand for 
national ownership of coal mines. As yet we have hardly 
begun to take measures to encourage orderly development 
and sanity on the part of the workers in the working-out 
of industrial adjustments. Lack of public policy or re- 
pression causes the labor unrest to take the form of syn- 
dicalism and the Industrial Workers of the World. With 
the development of a greater solidarity among the workers 
and with the increasing economic pressure due to the ex- 
haustion of our free land, we may expect a demand for 
social and political action which will put a severe strain on 
our rigid constitutional system. Even in Britain, where 
political institutions are more elastic and where pressing 
demands can be met more readily by legislative action, it 
is only after a struggle that adjustments are made to 
fit the needs resulting from economic and social pressure. 
There the workers are now met by a frank, conciliatory 
policy that ramifies through all industry. But what of the 
future in this country if in 1916, when the present agree- 
ments in both the bituminous and anthracite fields expire 
simultaneously, either party assumes an arbitrary and un- 
yielding position ? 



CHAPTER IX 

OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE 

1. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A CONCILIATORY 

SYSTEM, PRICES OF COAL, AND A 

REGULATORY POLICY 

When we ask, " What of the public ? " it would seem that 
this question has at least two aspects. The public has been 
made to feel that there is very close connection between 
a system of conciliation and arbitration and the price it 
pays for coal. Furthermore, we have seen that on several 
occasions the public has found its whole supply of coal 
cut off because of the lack of a system of peaceful settle- 
ment which would permit the parties producing coal to 
come to an honorable and fair adjustment of their diffi- 
culties. 

Shortly after the last anthracite agreement in 1912, 
consumers were informed that they must pay a higher 
price for their coal because wages had been raised. This 
seemed a fairly reasonable explanation, but it did not 
satisfy everybody that the wage-earners were getting all 
the increase. A resolution passed by the House of Repre- 
sentatives on July 29, 1912, directed the Secretary of 
Commerce and Labor to obtain information which would 
show how much "the coal miners were benefited by the 
recent strike agreement, and how much and for what rea- 
sons and by what means the cost of coal to the general 
consumers was at the same time increased." ! Asa result 
of this investigation it was shown that seven companies, 

1 Increase in Prices of Anthracite Coal, 62d Congress, 3d Session, House 
Doc. no. 1442, p. 9. 



314 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

which produced about seventy per cent of the total sales, 
had obtained about 113,450,000 " more than they would 
have received for the same tonnage at the prices previously 
existing." 1 Of this amount the miners received about 
$ 4,000,000. Since the cost of labor constitutes between 
seventy-five and eighty per cent of the total colliery cost, 
the consumers may well question the extent to which the 
employers are to be allowed to raise prices every time the 
miners are granted an increase in wages. Nor are the con- 
sumers protected by anything other than the privilege of 
substituting some other kind of fuel when the prices of 
coal become prohibitive. This is not possible without a 
great deal of trouble and expense, and there are compara- 
tively few substitutes to be had. Consumers will pay al- 
most extortion prices for anthracite rather than substitute 
soft coal with its disagreeable qualities, and this fact, in 
connection with the expense involved, gives us a concep- 
tion of the margin the operators have to play upon before 
they reach the maximum which the traffic will bear. Since 
the domestic consumers have to pay for the greater part 
of this increase (the average increase on domestic sizes 
was 31.23 cents per ton, while the pea coal and steam 
sizes were increased only 16.14 cents per ton), 2 it becomes 
evident that protection from such a burden must come 
from the Government. Thus far under our governmental 
policy of laissez-faire in industry, the organized and pow- 
erful have been able to gain their purposes and the dis- 
organized consumers are left to express their protests at 
election times. Before we can be in a position to appreci- 
ate the complexity of the problem before us we shall have 
to look back upon the efforts that have been made and the 
recommendations suggested for dealing with the growing 
coal monopoly. In conjunction with a constructive policy 
which would prohibit the operators from shifting upon the 

1 Increase in Prices of Anthracite Coal, 62d Congress, 3d Session, House 
Doc. no. 1442, p. 11. 2 Ibid. 



OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE 315 

public an increase greater than that granted to the wage- 
earners, plus legitimate profits, we must have a further ex- 
tension of the activities of the Government into the realm 
of industrial agreements which shall encourage within the 
parties a feeling of greater responsibility to the public. 

In our efforts to prevent the growth of a monopoly con- 
trol and the fixing of prices of coal, our public policy has 
gone through an evolution based on common law, state 
statutes and constitutions, national laws in restraint of 
trade with court interpretations, with barely a beginning 
at a policy of regulation under the Interstate Commerce 
Commission. We have clung tenaciously to the theory that 
law per se is quite sufficient and needs but little coopera- 
tion on the part of the administrative branch of the Gov- 
ernment. We have expected that the mere existence of 
law would be sufficient to counteract the influence of fun- 
damental economic forces. But these, as they were bound 
to, have worked themselves out without the guidance and 
cooperation of the Government. 

A. Recommendations of Investigating Committees 

A. THE COMMITTEE OF 1888 

With the prevalence of abuses in freight rates, increas- 
ing concentration of ownership of coal lands, and the 
growth of labor struggles involving large numbers, we 
have appointed our investigating committees, but their 
recommendations we have accepted slowly if at all. As 
early as 1878, the Legislature of Pennsylvania recognized 
the power of the railroads to force concentrated ownership 
by discrimination in freight rates, and a joint resolution 
was passed petitioning Congress to legislate " for equity 
in the rates of freight." 1 The congressional committee of 
1888 which investigated the anthracite troubles found prac- 
tically the same conditions we have now except that they 

1 Lloyd, Lords of Industry, p. 237. 



316 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

were not developed quite so far. Under state remedies for 
dealing with the situation they suggested, first, that the 
state tax " idle anthracite lands on the basis of their full 
market value," which would force the holders to work, sell, 
or lease them. 1 By the exercise of the right of eminent 
domain the State could take possession of the lands at a 
fair valuation and then " throw them open to free com- 
petition in mining at a reasonable royalty, sufficient to 
pay the interest on the debt she would thereby contract." 
Through the exercise of the police power the State could 
fix a minimum freight rate and a maximum royalty. On 
the side of national remedies the committee suggested that 
Congress could prohibit interstate carriers from engaging 
in mining and manufacturing. And further, Congress could 
prohibit the consolidation of parallel or competing lines 
which tap the anthracite region. 

B. THE COMMITTEE OF 1893 

The congressional committee of 1893 concluded that 
the railroad companies had entered into a combination to 
control output and fix prices. They were fortified in this 
conclusion by evidence of monthly meetings of railroad 
representatives in which, as the result of tacit understand- 
ing, the industry was regulated. The railroads forced re- 
calcitrant operators to limit their output by withholding 
cars from them. These monthly meetings explained why 
the annual output of coal was about 10,000,000 tons less 
than the capacity of the mines would warrant. The manip- 
ulation of freight rates was also used to hold the inde- 
pendent operator in line. The Interstate Commerce Com- 
mission had determined, in the case of Coxe Brothers and 
Company versus the Lehigh Valley Railroad, in 1888, that 
the railroad was charging fifty cents per ton above what 
the commission regarded as a fair rate. Yet the commis- 

1 Report on Labor Troubles in the Anthracite Regions, 1887-88, op. cit, 
p. xvi. 



OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE 317 

sion had at that time no power to fix rates. Because of 
these conditions the committee centered their recommen- 
dations about features which would give the Interstate 
Commerce Commission adequate powers to deal with the 
situation, and suggested that state and national Govern- 
ments take united action in divorcing the business of 
transportation from mining and manufacturing. 1 

C. THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 
INVESTIGATION, 1907 

The Interstate Commerce Commission in 1907, after in- 
quiring into the ownership of coal lands, stock ownership 
in coal companies by railroads, and other factors which 
might give monopoly control of the bituminous coal in 
Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, and West Virginia, set 
forth the following facts which it regarded as contributory 
to discrimination and monopoly power. 

The first great factor which permitted unfair car dis- 
tribution was "want of publicity on the part of the car- 
riers in their dealings with shippers." If there was any 
system to the car distribution it was hard for the shipper 
to find out what it was and whether it was faithfully 
carried out. 

The method of rating mines for the purpose of deter- 
mining proper distribution of cars was another important 
factor. "If capacity of mines is to govern in the rating 
for car distribution, the persons or companies owning the 
mines should be fairly represented when such a rating is 
made." The importance of this factor is exemplified by 
the practice of companies (which own several mines) in 
utilizing their entire car allotment to alternately run up 
the capacity of their mines. This is accomplished by the 
way they distribute their cars to certain mines and shut 
down others. 

The Commission was of the opinion also that the 

1 "Report on Alleged Coal Combination, 1893, op. cit., p. viii. 



S18 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

ownership by the Pennsylvania and the New York Central 
Railroads of stock in other roads tended to eliminate com- 
petition in rates, although the railroads justified this own- 
ership by pointing to it as " the real cause for the cessation 
in rebates." 

Another important element entering into the situation 
was the ownership of " individual cars " which made it 
possible for the large operators to get a greater amount 
of coal to market and have greater regularity of service. 
These cars were sold or leased to the individual operator 
by the railroad, and the owner was allowed a reduction of 
six mills per mile on freight rates for their use. Since 
this allowance was insufficient to pay interest on the in- 
vestment, the amount of coal marketed and regularity of 
service were the important factors. 

Analogous to this abuse of individual cars was the as- 
signment of fuel cars for railroad coal to certain mines or 
mining companies without counting them in the regular 
allotment. This practice is " frequently used by the rail- 
road company to enable it to get its coal supply at less 
than the market price of coal." 

To rectify these conditions the Commission recom- 
mended that common carriers be required to make public 
their systems of car distribution. They should be required 
to publish them at stated periods, show their effect on the 
different divisions, and, when the supply did not equal 
the demand, explain how the cars were divided among the 
mines along the road. If " capacity of mines " were used 
as the basis of distribution, owners of mines should be 
represented at the rating thereof. The Commission fur- 
ther recommended that " after [a] reasonable time " in- 
dividual or private cars should be prohibited, and that 
carriers or their officers be forbidden to own either di- 
rectly or indirectly any operated coal properties. 1 

1 Report of Interstate Commerce Commission on Discriminations and Mo- 
nopolies in Coal and Oil, 1907, p. 81. 



OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE S19 

These conditions in the bituminous fields and the re- 
commendations for correcting abuses show that we have 
the same influences, working toward the same results, as 
have been noted in the anthracite field. Many unique 
suggestions have been offered for dealing with our coal 
monopoly. We shall see to what extremes advocates of 
the common law are willing to go. 

B. The Common Law Remedies 

Supplementary to the principle permitting the State to 
compel an owner of purely private real estate to conform 
to state regulations is the doctrine that the owner of prop- 
erty which has a quasi-public character is further obligated 
to conform to public needs and policy. This doctrine has 
received the support of the United States Supreme Court 
in the case known as Munn vs. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, de- 
cided in 1876. In this case a firm owning and operating a 
grain elevator refused to conform to a state statute requir- 
ing grain-elevator owners to take out a license which would 
insure the faithful performance of their duties as public 
warehousemen. It was decided that the State had the right 
to require the owners of property on which the public good 
depended to conform to regulations necessary for accom- 
plishing this end. Furthermore, this common-law principle 
of early origin stood in support of any constitutional or 
statutory provisions. Not only had the State a right to 
regulate, but also to fix, prices. If there is no statute 
in existence, and representative people dependent on the 
public services of the property complain that the owner 
refuses to give the services which the nature of his public 
ownership requires, the courts commonly appoint agents 
or receivers to operate the property and see that all par- 
ties are rendered justice. 

In 1902, when the railroads were refusing to arbitrate 
and thus make possible the operation of their proper- 
ties, one advocate of common-law procedure summed up 



320 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

his argument and citation of authorities with this state- 
ment : — 

It follows that since the public have a right in the mines — a 
right to have coal forthwith mined for immediate consumption 
— and have a right to have that coal immediately transported 
out of the mine regions by the coal-carrying roads — a court of 
equity, if no other solution of the difficulty is open, has the au- 
thority to, and, upon the application of a representative portion 
of the public, undoubtedly would, appoint a receiver or receiv- 
ers to take into his or their hands the whole business now in 
the hands of the anthracite coal combine, and to run it in their 
place. This would be neither nationalism nor socialism, and 
would introduce no unfamiliar principle of law or of practice, 
and would not extend one whit the magnitude of the powers 
heretofore lately exercised by the courts of justice in great en- 
terprises. 1 

But so long as the owners continued to serve the public 
there would be no remedy from this source. Furthermore, 
in the matter of combination and restraint of trade the 
common law operates merely in a negative way. It pro- 
vides that covenants in restraint of trade are not operative 
or effective, " but it can do little if all within the combi- 
nation are satisfied." 2 Then it is that affirmative statutes 
are needed. 

C. The Inadequacy of Decisions based on Laws 
in Restraint of Trade 

A. THE RECENT ANTHRACITE DECISION 

Even when we have the affirmative statutes in the form 
of the Sherman Law and the commodity clause of the 
Hepburn Act, the extent to which they are prohibitory 
and really effective in preventing restraint of trade and 
monopoly control is well exemplified by the results of the 
commodities case and of the recent decision of the Su- 

1 Chaplin, The Coal Mines and the Public, p. 37. 

2 Wyman, Control of the Market, p. 138. 



OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE 321 

preme Court dealing with the anthracite situation. In this 
latter decision the government attorneys were informed 
that they had failed to establish the fact that there was 
any general combination which entered into a pooling ar- 
rangement to apportion tonnage. Yet the court took cog- 
nizance of the Temple Iron Company, which as a holding 
company was operating in restraint of trade and was de- 
clared illegal. The very antecedents of the holding com- 
pany, 1 the way it was formed, the percentages of holdings 
in the company, and the voting trust which it entailed all 
point to the power to control production, allot tonnage, 
and fix prices. The court admitted that the thwarting of 
the projected New York, Wyoming, and Western Rail- 
road, in order to prevent the competition of independents 
in the market, was an illegal act in restraint of trade and 
that it was accomplished by the Temple Iron Company as 
a holding company. But it found no general combination 
in restraint of trade. Furthermore, " its board of directors, 
composed as it is of men representing the defendants, sup- 
plies time, place, and occasion for the expression of plans 
or combinations requiring or inviting concert of action. 
Though as a board it may not dictate the activities of the 
owning corporations, still, in view of the relation of the 
Temple Iron Company to the defendant carriers and their 
respective coal mining companies, and of the constitution 
of its directors, the attitude of its board, as indicated by 
the proceedings spread upon the corporate minutes, is of 
significance upon the question of the existence of any con- 
certed purpose to unite the activities of its corporate own- 
ers to suppress competition. There are to be found on the 
minutes of the Temple Iron Company a number of entries 
which point strongly to combinations between the defend- 
ants. Thus, on June 27, 1899, a committee was appointed 
to consider the establishment of a statistical bureau ' to 
keep a record of all matters of interest to the anthracite 

1 We have already described these on pp. 226-227, ante. 



322 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

companies.' " * The evidence was sufficient to warrant the 
dissolution of the Temple Iron Company, but not to es- 
tablish a general combination in restraint of trade. The 
court considered it sufficient to break up the combination 
into its elements, for "each group in the absence of any 
agreement or combination possesses the power to compete 
with every other in the production, sale, and transporta- 
tion of coal." 2 

Following the consummation of the Temple Iron Com- 
pany deal, the independents were given sixty-five per cent 
contracts in order to mollify them. This meant that they 
would get sixty-five per cent of the selling price of coal at 
tidewater, be relieved of the expense of selling agencies, 
and pay fluctuating freight rates with the varying price in 
coal. These contracts were declared illegal and void. On 
what grounds can such a decision be justified as helping 
either the public by a fall in prices or as aiding the inde- 
pendents in making them freer and able to get better 
prices for their coal ? The usual argument is that it will 
reestablish a certain amount of competition. Up to the 
present, at least, the independent has been practically at 
the mercy of the carriers as to freight rates, allotment of 
cars, and discrimination. The railroad can justify freight 
rates by pointing to the rates they charge their own min- 
ing companies, even though they are " robbing Peter to 
pay Paul." The independents will also be put to the ex- 
pense of establishing selling agencies, which certainly will 
not help to reduce the selling price to the consumer. Last, 
and more important than all, the comparatively small ton- 
nage and control of unmined coal points to one of the ele- 
ments that make it " seem a little mystifying that President 
Baer and Attorney-General Wickersham express equal 
satisfaction with the opinion." The general understand- 

1 United States vs. Beading Company, 33 Supreme Court Reporter, no. 4, 
p. 97. 

2 Ibid., p. 93. Italics mine. 



OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE 323 

ing developed by the Temple Iron Company will con- 
tinue, and the railroads are quite sure that the independ- 
ents received enough benefit by their sixty-five per cent 
contracts, so that they will seek to save themselves trou- 
ble and expense by selling the railroads their coal. As 
for the Attorney-General, he was probably deluded into 
thinking the decision would accomplish more than it will. 
So far as the absorption of the Pennsylvania Coal 
Company and the New York, Susquehanna, and Western 
Railroad by the Erie, and the acquisition by the Reading 
of the majority stock ownership in the Jersey Central is 
concerned, these deals are still open to action by the 
Government. However we may look upon the interpreta- 
tion of the facts, it should be pointed out that the decision 
does not mean that such a combination did not exist, but 
that it has not been proved to exist. There is hardly need 
to raise the question of the efficacy of the courts in dealing 
with the situation. 



B. THE " COMMODITIES CASE " 

The commodities clause of the Hepburn Act, 1 which 
prohibits the common carrier from transporting any arti- 
cle or commodity which it has manufactured, mined, or 
produced, " or which it may own in whole or in part, or in 
which it may have any interest, direct or indirect," was 
inoperative in this case for two reasons. Action in the 
anthracite case was begun in 1907 before the Hepburn 
Act became effective (May 1, 1908), and on that score 
the Delaware, Lackawanna, and Western Railroad, whose 
charter permitted it to engage in mining, was not subject 
to action in this case. But relief against a continuance of 
the mining operations can be sought in another proceed- 
ing. On the basis of priority of action the other roads 

1 " An Act to regulate commerce," 34 Statutes at Large, 584, chap. 
3591. 



SU ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

were also immune in this case, but one may wonder why 
they are not also subject to proceedings under the com- 
modities clause, since they own and have "an interest, 
direct or indirect," in subsidiary coal companies. In 1908 
a decision 1 was rendered on this same commodities clause 
which ruled that "the provision of the commodities 
clause relating to interest, direct or indirect, does not em- 
brace an interest which a carrier may have in a producing 
corporation as the result of ownership by the carrier of 
stock in such corporation. " 

O. UNITED STATES VS. LEHIGH VALLEY RAILROAD 
COMPANY 

But the Supreme Court was soon called upon to amplify 
its decision in the United States vs. the Delaware and 
Hudson Company and interpret still further the mean- 
ing it attached to the commodities clause. In fact, the 
case of the United States vs. the Lehigh Valley Rail- 
road Company (1910) 2 is a sequel to the former case de- 
cided in 1908. The court had held that the prohibitions 
of the commodities clause had but a common purpose, to 
disassociate the "railroad companies prior to transporta- 
tion from articles or commodities, whether the association 
resulted from manufacture, mining, production or own- 
ership, or interest, direct or indirect," and these provisions 
were applicable to a "legal or equitable interest" which 
could be satisfied by the coal company being a " distinct 
corporation " from the railroad. " Thus construed," the 
clause was held to be " within the power of Congress to 
enact." 

The clause, bearing this interpretation, was remanded 
to the lower court for further proceedings. The Lehigh 
Valley Coal Company was charged with not being a bona 

1 United States ex rel. The Attorney -General of the United States vs. Del- 
aware and Hudson Company, 213 U.S. 366. 

2 220 U.S. 257. 



OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE 325 

fide mining company, but merely a department of the 
railroad company. Further, the railroad used its stock 
ownership in the coal company to "buy up all the coal 
produced by other mining companies in the area tributary 
to the railroad and fix the price at which such coal was 
bought.' ' By this means and by the control of transpor- 
tation facilities it was able to determine prices at sea- 
board. 

The lower court had refused to allow the Government 
to file an amended bill and had dismissed the suit. The 
case was appealed to the Supreme Court. In reply to a 
technical objection of the railroad company, which claimed 
that the action of the lower court was not susceptible to 
review, " however germane that amendment may have 
been . . . because the allowance of amendments to pro- 
ceedings is discretionary with a trial court . . . unless a 
gross abuse of discretion was committed," the Supreme 
Court decided that " an absolute abuse of discretion " had 
been committed in refusing to allow the amendment. 

The railroads had interpreted the former commodities 
decision to permit unlimited commingling of the affairs of 
coal and railroad companies, but the court decreed that 
they must be bona fide separate corporations, and insisted 
that the abuses of " such a situation could not have ex- 
isted had the fact that the two corporations were separate 
and distinct legal entities been regarded in the adminis- 
tration of the affairs of the coal company." As it now 
stands the railroads can continue to be interested in coal 
companies, provided they keep up the appearance of bona 
fide legal entities. 

D. The Lack of Public Policy 

If we can learn nothing else from this resume of recom- 
mendations by committees, common-law principles, and 
court decisions under affirmative statutes on restraint of 
trade, one fact should stand out plainly — the weakness 



S26 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

and inadequacy of our public policy in dealing with the 
growing control of such an important commodity as coal. 
Here we have a natural resource which can be made avail- 
able to the public only by the use of transportation facili- 
ties. The development of the mines and the railroads have 
necessarily gone hand in hand. Competition, glutted mar- 
kets, and interruption of traffic early prompted the rail- 
roads to seek control of the whole industry. As so many 
units, the railroads found that they were not in a much 
better position to regulate the industry than before they 
acquired ownership of the coal lands. Responding to im- 
mutable economic pressure as well as to any desire for 
monopoly which may be attributed to them, they learned 
to develop a community of interests in spite of legal ob- 
stacles. Their problem has been to curb the individual or 
company which proposed to carry free competition to ex- 
tremes, just exactly as the labor union finds it necessary 
to curb the individual who is willing to work for very low 
wages. In the mean time the consumer, as long as he got 
his coal at a price somewhere within proportion to the 
prevailing regime of prices, paid what he had to pay, 
and grumbled. The level of monopoly prices would have 
been higher than it is had we been dependent solely on 
the effectiveness of our public policy. The competition 
from bituminous coal and the limits set by the possibility 
of substitution and by ability to consume have been the 
only regulatory factors of the anthracite monopoly. 

With the rise of a labor organization and a system of 
conciliation and arbitration which will extend itself over 
the whole coal industry, it becomes a matter of vital con- 
cern to the public that the prices charged for coal shall 
give a just recompense to both labor and capital and at 
the same time not reach an extortionate level. In this 
connection one naturally wonders why the administrative 
and regulatory powers of Government, through the activi- 
ties of the Interstate Commerce Commission and other 



OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE 327 

commissions, have not evolved to a point which would 
permit more effective governmental protection of con- 
sumers. To understand this we have but to turn to a 
consideration of the factors which have prevented the In- 
terstate Commerce Commission from adequately regulating 
interstate commerce through the adjustment of " reason- 
able " freight rates. Then we shall understand why further 
extension of regulatory powers which would permit a com- 
mission to deal with the more difficult problem of con- 
centrated ownership of coal lands and railroads and the 
adjustment of freight rates and prices of coal has not 
taken place. 

E. The Work of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission 

A. COXE BROTHERS CASE 

Until recently the Interstate Commerce Commission has 
been greatly handicapped in its work. In its first attempt 
to deal with anthracite rates it learned that where rail- 
roads own mining companies the only regulation practica- 
ble is the requirement making rates reasonable. In 1888, 
Coxe Brothers and Company brought action against the 
Lehigh Valley Railroad for charging unreasonable rates. 
After an investigation in which the other railroads refused 
to avail themselves " of the liberty to appear and join in 
the defense," the Commission established rates varying 
from 1 1.05 to 11.50 per ton, according to the sizes of coal. 
The Lehigh refused to conform to the rates, and when 
haled into court by the Commission denied that it had vio- 
lated any provision of the act regulating commerce or that 
its rates were unreasonable. Furthermore, if the act per- 
mitted the Commission to set up what it regarded as rea- 
sonable rates, the company held it to be unconstitutional 
because it interfered " with the common-law rights of com- 
mon carriers " and violated the companies' charter rights 



328 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

which permitted a charge of three cents per ton per mile 
for " tolls " and " transportation." 1 

The case was brought before the Circuit Court of the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania in 1891, but the decision 
was not handed down till 1896. In the mean time the at- 
tempted merger in 1892-93 had taken place, and the 
Commission says rather bitterly that the interests of the 
complainants were probably " better served by the present 
high prices enforced through the ' combine ' than they 
would be by the lower transportation rates " which were 
ordered for the public good. 2 In 1896 the court informed 
the Commission that it declined to enforce its orders in 
the matter of freight rates because of "an erroneous esti- 
mate of cost to the company " and the inability of the Com- 
mission to " itself fix rates." The estimate of cost by the 
Commission had been " made upon the company's report 
of earnings and expenses on coal transportation and was 
somewhat lower than an estimate stated by counsel for 
the carrier." 

The case was appealed, but in 1897 the Supreme Court 
decision on the Freight Bureau Cases, 3 which denied the 
authority of the Commission to require carriers not to ex- 
ceed charges found reasonable and just, caused the Com- 
mission to drop the case. The Commission had expected 
that the courts would compel obedience to the orders of 
the Commission "unless the record of the investigation 
which resulted in that order disclosed some plain error of 
fact or conclusion sufficient to justify the court in refusing 
to take such action." 

After the Commission had made its investigation, issued 
its orders, and appealed to the court to enforce them, it 
was often found that the carrier had withheld evidence, 
and the courts were required to pass on evidence very dif- 
ferent from that submitted to the Commission. 

1 Report of Interstate Commerce Commission, 1891, p. 288. 

2 Ibid., 1892, p. 27. 3 167 U.S. 479. 



OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE 329 

The Commission summed up the conditions thus : — 

The special weakness of the law as it now stands is the want 
of finality and binding force to the decisions of the Commission 
though made upon facts ascertained after notice to the carriers 
and full opportunity for all interested parties to be heard. The 
absence of any conclusive character to our determinations de- 
prives them of the weight and vigor which they ought to pos- 
sess, and prevents the exercise of that authority which is essential 
to effective regulation. 1 

B. THE BAIRD CASE 

The next case worthy of note that arose in the anthra- 
cite field was the result of a complaint concerning legality 
of rates brought by William R. Hearst in 1903 against 
the Reading and other railroads. During the investigation 
David S. Baird, Secretary of the Lehigh Valley Coal 
Company, refused to produce the contracts entered into 
between the company and independent producers. The 
officials of the other coal and railroad companies also re- 
fused to produce similar contracts. These contracts had 
been entered into after January 1, 1901, and are now 
popularly known as the " sixty-five per cent contracts." 
Information regarding the fixing of prices of coal at tide- 
water, the cost of producing coal, and the items entering 
into company reports under the heading "general ex- 
penses " was also refused. 

The Commission brought action in the United States 
Circuit Court of the Southern District of New York to 
compel the parties 2 to answer questions and produce in- 
formation. The court compelled the president of the Lack- 
awanna to answer the specific question regarding the items 
under general expenses, "inasmuch as the documents 
containing that item were in evidence before the Com- 
mission." But the court held that the other information 

1 Report of Interstate Commerce Commission, 1895, p. 11. 

2 Interstate Commerce Commission vs. Baird et al., 194 U.S. 25. 



330 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

asked and the contracts called for were not relevant to 
the question of reasonable rates. The Commission be- 
lieved that this evidence had direct bearing upon rea- 
sonable rates, whether or not there were discriminating 
charges and whether or not the fixing of tidewater prices 
was in violation of the anti-pooling section of the act to 
regulate commerce. 

The case was appealed to the Supreme Court, which 
reversed the decision of the lower court. The railroads 
tried to have the appeal dismissed on a technicality and 
" insisted that the language of the proviso [in the Elkins 
Act of 1903 providing for the expediting of cases] applied 
only to cases in equity, and did not include those of the 
character of an action to compel the production of books 
and papers and the giving of testimony by witnesses called 
before the Commission." But the court refused to inter- 
pret the proviso narrowly, and took into consideration 
other sections of the act which permitted the Commission 
to inquire into the management of the business of all 
common carriers and keep itself informed " as to the man- 
ner and method in which the same is conducted, with the 
right to obtain from such common carriers full and com- 
plete information necessary to enable the Commission to 
perform its duties and carry out the objects for which it 
was created." 1 

This decision was handed down in 1904, but it was not 
till March 8, 1906, that it was reopened for argument. It 
was reargued on March 29, 1906, " and since that time 
the case has been placed on the suspense calendar." 2 
Whether or not this action was encouraged by the ex- 
pected passage of the Hepburn Act of 1906, which gave 
the Commission enlarged powers, or the expected govern- 
mental prosecution of the roads under the Sherman Law 
(begun in 1907), we can only conjecture. At any rate, the 

1 Report of Interstate Commerce Commission, 1904, p. 33. 

2 Official correspondence. 



OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE 331 

courts monopolized the field of action from 1907 to 1912 
with very ineffective results. 

C. THE POWER TO FIX MAXIMUM RATES 

The Hepburn Act gave the Commission power to fix 
maximum rates, and this function was upheld by the Cir- 
cuit Court of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in 
1909. 1 The decision also supported the Commission's con- 
tention that since the passage of the Hepburn Act the 
courts have no right to review or set aside its orders " in 
so far as they involved the exercise of discretion or judg- 
ment," but that "the courts might inquire whether the 
formalities required by the statute had been complied 
with ; whether a proper complaint had been presented, a 
full hearing had, an order made in due form and properly 
served upon the defendant ; but if these formalities had 
been followed, then the order of the Commission could 
only be attacked upon the ground that it violated some 
constitutional right of the defendants." 

D. THE COMMISSION HANDICAPPED BY THE COURTS 

The powers now secured are those that the Commission 
has needed all the time. Without them its efforts to func- 
tion as it was intended to have been handicapped on every 
side. The courts have been concerned about technicalities 
and have quibbled over minor matters to the exclusion of 
important ones. This is well exemplified in the Chesa- 
peake and Ohio coal case, in which the Chesapeake and 
Ohio Railroad was restrained from granting discrimina- 
tory rates to the New York, New Haven, and Hartford 
Railroad Company, but " the court declined, however, to 
enjoin the Chesapeake and Ohio from further departing 
from its tariff rates in the transportation of coal or of in- 
terstate traffic generally, and that was, of course, the ob- 
ject of the preceding commission." 2 

1 Report of Interstate Commerce Commission, 1909, p. 29. 

2 Ibid., 1904, p. 78. 



332 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

F. The Need for an Accounting System 

In fact, before the Commission can really get at the 
rate problem, where railroads own the coal mines, it will 
be necessary to make a thorough investigation of the costs 
of mining. In spite of the varying conditions in mining 
and the great differences in productivity between fields, 
an effective system of obtaining costs is possible. That it 
can be accomplished is demonstrated by the results of 
work done in the mining industry of Germany. 1 

The work done by the Department of Commerce and 
Labor in 1913 in investigating costs and prices of anthra- 
cite coal is a good beginning. One of the first difficulties 
the bureau which had charge of this investigation encoun- 
tered was the " widely different methods of accounting." 
Thus a policy of regulation would involve a uniform sys- 
tem of accounting in mining similar to the requirements 
placed upon the railroads by the Interstate Commerce Com- 
mission. 

In spite of this handicap the bureau obtained informa- 
tion from the records of " railroad interests " which own 
their own mines or are affiliated through holding com- 
panies and produce seventy-five per cent of the anthracite 
coal. 2 The information given was checked against the 
books of the companies or their published records by cer- 
tified public accountants, and no discrepancies were found 
except in the case of one company whose records were not 
included in the report of the bureau. Other information 
was obtained from annual reports, " sworn statements in- 
troduced in judicial hearings," and by " personal visits of 
agents of the bureau to the retailers of the cities covered 
by the investigation." 

The bureau was able to arrive at a figure which repre- 

1 Walker, Monopolistic Combinations in the German Coal Industry. Pub- 
lications of American Economic Association, 3d series, vol. 5, pp. 145-59. 

2 Increase in Prices of Anthracite Coal, op. cit., p. 10. 



OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE 333 

sented at least the maximum increase in labor cost per 
ton (9.75 cents), operating costs, fixed charges, and the 
extent of depletion funds which, compounded at four per 
cent for forty years, would repay the companies for the ac- 
tual costs of their coal lands. The causes which tend to 
increase and decrease cost of production can also be ascer- 
tained, and computations can be made which will allow 
for both influences. 

In this investigation the benefit of the doubt would 
seem to have been given the companies in every instance, 
and yet the Government was able to show the dispropor- 
tionate share that capital was getting out of the increased 
charges. Furthermore, we must remember that this esti- 
mate of $13,450,000 increase is a minimum, for ability to 
sell coal at "premiums " for quick delivery during periods 
of shortage makes a substantial addition. Out of this in- 
crease the operators had to pay the $ 4, 000,000 increase in 
wages and the expenses attached to the six weeks' sus- 
pension of mine operation. Since the market can be sup- 
plied by operating the mines about 225 days during the 
year, the charge for six weeks' suspension reduces itself 
to expenses attached to keeping the mines free from water 
and deterioration of working equipment. 

If the Government used its powers to require effective 
publicity, it ought not to have to go to the extent of actu- 
ally fixing prices. But to make publicity effective it must 
require a uniform system of accounting, separate account- 
ing for the mining industry, physical valuation of mining 
equipment, and other regulations which will enable it to 
arrive at a fair approximation of the cost of mining a ton 
of coal. The public should have this information from an 
authoritative source along with the earnings of mining 
companies and railroad companies combined. The In- 
terstate Commerce Commission should possess such in- 
formation as would enable it to adjust railroad rates on 
coal in relation purely to the cost of transportation. This 



834 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

information should be in the hands of labor and capital 
when they meet for collective bargaining, and it would be 
a powerful factor in preventing arbitrary action on the 
part of either party. 

These recommendations are particularly applicable to 
the anthracite region, and are suggested by the thought 
that it will be impossible to undo the work of concentra- 
tion of ownership which has taken place or to counteract 
the impelling economic factors which have forced the 
cooperation necessary to put the industry on a profitable 
basis. 

G. The Work of Concentrated Capital 

We cannot neglect the actual services which combina- 
tion and concentration of capital have rendered in the coal 
industry. It is estimated that the large aggregation of 
capital has reduced the waste of coal from one and a half 
tons to one-half ton for every ton mined, 1 by making it 
possible to use better methods and equipment in mining. 
As it has been necessary to penetrate the earth more 
deeply, a greater amount of capital has been required to 
open mines. When such mines are opened there is a 
greater cost connected with keeping them open. A greater 
amount of refuse has to be hoisted and a greater amount 
of water pumped. The concentrated ownership of many 
collieries has made it possible to shut down the expensive 
mines and keep the profitable mines running more con- 
stantly. The better system atization and regularity of trans- 
portation that comes with large equipment and general 
control has enabled the common carrier to move freight 
much more cheaply, regardless of whether or not the pub- 
lic has profited by this in the reduction of anthracite coal 
rates. A similar saving is accomplished by the reduction 

1 Mitchell, "Our Coal Supply Today," 'Review of Reviews, vol. 41, 
pp. 193-204. Mr. Mitchell is Secretary to the Director of the U.S. Geologi- 
cal Survey. 



OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE 335 

and concentration of selling agencies. That centralized 
control is necessary to keep the markets and the industry- 
healthy is recognized by capital and labor and by the 
economists who have made a study of the industry. That 
the public did not profit sufficiently by the good results of 
concentrated ownership and unified policy, and that labor 
did not enter into its own until it enforced collective bar- 
gaining, does not disprove the beneficial features which 
have gone hand in hand with this development. It rests 
with constructive public policy to see that the public par- 
ticipates in the fruits of control and organization. 

H. The Operators ask for a Commission 
In the bituminous field, although the process of com- 
bination is progressing fast, competition is still the con- 
trolling factor. The field is too vast and varied and the 
individual operators and companies too many for one to 
expect that a gentlemen's agreement could fix the price 
of coal in spite of legal restraints. But we hear certain 
operators in both the central field and in West Virginia 
frankly advocate the inauguration of a commission which 
shall have the power to say whether the prices fixed by 
the operators are reasonable. 1 They are undoubtedly im- 
pelled by other motives than would move those who advo- 
cate regulation for the anthracite field. The competitive 
race between fields in the bituminous regions and the 
crowding to the wall of the smaller men by the large com- 
binations of capital make certain ones cry out for some 
degree of protection. If their cry is not heard it may not 
be long before the necessity for regulation will be for the 
sake of the public, as it is in the anthracite field. At 
any rate, the same policy of effective publicity as ap- 
plied to the anthracite field would not be a detriment to 
the public. In fact, the same necessity for authoritative 

1 Report of Joint Conference of Central Field, 1912, p. 331 ; also Report 
of Senate Committee Hearings in West Virginia, op. cit., part 2, p. 1664. 



336 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

information is present, both from the standpoint of the pub- 
lic and for purposes of collective bargaining. With greater 
unity among the laborers and greater combination of the 
capitalists, we shall approach deadlocks over fundamental 
questions just as the English did over the minimum wage. 
In England we have seen that the miners took the initia- 
tive in determining whether the coal industry was able to 
pay a minimum wage that would put the loss, which came 
to the individual miner from working in abnormal places, 
upon the industry as a whole. Conclusions which are based 
upon a thorough and authoritative system of investigation 
and publicity will result in greater justice to both labor 
and capital and give the public a safe basis for placing 
the force of its sympathy with the party which is in the 
right. The general benefits to the public that come from 
actual and potential competition will be just as great, 
and by publicity and regulatory measures the evils and 
abuses of " cut-throat " competition may be thwarted or 
corrected. 

Under the conditions which exist in the bituminous 
field the operators who ask for a commission to regulate 
prices cannot expect by this means to be relieved entirely 
of competition. A commission which fixed maximum prices 
might protect the public from extortion, but it would have 
to fix and enforce minimum prices in order to protect the 
operators in the fields which are producing under the most 
adverse circumstances. In connection with the fixing of 
maximum prices the commission would have the coopera- 
tion of the public because nobody is going to pay more 
for coal than he has to ; but with the attempt to fix mini- 
mum prices there would be every incentive for consumers 
to connive with the producer who wished to sell his product 
lower than the minimum in order to gain the market. 

Unless the minimum prices could be enforced, the in- 
dependent operators would still be subjected to the bane- 
ful competition of concentrated capital. Besides our policy 



OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE 337 

of effective publicity we must inaugurate measures that 
will leave room for healthy competition and yet rob the 
powerful operator or company of the ability to exploit 
labor, utilize cut-throat competition against the independ- 
ent, or entirely absorb his holdings. The cheaper the rail- 
road and guerrilla operators in West Virginia and Penn- 
sylvania get their labor, the greater will be their profits, 
and the more effective the power which they will possess 
to continue their labor exploitation, force the independent 
to the wall, and create social and political problems. 

I. Regulatory Measures 

The growth of the industry in the bituminous field may 
require capital to concentrate to obtain the greatest effi- 
ciency ; nevertheless, there are certain fundamental condi- 
tions in the industry which can be established by legal enact- 
ment and which will put the large and the small operator 
on an equal footing to a certain extent. Then evolution in 
the industry may take its course, work more slowly, and 
entail less hardship. 

The advocacy of effective publicity and regulation pre- 
supposes that the industry is to be regarded from a na- 
tional standpoint. The same is true of the measures which 
follow. Perhaps the reader is immediately struck with all 
the difficulties of constitutionality, of judicial interpreta- 
tion, and of obtaining legislative enactment that eternally 
rise before the minds of Americans when they attempt to 
approach new problems. Let us grant that they are ever 
present, still we shall never get very far toward a solution 
of problems so long as we can see nothing but difficulties. 
Besides, there are new forces at work in our industrial, 
political, and social life which will make old things new 
and compel us to exert ourselves to keep up with progress 
rather than spend our energies lamenting inaction. 



338 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

A. THE EIGHT-HOUR DAY 

First among the measures of a general regulatory nature 
is the legal eight-hour day. This would be one of the most 
effective regulations with which to bring up the level of 
working conditions and competition between the organized 
and unorganized fields. The unorganized fields would then 
have to inaugurate the eight-hour day. In this respect we 
should simply be following the line of evolution which has 
been found necessary in England. We remember that the 
British miners were unable to obtain such a regulation by 
conciliatory means. Nor have the American miners met 
with better success in our richest bituminous field where 
large concentration of mining and railroad capital has 
fought it. Furthermore, since our United States Supreme 
Court in the case of Holden vs. Hardy (169 U.S. 366) 
has shown itself liberal enough to uphold a state law pro- 
viding for an eight-hour day, we may expect that our 
evolution in this respect will not be such a remote possi- 
bility. 

B. A LEGAL TON 

Analogous to the eight-hour day in its effects would be 
a national regulation and enforcement of a legal and uni- 
form ton. The miner, even though an unorganized worker, 
should not be subjected to an abuse which permits an em- 
ployer to regard considerably over 3000 pounds as a ton 
when he is paying his workmen and consider 2240 pounds 
as a ton when he sells his coal. National legislation should 
be able to excel state legislation by the elimination of 
provisos or " jokers " which make the effectiveness of the 
act dependent upon the agreement of the employer and 
employees, for in unorganized fields there can be no fair 
agreement. 



OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE 339 

C. REGULATION OF IMMIGRATION 

We must take more effective measures than we have 
taken as yet to stop the manifestly untrammeled exploi- 
tation of labor made possible by our lax immigration 
policy and the use of arbitrary and barbarous practices to 
defeat collective bargaining. While capital has had pro- 
tection by the tariff, labor has been compelled to compete 
with southern European peoples in wages and standard of 
living. As a result of this the unions have been disrupted, 
bargaining power has been destroyed, and the homogeneity 
and cohesion necessary for sane development through col- 
lective action is absent. The system of armed guards and 
peonage shown in the recent West Virginia troubles and 
the control of judicial and administrative machinery in 
Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania, during the strike 
of 1911, point to the extremes we may expect when con- 
centrated capital is given unlimited opportunity to con- 
trol natural resources and exploit ignorant labor. 

D. THE MINIMUM WAGE 

A minimum wage equal to the wage paid in the organ- 
ized districts would greatly supplement a policy of effec- 
tive restriction of immigration. It certainly would reduce 
the incentive the employer has to cast off his old workmen 
inconsiderately when he knows he has a ready supply of 
men with which to break strikes and carry on indefinitely 
a series of exploitations until the workmen rise in discon- 
tent. If capital in the fields which are unionized can afford 
to pay the higher wages which go with collective bargain- 
ing, the operators in the richer and unorganized fields of 
West Virginia and Pennsylvania not only can afford to pay 
a minimum wage equal to the wages in the organized dis- 
tricts, but they should be forced to pay it. Even then their 
superior natural resources and concentration of capital 
would give them sufficient advantage in competition. 



340 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

In an attempt to equalize competition between coal 
fields (or States), differences in rates of wages are made 
to offset the difference in distance from the market and 
the attending extra expense in getting coal to market. 
But as between two mines within the same field, an at- 
tempt is made to equalize wages by paying higher rates 
in the thin-vein mines than in thick veins where working 
conditions are easier. Thus the operator with the richest 
mine profits by his superior natural resources and is in a 
more advantageous position competitively than the opera- 
tor with a thin-vein mine. These same principles should 
stand in dealing with the " West Virginia problem," but 
the differential which the field should have as compared 
with the other fields ought to be proportionately smaller 
because of its superior natural advantages. In such an 
adjustment a minimum wage and a compulsory eight-hour 
day would be other elements which could be utilized in 
connection with a proper regulation of freight rates so as 
to reduce destructive competition from the unorganized 
fields. The minimum wage may be considered a measure 
of last resort, though it may not be more difficult to in- 
augurate than the other measures advocated after consti- 
tutional and legislative difficulties have been surmounted. 

J. Possible Rise and Influence of a Labor Party 

Although attainment of such regulatory measures may 
seem impossible, beginnings have already been made which 
will aid adjustments of this kind and lead us along the 
same line of development that has taken place in Great 
Britain. We must remember that of some years we have 
been electing labor men to Congress and the state legis- 
latures, who, although they nominally ran as Democrats 
or Republicans, would undoubtedly stand for labor on 
questions which would vitally affect its welfare. The Labor 
party in Great Britain passed through this same stage of 
development. With the increase of economic pressure and 



OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE 341 

inability to make the existing political machinery respon- 
sive enough, new means necessarily develop by which the 
rising discontent can find expression through peaceful 
adjustment. 

We now have fourteen labor men in the House of Rep- 
resentatives and one in the United States Senate. These 
men represent twelve different unions. Besides, we have 
a labor man in the Cabinet, and this may well be con- 
sidered quite as significant of a new era as the entrance 
of John Burns into the British Cabinet. These men are, 
of course, among the most conservative in regard to any 
measures which would encourage the development of class 
struggle, but we may expect to find them on the side of 
those who see the necessity for making our political ma- 
chinery more responsive to changing industrial and social 
needs. Furthermore, since we have hardly begun our social 
legislation, with the advent of definite issues we may ex- 
pect party adjustments on new lines. 

The same economic pressure which has brought the for- 
mation of a Labor party in France, Germany, and Eng- 
land, has already found expression in the form of resolu- 
tions for a similar party in the United States. At the 
annual convention of the American Federation of Labor 
in November, 1913, the following resolution was sub- 
mitted to the Committee on Resolutions : — 

Resolved, That the president of the American Federation of 
Labor select nine members of the Thirty-third Annual Conven- 
tion, with cards of their respective unions in good standing, to 
draft a political platform to be known as the platform of the 
American Labor Party, such platform to be adopted by this con- 
vention. 

Another more extended resolution with the same pur- 
port contained a provision for submitting the proposition 
to a vote of the rank and file of labor unionists. The com- 
mittee on resolutions was of the opinion that the time was 



342 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

not ripe for a " distinct labor political party," but that 
with further maturity in political activity a " new politi- 
cal party [would] be the logical result." In the mean time 
they felt that labor should be more fully organized and 
that the Federation should maintain its " non-partisan 
political position." * The recommendations of the commit- 
tee were sustained, but during the course of the debate it 
was fully brought out " that it was useless to organize in- 
dustrially without a strong political organization back of 
the industrial organizations, and that it was useless to se- 
cure labor legislation unless there was a strong industrial 
organization to see that it was enforced." 

Although it is evident by a vote of 193 to 15 that the 
conservative element was in the saddle, the radicals may 
prove to have the keener sense of the real attitude of the 
rank and file at present. In January, 1914, the United 
Mine Workers' Convention passed resolutions favoring 
the formation of a labor party and government owner- 
ship of all public utilities, especially of coal mines. Even 
though the resolutions contained no preparations for a 
new party, the formal expression of intention is signifi- 
cant. If the United States Supreme Court should decide, 
in connection with the Danbury Hatters' Case, that trade- 
union funds are open to attack under the Sherman Anti- 
Trust Law, events may move faster than we anticipate, in 
quite the same way as they did in England. Not less sig- 
nificant is the resolution in respect to the nationalization 
of mines, especially so since two United States Senators 2 
have advocated a similar policy as the solution of labor 
problems in the mining industry. 

All this, it would seem, is indicative that we are enter- 
ing upon an era of new adjustments which would make 

1 'Report of Annual Convention of the American Federation of Labor, No- 
vember, 1913, p. 315. 

2 Report of Senate Committee on the Investigation of the Paint Creek Coal 
Fields of West Virginia, pp. 19 and 21. 



OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE 343 

effective publicity and regulation, an eight-hour law, and 
a minimum wage less remote possibilities. With the de- 
velopment of greater homogeneity and common sympathy 
among our manual workers there must come the develop- 
ment of a new elasticity in our constitutional, political, 
and governmental machinery that will allow the masses 
to give voice to their needs and permit the accomplishment 
of certain ends which can be gained only through legal 
enactment. Furthermore, the Government must function 
more readily when voluntary conciliation and arbitration 
have failed to function. This leads us to a consideration 
of the role the Government should play in a situation 
like the anthracite strike of 1902, or of a general coal 
strike which may come with the simultaneous expiration of 
contracts in both the anthracite and bituminous fields in 
1916. 

2. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A CONCILIATORY 

SYSTEM, THE SUPPLY OF COAL, AND 

GOVERNMENTAL ACTION 

Although the United States Government showed itself 
impotent in dealing with the serious anthracite strike of 
1902, and in spite of the fact that the "suspensions" 
which have taken place during the formation of a new 
agreement could easily have developed into a protracted 
struggle, we still have no legal provision which would 
enable the Government to function more effectively on 
such a momentous occasion. That the Government could 
use its good offices at such times without interfering with 
a system of conciliation and arbitration or taking away 
whe laborer's right to strike or the employer's right to lock 
out, is demonstrated for us by the Canadian Industrial 
Disputes Investigation Act. By such an act we can give 
the force of public opinion a thorough trial and exert a 
most salutary educational influence on capital, labor, and 
the public. To be an effective educational influence the 



344 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

measure should iusure authoritative information. With 
this placed before them the people should be able to ren- 
der a verdict on the immediate struggle. But a still greater 
asset is the leaven within the measure for the encourage- 
ment of further evolution of public policy. 

A. The Canadian Industrial Disputes Act 

(1) Application for a board 

When industrial disputes have developed to a point 
where trouble is imminent, either party to the dispute 
may make application to the Minister of Labour asking 
him to appoint a board of conciliation and investigation. 
The written application sets forth the nature and cause 
of the trouble, the demands made by the parties, the num- 
ber of persons involved, and the efforts made to adjust 
the dispute. The party making the application transmits 
a copy to the opposing party. At least ten employees must 
be affected by the dispute if the application is to receive 
consideration. These provisions could be adapted so that 
a voluntary system of conciliation for the formation of 
contracts and the adjustment of disputes thereunder would 
not be interfered with. By refusing to grant an application 
for a board except when one of the parties arbitrarily re- 
fuses to meet the opposing party, plenty of free play could 
be given all voluntary conciliatory systems. But it is when 
either party is arbitrary that the Government can use its 
power most effectively to force publicity. 

(2) Composition of the board 

A board consists of three members, and they are ap- 
pointed by the Minister of Labour from the recommenda- 
tions of the contending parties. Each party recommends 
its representative and these two recommend a third. If 
either party tries to block proceedings by neglecting or re- 
fusing to appoint a representative, the Minister of Labour 



OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE 345 

selects a suitable person to fill the place. The third party 
selected by the representatives is the chairman of the 
board. The members of the board are not to have any 
pecuniary interest in the dispute and are bound by an 
oath to secrecy and faithful performance of their duties. 
The remuneration received by each member of the board 
is twenty dollars per day for each day the board sits and 
for each day they are necessarily engaged in traveling. 
Besides this, their traveling expenses are paid. 

(3) Conciliation, investigation, and publicity 

The primary function of the board is to bring the parties 
together and induce them to come to a fair and amicable 
settlement. In cases where a settlement is not reached, 
the board makes a report to the Minister of Labour which 
" sets forth the various proceedings and steps taken by the 
Board for the purpose of fully and carefully ascertaining 
all the facts and circumstances, and shall set forth such 
facts and circumstances, and its findings therefrom, in- 
cluding the cause of the dispute and the Board's recom- 
mendation for the settlement of the dispute according to 
the merits and substantial justice of the case." 1 This re- 
port shall avoid " as far as possible all technicalities " and 
set forth " what in the Board's opinion ought or ought 
not to be done by the respective parties concerned." The 
Minister of Labour files the report, sends copies of it to 
the parties, the newspapers, and "may distribute copies 
of the report, and of any minority report, in such a man- 
ner as to him seems most desirable as a means of securing 
a compliance with the Board's recommendation." 

(4) Powers of the board 

To make the report as effective and authoritative as 
possible the board has the power to summon witnesses and 
compel testimony and the production of documents. The 

1 Industrial Disputes Investigation Act, section 25. 



346 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

board is allowed clerical assistance and may employ ex- 
perts to whom it may delegate its powers. These experts 
may inspect and interrogate, and any person who hinders 
them is guilty of an offense and liable to a penalty of 
$ 100. But the information obtained from documents "shall 
not, except in so far as the Board deems it expedient, be 
made public, and such parts of the books, papers, or 
other documents as in the opinion of the Board do not 
relate to the matter at issue may be sealed up." 

The proceedings of the board are public, unless other- 
wise ordered, and " No proceeding . . . shall be deemed 
invalid by reason of any defect of form or technical ir- 
regularity." All expenses, including payment of witnesses, 
experts and salaries, are borne by the State. 

(5) Penalties for strikes and lockouts during 
investigation 

The investigation begins before a strike or lockout has 
taken place, and the relation of the parties must remain 
unchanged during the proceedings of the board. The em- 
ployer is liable to a fine of from $100 to $ 1000 per day 
for each day of a lockout, and the workman to a fine of 
from $ 10 to $50 per day for striking. Furthermore, a per- 
son who incites or encourages the parties to declare a lock- 
out or continue a strike is liable to a fine of from $50 to 
$1000. These penalties are enforced under the criminal 
code. 

After the investigation has been made and the report 
made known, either party may refuse to accept the rec- 
ommendations, and declare hostilities. The chief purpose 
of the act is to discourage strikes and lockouts, relieve the 
public of the trouble and suffering that result from un- 
warranted acts by either party, and to inform the people 
on how just grounds they are deprived of a service or a 
commodity. 



OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE 347 

(6) Results from the act 

That the act has been worth while is shown by the re- 
sults obtained under it during the five years it has been 
in operation. Out of the 124 cases of dispute, in only 14 
have the parties refused to accept the recommendation of 
the board and declared hostilities. In 8 out of the 14 cases 
the parties finally resumed work on the basis recommended 
by the board. In 4 of the remaining cases settlement was 
brought about through negotiation and intervention of a 
citizens' committee and government agents. Two cases re- 
mained unsettled at the time of the last report. 1 

This act presupposes the right of the men to organize, 
and their right of recognition and representation. An in- 
vestigations act in this country would have to incorporate 
these rights, for they are far from recognized rights among 
a large class of employers. If we had such an act as this 
the public would be able to find out whether in a situation 
like the Westmoreland County strike and the West Vir- 
ginia troubles the operators had " nothing to arbitrate.'' 
It is a sad reflection on our public policy that we allow 
the barbarous methods of force to continue in industry. 
We have learned in civil matters that it is conducive to 
peace and justice to compel parties to settle their differ- 
ences in court. The same principle operates in industrial 
matters where it has been tried. 

There would seem to be no right of either party denied 
in this act except that of a sudden strike or lockout. 
With the development of voluntary conciliation and the 
appointing of stated times for changes in wage contracts, 
such tactics ought not to be used as were used in the days 
when there was little understanding between the parties 
and when they sought to take quick advantage of each 
other. If we can accept the evolution in feeling in the 

1 'Report of Canadian Registrar of Boards of Conciliation and Investiga- 
tion, 1912, p. 12. 



348 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

coal industry of Great Britain as any criterion, we might 
expect the Government to be looked upon simply as a 
willing intermediary. It would stand ready to function in 
case of a crisis which had driven the parties so far asunder 
that the occasion required the overwhelming force of pub- 
lic sentiment to decide which party was in the right, after 
a fair and impartial investigation. Moreover, the mere 
existence of a remedy would lessen the tendency to drift 
so far apart as to necessitate public action. 

B. Conclusion 

In conclusion we should recall the economic and indus- 
trial conditions which brought about the rise and extension 
of the system of conciliation and arbitration in the bitu- 
minous field. The elaborate machinery of the interstate 
joint conference, state conferences, and the arrangements 
for settling disputes that arise under agreements are only 
made possible by the effective organization of the United 
Mine Workers and the operators' associations. 

It is evident that the methods utilized in the bitumi- 
nous field have reached a very high stage of development. 
When it was once recognized that the old order had 
changed and that labor had the right of representation in 
adjusting its affairs, the parties were ready for collective 
bargaining. But we have seen that a realization of this 
came only after much strife and bitterness of feeling. As 
an industry develops to a stage where it is possible by ill- 
adjusted production and exploitation to reduce the level 
of wages and profits to a bare subsistence for labor and 
small earnings for capital, the rise of a workers' organi- 
zation to better these conditions must be expected. When 
this occurs, the employers should organize to meet the 
workers, and the result should be an adjustment of pro- 
duction and of working conditions making both for higher 
industrial efficiency and greater regard for the interests 
of the workers. 



OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE 349 

When trade agreements are first inaugurated, the par- 
ties must not expect that everything will run smoothly at 
once. It requires a certain amount of experience and edu- 
cation to use this piece of social machinery, just as training 
is necessary to the efficient utilization of a new mechanical 
device. The important thing is to profit as much as pos- 
sible by the experience gained in industries in which an 
elaborate system of conciliation has slowly evolved. Au- 
thorities who have investigated the workings of peaceful 
adjustment in various industries are convinced that the 
highest types of conciliatory methods are those which fur- 
nish a series of opportunities for arriving at a settlement. 
Such a system requires officials from both sides who have 
a wide outlook upon the industry as a whole to give con- 
sideration to fundamental and deep-seated grievances. 
When the same honest effort is made to solve the labor 
problem that is commonly expended on the selling of 
products or the improvement of methods of production, 
we shall be on the highroad to a solution of our diffi- 
culties. 

Moreover, we have seen that collective bargaining soft- 
ens class antagonism and encourages friendly relations 
between employers and workers, while at the same time 
each party becomes aware of the difficulties with which 
the other has to contend. The employers have shown a 
willingness to democratize their industry, and the work- 
ers, as their power has increased, have demonstrated a 
sense of larger responsibility to the public. 

Those who are afraid that they will surrender some of 
their prerogatives, and because of their fear fail to see the 
opportunity for utilizing the cooperative force of rising 
intelligence, are in reality a hindrance to themselves and 
to society. Rising intelligence and increasing efficiency 
properly directed should bring greater prosperity to wage- 
worker and to capitalist alike. It goes without saying that 
at least approximate justice must be granted in order to 



350 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

bring cooperation and good feeling. Whenever capital is 
ready to demonstrate by authenticated figures its desire 
to do justice, it lays the basis for a cooperative spirit on the 
part of labor, and one cause of suspicion is eradicated. If 
the worker could possess a confidence (born of past expe- 
rience) that the employer was giving him all the wages 
possible without depriving himself of a legitimate profit, 
he might be expected patiently to await the evolution of 
his standard of living and strive to build up the industry 
to the best of his ability, just as the employer works and 
waits for the growth of his industry. A system of concili- 
ation founded on authentic figures should bring such a 
result. As yet conciliation has not been put on a frank 
business basis, but is still in the barter stage. It should 
be supplemented by an efficient system of accounting that 
will enable labor and its representatives to know the exact 
status of the industry. 

In the anthracite field we have gained some conception 
of the disrupting factors which have deferred the devel- 
opment of a satisfactory system of industrial adjustment. 
There conciliation is just making a beginning. The large 
corporate ownership and the heterogeneous population 
may prove such powerful and disintegrating factors that 
organized labor will be unable to deal adequately with the 
situation. It certainly could not if the movement were 
solely dependent upon the small band of faithful unionists 
in the anthracite field. But the support and encourage- 
ment which they receive from the unionists in the bitu- 
minous fields enable them to array a sufficient fighting 
force at the termination of contracts to compel the opera- 
tors to give some consideration to their demands. Before 
they can have effective conciliation and settle wages on 
an equitable basis the anthracite miners should be in a 
position to know the costs of producing coal and the ex- 
tent of the operators' earnings. 

An authoritative cost and accounting system is also of 



OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE 351 

vital concern to the public in permitting an understand- 
ing of the justice of the rise in prices of coal. The ad- 
ditional profits of $9,450,000 which the operators obtained 
after the last wage agreement has led the public to think 
that strikes may develop into a profitable business. 

The ability to control prices brings a frank statement 
from some quarters that the only solution of the problem 
is government ownership. The Boston " Journal " says : 
" In the climax of hopelessness and measure of futility 
against the outrage, it writes down the plainest demand 
for government ownership of coal mines which has been 
made. If the great coal interest is so intrenched that it 
can violate with impunity a principle supposed to be writ- 
ten into the federal statutes, the need for government 
ownership becomes exigent and imperative." 

If a combined demand is made by the miners and the 
public for government ownership, we shall be plunged into 
the midst of a struggle for which the workers in the an- 
thracite region have received no adequate preparation 
either in peaceful adjustment or in attempts to ameliorate 
their condition through legal enactment. Over against 
this situation the experience of the British miners stands 
in striking contrast, and thoroughly illustrates the folly of 
a system of government and social adjustment which per- 
mits grievances to accumulate without providing effective 
devices by which they can be adjusted. If the anthracite 
workers were a homogeneous population which had come 
through a process of evolution in conciliatory adjustment 
and had had practice in redressing their grievances through 
legal enactment, the situation could be viewed in a differ- 
ent light. 

We should remember that we have a situation before us 
likely to prove more conducive to class struggle than if 
our constitutional system were less rigid and permitted us 
to deal with our problems on a national basis when they 
demand such treatment. Moreover, if the miners felt that 



352 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

they could go to Congress with the same assurance which 
the British miner has in approaching Parliament to obtain 
an eight-hour day or a minimum wage (which could not 
be obtained by conciliation), and there present by legiti- 
mate argument and persuasion the necessity for ameliora- 
tive measures, the whole industrial situation would have 
a different outlook. 

In contrast to British affairs it is with great difficulty 
that labor in the United States can obtain betterment of 
conditions through congressional action, and when a law 
is once enacted, it may easily be quashed as it runs the 
gauntlet of the courts. Nor can the American miner turn 
again to Congress and obtain an enactment that will su- 
persede the court decision with the same facility that an 
act of parliament overrides British court decisions. This 
contrast is well illustrated by the readiness with which 
the attempt to tie up union funds and cut off parliamen- 
tary representation of labor was thwarted by bringing about 
government payment of parliamentary members. 

Again, we have seen that the British miner has taken 
a first step toward an investigation of wages and profits 
in the coal trade. This will probably lead to a demand 
for an efficient governmental system of accounting which 
will ultimately redound to the benefit of the miners, the 
operators, and the public. 

We are beginning to recognize that such matters as 
hours of labor, sanitary and safe working conditions, child 
labor, workmen's compensation, old-age pensions, and oc- 
cupational diseases are proper matters for state regulation. 
When we consider the magnitude of the trade-union prob- 
lem of limiting the hours of labor in the many States of 
our Union, we are struck with the manifest unfairness of 
leaving the task to them. " If the objects of trade unions 
could find quiet and orderly expression in legislation and 
enactment, and if their measures could be submitted to 
the examination and judgment of the whole [people] with- 



OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE 353 

out a sense of division or warfare, we should have ideal 
development of the democratic state." * 

The preoccupation of legislatures and courts with the 
enactment and enforcement of laws that primarily pertain 
to property rights as opposed to other human rights has 
been alienating the mass of workers from that sense of 
patriotic citizenship which is so essential to a republic. 
The speed with which governmental functions are applied 
to thwart labor's attempts to obtain rights through col- 
lective action is bitterly contrasted with the slowness with 
which the Government acts in upholding laws that are 
intended to improve the conditions of labor. 

The workingman sees the club of the officer, the bayonet of 
the militia directed against him in defense of property, and he 
believes that the hand of the law, strong in the protection of 
property, often drops listless whenever measures are proposed 
to lighten labor's heavy burden. Occasional and imperfect ex- 
pressions of the underlying feeling reach the surface. Those 
who dismiss them as sporadic assaults upon the judiciary have 
no appreciation of the depth and breadth of the social situation. 
There is profound restlessness among large groups of labor who 
feel that there are no organic ways open through which they 
can act collectively with respect to the things that most concern 
them ... that they are thwarted when they get together for 
common strength and when, not as mutual benefit societies, but 
as aggregations of men they set out to mind their business. . . . 
We hold that the criminal court is not a sufficient instrument 
through which the democracy can address itself to the economic 
struggle. The federal grand juries may well concern themselves 
with those who have carried dynamite across state boundaries. 
We want light along a more crucial boundary line — the bor- 
derland between industry and democracy. We want light on 
that larger lawlessness which is beyond the view of the criminal 
court. This is a matter of public defense in which we, as a peo- 
ple, should if necessary invest as much money as we put into a 
battleship. We appeal to the Federal Government to create a 

1 Jane Addams, American Journal of Sociology, vol. 4, p. 459. 



354 ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 

commission, with as great scientific competence, staff resources, 
and power to compel testimony as the Interstate Commerce 
Commission. 1 

This address, signed by people from many walks in life, 
is a protest against a public policy which allows conditions 
to exist in industry that encourage violence. Whether it 
comes as a result of the employers' attempts to " smash " 
the union, as in the McNamara case, or the sporadic up- 
rising of a disorganized mass in protest against grinding 
economic necessity, as in the Lawrence strike, matters lit- 
tle in its jeopardizing effect upon society. The essential 
thing is to have enough interest in the facts of the case to 
encourage the development of devices which shall keep 
the public sufficiently informed to enable it to take action 
and bring about adjustments for the prevention of similar 
occurrences. Wherever capital is closely organized and la- 
bor entirely unorganized there exists a fruitful field for 
almost any kind of industrial and social catastrophe. Add 
to this situation the ability of capital to play off one race 
against another in competition for work and there is hardly 
a limit to the depths to which labor may sink. Throw in 
the elements of absentee ownership, which knows little, 
and in many cases cares less, how it gets its dividends, 
and a political corruption which feeds on ignorance and 
distress, and we lay a basis for continued depression which 
must end only in a volcanic outburst against degraded 
human rights. 

That there is no necessity for such conditions is proved 
by the many examples in industries where conciliation has 
been given a fair trial. Where the parties fail to bring 
about a voluntary conciliation, the Government should be 
able to take them through the preliminary stages and thus 
show them the benefits of peaceful adjustment. The near- 
est approach to such a provision is the Canadian Indus- 

1 Address presented to President Taft, December 30, 1911, requesting 
the appointment of an industrial commission. 



OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE 355 

trial Disputes Investigation Act. Moreover, the public 
learns which side deserves its sympathy and cultivates an 
intelligent interest in the problems that affect the dispu- 
tants and the general body politic. Thus we may seek to 
anticipate our problems by effective publicity and the in- 
auguration of measures that will supplement the efforts of 
the parties to reach a settlement and give them a chance 
to express and adjust their grievances when they come to 
a deadlock. It is hoped that this sketch of conciliation 
and arbitration in the coal industry of America and Great 
Britain will demonstrate the benefits of voluntary concil- 
iation and the necessity for an effective, constructive, pub- 
lic policy. 



THE END 



APPENDIX 

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APPENDIX 



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APPENDIX 



TABLE V 

Comparison op Wages, Working Days, Hours per Year, 
Rates per Hour, op Pick-Miners 



Year. 



1904 



1905 



1906 



1907 



1908 



1909 



1910 



1911 



State. 



Illinois .... 

Ohio 

Pennsylvania 
West Virginia 
Illinois .... 
Ohio ..... 
Pennsylvania 
West Virginia 
Illinois .... 
Ohio 

Pennsylvania 
West Virginia 
Illinois .... 
Ohio ..... 
Pennsylvania 
West Virginia 
Illinois .... 
Ohio ..... 
Pennsylvania 
West Virginia 
Illinois .... 

Ohio 

Pennsylvania 
West Virginia 
Illinois .... 
Ohio ..... 
Pennsylvania 
West Virginia 
Illinois .... 

Ohio 

Pennsylvania 
West Virginia 



Total Yearly 
Wages. 1 



$565.30 
444.50 
442.56 
484.96 
492.32 
468.05 
491.29 
508.01 
480.86 
504.14 
519.30 
599.37 
549.39 
555.75 
601.91 
643.05 
546.97 
402.48 
447.00 
503.84 
510.66 
483.60 
524.33 
481.17 
497.71 
486.50 
588.36 
573.94 
498.09 
556.80 
572.98 
570.48 



Working 


Hours per 


Days. 1 


Year.* 


213 


1704 


175 


1400 


204 


1632 


209 


2090 


198 


1584 


185 


1480 


225 


1800 


213 


2130 


186 


1512 


182 


1456 


205 


1640 


231 


2310 


209 


1672 


195 


1560 


268 


2144 


234 


2340 


188 


1504 


156 


1248 


238 


1904 


211 


2110 


180 


1440 


186 


1488 


261 


2088 


192 


1920 


168 


1344 


175 


1400 


264 


2112 


229 


2290 


167 


1336 


192 


1536 


248 


1984 


194 


1940 



Cents 

per 
Hour. 



.33 
.32 
.27 
.23 
.31 
.32 
.27 
.24 
.32 
.35 
.32 
.26 
.33 
.36 
.28 
.27 
.36 
.31 
.23 
.24 
.35 
.35 
.25 
.25 
.37 
.35 
.28 
.25 
.37 
.36 
.29 
.29 



1 Obtained from State Reports. 

2 Obtained by multiplying the working days by eight or ten hours according to 
length of working day in each state. 



APPENDIX 



365 



TABLE VI 

Average Production per Mine and per Employee from 
1850-19021 





1902 


1889 


1880 


1870 


I860 


1850 


Average Product. 

Per mine — tons 

Per employee — 

tons .... 


50,383 
565 


53,578 
476 


21,701 
422 


20,986 
347 


23,045 
393 


12,539 
426 



i U.S. Census Report, 1902, Mines and Quarries, p. 669. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 

1. SOURCE MATERIAL 

Canadian Industrial Disputes Investigation Act, 1907. 

Coal Mines Minimum Wage Act, 1912, of Great Britain. 

Coal Mines Regulation Act, 1908 (eight hours), of Great Britain. 

Constitution of the Illinois Coal Operators Association, 1907. 

Constitution of the United Mine Workers of America, 1912. 

Illinois Coal Operators' Association Bulletins. 

Justi, H. (writings), in the Illinois Coal Operators' Publications. 

McBride, J., in "The Labor Movement," edited by G.E. McNeill, 
1886. 

Miners' National Record, 1875-76. 

Negotiations of the Anthracite Operators and Anthracite Min- 
ers, 1912. 

Proceedings of the Interstate Joint Conferences of Illinois, 
Indiana, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. 

Proceedings of the Federated Coal Owners and Miners of 
Great Britain. 

Proceedings of the Interstate Joint Conferences of the South- 
west Field. 

Reports of the State Bureaus of Labor Statistics. 

Report of the Special Commission on the Northern Illinois Coal 
Strike, 1889. 

Reports of the Interstate Commerce Commission. 

Report of the United States Immigration Commission, 1911. 

Reports of the Proceedings of the United Mine Workers' Annual 
Conventions. 

Reports of State Inspectors of Mines. 

Report of the United States Industrial Commission, 1902. 

Report of the Interstate Commerce Commission on the Inves- 
tigation of the Eastern Bituminous Coal Situation, 1907. 
59th Cong., 2d Sess., House Doc. no. 561. 

Report on the Miners' Strike in Westmoreland County, Penn- 
sylvania, 1910-11. 62d Cong., 2d Sess., House Doc. no. 847. 



370 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Report of the Proceedings of the Special United Mine Workers' 
Conventions in 1902 and 1906. 

Reports of the Illinois State Joint Conferences. 

Report of the Illinois Employers' Liability Commission, 1910. 

Report of the Labor Troubles in the Anthracite Regions, 1887- 
88, 50th Cong., 2d Sess., House Rept. no. 4147. 

Report on the Alleged Coal Combination, 1893, 52d Cong., 2d 
Sess., House Rept. no. 2278. 

Reports of the Commissioner-General of Immigration. 

Report of the Anthracite Strike Commission, 1902. 

Report of the Conference between the President, the Anthra- 
cite Operators, and Representatives of the United Mine Work- 
ers, 1902. 

Reports of the Miners' Federation of Great Britain. 

Report of the Board of Trade of Great Britain, 1910, on Rules 
of Voluntary Conciliation and Arbitration Boards and Joint 
Committees. 

Reports of the Canadian Registrar of Boards of Conciliation and 
Investigation. 

Report of the British Royal Commission on Labour, 1894. 

Report of Subcommittee on Education and Labor of the United 
States Senate on " Conditions in the Paint Creek District, 
West Virginia," 63d Cong., 1st Sess., pursuant to Senate 
Resolution 37. 

Report of Commissioner of Labor on " Increase in Prices of 
Anthracite Coal," 62d Cong., 3d Sess., House Doc. no. 1442. 

Special Report of the United States Commissioner of Labor on 
Coal Mine Labor in Europe, 1905. 

State Laws. 

United Mine Workers' Journal. 

United States Bulletins of the Bureau of Labor. 

United States Census Reports. 

United States Statutes at Large. 

2. SECONDARY MATERIAL 

Ashley, W. J. The Adjustment of Wages, 1903. 
Bigelow, M. M. The Law of Torts, 1907. 
Chaplin, H. W. The Coal Mines and the Public, 1902. 
Crompton, H. Industrial Conciliation, 1876. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 371 

Drinker, H. S. The Interstate Commerce Act, 2 vols., 1907. 

Hall, P. F. Immigration, 1906. 

Henderson, F. The Labor Unrest, 1911. 

Jeans, J. S. Conciliation and Arbitration, 1894. 

Knoop, D. Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration, 1905. 

Lloyd, H. D. A Strike of Millionaires, 1890. 

Lloyd, H. D. The Lords of Industry, 1910. 

Mitchell, J. Organized Labor, 1903. 

Moore, H. L. Laws of Wages, 1911. 

Nearing, S. Wages in the United States, 1911. 

Price, L. L., F. R. Industrial Peace, 1887. 

Richardson, T., and Walbank, A. Profits and Wages in the 

British Coal Trade, 1911. 
Roberts, P. The Anthracite Coal Industry, 1901. 
Roberts, P. Anthracite Coal Communities, 1904. 
Roy, A. History of the Coal Miners, 1903. 
Saliers, E. A. The Coal Miner, 1912. 
Smith, J. A. The Spirit of American Government, 1907. 
Stimson, F. J. Labor and its Relation to Law, 1895. 
Warne, F. J. The Slav Invasion, 1904. 
Warne, F. J. The Immigrant Invasion, 1913. 
Warne, F. J. The Coal Miners, 1905. 
Webb, S. and B. The History of Trade Unionism, 1911. 
Webb, S. and B. Industrial Democracy, 1902. 
Wyman B., Control of the Market, 1911. 



INDEX 



INDEX 



Absentee ownership, 74. 

American Miners' Association, 5. 

Anthracite Board of Trade, 204. 

Arbitration, 203, 209; inauguration 
of, 10; in Ohio, 16; in western 
Pennsylvania, 17; under state 
laws, 21; in England, 277. 

Armed guards, 75. 

Athens local union, case of, 189. 

Baird, case, 329. 
Bates's Union, 202. 

Canadian Industrial Disputes Act, 

344. 
Capital, earnings of, 42. 
Causes of conciliation and arbitra- 
tion, 1 ff. 
Closed shop, 193. 
Coal lands, 211; ownership of, 80; 

concentration of ownership of, 

220. 
Coal operators' associations, rise of, 

128; American Federation of, 

129; Illinois Coal Operators' 

Association, 134. 
Collective bargaining, results of, 

170 ff. 
Colorado struggle, 60. 
Commodities case, 323. 
Common-law remedies, 319. 
Company stores, 27. 
Conciliation Act (England, 1896), 

283, 
Conciliation and Arbitration in the 

anthracite field, 201 ff.^ 
Conciliation and Arbitration Board, 

255; in England, 285. 
Conclusion, 348. 
Consolidation, 214; history of, 214; 

legal background, 215; railroad 

consolidation, 228. 
Contract labor, 230. 
Court of Arbitration, 284. 

Danville case, 188. 



Eight-hour day, 338. 
Eight-hour law (1908), 295. 
Enlargement of the market, 24. 

Hocking Valley strike (1884), 23. 

Illinois Coal Operators' Association, 
134; objects, 134; membership, 
135; representation, 136; officers, 
137; commission of, 137; execu- 
tive board, 138; defense fund, 
140. 

Immigration, 73, 229, 232; regula- 
tion of, 339. 

Increase in non-English speaking 
miners, 36. 

Industrial Council, 284. 

Injunctions, and conspiracy laws, 
76; conflict of federal and state, 
51. 

Interstate Conference of 1880, 19. 

Interlocking directorates, 87. 

Interstate joint Conference, 142; 
foundations of, 142; "right" of 
representation, 143; principles 
formulated, 144; membership, 
145; organization and rules, 146; 
order of business, 148; inviolable 
contracts, 152; formation of 
scales, 153 ff; new method in 
1912, 166. 

Interstate Joint Conference of 
1885, 16; of 1886, 30. 

Interstate Commerce Commission, 
investigation (1907), 80, 218, 317; 
work of, 327; maximum rates 
by, 331. 

Joint conference (1885), 16; (1886), 

30. 
Joint movement, extension of, 46. 

Knights of Labor, 234. 

Labor, direction of policy toward, 
91. 



376 



INDEX 



Labor Party, 340. 

Labour Party (England), 291. 

Labour representation (England), 

289. 
Leases, 224; Jersey Central and 

Lehigh Valley railroads, 224. 
Legal enactment, 288. 

Machinery, effects of, 42. 

Maryland, attempts to organize, 
54. 

Maximum rates by Interstate Com- 
merce Commission, 331. 

Miners' National Association, 7. 

Minimum wage, 339. 

Minimum Wage Act (1912), 299, 
304; effects of, 308; ability of 
industry to bear, 309. 

Molly Maguires, 213. 

Monthly bulletin of decisions, 190. 

National Federation of Miners and 
Mine Laborers, 29. 

Negotiations of 1912 in the anthra- 
cite field, 261 ff.; the agreement, 
265. 

Northwest, organization of, 59. 

Ohio Miners' Amalgamated As- 
sociation, 20. 

Operators' tactics, 92. 

Osborne case (1909), 293. 

Ownership of coal lands and stock, 
80. 

Parliamentary members, 294. 
Pools, 212; formation of, 212, 221. 
Problem before the public, 198. 
Public policy, lack of, 325. 

Reading Railroad, 207. 

Reese case, 52. 

Regulatory measures, 337; eight- 
hour day, 338; legal ton, 338; 
of immigration, 339; minimum 
wage, 339. 

Restraint of trade, decisions 
against, 320. 

Royal Commission of Labour, 282. 

Rural worker and individualism, 
71. 



Sliding scales, 205, 278. 

Southwestern Interstate Joint Con- 
ference, 53. 

Southwest field, organization of 
(1899), 50; system in, 191 ff. 

State conference, 179; task of, 179; 
organization, 181; fundamentals 
settled, 181; administration of 
contracts, 184^. 

State statutes vs. common law, 77. 

Steele case (1907), 292. 

Strikes — 

Strike of 1897, 41; strike of 
Virden and Pana, 47; strikes in 
Alabama, Tennessee, and Ken- 
tucky, 56; strike of 1912 in West 
Virginia, 94; "Long Strike" of 
1875, 212; strike of 1887-88, 234; 
of 1900, 240; of 1902, 244; strikes 
during the nineties in England, 
279/. 

Suspension of 1894, 39. 

Temple Iron Company deal (1898), 

226. 
Trial of Siney and Parks, 13. 
Traffic Associations, 86. 

Unions — 

Miners' unions in England, 
270 ff.; Miners' Association of 
Great Britain and Ireland (1841), 
271; Miners' National Union 
(1863), 272; Miners' Federation 
of Great Britain (1889), 275. 

United Mine Workers of 
America, formation of, 33; in 
1897, 43; membership, 108; pur- 
pose, 109; units of organization, 
110; local unions, 111; finances, 
114, 125; officers, 116; nominations 
and elections, 119; recall, 121; 
conventions, 122; strikes, 124. 

Wages, reduction in (1904), 160. 

Westmoreland County strike 
(1910), 91. 

West Virginia Problem, 63. 

Workingmen's Benevolent Asso- 
ciation, 203. 

Working Conditions, 25. 






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